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The above mentioned fndings are consistent with the conclusion of the Dutch Safety
Board that flight MH17 was struck by a 9N314M warhead as carried on a 9M38 series
missile and launched by a Buk surface-to-air missile system.

3.11 The in-flight break-up and its aftermath

3.11.1 Introduction
As part of the failure analysis, the structural fractures of the wreckage pieces were
examined. The purpose of this analysis was to determine whether there was pre-existing
damage that had initiated or contributed to the in-flight break-up. For that purpose
possible fatigue, mechanical damage, corrosion or repairs were looked after. A second
objective was to determine where on the aeroplane the failure had initiated. Descriptions
of types of failure found on the wreckage parts have been included in Appendix L.
Structural fractures at specifc locations were examined, namely the boundaries between
the four main parts of the aeroplane’s structure that have been recovered:
• cockpit and front fuselage;
• centre fuselage;
• rear fuselage;
• tail.
The failure analysis was limited to the wreckage parts that had been recovered.
3.11.2 The separation of the cockpit and front fuselage from the centre fuselage
The cockpit and the front fuselage separated at approximately STA888 from the centre
fuselage. Fractures in the cockpit and the forward fuselage were examined because
these fractures indicate the start of the break-up.
Multiple perforations were present in the cockpit region (i.e. forward of STA236.5). The
left hand side of the cockpit was fractured into small pieces. Therefore, the perforations
had probably acted as crack initiation sites. Due to the presence of these perforations,
the fractures in the cockpit region could not be analysed.

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Following this separation, several longitudinal fractures developed in the fuselage part
from STA655 until STA888/909, (fractures 8, 9, 17, 19 and 24) propagating to the rear,
caused radial opening of it and locally peeling of the skin from stringers and frames. The
other fractures between STA655 and STA888/STA909 were consistent with the radial
opening of the fuselage due to aerodynamic loads. Finally this fuselage part separated
from the centre fuselage behind it between STA888 and STA930, see Figure 68.

Figure 68: Observed position of fracture at STA 888/909 and type of loading of the fracture at STA888/909.
                Only between stringers 45R and 39R parts from the front and the centre fuselage ftted together. In
                the fgure the thick line indicates this location. (Source: Dutch Safety Board)

3.11.3 Separation of the rear fuselage from the centre fuselage
The rear fuselage separated from the centre fuselage at approximately STA1546. This
location coincides with the aft door frame of passenger doors 3L and 3R. The radial
fractures between the centre part and the rear part of the fuselage were consistent with
tensile and bending loading. A large skin panel on the left upper side of the fuselage,
extending from half way the main landing gear wheel bay in front of doors 3L and 3R to
about 1.5 meters aft of doors 3L and 3R, was found at the same location as the parts of
the rear fuselage (in wreckage site number 4). This part probably separated just before
the fuselage rear part broke away. As this part separated, the section at the doors was
weakened.

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3.11.5 Fractures in specifc parts
Also, fractures in a number of specifc parts were examined.
Rear pressure bulkhead
The curved rear pressure bulk head was fractioned and severely deformed. Figure 71
shows the fractures in the dome and the parts that were recovered, namely major
sections with clear intersection with the dome centre part (parts numbered 1, 2, 6 and 8)
and four smaller pieces intersecting with the fuselage structure (parts numbered 3, 4, 5
and 7).
The fractures in circumferential direction followed the intersection with either the
fuselage, or with the tear straps. These fractures are predominantly consistent with a
tensile overstress fracture in the net section. In addition, circumferential fractures were
observed at the connection to the centre part of the dome. Also these fractures surfaces
were consistent with overstress fractures as result of combinations of tension and out of
plane bending. Fractures in a radial direction were observed also consistent with tensile
overstress fractures. These fractures follow the fastener row underneath the radial
stiffeners.

Figure 71: Fractures in rear pressure bulkhead. Looking aft. The parts that were available for investigation are
                numbered 1 to 8. (Source: Dutch Safety Board)

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Figure 73: Fracture separating the vertical stabilizer from the fuselage. Attached skin and broken vertical
               stabilizer-to-fuselage frames bended out of their plane and fractured. (Source: Dutch Safety Board)

Horizontal stabilizers
The horizontal stabilizers had separated from the centre part just outside the fuselage.
Only the centre horizontal stabilizer part and the left hand horizontal stabilizer were
available for investigation. The fractures in the left horizontal stabilizer were consistent
with a downward bending moment acting in the separation plane. This moment was
caused by a downward acting loading on the horizontal stabilizer. Failure of the elevator
attachment brackets and power control units were consistent with high aerodynamic
loads acting on the elevator.
Main landing gear
The Flight Data Recorder data indicated that the main landing gear was in the retracted
position at the last recorded position of the aeroplane. Pictures taken on the crash site a
few days after the crash indicate that the right hand retract actuator of the main landing
gear was close to its retracted (gear-up) length. Therefore it can be concluded that the
landing gear was in the retracted position when the event occurred.

