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Figure 39: Micro CT-images of the fragments (shown at the right side of Figure 37, left from the First Offcer’s
               and right from the Captain’s body) show the deformation of the fragments. (Source: NFI)

The investigation concluded that these fragments impacted the aeroplane at a very high
velocity, thereby deforming the object at the side of the impact. The consequential
frictional heat melted the aeroplanes materials (glass, aluminium etc.) and a thin layer of
solidifed aeroplane material was deposited to the heavily deformed side of the object.
Although the velocity of the object was reduced due to the impact with the aeroplane,
the object continued its path and then impacted the crew member where it was found.
These fragments were as such assessed to be high-energy objects.
The chemical composition of 20 selected fragments which had either a very distinctive
shape (including the two bow-tie shaped pre-formed fragments) or a layer of deposits or
both was determined. This was determined by means of laser-ablation inductively
coupled plasma mass spectrometry.
A comparison between the fragments and their composition was made using a statistical
analysis method called Principal Component Analysis. The analysis showed that the
20 selected fragments from the wreckage and the remains can be divided in two
distinctive groups. Within such a group, no statistical difference could be determined
between the fragments, indicating that the fragments originated from the same source.
In other words, the fragments within a group were made from the same unalloyed steel
base material (i.e. the same plate). One of the analysed fragments could not be linked to
a distinctive group.
The result of the Principal Component Analysis was that from the 20 selected fragments,
19 fragments were assessed to be high-energy objects; 8 originated from the flight crew
and 11 from the wreckage. A summary of the results is given in Table 11 and Table 12.
One fragment not linked to either of the two distinctive groups above was concluded to
be a high-energy object as well. This conclusion was drawn primarily on the basis of the
fragment’s shape (a deformed cubic form) and the presence of a similar glass deposit on
the fragment.

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Table 12: Composition in (percentage) of elements found in steel of the two groups of fragments examined.

2.16.3 Explosive residue and paint analysis
In addition to the examination described above, as part of the criminal investigation,
126 swab samples were taken on various locations of the wreckage of the aeroplane and
one of the missile parts in paragraph 2.12.2.8 and analysed by the NFI for the presence
of explosive residues.
Approximately 30 of the 126 swab samples showed traces of mainly two different
explosives; the nitroamine RDX and trinitrotoluene (TNT). A few of the 30 samples
showed traces of PETN. On the tested missile part traces of RDX was found. On the
missile part TNT or PETN could not be identifed.
The investigation into the origin of the explosive residues was made more complicated
as the objects from which the swab samples were taken had been exposed to the
elements for a long period of time. The possibility of contamination during transport and
by the fact that the wreckage lay in an area of armed conflict is a concern for the explosive
residue analysis.
One of the fragments that was recovered from the wreckage of the aeroplane, was found
in the left wing tip and a second one was found lodged in the left cockpit window frame.
Figure 40 shows images of both of these fragments.

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spectroscopy) of each paint layer was identical for the samples analysed. It was concluded
that the paint samples taken from missile parts could not be distinguished from those
found on foreign objects extracted from the aeroplane.
The results of these analyses were provided to the Dutch Safety Board by the public
prosecutor.

2.17 Organisational and management information

Factual information and the analysis related to the decision-making processes around
the flight routes are contained in Part B of this report entitled ‘Flying over conflict zones’.
The following subjects relevant to this crash were investigated:
• The decision-making with regard to flight routes by Malaysia Airlines, with particular
emphasis on the route across Ukraine;

