стр.30

2.6 Aircraft information

This Section and Appendix J provide information on the following:
• A general description of the aeroplane involved in the crash;
• A description of the operation, airworthiness and maintenance of the aeroplane and
specifc systems and equipment that are deemed relevant to the investigation, and
• The load of the aeroplane.
2.6.1 General description
The aeroplane, a Boeing 777-200, is a low-wing, wide body, commercial aeroplane ftted
with two wing-mounted turbofan engines and a tricycle landing gear confguration. The
aeroplane’s maximum take-off mass was 286,897 kg. The passenger seating confguration
for 9M-MRD was 33 business class seats located in the front of the cabin and 247 economy
class seats. The aeroplane had accumulated 76,322 flight hours and 11,434 cycles (see
Section 12 - Abbreviations and Defnitions). The aeroplane was equipped with two RollsRoyce Trent-892B series engines.
The most recent version of the certifcate of registration of 9M-MRD, issued by the
Department of Civil Aviation Malaysia, in accordance with Malaysia Civil Aviation
Regulations 1996, was dated 23 August 2006. The Department of Civil Aviation Malaysia
issued a certifcate of airworthiness numbered M.0817 for 9M-MRD (serial number 28411)
on 7 July 2014 that replaced the certifcate previously issued on 8 July 2013. The new
certifcate was valid until 29 July 2015.
The scheduled maintenance, implementation of mandatory modifcations and the
treatment of defect reports were analysed. Details on this and other airworthiness related
issues at Malaysia Airlines are provided in Appendix J.
2.6.2 Aeroplane load and technical defects
According to the load sheet, the aeroplane was loaded as follows:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Load sheet data
Checked baggage and cargo:                                              17,751 kg
Passengers and hand-baggage (based on standard masses): 20,225 kg
Aeroplane - empty mass:                                                  145,015 kg
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The aeroplane’s balance fgures were:
Percentage mean aerodynamic chord (MAC):                          25.51
Loaded index:                                                                      35.47
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 4: Load data.

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2.7 Meteorological information

2.7.1 General
The weather conditions described in this paragraph were obtained from three
meteorological institutes:
• Royal Dutch Meteorological Institute (KNMI);
• British Met Offce;
• Ukrainian Hydrometeorological Institute.
2.7.2 Forecast weather
The meteorological reports (METARs) for the airports in the vicinity, and at about the
time of the crash (times in UTC only), show the following information:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Explanation of relevant information                                                             Airport name (ICAO code)
                                                                                                                               METAR
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Information issued: 17 July, 13.30;                                                              Kryvyi Righ (UKDR)
Wind: mainly from direction 050º and variable between 020° and 090º,          171330Z 05006MPS
speed 6 m/s;                                                                                              020V090 CAVOK 25/16
Cloud and visibility: CAVOK;*7                                                                       Q1011 3609//70 NOSIG
Temperature: 25 ºC, dew point 16 ºC;
Barometric pressure at sea level: 1,011 hPa, and
No signifcant change expected.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Information issued: 17 July, 13.30;                                                               Dnipropetrovsk (UKDD)
Wind: mainly from direction 060º, speed 5 m/s;                                             171330Z 06005MPS 9999
Cloud and visibility: visibility more than 10 km, thunderstorms in the               VCTS SCT033CB BKN100
vicinity, scattered cumulonimbus cloud coverage at 3,300 feet, broken at         25/18 Q1011 08210270
10,000 ft;                                                                                                   TEMPO 05008G14MPS
Temperature: 25 ºC, dew point 18 ºC;                                                           TSRA BKN015CB
Barometric pressure at sea level: 1,011 hPa, and;
Expected change: temporarily in the coming 60 minutes, wind direction
050º and wind speed 8 m/s with gusts of 14 m/s, thunderstorms and rain
and cloud coverage: cumulonimbus clouds broken at 1,500 feet.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Information issued: 17 July, 13.30;                                                               Kharkiv (UKHH)
Wind: mainly from direction 070º, speed 4 m/s;                                             171330 07004MPS 9999
Cloud and visibility: visibility more than 10 km, scattered cumulonimbus           SCT033CB BKN200 31/11
cloud coverage at 3,300 ft, broken cloud coverage at 20,000 ft;                        Q1013 070/// 65 TEMPO
Temperature: 31 ºC, dew point 11 ºC;                                                            08009G16MPS
Barometric pressure at sea level: 1,013 hPa, and
Expected change: temporarily in the coming 60 minutes, wind direction
080º, wind speed 9 m/s with gusts of 16 m/s.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*7 CAVOK stands for “Ceiling and Visibility OK”; specifcally, (1) there are no clouds below 5,000 feet above
aerodrome level or minimum sector altitude (whichever is higher) and no cumulonimbus or towering cumulus; (2)
visibility is at least 10 kilometres or more, and (3) no current or forecast signifcant weather such as precipitation,
thunderstorms, shallow fog or low drifting snow.