3.11.6 External damage exacerbated by airworthiness aspects
In paragraph 3.2.2, a number of airworthiness aspects were analysed and excluded as
being the cause of the crash. For completeness, a fnal hypothesis was also considered;

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As mentioned elsewhere in this report, no radar fxes or eye-witness statements on the
moment of the in-flight break-up were available. As a result, the information available to
make a reliable reconstruction of the flight path and the break-up sequence is limited.
Only information from distribution of debris over the six wreckage sites is available.
To obtain information about the moment of separation of some wreckage parts at a
certain moment, a ballistic trajectory analysis was carried out.
A ballistic trajectory analysis can be used to determine the trajectory through the air of an
object that has no aerodynamic lift. Its trajectory is determined by its ballistic coeffcient
(BC), which is the weight of an object divided by the product of its drag coeffcient with its
cross-sectional area. Thus a feather (which has a very low ballistic coeffcient) would fall
slowly when released from an initial point in space, moving almost exclusively with the
wind to the ground. In contrast, a bowling ball (which has a high ballistic coeffcient) would
fall rapidly, with very little displacement resulting from the wind.
A ballistic trajectory analysis was performed for selected wreckage parts recovered on
the ground, with known starting conditions; the last recorded FDR position and time,
flight altitude and airspeed. Using the known wind speed and directions from the ground
until the cruise altitude, it was possible to determine the trajectories and thus the landing
locations. More information about the method of ballistic trajectory analysis is found in
Appendix K.
3.11.7.2 Results of the ballistic trajectory analysis
A ballistic trajectory analysis was performed for parts, with the following starting
conditions: last known FDR position, time of last FDR recording, speed and altitude,
taking into account the reported wind from cruise level to the earth.
By running the ballistic trajectory analysis for multiple ballistic coeffcients, a so-called
locus line was obtained. The locus line represents the possible ground positions of
wreckage parts after break-up, assuming that they all separated at the same initial
position, altitude and speed and assuming a ballistic trajectory taking into account the
wind, see Figure 74.

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The combination of the cockpit with the lower fuselage part has a very high ballistic
coeffcient. This means it would likely be found near the lower end of the locus line if it
separated from the aircraft at the point of initial break-up, and that is where it was found
(site 3).
All parts from the fuselage part in front of STA888/909 that were recovered, were found
in the sites 1, 2 and 3, at or very close to the locus line.
Thus, it can be concluded that all the pieces of wreckage from the fuselage part in front
of STA888/909, recovered from the sites 1, 2 and 3, separated from the aeroplane in the
frst few seconds after the impact of the high-energy objects.
All aeroplane parts of the fuselage aft of STA888/909, wings and empennage were found
in sites 4, 5 and 6. These sites are located relatively far beyond the locus line. From this it
can be concluded that these parts separated from the aeroplane much later than those
of the forward fuselage.
3.11.8 Break-up of the aeroplane
After the impact of the high-energy objects the aeroplane broke up in the air: There are
two distinct phases in relation to the in flight break-up; the break-up of the front fuselage
and the centre/rear fuselage. These are described in the paragraphs below.
3.11.8.1 Break-up of the front fuselage
The front fuselage broke into the following three main components:
• the damaged cockpit with a large part of the lower fuselage with the passenger floor
in front of STA655;
• large parts of the fuselage above the passenger floor, in front of STA655;
• the cylindrical fuselage part between STA655 and STA888/909.
Within approximately one second the fuselage top parts in front of STA655, above the
passenger floor, were bent upward, while the fuselage lower part in front of STA655, was
bent downward. This was followed immediately by the fuselage part behind it, bending
radially outward and separating behind the doors 2L and 2R at (STA 888/909).
All recovered parts from the fuselage in front of STA888/909, were found on or very
close to the locus line. This indicates that the break-up sequence of the forward part of
the aeroplane took place immediately after the last FDR recording, and lasted in the
order of seconds.
3.11.8.2 Break-up of the centre and rear fuselage
The separation of the forward fuselage resulted in signifcant changes to the mass and
balance and aerodynamic characteristics or the aeroplane, substantially modifying its
flight characteristics.
The centre of gravity moved aft, probably behind its rear certifed limit, probably causing
longitudinal instability of the aeroplane. Further, the aerodynamic loads that would
normally result from the air impacting and flowing over the smooth forward fuselage