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The Boeing 777 is equipped with a cabin emergency oxygen system consisting of
chemical oxygen generators with masks that are stored above the seats. Each passenger
seat, cabin attendant seat, toilet and crew rest berth have masks, including additional
masks for infants travelling in the lap of an adult passenger.
The emergency oxygen masks can be deployed manually by pushing the ‘PASS OXYGEN’
switch in the cockpit on the pilot’s overhead panel. The masks will be deployed
automatically, when the cabin pressure altitude exceeds 13,500 feet. In the event of a
sudden loss of pressurisation, e.g. a depressurisation, the masks will deploy according to
the aeroplane manufacturer, with a time delay of a few seconds. Sometimes masks
deploy unintentionally, when the passenger service unit (PSU) is exposed to a heavy
shock or distortion of its container; for instance after a hard landing.
When the emergency oxygen masks are deployed, either manually or automatically,
internal software logic to the Electrical Load Management System will result in an activation
signal to open the passenger service units above each block of seats. The system logic has
an in-built delay for the activation signal. The signal activates the solenoid switch of the
passenger service units. The activated solenoid switch withdraws a latch pin in the door
panel of the passenger service unit, allowing it to open, followed by the masks falling out.
The chemical oxygen generators are fred by a downward force being applied to the
mask. The application of this force results in the attached lanyard pulling out the fring
pin, which in turn allows the mixing of chemicals in the generator. This mixing of chemicals
starts a chemical reaction that provides a high concentration of oxygen starting to flow
to the mask via a hose for about 10 to 20 minutes.
The aeroplane manufacturer stated that the Electric Load Management System nonvolatile memory does not record a signal as to whether or not the Electrical Load
Management System has activated the emergency passenger oxygen system, so as to
deploy the masks. The Flight Data Recorder does not record information regarding the
activation of the emergency oxygen system. However, in the event of activation this will
generate a Master Caution warning. The Master Caution warning and the cabin pressure
altitude are both recorded. The recorded cabin pressure altitude during cruise flight up
to the moment that the Flight Data Recorder stopped recording was 4,800 feet and there
were no warnings recorded.
According to the aeroplane manufacturer, the operator can choose whether or not to
store the signal that activates the emergency oxygen system on the Quick Access
Recorder (QAR), if installed. The aeroplane did have a QAR installed which was not
recovered from the wreckage site. Malaysia Airlines provided QAR data from earlier
flights to show that the failure of the pressurisation of the cabin pressure system and
cabin pressure altitude warning were recorded, but not the actual activation of the
emergency oxygen system.
During the investigation about ffty chemical oxygen generators were recovered from
the wreckage sites. With the exception of one, none of the chemical oxygen generators
had its fring pin in place and all displayed a black coloured stripe; an indication that the

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Figure 42: Emergency oxygen mask found on passenger. (Source: Dutch Safety Board)

During the victim identifcation process in the Netherlands, one passenger was found
with an emergency oxygen mask, see Figure 42. The strap was around the passenger’s
neck and the mask was around the throat. No information was available about how this
passenger was found at the wreckage site. The NFI examined the mask for biological
traces and performed DNA tests. No DNA profles could be obtained from the fve
samples taken. Therefore, DNA analysis was not possible. The lack of DNA material can
be explained by the mask having been left outside for a long time at high temperatures.
There were no useable fngerprints found on the mask. The high temperatures may have
caused the quality of fngerprints on the mask to deteriorate.

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2.18.3.2 Space debris
The Aerospace Corporation, a research and development centre based in the United
States of America that works with space programmes, maintains a register of the re-entry
of space debris. This register stated that no space debris re-entered the earth’s
atmosphere in the period 10 to 19 July 2014.

2.18.4 Safety actions taken
Following the crash, at 15.00 (17.00 CET) on 17 July 2014 the UkSATSE issued NOTAM
A1507/14. This NOTAM added another restricted area above the existing area,
commencing at FL320 to an unlimited altitude.
At 23.00 on 17 July 2014 (01.00 CET, 18 July), UkSATSE issued NOTAM A1517/14, which
increased the size of the restricted area and imposed a limitation from the surface to an
unlimited altitude. This NOTAM became effective at 00.05 (02.05 CET) on the morning of
18 July. Table 13 summarises these NOTAMs. These two NOTAMs, issued by UkSATSE
and covering an area of the eastern part of Ukraine, closed the airspace.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NOTAM number             Lower limit             Upper limit               Valid from (UTC)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1507/14                         FL320                         UNL                    17 July, 15.00
1517/14                           SFC                          UNL                    18 July, 00.05
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 13: Ukrainian NOTAMs post-crash.

2.19 Useful or effective investigation techniques

ICAO Annex 13 reserves a paragraph for providing information on useful or effective
investigation techniques that may be of use in future air accident investigations.
2.19.1 Wreckage registration and tagging
During the on-site recovery missions in Ukraine, wreckage parts were tagged, photographed
and registered. During the transportation to the Netherlands, this process was checked at
the different locations where parts were transferred to other means of transportation.
Upon arrival at Gilze-Rijen Air Force Base the wreckage was visually inspected, pieces of
wreckage were given a tag with an identifcation number and were then photographed
in front of a green screen. A database was created containing the following details for
each tagged piece of wreckage:

