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impacts on the cockpit roof as indicated in Figure 46. To the right of this area no impact
damage was present. On the left hand side, the rear impact damage boundary was found
in front of the left hand forward passenger door.

Figure 46: Right hand side cockpit roof, looking front to back. (Source: Dutch Safety Board)

The total number of hits (over 350), of all types of impact damage, on the available
wreckage of the cockpit suggests that the total number of hits of high-energy objects
was well over 800. The highest density of hits on the left hand side of the cockpit was
calculated to be over 250 hits per square metre. The highest density of hits was on the
left front windows.
Figure 47 shows the high-energy object damage observed on a number of parts of
wreckage. In addition, such damage was also noted in a panel of the cockpit roof. The
high-energy object damage was primarily limited to the left hand side of the cockpit and
a small part of the fuselage immediately aft of that. At the rearward edge of the panel,
positioned on the left hand side of the aeroplane between approximately STA220 and
STA410 close to the forward passenger door and on panels further away from the cockpit,
no high-energy object damage was noted. The cockpit panel at STA132.5 appeared to
be the leading edge of the high-energy object damage.

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Figure 48: Cockpit bulkhead at junction with radome. (Source: Dutch Safety Board)

There was no perforation damage found in the cockpit bulkhead (Figure 48) that can be
identifed, with any certainty, as being from the perforation of high-energy objects. The
perforation in the bulkhead was the result of other parts of the cockpit’s structure having
pushed through the plating.
For the non-perforating ricochet and grazing hits, the angle relative to the structure was
measured to give a direction in the flat plane of the structure plate. This was done for the
cockpit roof (see Figure 49), the lower left hand cockpit side and aft of the cockpit windows.

Figure 49: Grazing on cockpit roof. (Source: NLR)

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Another example of blast damage was found in a panel on the right hand side of the
fuselage between STA250 and STA330 (see Figure 51); the fuselage skin was pushed-in
in the areas relative to the fuselage’s structural support elements (i.e. the stringers and
frame). These structural support elements showed no deformation. The sort of damage
noted is typical of a phenomenon known as ’dishing’. Dishing is a type of damage
associated with the effects of blast.

Figure 51: Blast damage on the forward right hand side of the fuselage. The panel was also damaged by the
               break-up of the aeroplane and impact with the ground. (Source: Dutch Safety Board)

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paragraph 3.4.2 of this report shows that no (military) aeroplanes were within at least 30
km of flight MH17 at the time of the crash. Primary radar data was available for an area
between about 30 to 60 km to the south of the aeroplane’s fnal position and about 90
km to the north and east and about 200 km to the west.

3.6.2 Air-to-air missile
Two types of air-to-air missile were considered in the investigation; those with a warhead
flled with rods and those with a fragmentation warhead.
Air-to-air missiles with a warhead flled with rods eject a ring of metal rods after the
warhead’s explosive charge detonates near its target. The rods then cut into the target.
Figure 52 shows an example of the typical damage pattern; where the rods separated
into individual high-energy objects.

Figure 52: Example of damage caused by metal rod warheads. (Source: PPRuNe, via NLR)

Other air-to-air missiles have fragmentation warheads; warheads that are designed to
fragment into small, high-energy objects on detonation.128 of 279
Table 14 provides an overview of typical air-to-air missiles in use in the region. The table
is simplifed and excludes variants and derivative versions of the weapons

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MANPADS could not have caused damage to the aeroplane, because the altitude of
flight MH17 (33,000 feet) cannot be reached by MANPADS.
Considering larger systems, these are usually radar guided weapons with guidance being
provided by a combination of ground control and autonomous ‘seeker’ control. All warheads
detonate on impact with a target but some also detonate at close proximity on passing the
target. A proximity fuse uses a beam of radar or laser energy in a cone with a forward angle
with respect to the missile axis to sense the presence of a target. When a part of the target
passes through the beam, the target is detected and shortly thereafter the fuse will detonate
the missile’s warhead. The warhead is typically a fragmentation device. Fragmentation
warheads are composed of between hundreds and several thousand pre-formed fragments,
possibly of different shapes, in layer or layers around an explosive core. On detonation, the
warhead showers the target with these small metal fragments; objects that are designed to
penetrate the target aircraft structure and weaken it so that it is severely damaged or
destroyed. Although designed to destroy high-flying military aeroplanes, some of these
systems have the capability, in terms of both range and speed, to engage an aeroplane
such as a Boeing 777 operating at the altitude and speed of flight MH17.
The generic form of a surface-to-air missile is shown in Figure 53