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In site 5 the vertical fn was located and in close proximity parts of the tail section. The
crew bunk container, located in the aeroplane aft cargo compartment (hold 31 and 32),
was located in site 5.
Other cargo items from load positions 41 to 44 (See Appendix E) were found spread over
sites 4 and 5. These items were found in reverse, meaning that the items that originate
from the left hand side of the aeroplane were found predominantly on the right hand
side of the expected flight track and vice versa. This combined with other wreckage
pieces suggest that at this point the aeroplane may have been inverted.
In site 6 a fuselage part just in front of passenger door 3R was found under the aeroplane
keel beam structure together with a part of the lower fuselage, normally located just in
front of the centre wing. This suggests that the centre fuselage with the remainder of the
wings and engines was in an upside down position by a rotation around the lateral axis,
and thus moving in a rearward direction, during impact with the ground. Both wings
were found separated from the mid centre section, up-side down in site 6. The engines
did not separate in the air as both engines were found in site 6 in close proximity of their
respective wing positions. However, the left engine intake ring was found in site 2. This
indicates an earlier separation in time of that part.
With the available information the conclusion can be drawn that after separation of the
front fuselage, the centre and aft fuselage sections with the complete wings continued
flying, and then after a short time interval the wing tips broke off and the aft fuselage
section and tail separated. Thereafter the aft fuselage section may have rolled inverted
when the stabilizers separated, and later the damaged tail section, with the vertical fn
and the stabilizer centre torsion box, separated near STA2150. These parts landed closely
together. From the wreckage pattern it can be seen that this would have been at a low
altitude. The centre fuselage fnally landed in an inverted position after a rotation around
its lateral axis.
The time interval between the separation of the front fuselage and the moment that the
remainder of the aeroplane impacted the ground is estimated to have been 1-1.5 minutes.

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It requires a force of only a few Newton*20 to remove the fring pin from the oxygen
generator. Therefore, it is conceivable that the oxygen generators were fred as a result
of the blast, the dynamic forces during the in-flight break-up or the impact with the
ground. The oxygen generator which had not been fred, originated from the crew rest
area. It is considered possible that the rest area, a closed container, may have been
better protected against the dynamic forces during the in-flight break-up or from the
impact with the ground.

Figure 75: One of the recovered passenger oxygen generators. (Source: Dutch Safety Board)

The flight crew’s emergency oxygen supply is a different system to that in the cabin.
Information on the flight crew system could not contribute to the analysis of the cabin
pressure or cabin oxygen supply system.

3.13 Recovery and identifcation of victims flight MH17
Given the circumstances, the recovery and transporting of the human remains were
carried out with the greatest possible care. The recovery method adopted during the
frst few days after the crash allowed a substantial number of the victims to be identifed
reasonably quickly. At the time of the report’s production, two of the 298 occupants had
not been identifed.
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*20 For reference see Federal Aviation Administration specifcation TSO-C64.

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During the process to identify the victims, one passenger was found with an oxygen
mask around the neck. It is unclear how the mask got there. The traces the NFI found
during the forensic examination were not suitable for constructing a DNA profle, thus it
remains unclear whether the person concerned put on the mask in a reflex or that it was
done by someone on the ground after the passenger’s death.

3.15 Recording of radar data

During the investigation, the Russian Federation declared that the requirement to store
surveillance radar data only relates to Russian Federation territory. As flight MH17 crashed
outside this territory, according to the Russian Federation, there was no requirement to
retain data of flight MH17. However, the ICAO requirements in paragraph 6.4.1 of Annex
11 make no distinction about the geographic limitation regarding the storage of data
and they imply that all data shall be recorded. This means that there was a requirement
to store all radar data, both raw and processed data, regardless of state bounderies.
The extract of the Russian Federation’s national requirements supplied to the investigation
does not mention a distinction about the geographic limitation regarding the storage of
data. The automatic recording of radar data by the Russian Federation differs from the
ICAO standard. When a State cannot, or will not, follow the provisions of an ICAO
standard, ICAO requires that the difference between the national version of a specifc
standard and ICAO’s text be reported to ICAO. The obligation to make such a notifcation
arises from Article 38 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation.
Based on the information available, it cannot be concluded that a difference exists
between the Russian Federation’s requirements and the ICAO standard in this matter.