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• From which position relative to the aeroplane did the high-energy objects come?
• What were the effects of the impact of the high-energy objects on the aeroplane
structure?
• How did the aeroplane break up?
The physical evidence of the recovered wreckage and other investigation activities were
suffcient for the Dutch Safety Board to complete the investigation. The reconstruction was
of signifcant value to the investigation as it allowed the investigators to better visualise the
recovered wreckage and the damage when comparing the analyses performed with the
parts of the wreckage. The assembly of the wreckage into a three-dimensional reconstruction provides the relatives of the passengers and crew, the stakeholders and the
public with compelling physical evidence of some of the main conclusions drawn in the
investigation.
2.19.4 High-energy object analysis
Four studies regarding the source of the high-energy objects and the damage they
caused were produced by specialist external laboratories as part of the investigation.
The Dutch Safety Board requested specialist assistance from the Dutch National
Aerospace Laboratory (NLR) and the Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientifc
Research (TNO).
The NLR work was performed by the Defence Systems Department. This department
provides operational, technical and scientifc support to the Dutch Ministry of Defence in
general, and the Royal Netherlands Air Force in particular. The main research subject is
airborne self-protection, which requires an extensive knowledge of the performance of
surface-to-air and air-to-air weapon systems. For this purpose the department has several
tools at its disposal. One of these is the Weapon Engagement Simulation Tool (WEST),
an in-house developed software tool to simulate the flyout and performance of threat
systems. The work was performed using pieces of wreckage at the Gilze-Rijen Air Force
Base, photographs and three-dimensional laser scans of some of the parts of the
aeroplane. The NLR report is contained in Appendix X.
TNO used a computer-based ballistic simulation to reconstruct the damage from an
assumed warhead when striking the aeroplane. This TNO report is contained in Appendix Y.
TNO performed a blast damage simulation using a computer model of the warhead. A
Computational Fluid Dynamics simulation was performed to provide a high fdelity,
quantitative, description of the blast loading that would be caused by the detonation of
the warhead identifed by NLR and TNO taken into account the evidence found. This
TNO report is contained in Appendix Z.
The details of how the software models for each company performs its calculations are
proprietary information to those companies and have, as such, not further been
described.

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3.2.2 Airworthiness
3.2.2.1 General
In order to establish the airworthiness of the aeroplane prior to the flight on 17 July 2014,
the investigation reviewed the way that Malaysia Airlines planned, performed and
documented the maintenance of the aeroplane. For example, Malaysia Airlines’ documented
system for the evaluation, deferral and later rectifcation of technical defects of the
aeroplane was examined. In addition, a list containing occurrence reports for the subject
aeroplane from the aeroplane’s delivery in 1997 to November 2013 was reviewed. The
background to the material in this paragraph is contained in Appendix J. Two specifc
matters were analysed with regard to the crash. These relate to the aeroplane’s pressure
cabin and to the engines.
3.2.2.2 Pressure cabin
None of the mandatory occurrence reports for the aeroplane involved in the crash sent
to the Department of Civil Aviation Malaysia between aeroplane’s delivery in 1997 and
November 2013 were related to the functioning of the pressure cabin.
Aeroplane technical log entries revealed that since the heavy maintenance check in
November 2013 cabin doors and a cockpit window produced buzzing or hissing sounds.
These type of complaints, which occasionally occur with jet aeroplanes, were caused by
leaking seals and were repaired. As such, these sounds may bring some discomfort for
passengers and crew, but would not cause a depressurisation. According to the aeroplane
technical log, no such complaints were present on leaving Amsterdam for the return
flight to Kuala Lumpur.
The Flight Data Recorder indicated that until the end of recording the cabin pressure
altitude was constant at 4,800 feet and correct for the cruise level at that time and no
warnings were recorded. Analysis of the passenger oxygen system is contained in
Section 3.12.
The aeroplane’s rear pressure bulkhead and adjacent parts of the fuselage were not
found at the beginning of the debris pattern (sites 1, 2 and 3) but in site 4 (see paragraph
2.12.2.4). This indicated that the failure of the rear pressure bulkhead was of a secondary,
rather than a primary failure. The fractures were predominately consistent with tensile
overstress indicating an instant overload resulting in a failure of the rear bulkhead
structure rather than, for example, a failure due to a faulty repair, fatigue or corrosion
(see paragraph 3.11.5 for more information on the rear pressure bulkhead).
Maintenance information and occurrence data from Malaysia Airlines was reviewed back
to the aeroplane’s delivery in 1997. This data did not reveal any tail strike occurrences or
damage to the bulkhead. In addition, the physical evidence derived from the investigation
in the Netherlands allows the Dutch Safety Board to conclude that the rear pressure
bulkhead was not damaged prior to the flight on 17 July 2014.
In paragraph 2.18.1, the contents of Boeing Service Bulletin 777-53A0068 and
Airworthiness Directive 2014-05-03 were described. These documents addressed the
risk of a fuselage skin rupture due to corrosion under those SATCOM antennae installed