Figure 53: Generic form of a surface-to-air missile. (Source: Dutch Safety Board)

There are three different types of fragmentation warhead; pre-formed, smooth and
grooved or scored case. In a pre-formed fragmentation warhead, the case surrounding
the explosive material is composed of one or more layers of pre-formed, separate,
fragments closely packed together. This is different to the natural fragmentation of a
smooth case and the controlled fragmentation of a grooved or scored case where the
fragments are formed by the explosive force at the moment of detonation. The fragments
of a pre-formed fragmentation warhead are arranged regularly around the circumference
of the warhead. The fragmentation pattern created after the warhead’s detonation is a
bounded fragment spray zone primarily consisting of pre-formed fragments. The damage
caused by pre-formed fragmentation is different from that of natural and controlled
fragmentation and is very distinct in that the pre-formed fragments give a regular pattern
of fragment impacts within a bounded area on the structure of the target.
In a warhead using pre-formed fragments, the separate fragments propagate from the
detonation point in an expanding, divergent, ring-like pattern (see Figure 54).

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3.6.4 Multiple weapon impacts
The investigation also examined the available data and wreckage to address the
hypothesis that the aeroplane was struck by more than one weapon. The damage to the
forward part of the aeroplane requires that at least one surface-to-air weapon is a part of
the scenario. Three scenarios are considered:
• Two surface-to-air weapons struck the aeroplane;
• A surface-to-air weapon and aerial cannon fre, struck the aeroplane;
• A surface-to-air weapon and an air-to-air missile struck the aeroplane.
The aeroplane’s wreckage showed that all of the high-energy objects that perforated the
aeroplane originated from a single volume in space. No other witness marks were found.
The hypothesis that a second surface-to-air weapon detonated near to a part of the
aeroplane that was not recovered, i.e. wings or centre section, was discounted as the
wreckage distribution described in paragraph 2.12.2 would be different as the break-up
of a wing would affect the path that the damaged aeroplane followed.

3.6.5 Surface-to-air weapon systems common in the region
In the previous paragraphs, air-to-air weapons and all surface-to-air weapons not having
a pre-formed fragmentation warhead were excluded on the basis of the damage pattern
found, the injuries sustained by three crew members in the cockpit, the fragments found
and the wreckage distribution. This paragraph continues the analysis further by reviewing
surface-to-air weapons with pre-formed fragmentation warheads that were, potentially,
in use in the region.
There are around twenty types of surface-to-air missiles common in the region that are
capable of engaging a target at an altitude of 33,000 feet. All of these types use radar
guidance and are equipped with a fragmentation warhead. Three systems, potentially
relevant to the investigation, are noted in Table 15.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
System name                         S-300                    S-200                   9K37
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Missile (typical)                       5V55                     5V28               9M38/9M38M1
Warhead mass (kg)                  130                       220                      70
Fragment shape and       Cubic (5 x 5 x 5)        Mix of round           Mix of cubic (8 x 8 x 5
size (mm)                                                     balls (9 and 12)       and 6 x 6 x 8.2) and
                                                                                                 bow-ties (13 x 13 x 8)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 15: Typical surface-to-air weapon systems in the region

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Figure 57: A typical Buk surface-to-air missile system. (Source: Dutch Safety Board)

Normally, the system operates as unit of several vehicles, consisting of:
• one Target Acquisition Radar;
• one Command Post;
• several Transporter Erector/Launcher and Radar vehicles;
• several Transporter/Erector/Launcher and Loader vehicles;
• technical, maintenance and other support vehicles.
The Target Acquisition Radar will search for and detect targets. Once a target has been
detected by the Target Acquisition Radar, the fre control radar in the Transporter/
Erector/Launcher and Radar vehicle can acquire and track the target. Once in range, a
missile from the Transporter/Erector/Launcher and Radar vehicles can be launched to
engage the target. However, each Buk Transporter/Erector/Launcher and Radar vehicle is
equipped with its own fre control radar, allowing the vehicle to search for and engage
with a target independently.