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PART B: Flying
over conflict zones
This part of the report focuses on the
investigation into the flight route of flight MH17
on 17 July 2014 and the decision-making related
to flying over conflict zones.

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INTRODUCTION TO PART B

This Part of the report deals with the flight route of flight MH17 on 17 July 2014 and the
decision-making process about flight routes above conflict areas.
The key questions are:

Part B consists of six Sections:
• A description of the system of responsibilities of parties involved;
• Indicators related to the situation in the eastern part of Ukraine in the months prior to
the crash of flight MH17;
• The airspace management by Ukraine in the period up to and including 17 July 2014;
• The route and flight operations of flight MH17, the decisions made by the airline,
Malaysia Airlines, and the decisions made by other airlines and other states with
regard to flying over the conflict area in the eastern part of Ukraine;
• The role of the Netherlands, as the state of departure of flight MH17, with regard to
flying over conflict areas;
• Risk assessment related to flying over conflict zones.
Part B relates to part A in the following manner:
• In Section 2.1 (part A), flight MH17 is introduced: the flight plan and the actual conduct
of the flight. In Section 7.2 (Part B), this is further elaborated.
• In Section 2.9 (part A), Air Traffc Management is introduced. In Section 6 of part B,
this is further elaborated.
After the crash of flight MH17, various actions were taken to make flying over conflict
areas safer. Appendix P provides an overview. Where relevant, these are also mentioned
in the report itself.

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4.2.1 States’ responsibilities

4.2.1.1 The state that manages the airspace
Each state has sovereignty over the airspace over its territory. This means that the
relevant state exercises complete and exclusive control over its own airspace.*32 States
enter into mutual agreements to open their airspace to operators from other states.*33 For
reasons of safety, a state may impose limitations on the use of its airspace and determine
along which routes and at which minimum altitude aircraft may fly within that airspace.
The managing state can also partly or fully close its airspace if this is necessary for safety
reasons.*34 Due to its sovereignty, however, a state cannot be compelled to do so.
In the State Safety Programme (SSP), the state describes how policy, regulations,
permitting processes and monitoring are organised.*35 A state should ensure a safety
level of the airspace that it has chosen. Although it is not explicitly established anywhere
that the manager of the airspace must guarantee the safety of the relevant airspace,
ICAO documents reveal that this is expected of states. The introduction to Doc 9554-
AN/932*36 stipulates that ‘The common use by civil and military aviation of airspace and of
certain facilities and services shall be arranged so as to ensure the safety, regularity and
effciency of international civil aviation’. From this one can deduce that the state must
make all reasonable attempts to ensure the safety of the airspace, specifcally in case of
common use by civil and military aviation. Circular 330 AN/189, which offers guidance on
the joint use of airspace by civil and military aircraft, also states: ‘Obligations of ICAO
Member States under the Chicago Convention germane to civil/military issues include:
a. Rule-making as regards aviation safety rules in compliance with ICAO SARPs contained
in the Annexes to the Convention (Article 37);
b. Carrying out tasks which pertain to, for instance, ATM and which are laid down in the
Annexes to the Convention, such as the classifcation of airspace and coordination
between civil and military air traffc.’
Moreover, paragraph 10.3 of Doc 9554-AN/932 states that the state responsible for air
traffc services should, on the basis of available information, determine the geographical
conflict area and assess the dangers or possible dangers to civil aviation. Based on the
assessment, the state should decide whether the operation of civil aircraft should be
avoided in or through the conflict area or could be allowed to continue under certain
conditions. In the latter case, the state should publish an international NOTAM with the
necessary information, recommendation and safety measures to be taken and update
this on the basis of any developments.*37
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*32 Convention on International Civil Aviation, ICAO Doc 7300/9, Paragraph 1.
*33 Airlines from other states need an overflight permit (Convention on International Civil Aviation, ICAO Doc 7300/9,
Article 6). The permit specifes that the airline pays an overflight charge to the state managing the airspace. The
costs are worked out in an agreement that arises from article 6.
*34 Convention on International Civil Aviation, ICAO Doc 7300/9, Article 9. This includes the activities a state shall
undertake to ensure an acceptable safety level. Here it involves activities related to Annexes 1, 6, 8, 11, 13, 14 and 19.
*35 Convention on International Civil Aviation Annex 19, Paragraph 3.1.1.
*36 Doc 9554 has a recommending function and is not binding.
*37 ICAO is currently updating Doc 9554. It should be completed in 2015.

