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5.3 Shootings involving military aircraft

During the period between the conflict breaking out in the eastern part of Ukraine in
April 2014 and the day of the crash of flight MH17 on 17 July, a number of Ukrainian
military aircraft were shot at (mostly from the ground). The Ukrainian authorities offcially
confrmed some of these incidents although specifc details, such as the weapons used
or the altitude at which the incident occurred, were not always revealed.
This Section provides an overview of the incidents that were confrmed by the Ukrainian
authorities. These are also shown in Figure 77. In those cases in which Ukrainian authorities
mentioned the flight altitude of a downed aeroplane, this is indicated in the fgure. It
cannot be ruled out that, during the period mentioned, other incidents also occurred.
Therefore, no verifed overview of the total number of incidents can be provided.
On 22 April 2014, a Ukrainian military aeroplane (Antonov An-30B) was shot at during a
reconnaissance flight above Slavyansk. On its website, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence
declared that the aeroplane had been attacked using automatic weapons, but had been
able to land safely.*73 The shooting of the Antonov An-30B was, as far as known, one of
the frst incidents in the eastern part of Ukraine in which an Ukrainian Air Force aeroplane
had been hit from the ground and that had been confrmed by the authorities. During
the weeks following the incident involving the Antonov An-30B, mainly helicopters of the
Ukrainian Air Force were shot above the conflict area.*74 Some of these incidents were
offcially confrmed.

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*73 Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence website, http://www.mil.gov.ua/news/2014/04/22/nad-slov’yanskombuv-obstrilyanij-litak-povitryanih-sil-zs-ukraini/, consulted on 11 March 2015.
*74 See for example: Ukraine’s Ministry of Internal Affairs, http://mvs.gov.ua/mvs/control/main/uk/publish/
article/1065660, consulted on 14 January 2015.

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In June and July, transport and fghter aeroplanes were downed as well as helicopters.
On 6 June 2014, a spokesman for the Ukrainian armed forces stated on social media that
an Antonov An-30B had been downed using a MANPADS at an altitude of less than
4,500 metres near Slavyansk.*75 On 14 June 2014, the Ministry of Defence reported that a
Ukrainian Air Force Ilyushin 76MD military transport aeroplane had been downed during
landing at Luhansk aerodrome. This was carried out using a MANPADS, followed by
machine gun fre. There were 49 fatalities.*76 Various media devoted attention to this event
and the incident also led to international reactions.*77 During the weeks that followed,
other incidents occurred in which a helicopter (Mil Mi-8TV, 24 June 2014) and fghter
aeroplanes were shot down. On 1 July an attempt was made to down a Su-25 UB *78 and
on 2 July 2014 a Su-24 was shot at.*79 Both were allegedly targeted by a MANPADS.
On 14 July, three days prior to the crash of flight MH17, a Ukrainian Air Force transport
aeroplane, an Antonov An-26, was downed in the Luhansk region, killing two members
of the crew. On the same day, Ukraine’s National Security and Defence Council (RNBO)
published a press release that stated that the aircraft was flying at an altitude of
6,500 metres when it was hit (see the box for a literal English translation of the text).*80
Given this altitude, according to the Ukrainian authorities the aircraft must have been hit
by a ‘more powerful weapon’ than a MANPADS.
The Ukrainian government assumed two possibilities: a modern anti-aircraft system
‘Pantsir’ *81 or an ‘X-24 Air-to-air missile’.*82 The authorities assumed that it was a weapon
fred from the Russian Federation, because the armed groups would not have such
weapons.*83, *84 Later, the Ukrainian authorities stated that is was most likely an air-to-airmissile. Because the An-26 flew below the altitude of FL230-240, which was regarded as
safe to military aviation, the authorities did not see the attack as a risk for civil aviation
that flew above FL320.
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*75 The press secretary of the Ukrainian armed forces announced via social media that it involved an An-26: https://
wwwfacebook.com/vladislav.seleznev.94/posts/451342608335801, consulted 11 March 2015. Aviation Safety
Network reported that it could not be established with certainty whether an An-30B or An-26 had been involved:
http://aviation-safety.net/database/rec … 0140606-0, consulted 13 January 2015.
*76 http://www.mil.gov.ua/news/2014/06/14/v … ni-il-76/,
consulted on 13 January 2015.
*77 See for example http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldne … g-49.html, consulted on 12 March 2015; http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27850190,
consulted on 12 March 2015.
*78 There is no known offcial, written confrmation of this incident, even though a spokesperson for the Ukrainian
armed forces is cited as confrming the incident in various media: http://ukr.segodnya.ua/regions/donetsk/
terroristy-pytalis-iz-zenitok-sbit-samolet-su-25-spiker-ato-532935.html, consulted on 13 January; http://www.wz.
lviv.ua/news/69458, consulted on 13 January; http://podrobnosti.ua/podrobnosti/2014/ … 2855.html.
*79 http://www.rnbo.gov.ua/news/1711.html?PrintVersion.
*80 The altitude of the Antonov An-26 is not substantiated with further details in the RNBO press release.
*81 A Pantsir-S1 is a combined system of airborne guns and medium-range surface-to-air missiles with a range of up to
20 kilometres. (http://www.janes.com/article/48685/russ … t-ukraine,
consulted 14 August 2015).
*82 This type of air-to-air missile is not known. In response to additional questions by the Dutch Safety Board about
this incident, the Ukrainian authorities have stated that, when drafting the report, a technical error was made in the
reference to the type.
*83 http://mediarnbo.org/2014/07/14/zvedena … -17-00-14-
lipnya-2014-roku/ and http://mediarnbo.org/2014/07/15/znayden … hu-an-26/, consulted
on 27 July 2015.
*84 The shoot-down of the An-26 was also confrmed by Klimkin, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in a closed briefng
with diplomats at the Presidential Administration of Ukraine. But then a flight altitude of 6,200 metres was
mentioned. Also see Sections 5 and 8.4 and Appendix T