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• The weather reports of large airports and Flight Information Regions on the route
Amsterdam - Kuala Lumpur, including the METAR for Kyiv Boryspil Airport described
above.

The prognostic weather charts for signifcant weather showed an area with occasional
embedded cumulonimbus clouds up to FL350 north-west of the Black Sea forecast to
move north-east during the period of the forecast.
The forecast wind and temperature in Ukraine at FL330 and FL350, as reported to the
flight crew in the information provided by the ground handling agent prior to the flight,
varied between 160 and 165 degrees/17 to 19 knots in Ukrainian airspace up to air
navigation waypoint PEKIT, and between 180 and 220 degrees/20 to 40 knots between
air navigation waypoint PEKIT and the border with the Russian Federation at air navigation
waypoint TAMAK. The outside air temperature varied between -40 and -50 ºC.
2.7.4 Actual weather
An aftercast was made of the general weather conditions in the area of Donetsk at about
14.00 (16.00 CET) on 17 July 2014 by KNMI.
A near stationary occlusion associated with an area of low pressure above the Black Sea
extended from the Russian Federation and Ukraine to Romania. In between this
depression and an anticyclone over north-western Europe, a weak north-easterly flow
led warm and unstable continental air over the vicinity of the crash site. Several clouds,
producing rain and thunderstorms, originated at different places in this system. The
cloud base was between 3,000 and 5,000 feet with peaks, generally, at around FL350.
Weather satellite images of Europe showed large cloud formations west and north of the
Black Sea; an area largely matching with the Dnipropetrovsk Flight Information Region.
The area to the south of flight MH17’s last known position contained mostly cumulonimbus
clouds and possibly thunderstorms. The sky above areas associated with the
cumulonimbus clouds was obscured with a cloud base of between 1,000 and 5,000 ft. In
other places, the sky was less obscured. The weather system was moving to the northeast. See also Appendix F.
Analysis of ground observations, showed that thunderstorms were reported in the area
to the south, west and south-west of the crash area. The winds at ground level were
north or north-easterly and tended to gradually veer with altitude, eventually becoming
south-westerly by about FL230. From this point, the winds increased in speed with
altitude towards the tropopause, indicated at being around FL400. The cloud cover is
shown on a visible-light satellite image issued at 13.00 (15.00 CET).