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ICAO Member States shall use a national aviation security programme for aviation
security. In accordance with Annex 17, such a programme exclusively applies to the
security of the state’s own aviation infrastructure.
Risks related to the use of foreign airspace are not specifcally addressed in Annex 17.
This does not, however, preclude states from conducting risk assessments of foreign
airspace, as appropriate.
A state can request its operators to take additional security measures when operating
specifc flights in the airspace of other states.*49 The state shall also possess systems for
monitoring requirements related to aviation security.*50
4.2.2 Operators’ responsibilities
Operators determine which flight routes they use in the available airspace and perform
their own assessments when opting for a particular flight route. These may be
considerations of aviation safety, but also concern the aeroplane and costs. The
responsibility for safe flight operations is also cited in Annex 6 of the Chicago
Convention.*51 In accordance with the aforementioned Annex 17 of the Chicago
Convention, states shall require its commercial air transport operators to have in place a
written operator security programme that satisfes the requirements of the National Civil
Aviation Security Programme of the state concerned.*52 Combined with the provisions in
Annex 19, they are required to have and use a safety management system as well as a
security programme.*53 Annex 17 includes provisions for operators mainly related to the
security at aerodromes or in the aeroplane. The security of flight routes in foreign
airspace is not part of the provisions in Annex 17.
If a particular foreign airspace is not closed or restricted, and the state in which an
operator is based has not issued an overflight prohibition or restriction that applies to
this particular airspace, it is the operator that decides whether to use that airspace or
not. This means that operators have a responsibility to determine whether a flight route
is safe enough to be used. Operators can use various information sources, such as public
sources, sources from the government of the state in which they are based, external
consultants, other operators and its own personnel. The latter also includes staff
specifcally charged with security aspects.
The aircraft captain is responsible for ensuring that flights are operated in accordance
with aviation regulations as included in ICAO Annex 2.*54 This also covers flight
preparation.*55 ICAO does not specifcally mention the assessment of safety and security
aspects related to airspace and flight route. ICAO anticipates a role for the operator as
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*49 ICAO Annex 17, Paragraph 2.4.1.
*50 ICAO Annex 17, Paragraph 3.4 - Quality Control.
*51 Convention on International Civil Aviation Annex 6, part I, Aeroplanes, Paragraph 4.1.
*52 Annex 17 of the Chicago Convention affords states room for a broad interpretation in which risks to foreign flight
paths are also part of the National Security Plan, but the elaboration in the ‘Aviation Security Manual’ illustrates
that such a broad interpretation is uncommon.
*53 ICAO Annex 19, Safety Management, Paras 3.1.3 and 4.1 and ICAO Annex 17, Paragraph 3.3.1.
*54 Convention on International Civil Aviation Annex 2, Rules of the Air, Paragraph 2.3.1.
*55 Convention on International Civil Aviation Annex 2, Paragraph 2.3.2.