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contingency fuel. This represented a fuel value of between about 8,000 kg and 10,000 kg.
For flight MH17 the planned fuel remaining was 8,800 kg.
Based on Section 2.6, the aeroplane’s mass and balance were within the required
manufacturer’s limits. There were no dangerous goods loaded as cargo.
An air traffc control flight plan was fled and the flight crew was provided with an
operational flight plan, NOTAMs, loading and weather information.
There were no technical defects noted on the aeroplane technical log that would have
affected the safety of the flight.
Based on paragraph 2.9.3, the planning of the flight route through Ukraine included the
flight across the Dnipropetrovsk Flight Information Region at FL330 - FL350. For this part
of the route there were no restrictions for these altitudes.

3.3.2 Flight execution
3.3.2.1 Vertical profle
As stated in Section 2.1 of this report, the airline’s operational flight plan called for a
climb from FL330 to FL350 at a point 74 NM before PEKIT, whilst the air traffc control
flight plan called for the climb to be made at PEKIT. This apparent discrepancy is the
result of the fact that the air traffc control flight plan is prepared earlier than the
operational flight plan and that the latter document takes account of a more recent
forecast for wind speed and direction. The operational flight plan is therefore more
accurate than the air traffc control flight plan as it contains recent weather information.
However, 6 NM before PEKIT, the captain decided to deviate from the planned vertical
profle by not climbing to FL350 as requested by the air traffc controller but maintained
FL330. It is not known why the flight crew did not accept this request as the flight crew
did not provide the air traffc controller with an explanation. The air traffc controller did
not request an explanation either.
The Dutch Safety Board tried to fnd an explanation for this operational decision by
discussing the operator’s procedures with Malaysia Airlines. Malaysia Airlines showed
that, as per the Boeing performance handbook, the optimal altitude to use for the
prevailing conditions was 33,800 feet at the time of the air traffc controller’s request and
for the following 8 to 10 minutes. The optimal altitude in this case is related to fuel
effciency. As FL340 is a non-standard level for an eastbound flight (see paragraph 2.9.3),
the flight crew, in the opinion of Malaysia Airlines would have preferred to remain at

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the centreline of airway L980 and proceeding on a direct track to waypoint RND. The fact
that the flight crew requested a deviation of 20 NM but only flew approximately 6.5 NM
north, was consistent with normal operational practice of minimising any additional
distance flown.
The actions of the air traffc controllers are consistent with normal operations. The
communication between the flight crew and the air traffc controllers by both parties
appeared normal and was considered consistent with normal operations.

3.3.2.3 Flight data
The Flight Data Recorder records approximately 1,300 parameters; for an effective
investigation a shortlist of parameters considered to be useful for the investigation was
created in order to gain an insight into the possible cause or causes of the crash. Relevant
details of the last three minutes of flight recorded on the Flight Data Recorder are
published in Appendix H.
The investigation included a verifcation that the aeroplane’s warning systems had
functioned correctly and these signals were present on the Flight Data Recorder
recording. For example, the Flight Data Recorder contained a recording of the activation
of the aeroplane’s master warning; a warning that should, and was, generated when the
autopilot was disconnected at a point on an earlier flight.
No aeroplane system warnings or cautions for flight MH17 were recorded on the Flight
Data Recorder. All engine parameters were normal for cruise flight until the recorders
ended at 13.20:03 (15.20:03 CET).
Flight Data Recorder engine parameters were continuously sampled during the flight.
According to the data on the Flight Data Recorder, both engines were running at cruise
power during the flight across Ukraine. All indications regarding the operation of the
engines were normal and no abnormalities were shown. All of the engine indications
were as they would be expected to be during cruise flight. No abnormal vibrations were
recorded. There were no warnings recorded. Appendix H contains an overview of the
engine data recorded on the Flight Data Recorder