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Russian Federation are described. Lastly, information from Airborne Warning and Control
System (AWACS) aeroplanes is described. Air traffc management, the airspace affected
and associated restrictions are described in detail in Section 6 (part B) of this report.
Licenses and qualifcations of the air traffc controllers were not relevant to the
investigation into the crash. The handling of the flight and the actions after radio contact
with flight MH17 was lost, were considered adequate.
2.9.2 Air traffc management
Ukrainian State Air Traffc Service Enterprise (UkSATSE) is the air navigation service
provider for civil aviation in Ukraine. Air traffc management in Ukraine is the responsibility
of a two-party system, comprising the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Ministry of
Defence. Civil and military air traffc management activities are coordinated by Integrated
Civil Military Air Traffc Management System that functions as a part of UkSATSE.
For the Russian Federation, civil and military air traffc management is the responsibility
of the State Air Traffc Management Corporation (GKOVD). This is a government owned
corporation (a so-called Federal State Unitary Enterprise) which is supervised by the
Federal Agency for Air Transport (ROSAVIATSIA), which in turn comes under the Ministry
of Transport.
2.9.3 Airspace
Ukrainian airspace is made up of fve flight information regions and a network of airways
for the purpose of provision of air traffc control service for en-route flights. Ukraine
applies the ICAO system of flight levels. It was noted that due to the situation in Crimea,
the Ukrainian authorities restricted the use of segments of the routes within Simferopol
FIR from 3 April 2014. At the time of the crash, these restrictions, published in NOTAM
number 0569/14, were in force.
The adjacent sector in the Russian Federation to Dnipropetrovsk Control Sector 4 in
Ukraine has the callsign Rostov Radar.
For flights such as flight MH17, performed under instrument flight rules, the general
principle of standard flight levels (FL) applies: odd thousands of feet (flight levels 310,
330, 350) when on a magnetic track of 0º through 179º and even thousands of feet (flight
levels 300, 320, 340) when on a magnetic track of 180º through 359º. Other flight levels
may be available from air traffc control.
For flight MH17, following airway L980, through the Dnipropetrovsk (UKDV) FIR, on an
eastbound track, odd number standard flight levels were in use, as depicted in its flight
plan for this part of its routing: FL330 and FL350. The airway’s width is 10 NM (5 NM on
either side of the centreline) and extends from FL280 to FL660 vertically.
2.9.4 Airspace restrictions
Both Ukraine and the Russian Federation had issued NOTAMs that restricted access to parts
of their respective airspace up to FL320. On 17 July parts of the airspace in both countries
were restricted up to FL320. At the time of the crash, flight MH17 was flying at FL330 in
unrestricted airspace of the Dnipropetrovsk (UKDV) FIR in the eastern part of Ukraine.

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A state that, for certain reasons, does not comply with an ICAO Standard is required to
notify ICAO that a difference between their national regulations and the ICAO Standard
exists. A review of the differences notifed to ICAO by states showed that neither Ukraine
nor the Russian Federation had notifed to ICAO that their national regulations differed
from the Standards promulgated in Annex 11.
Surveillance data from the radar systems of both Ukraine and the Russian Federation was
requested for the investigation. The data requested for the investigation was as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Type                                                                 Ukraine                           Russian Federation
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Primary radar data - raw data                            Not available                     Not available

Primary radar data - processed data                   Not available                     Not available

Secondary surveillance radar data - raw data       Available                          Not available

Secondary surveillance radar data -
processed data                                                 Available                           Not available

ADS-B data                                                      Available                           Not available
Other data made available                           Video flm of radar screen         Video flm of radar screen
                                                                 showing processed                  showing processed primary
                                                                 secondary data                       and secondary data
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 8: Radar data, requested and received.

Appendix I contains various relevant stills from the videos provided by both UkSATSE
and GKOVD.
The reasons why data was not available are discussed in paragraph 2.9.5.3.
On 23 July 2014 (before the MH17 investigation was delegated to the Netherlands),
experts of the international group of investigators and a representative of NBAAI had an
interview with UkSATSE experts. During the interview information from different sources
was provided by UkSATSE. The transferring of Air Traffc Control (ATC) records, including
video and audio records to the experts of the international group of investigators was
laid down in a protocol. See Appendix M. The next day, the investigators transferred the
information received from UkSATSE to the Dutch Safety Board.
2.9.5.2 Surveillance radar data
The radar data for flight MH17 received from both Air Navigation Service Providers,
UkSATSE and GKOVD, is described in this paragraph.
The Ukrainian civil primary radar stations in the area were not functioning at the time of
the crash due to scheduled maintenance. The military primary radar stations were also
not operational. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defence stated that this system was not
operational, because there were no Ukrainian military aircraft in the sector through which
flight MH17 flew. UkSATSE provided secondary surveillance radar data in raw data format
and a video containing a replay of the radar screen. Figure 5 shows a sample image of
the replay of the radar screen and an explanation of the data displayed.