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With this in mind, all aviation parties bear a major responsibility with regard to safety.
The Dutch Safety Board expects private and public parties in the system to manage
safety (including new risks) as effectively as possible and using the latest technology,
both individually as well as collectively. The nature of this responsibility of the parties
concerned can be compared to that of a duty of care. This means that the parties are
expected to make optimal efforts with regard to civil aviation safety and not exclusively
stick to their strict task description.
The Dutch Safety Board expects states and operators to - at least - comply with legislation
and regulations. With regard to Sections 6 and 7, dealing with the responsibilities of
Ukraine and Malaysia Airlines, the legal frameworks as discussed in Appendix Q represent
a major component of the frame of reference for the investigation conducted by the
Dutch Safety Board. Since the investigation also examines the extent to which the legal
frameworks and their implementation leave room for improvement, the Dutch Safety
Board also adopts its own frame of reference in addition to the legal frameworks.
The general principles of the frame of reference adopted by the Dutch Safety Board
arise from insights from safety science and involve risk inventory and risk assessment and
coping with uncertainty.
4.3.1 Risk inventory and risk assessment
The Dutch Safety Board expects all parties involved - states, operators and international
organisations such as ICAO and EASA - in the spirit of the Chicago Convention, and with
regard to the principles behind ICAO to proactively identify risks and, if necessary, adapt
their safety approach to limit these risks as much as can reasonably be expected. This
means that all the organisations involved shall always take the measures available to
reduce and/or manage the risk, unless these involve demonstrably disproportionately
high costs or other negative consequences. This general principle arises from the
so-called ‘ALARP’ *60 principle, which requires parties involved to consciously and
transparently weigh risks against the effort, time and investments needed to reduce and/
or manage that risk. This principle originated in the feld of external safety and means
that parties that cause risks shall take measures in the context of their social duty of care,
unless they can demonstrate that these measures are disproportionate.
4.3.2 Coping with uncertainty
The Dutch Safety Board expects uncertainty to be the basic point of departure of the
approach adopted by the parties. This means that the parties concerned shall remain
constantly alert and receptive to signals that could indicate the inaccuracy or
incompleteness of earlier assumptions. This requires them to be constantly vigilant with
regard to risks and be prepared to question common assumptions.
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*60 ALARP: As Low As Reasonably Practicable.

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this by issuing a NOTAM in which the message from the Russian Federation was rejected
and in which was indicated that Ukraine continued to be responsible for providing air
traffc services in this airspace.
This was followed by more NOTAMs from Ukraine as well as from the Russian Federation.*64
The situation thus created led to the possibility that civil aviation over the area would
receive conflicting instructions, as the various NOTAMs made it clear that there were two
air navigation service providers that both claimed responsibility for air traffc management.
This could present a risk to the safety of air traffc due to possible conflicting instructions.
On 2 April 2014, ICAO published a State Letter in which Member States were informed
of the potential risks to the safety of civil flights in the Simferopol FIR, as a result of the
conflicting instructions: ‘Due to the unsafe situation where more than one ATS provider
may be controlling flights within the same airspace from 3 April 2014, 0600 UTC onwards,
consideration should be given to measures to avoid the airspace and circumnavigate the
Simferopol FIR with alternative routings.’ *65
Also on 2 April, and in response to the ICAO State Letter, the Network Manager at
EUROCONTROL urgently recommended that operators avoid Crimean airspace (the
Simferopol FIR) and select alternative routes.*66 On 3 April 2014, EASA issued a Safety
Information Bulletin (SIB), in which EASA highlighted ICAO’s warning.*67
In the State Letter of 2 April 2014 regarding Simferopol FIR, ICAO also announced that it
would continue to remain active in coordinating all parties regarding any dangers for civil
aviation: ‘ICAO continues to actively coordinate with all involved authorities, international
organisations, airspace users and other states in the region regarding developments as
they unfold, specifcally those which could impact flight safety.’ However, during the
period of 2 April through 17 July 2014, the period during which the armed conflict in the
eastern part of Ukraine broke out and intensifed, ICAO did not mention the situation in
Ukraine again.
The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) published FDC NOTAM 4/3635 on
4 March 2014. In this NOTAM, the FAA warned U.S. operators and airmen that were
flying to, from or over Ukraine to be careful in connection with potential instability. From
this information it appeared that there were increasing military activities in Ukraine
airspace and in the area of military aerodromes. Civil aviation could encounter military
activities, particularly in the Crimea region: ‘Potentially hazardous situation - Flight
operations into, out of, within, or over the Ukraine U.S. Operators and airmen should
exercise caution when operating in the Lvov (UKLV), Kyiv (UKBV), Dnepropetrovsk (UKDV),
Odessa (UKOV) and Simferopol (UKFV) flight information regions (FIRs) due to the
potential for instability. Information from the European Emergency Coordination Crisis
Cell and open source media reports indicates there is an increased military presence in
the airspace over Ukraine and in the vicinity of military aerodromes. Civil flight operations
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*64 These are the following NOTAMs: A0528/14, A0520/14, A0524/14 and A0569/14 from Ukraine and NOTAMs
A0906/14, A0907/14A02, A0907/14B02, A0909/14, A0910/14, A0911/14A02, A0911/14B02, A0912/14 from the
Russian Federation.
*65 ICAO State Letter (EUR/NAT 14-0243.TEC (FOL/CUP)), 2 April 2014.
*66 EUROCONTROL Headline News, 2 April 2014.
*67 EASA Safety Information Bulletin 2014-10, 3 April 2014.