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------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
9N314M warhead                                 Square                            Bow-tie                        Filler
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dimensions (mm)                               8 x 8 x 5                          13 x 13 x 8                 6 x 6 x 8.2
Mass (grams)                                        2.35                                  8.10                          2.10
Proportion in warhead*              ca. half                            ca. quarter                  ca. quarter
Composition                                      unalloyed steel                unalloyed steel              unalloyed steel
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
9N314 warhead                                   Square                                  Filler
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dimensions (mm)                               8 x 8 x 5                               13 x 13 x 8
Mass (grams)                                        2.35                                     10.50
Proportion in warhead*         ca. three-quarters                     ca. quarter
Composition                                      unalloyed steel                     unalloyed steel
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Approximation made by the Dutch Safety Board.
Table 17: Pre-formed fragments in warheads used in Buk surface-to-air missile systems. (Source: JSC Concern
              Almaz-Antey)

The total number of pre-formed objects in a 9N314M warhead is, according to the
Russian Federation defence group, JSC Concern Almaz-Antey, between 7,000 and 8,000.

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Notwithstanding the possibility of sample degredation and contamination, some of the
wreckage parts and the missile part recovered showed traces of explosive residues (e.g.
RDX). The results were provided to the Dutch Safety Board (see Sections 2.12 and 2.16).

3.8 Simulations to assess the origin of the damage

3.8.1 Introduction
Using the results in Section 3.7 that the aeroplane was struck by a warhead, a number of
simulations were run. These were intended to corroborate the fndings and to calculate
the volume of space of the warhead’s detonation location and the missile’s possible flight
path from the ground to detonation. Simulations performed by three parties delivered
results that were consistent with the damage observed on the aeroplane’s wreckage. A
study provided by the Russian Federation had results that were not consistent with the
damage. More information on this matter is contained in Appendix V to this report and
in the report ‘MH17-About the investigation’.
NLR performed two studies to verify that the damage observed on the wreckage could
originate from a 9N314M warhead. The studies were a fragmentation visualisation model
and a missile flyout simulation. TNO used, independently, its terminal ballistics simulation
to verify that the damage observed on the wreckage could originate from a 9N314M
warhead. As part of this work, alternative warhead loads and detonation positions were
simulated. In addition to the above work, TNO simulated the blast loading that the
detonation of the warhead exerted on the aeroplane. To this end, a computational fluid
dynamics simulation of the detonation was performed by TNO. More informative about
these simulations can be found in Appendices X, Y and Z.
On behalf of Ukraine, the Kyiv Research Institute for Forensic Expertise of the Ministry of
Justice and military experts of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry provided the results of
their simulations performed regarding the origin of the damage.
3.8.2 Fragmentation visualisation model
A simulation model of the location and the boundaries of the damage on the fuselage of
the Boeing 777 was constructed by NLR, using the primary fragmentation pattern of the
9N314M warhead, the known speed of the aeroplane and a three dimensional model of

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3.8.3 Warhead simulation
Using the presence of a pre-formed fragmentation 9N314M warhead, TNO worked to
analyse the possible trajectories of the high-energy objects that would emanate from the
warhead. A summary of that work is discussed in this paragraph. The full report is
published in the on-line appendices on the Dutch Safety Board’s website (Appendix Y).
Several runs of the simulation were performed using three different warheads varying in
size, shape and explosive force. Table 18 shows the three warhead models used in the
simulation.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Characteristics                                  Model I                                  Model II                              Model III
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of pre-formed fragments      Unknown                            1,825 bow-tie                        1,870 bow-tie       
                                                                                               1,825 fller                             1,870 fller
                                                                                               4,093 square                         4,100 square
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Minimum ejection angle (degrees)        72                                         76                                        68
Maximum ejection angle (degrees)     109                                        112                                      126
Lowest fragment speed (m/s)          circa 1,700                          circa 1,300                              circa 1,110
Highest fragment speed (m/s)         circa 2,300                          circa 2,520                              circa 2,460
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 18: Warhead models used by TNO in the warhead simulation tool.

The following consideration was included in the simulation; fragmentation damage is
dependent on the distance of an aircraft from the warhead, the orientation of the aircraft
relative to the cloud of fragments and their impact velocity. The impact velocity is
determined by the vector sum of the warhead’s speed, the ejection velocity of the
fragments and the speed of the aircraft. Fragments encounter deceleration through the
atmosphere and perforating the aircraft structure, losing kinetic energy with each
subsequent perforation of material.
This warhead simulation was intended to compare the outcome with the actual damage
observed. Multiple runs of the simulation were performed using different warhead
characteristics (e.g. mass and number of pre-formed fragments), weapon approach
speed and angles. The warhead’s determined position at detonation took into account
the time between detonation of the warhead and the impact of the fragments. The
results of the simulation are shown in Table 19.