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Figure 6: Sample Russian Federation radar screen display. (Source: GKOVD)

GKOVD data showed flight MH17 as a combined primary and secondary target radar
symbol and label. The data label for the flight ‘MAS17’ showed the callsign in Cyrillic
script ‘MAC17’, the flight level ‘330’ and the aeroplane type ‘Б772H’ with the ‘B’ in Cyrillic
script (meaning Boeing 777-200). The number ‘893’ indicated the aeroplane’s groundspeed in km/h. N.B. This image is not of the same moment as the image in Figure 5.
From the Ukrainian raw radar data it was established that the last secondary radar return
was at 13.20:03 (15.20:03 CET) with flight MH17 flying straight and level at FL330. The
video radar replay did not show any primary or secondary radar targets in the vicinity of
flight MH17 at that time.
In general, the video replay of the Russian Federation’s combined primary and secondary
radar data was consistent with the Ukrainian radar data. The following observations were
made:
• Flight MH17’s target was detected by primary and secondary radar;
• The video replay data was consistent with the radar data from Ukraine until 13.20:03
(15.20:03 CET);
• At 13.20:47 (15.20:47 CET), there was a ‘jump’ from the previous track; this is due to
the radar re-acquiring the target. In essence, the radar target was coasting and it was
re-acquired north of the coasting track;
• The target data for flight MH17 was lost on the Russian Federation radar screen at
13.20:58 (15.20:58 CET). At that moment the secondary radar label changed to ‘xxxx’;
• The MH17 label on the radar screen continued to be visible as a coasting secondary
radar target until 13.22:10 (15.22:10 CET) and until 13.25:57 (15.25:57 CET) as a primary
radar target;
• A second, primary, target was visible near the MH17 labelled target on two occasions.
Once between 13.20:47 - 13.21:08 and again between 13.21:18 - 13.25:57 (15.20:47 -
15.21:08 and 15.21:18 - 15.25:57 CET).

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2.9.5.3 Recording of surveillance radar data
Both Ukraine and the Russian Federation were requested to provide their surveillance
radar data of flight MH17. Not all the requested information was provided (see paragraph
2.9.5.1).
The Russian Federation did not provide the radar data stating that no radar data was
saved, but instead provided the radar screen video replay, which showed combined
surveillance primary and secondary radar. In the absence of the underlying radar data
(so-called raw data), the video information could not be verifed. For analysis, raw data is
preferred to processed data. The screenshots and video flms made of the data, as
displayed to the controller, whilst of use, were the least preferred media for analysis.
In accordance with ICAO Annex 11 - Air Traffc Services, paragraph 6.4.1 (Automatic
recording of surveillance data) states are required to automatically record data from
primary and secondary surveillance radar equipment systems for use in accident and
incident investigations, search and rescue, and air traffc control and surveillance systems
evaluation and training. These recordings shall be retained for a period of at least thirty
days, and for accident and incident investigation for a longer period until it is evident
that the recordings will no longer be required.
The Federal Air Transport Agency of the Russian Federation stated that because the
crash had occurred outside Russian Federation territory, no radar data was saved, nor
was it required to be saved by national requirements. The Federal Air Transport Agency
confrmed that if the event had occurred in Russian Federation territory, the recorded
radar data would have been saved in accordance with Russian Federation requirements.
The national requirements for radar data recording management in the Russian
Federation are included in the following documents:
• Federal Aviation Regulations ‘CNS and aeronautical telecommunications’, as endorsed
by Federal Aviation Service Decree Number 115, dated 26 November 2007;
• Federal Aviation Regulations ‘ATM in the Russian Federation’, as endorsed by Ministry
of Transport Decree Number 293, dated 25 November 2011.
The regulation, ‘CNS and aeronautical telecommunications’, states that information that
is supplied through aeronautical telecommunication networks and radar data sources to
the displays installed at the working positions of air traffc controllers should be recorded
by special equipment.
This is further clarifed in the regulation, ‘ATM in the Russian Federation’, in terms of the
set of recorded information and their storage time. The regulation states that radio
communications between air traffc control units and flight crew members, air traffc
controller conversations, pre-flight inspections, weather information transferred by radio,
radar and flight plan information should be recorded by special equipment. In addition,
the recorded data should be stored for 14 days using analogue media and for 30 days
when using digital media.