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------------------------------------------------------------------
Aeroplane position
...................................................................................
Latitude                                                    48.12715 N
Longitude                                                 38.52630538 E
Altitude *18                                           32,998 feet
Indicated airspeed                                       293 knots
Magnetic heading                                        115 degrees
Drift angle                                                     -4 degrees
------------------------------------------------------------------
Weather
------------------------------------------------------------------
Wind direction                                             219 degrees
Wind speed                                                   36 knots
Static air temperature                                   -44 ºC
Total air temperature                               -12/-13 ºC
------------------------------------------------------------------
Small variations in the data are possible due to differences in resolution from the various
data sources.
The latitude and longitude data is shown above in the format that it was recorded in. This
position is converted to read 48° 07’ 37.74’N 038° 31’ 34.698’E.
A detailed analysis of the Cockpit Voice Recorder, covering the last 20 milliseconds of
the recording at 13.20:03 (15.20:03 CET) as described in paragraph 2.11.2, was performed.
The analysis showed that two peaks of sound were identifed in this timeframe. Using
specialised audio recording analysis software, a graphical representation of the sound
over time, its waveform, could be established. The waveform analysis assisted in
determining the signal’s characteristics, for example, duration and energy.
The frst sound peak had a duration of 2.1 milliseconds and the signal was recorded on
the cockpit area microphone channel only. Because no other Cockpit Voice Recorder
channels recorded the frst sound peak, the direction of this signal could not be
established. Wave spectrum analysis suggested that the sound peak was representative
for an ‘electrical spike’ as it showed the form of an electro-magnetic pulse that could
have been caused by static discharge or similar.
Signal triangulation was used to determine the origin of the second sound peak recorded
on the Cockpit Voice Recorder. The poor sound quality on the cockpit area microphone
channel noted during the investigation was most likely due to the missing microphone
cap from the cockpit area microphone. The fact that the microphone cap was missing
was noted on the aeroplane’s deferred defects list.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*18 Altimeter set to the standard pressure of 1013.25 hPa

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The acceleration data on these three axes was examined and all three axes showed
stable data up to the recording’s end at 13.20:03 (15.20:03 CET).

3.4.2 Surveillance radar data
The radar data that was received from Ukraine from UkSATSE showing flight MH17, is
described in paragraph 2.9.5.2. From the Ukrainian raw radar data it was established that
the last secondary surveillance radar return was at 13.20:03 (15.20:03 CET) with the
aeroplane flying straight and level at FL330. The video radar replay did not show any
radar targets in the vicinity of flight MH17 at that time other than the three commercial
aeroplanes mentioned in paragraph 2.9.5.2
The surveillance radar data showing flight MH17, that was received from the Russian
Federation were from GKOVD, is also described in paragraph 2.9.5.2. Flight MH17’s
target was detected by primary surveillance and secondary surveillance radar. A second
primary target was generated close to the target labelled MH17 on two occasions. No
other data was received. Due to the absence of raw data, it was not possible to verify the
video radar replay. The video of the radar screen did not show any failures, emergency
codes or other alerts of flight MH17.
The Ukrainian radar data, comprising of both raw and processed data as described in
paragraph 2.9.5.1 was analysed separately. The last radar data recorded by UkSATSE
showing no abnormalities with the target or symbol for flight MH17, was at 13.20:00
(15.20:00 CET). Time 13.20:03 (15.20:03 CET) coincided with two data points in the raw
data from secondary radar information provided by UkSATSE. The last position message
from the aeroplane’s Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast data and the last
secondary radar target identifcation message both have a time stamp of 13.20:03 (15.20:03
CET). The processed data showed that no secondary surveillance data was displayed from
13.20:18 (15.20:18 CET) and that the coasting mode was activated at 13.20:36 (15.20:36
CET). Due to processing delays, it is not expected that the radar display will coincide with
the actual time of the last secondary surveillance data transmission; this may occur later.
The target data for flight MH17 was lost on the GKOVD radar screen at 13.20:58
(15.20:58 CET). At that moment the secondary radar label changed to ‘xxxx’. The
22 seconds between the label changes and the change to coasting mode on the UkSATSE
radar can be explained by the different software settings in the two radar systems