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Based on its calculations, TNO concluded that a 70 kg warhead detonated 0.0 metres
ahead and 2.0 metres to the left of, and 3.7 metres above the aeroplane’s nose.
TNO’s simulation also showed that there is no match obtained between the observed
damage on the aeroplane and the simulated damage patterns when a smaller and lighter,
40 kg, warhead was applied. Figure 60 shows the simulated damage patterns for the set
of simulations with a 40 kg warhead which were closest to the actual observed damage.
This pattern gave a poorer match than was obtained with a heavier warhead (Model IIb).

Figure 60: Image of the damage pattern produced by the model of a 40 kg warhead in the warhead simulation
                model. (Source: TNO)

3.8.4 Ukrainian study
Based on the Ukrainian simulations, performed by the Kyiv Research Institute for Forensic
Expertise of the Ukrainian Ministry of Justice and the military experts of the Ukrainian
Defense Ministry, it was concluded that a 9N314M warhead detonated at approximately
4 metres to the left of and above the tip of the aeroplane’s nose.

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Figure 61: Simplifed representation of the volume of space of the warhead detonation location according to
                three independent simulations. (Source: Dutch Safety Board)

3.8.6 Simulations of the missile’s flight path
The investigation into the detonation of the warhead included fly out simulations which
also comprised the weapon’s possible flight paths. NLR, Ukraine, and JSC Concern

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Figure 63: Visualisation of Kyiv Research Institute for Forensic Expertise fly out simulation results. (Source: Kyiv
                Research Institute for Forensic Expertise)

JSC Concern Almaz-Antey performed a simulation of the effects that would be expected
from this weapon using detonation data that TNO had calculated and was included in
the draft version of this report. This was done without confrming that a 9N314M warhead,
carried by a 9M38-series missile and launched from a Buk surface-to-air missile system
had caused the crash. The material provided by JSC Concern Almaz-Antey was used by
the investigation as a validation of the models used by NLR and Kyiv Research Institute
for Forensic Expertise.
Results for sets of similar calculations were supplied; one for a warhead launched by a
9M38 missile and one for the same warhead launched by a 9M38M1 missile. These
calculations produced two areas, respectively, approximately 20 and 63 square
kilometres. The areas calculated by JSC Concern Almaz-Antey (see Figure 64) are
consistent with the results of the NLR and Kyiv Research Institute for Forensic Expertise
calculations.

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Whilst the results of the three studies all point to a similar geographic area, further
forensic research is required. Such work falls outside the mandate of the Dutch Safety
Board, both in terms of Annex 13 and the Kingdom Act ‘Dutch Safety Board’.

3.9 Blast damage

By reviewing the observed damage on recovered parts of the aeroplane and by
investigation of the blast pressure evolution for a number of discrete points on the
aeroplane’s contour, the effects of the blast of the warhead was analysed. This was
achieved by means of a so-called computational fluid dynamics simulation performed to
provide a high-fdelity quantitative description of the blast loading. The computational
fluid dynamic simulation takes into account the altitude, properties of the 9N314M
warhead, velocity of the aeroplane, velocity of the warhead, and shape of the aeroplane.
The position and orientation of the detonating warhead relative to the aeroplane was
taken from paragraph 3.8.3, model IIb.
Blast damage is highly dependent on the distance from the warhead, the orientation of
the aircraft part (so that it receives an incident or reflected blast) and the speed of the
aircraft. Blast has the following effect on aircraft structures, in increasing intensity:
• Compression of skin panels between frames and stiffeners where the skin does not
tear, and frames and stiffeners do not distort. This is known as dishing;
• Deformation of frames and stiffeners and detachment of skin panels, and
• Tears of skin panels and stiffeners.
Blast damage can be masked by perforation damage, damage caused by the break-up
of the aircraft and its impact with the ground. Of all the typical blast damage forms,
dishing is, in this situation, the most easily visually detected. Depression of skin panels
can also be caused by bending of aircraft parts during the break-up and impact with the
ground. Several depressions were found on the wreckage that could not be linked, with
suffcient certainty, to dishing.
The cockpit area had a considerable number of witness marks that provide an indication
of blast damage. The panel below the left hand cockpit windows is damaged by pitting
and showed traces of soot (see paragraph 2.12.2.7). The pitting damage is local and is
considered to be the result of hot fragments of a warhead detonating close by; evidence