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2.9.7 Airborne Warning and Control System aeroplanes
Two NATO Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aeroplanes conducted
missions in NATO airspace over Poland and Romania on 17 July 2014.
In correspondence with the Dutch Safety Board, the NATO Supreme Allied Commander
Europe stated that the AWACS aeroplanes detected flight MH17 during its flight but the
aeroplane ‘had flown beyond NATO AWACS coverage well before it crashed’. He noted
that, following a request from the Dutch Safety Board, NATO specialists had re-analysed
the data that had been collected by the AWACS aeroplanes on 17 July but that ‘there is
no data from the AWACS which would be relevant to the investigation of the crash.
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe does not hold any other radar or other
AWACS data relevant to MH17’.

2.10 Aerodrome information

Not applicable to this investigation.

2.11 Flight recorders, satellite and other data

2.11.1 Recovery of Cockpit Voice Recorder and Flight Data Recorder
The Cockpit Voice Recorder and Flight Data Recorder were not recovered by the Annex 13
investigation team. Individuals unknown to the investigation team removed the two flight
recorders from the wreckage area. On 21 July 2014, the recorders were handed over to a
Malaysian offcial in Donetsk, Ukraine by representatives of the armed group present in
the area. On 22 July 2014, the recorders were handed over to the Dutch Safety Board in
Kyiv, Ukraine. Appendix H contains further information on the Cockpit Voice Recorder and
the Flight Data Recorder readouts and data analysis.

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Figure 9: Sound peaks recorded at the end of the CVR recording. (Source: Dutch Safety Board)

The time period shown on each image is 4 milliseconds. The sound identifed as ‘peak 1’
was only recorded on the cockpit area microphone (CAM).
2.11.3 Flight Data Recorder
The Flight Data Recorder (Figure 10) was manufactured by Allied Signal, model number
980-4700-003 and serial number 2196. The serial number matched the details provided
by Malaysia Airlines. The recorder that was given to the Dutch Safety Board had no
Underwater Locator Beacon attached.
The exterior of the flight data recorder was slightly damaged, but the internal memory
module was intact. The external damage on the Flight Data Recorder and the loss of the
underwater locator beacon was consistent with impact damage. The Flight Data Recorder,
designed so that a minimum of the last 25 hours of operational data is retained on the
recording medium, was successfully downloaded and contained valid data from flight MH17.