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In Section 2.11 it was established that the Cockpit Voice Recorder and Flight Data
Recorder both stopped recording at 13.20:03 (15.20:03 CET). In paragraphs 2.9.5.2 and
3.4.2, it was shown that the transmission of radar surveillance data from flight MH17
ended at 13.20:03 (15.20:03 CET).
Following a fnal SATCOM transmission at 13.08:51 (15.08:51 CET), the ground system’s
inactivity timer ran out approximately 15 minutes later, as it is programmed to do. An
attempt by the SATCOM system at 13.21:26 (15.21:26 CET) to establish connection with
the aeroplane from the ground was not successful.
A signal from the fxed Emergency Locator Transmitter was frst received at 13.20:35
(15.20:35 CET) by Geostationary satellites of the emergency COSPAS-SARSAT network.
According to the ELT’s specifcations (see paragraph 2.11.5), an automatic, acceleration
or deceleration triggered, activation of the fxed Emergency Locator Transmitter has a 30
seconds delay. A manual activation, by a guarded switch located in the overhead panel
in the cockpit, of the fxed ELT has a delay of 50 seconds whereafter the ELT is activated
and detectable by Geostationary satellites. A second delay for both a manual or
automatic activation of approximately 1 or 2 seconds is expected due to signal latency
while going through the emergency satellite network.
Five ground stations received an Emergency Locator Transmitter signal which had been
relayed by two satellites between 13.20:35 and 13.20:36 (15.20:35 and 15.20:36 CET).
Considering the time of the receipt of the signal and the 50 second time delay on manual
activation, it was concluded that manual activation would have had to have occurred
around 13.19:45 (15.19:45 CET). This would have been recorded on the Flight Data
Recorder and, in all probability, on the Cockpit Voice Recorder. As this is not the case,
manual activation of the ELT is discounted.
The receipt of the signal, considering an automatic activation of the fxed ELT, with a time
delay of 30 seconds plus 1 or 2 seconds, would suggest an activation time between
about 13.20:05 - 13.20:06 (15.20:05 - 15.20:06 CET). The automatic activation was caused
by the Emergency Locator Transmitter’s G-switch detecting a longitudinal deceleration
of between at least 2.0 g and 2.6 g. This is consistent with the aeroplane breaking up
after the recorders stopped at 13.20:03 (15.20:03 CET).
A second ELT, a portable Emergency Locator Transmitter, was onboard that can only be
activated manually. No signal from the portable ELT was detected by the COSPASSARSAT emergency network.
The loss of the two recorders and the radar data at 13.20:03 (15.20:03 CET) indicated
that the electrical power was lost at this moment. The automatic activation of the fxed
ELT between 13.20:05 - 13.20:06 (15.20:05 - 15.20:06 CET), caused by a deceleration,
supported this. Finally, no other recorded data (e.g. SATCOM transmissions) contradicted
the hypothesis.
All times mentioned (in UTC only) that support this conclusion are set out in chronological
order in Figure 44.

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failure and lost electrical power, experienced a deceleration (described in paragraph
3.4.3), and started to break up. The complete in-flight break-up sequence is analysed in
Section 3.10.
In this section the possible scenarios that could have led to the in-flight break-up of the
aeroplane’s structure are described and analysed. Some of the scenarios were related to
internal aspects such as airworthiness, whilst others were related to external sources.
Those scenarios that were found not to be able to cause the damage noted (see Section
2.12) were, following analysis, excluded.
3.5.1 Lightning strike, meteor and space debris re-entry
Although there were thunderstorms in the area at the time of crash (see Section 2.7),
there was no evidence in the wreckage recovered or on the recorded data that a lightning
strike occurred that could have caused or exacerbated the high-energy object damage.
Based on the evidence provided by the Royal Netherlands Association for Meteorology
and Astronomy regarding the lack of ‘ultranoise’ in Ukraine on the date of the crash as
described in paragraph 2.18.3.1, and the damage patterns on the aeroplane, it was
concluded that a meteor strike did not occur.
In addition, the possibility that space debris caused the crash was considered (see
paragraph 2.18.3.2). The Aerospace Corporation database for 2014 showed no debris
re-entering the atmosphere between 10 and 19 July 2014.

3.5.2 Possible internal causes
The sound wave lasting 2.3 milliseconds that was recorded in the last 20 milliseconds on
the Cockpit Voice Recorder did not contain the same signature wave form as either an
internal explosion (bomb or fuel tank) or structural failure and explosive decompression.
Examples include the accident to flight PA103 at Lockerbie (Scotland) in 1988 and flight
TWA 800 off Long Island (United States of America) in 1996. In these two cases, the
sound signature was about 200 milliseconds long with the internal explosion building
very quickly to high value with a very short wavelength. The sound wave then dissipated
over time. In the case of structural failure and explosive decompression, the time is
similar but the peak noise was lower and the rate of dissipation was slower.