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On 17 July 2014, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence stated that, on 16 July, a Sukhoi Su-25
fghter aeroplane was shot at in the Donetsk region, near the Ukrainian-Russian border
(Amvrosiivka). According to Ukraine, it involved an air-to-air missile that had apparently
been fred by a military aeroplane belonging to the Russian Federation’s armed forces,
which was conducting border control flights.*91 On 17 July, the Ministry of Defence
reported that the previous day, another Su-25 had been shot at by a MANPADS, in which
the pilot of the fghter plane had successfully performed an emergency landing.*92
Op 18 July, the shooting of the Su-25 at Amvrosiivka was also mentioned in a media
report by the RNBO National Security and Defence Council. It stated that the Su-25 was
shot down above the Russian Federation at 8,250 metres with a Russian MIG-29 by a
medium-range air-to-air missile.*93 In response to additional questions by the Dutch Safety
Board about this incident, the Ukrainian authorities stated that a provisional investigation
had revealed that the plane was flying at an altitude of 6,250 metres. It also stated that
the possibility of a shooting down with a Pantsir system (also from the Russian Federation)
was viewed as an alternative (but less likely) cause. When exactly this preliminary
investigation has been completed has not been stated.
From the aforementioned it is clear that between April and July, the armed conflict in the
eastern part of Ukraine was continuing to extend into the air. Ukrainian armed forces
aeroplanes and helicopters conducted assault flights and transported military personnel
and equipment to and from the conflict area. The armed groups that were fghting
against the Ukrainian government attempted to down these aeroplanes. In May 2014,
mainly helicopters were downed, while in June and July also military aeroplanes were
downed, including fghter aeroplanes.
The Ukrainian authorities did not specify the exact altitude at which the attacked aircraft
were flying for the majority of these incidents. From the offcial confrmations it is clear,
however, that in many cases the shootings were carried out with portable short-range
surface-to-air missiles. In the case of the Antonov An-26 on 14 July and that of the Sukhoi
Su-25 on 16 July, the Ukrainian authorities also stated the possibility of a medium-range
surface-to-air missile or an air-to-air missile, possibly fred from inside the Russian
Federation. In an offcial statement related to the shooting of the An-26, the Ukrainian
authorities specifed an altitude of 6,500 metres - an altitude that, in their opinion, could
not be reached using MANPADS. The Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service
(MIVD) concluded on the basis of images of the damage and witness statements that the
aeroplane must have been shot down with a MANPADS. The possibility of an air-to-air
missile was not mentioned (see Section 8.4). The Russian Federation denied any
involvement in the incidents.
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*91 http://www.mil.gov.ua/news/2014/07/17/r … -donbasu/, consulted 13
January 2015. This press release was published on 17 July at 12.18 CET on the website of Ukraine’s Ministry of
Defence.
*92 http://www.mil.gov.ua/news/2014/07/16/b … otivnika/, consulted 13 January 2015.
*93 http://mediarnbo.org/2014/07/18/nsc-new … /?lang=en, consulted 13
July 2015.