стр.48

2.11.4 Quick Access Recorder
The aeroplane was equipped with a Quick Access Recorder (QAR). This unit, installed in
the rear part of the aeroplane, records similar data to the Flight Data Recorder and is, as
its name suggests, easily accessible for, among other things, maintenance purposes. The
QAR was not recovered.
2.11.5 Emergency Locator Transmitters
The aeroplane was equipped with two Emergency Locator Transmitters. One Emergency
Locator Transmitter was a fxed unit mounted in the aeroplane (Model ADT 406 AF) and
the other unit was a portable unit to be used during emergency evacuations (Model ADT
406 AP). The Emergency Locator Transmitters operate on three frequencies: 406 MHz,
243 MHz and 121.5 MHz. The Emergency Locator Transmitters were powered by highenergy lithium batteries and are capable of transmitting signals for at least 60 hours.
Each Emergency Locator Transmitter was uniquely identifable by a hexadecimal code
embedded into the Emergency Locator Transmitter software. More information on the
Emergency Locator Transmitter is described in Appendix H.
The fxed Emergency Locator Transmitter, located in the aft section of the aeroplane,
was connected to the cockpit remote control panel for manual activation. The Emergency
Locator Transmitter was connected to an antenna on top of the fuselage and it also had a
back-up antenna.
The portable Emergency Locator Transmitter was located in a stowage area to the right
of the forward passenger door 1R. The portable Emergency Locator Transmitter had only
a manual activation system. It was not recovered. It had not been activated, because no
data was found to have been received by the ground stations.
The fxed Emergency Locator Transmitter can be activated in one of three ways,
automatically, manually using a switch in the cockpit or manually using a switch on the
Emergency Locator Transmitter unit. The Emergency Locator Transmitter system logic is
designed to transmit the frst encoded signal after 30 seconds when automatically
activated and after 50 seconds when manually activated. The automatic activation is
based on a G-Switch in accordance with the EUROCAE ED-62 standard. The threshold
for activation is 2.0 to 2.6 g acceleration directed in the direction of flight of the aeroplane.
Normal turbulence during flight will not activate the Emergency Locator Transmitter.

стр.50

Figure 11: Fixed ELT location installed in a Boeing 777 (left), panel recovered from 9M-MRD with no insulation
                material or ELT attached (right). (Source: Dutch Safety Board)

2.11.6 Other aeroplane data
Two other recorded data sources that were obtained for the investigation were:
• Data transmitted by Very High Frequency (VHF) radio, and
• Data transmitted by Satellite Communication (SATCOM).
The SATCOM data was of interest to the investigation because, unlike VHF radio,
SATCOM interrogates the aeroplane’s system if no data is exchanged for more than
about 15 minutes.
2.11.6.1 Satellite Communication
SATCOM is a radio system that uses a constellation of satellites used to transmit voice
and data (see explanation below). Aircraft Communication Addressing and Reporting
System (ACARS) (see Abbreviations and Defnitions) can make use of SATCOM to transmit
data to ground stations. The SATCOM system used by the aeroplane was linked to the
Inmarsat network.

стр.52

The fuel planned to be remaining on landing at Kuala Lumpur was 8,800 kg. ACARS data
showed that the engines were consuming an average of 8,758 kg of fuel per hour in the
two hours of cruise flight for which ACARS reports were available. Flight Data Recorder
data showed that the fuel on board immediately prior to the end of the recording was
70,100 kg.
The timing and content of several messages could be verifed by cross reference of other
sources; e.g. Rolls-Royce and Inmarsat. The frst ACARS message from the aeroplane on
17 July was transmitted at 09.24 (11.24 CET) from Schiphol.
At 09.56:35 (11.56:35 CET), an ACARS transmission of the load sheet was recorded. The
Rolls-Royce engine take-off and climb reports for the Engine Health Monitoring
programme were sent to Malaysia Airlines at 10.31:20 (12.31:20 CET) and 10.48:32,
(12.48:32 CET), respectively.

Various position reports, generated between take-off at Schiphol and 13.12 (15.12 CET),
were transmitted by ACARS. ACARS Message number 50868018 showed that at 12.57:32
(14.57:32 CET), the last position report was sent.
ACARS Message number 50868202 was the last SATCOM transmission and it was
recorded at 13.07 (15.07 CET). The fnal ACARS VHF radio transmission was, according to
the ACARS log, made at 13.12 (15.12 CET). Later messages sent from the ground to the
aeroplane were not received by the aeroplane. These messages were stored by Malaysia
Airlines and were available to the investigation.

2.12 Wreckage and impact information

The following paragraphs describe the geographic area of the crash and wreckage as it
was found. Details are provided on the location, identifcation and observed damage of
the wreckage pieces

стр.54

Figure 12: Overview of wreckage area showing the six smaller sites. (Source of satellite images: Google Earth/
                Digital Globe)
Table 9 gives an overview of the wreckage sites that are described in this paragraph.
Outside of the six specifed sites, no items of note were identifed. Between sites 3 and
4, personal belongings, as well as small pieces of wreckage originating from the aft side
of the aeroplane were found.

Table 9: Description of wreckage sites in this report.

стр.56

The following paragraphs provide, per wreckage site, a detailed description of the
wreckage parts, relevant for the analysis. In the description of the pieces of wreckage of
the aeroplane, Boeing references such as sections and stations (STA) are used. Information
on these two means of reference is provided in the list of Abbreviations and Defnitions.
2.12.2.1 Wreckage site 1 (yellow)
This site of approximately 3 km2, is located 8.8 km west of the village of Hrabove. Parts of
wreckage were distributed over three agricultural felds which were separated by roads
and vegetation. No fre nor infrastructure damage was observed on this site. An overview
of the wreckage sites 1, 2 and 3 and the locations of the wreckage pieces is depicted in
Figure 14.

Figure 14: Overview of wreckage sites 1, 2 and 3 and the locations of the wreckage pieces. (Source: Dutch
                Safety Board)

The numbers in brackets following the titles below correspond with the locations in
Figure 14.
Upper left hand cockpit fuselage (1)
A portion of the cockpit fuselage’s top section (STA236.5 to STA332.5) was located in the
south-western region of site 1 (Figure 15). This part was not recovered. The fuselage skin

стр.58

Right hand fuselage with partial text ‘Malaysia’ (4)
A wreckage piece with a partial print of the text ‘Malaysia’ belonging to section 43 and
section 45 (STA846 to STA1032) on the right hand side of the aeroplane was located on
the south-eastern side of site 1. The upper portion of the fuselage had sheared just
above the text and the letter ‘M’ on the left hand side of the wreckage piece appeared
to be missing. All edges showed clear shears. Halfway, the fuselage was partially sheared
from top to bottom. Formers and stringers were no longer attached to the fuselage.
Left hand fuselage with positive pressure relief valves (5)
The part of the fuselage containing the two positive pressure relief valves was found in
the south of site 1. The fuselage part of the left hand side of the aeroplane (STA529 to
STA655), also contained a static port and six passenger windows. Photographic evidence
showed that both positive pressure relief valves were found in a closed position. The
upper side of the fuselage was sheared just above the window frames. This wreckage
piece was no longer present at the time of the recovery mission.
Cockpit and cabin furnishing
In site 1, pieces of cockpit and cabin furnishing, including the Captain’s charts folder and
pieces of a galley trolley, were found. A single overhead luggage bin, belonging to row
11 JK was found on the eastern region of the site. The surrounding overhead luggage
compartments were missing.
Cargo
Fragments of two cargo containers with registration AKE3951MH and AKE3540MH were
identifed on site 1. In total six textile rolls each with a length of approximately 100 metres
were located in the northern region of site 1. These rolls were identifed as being part of
the cargo. The cargo manifest indicated that in the forward- and aft cargo compartment
of the aeroplane, two unit load devices, each carrying 10 textile rolls, had been loaded.
These pieces of cargo were used as part of the trajectory analysis in paragraph 3.11.7.
2.12.2.2 Wreckage site 2 (orange)
This site of approximately 2.5 km2, covers a large part of the village of Petropavlivka and
is located 8 km west of Hrabove. Several structures in the village of Petropavlivka were
damaged by debris. An overview of the wreckage site and the location of the wreckage
pieces is depicted in Figure 14.
Left hand fuselage with door frame of door 1L (6)
The door frame of door 1L (STA309.5 to STA529) with surrounding fuselage was located
in the northern region of site 2. The inner structure of the fuselage was facing upwards
and the frames of six passenger windows were visible. Photographic evidence showed
traces of soot on the bottom portion of the fuselage and the absences of the upper door
sill. This wreckage piece was not recovered from the wreckage site.
Cockpit and cabin furnishing were found nearby the fuselage. However, the initial impact
location of this furnishing on the ground could not be verifed due to the absence of
photographic and video evidence. It is of note that as time went by, pieces of wreckage
were collected by the residents of Petropavlivka.