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‘To your last specifc question, yes, they do include that. What we see in training on the
east side of the border is big equipment, tanks, APCs, anti-aircraft capability, and now we
see those capabilities being used on the west side of the border.’
At a later point during the press conference he spoke of ‘vehicle-borne capability’
(weapon systems transported on vehicles), which were apparently being used for training
on the eastern side of the Ukrainian border, even though there had not yet been any
reports of their being spotted across the border:
‘So there has been a release of NATO data on tanks. I believe YouTube has other vehicles,
such as armoured personnel carriers. We have not seen any of the air defence vehicles
across the border yet, but we’ve seen them training in the western part of Russia, et
cetera. So I think that there are several types and capabilities of heavy weaponry that are
moving across that border.’
The NATO general did not specify which weapons, nor whether medium or long-range
surface-to-air missiles were involved. He did not explicitly state which parties were
involved in the cited training: the Russian Federation and/or armed groups fghting
against the Ukrainian government. Defence staff from other states doubted the accuracy
of the information supplied by General Breedlove. They could not confrm it from their
own observations.*97
Despite the Western political and military focus on the conflict, its escalation and its air
component, none of the politicians or authorities quoted publicly made a connection
between the military developments in the eastern part of Ukraine and risks to civil aviation.

5.5 Reports in the media related to possible available weapons capability

In the months prior to 17 July, reports also circulated in the media (including social media)
on the presence of weapons, including surface-to-air missiles, in the hands of the armed
groups that were fghting the Ukrainian government in the eastern part of Ukraine.*98 For
example armed groups seized the Ukrainian military air defence base A-1402 on 29 June
2014. Reports in the media indicated that, as a result, the armed groups had also been
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*97 Interview with Dutch defence attaché.
*98 On 26 May, for example, a spokesperson of the Ukrainian armed forces revealed in the media that a surface-to-airmissile-system that was being used by armed groups near Donetsk airport had been destroyed from a helicopter
by the Ukrainian army. On 5 June 2014, the International New York Times reported that armed groups received
instructions on how to use ‘surface-to-air missiles, a 30-millimetre automatic grenade launcher, heavy machine
guns and antitank weapons’. According to a leader of the armed groups these were weapons that the armed
groups had seized from the Ukrainian army. A day later, the International New York Times reported that surface-toair missiles had been seized from military bases. On 11 June, the newspaper Argumenty nedeli reported that
armed groups had apparently downed between nine and eleven helicopters, two SU-25s and an An-30B in just
one month. The same article also reported that a Buk-M1 system had been present in an area under the armed
groups’ control.

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‘Every third sortie was downed.’ The information that Ukrainian authorities provided
during a briefng with diplomats about the shoot-down of an Antonov An-26, possibly
from inside the Russian Federation,*102 was also placed in this geopolitical and militarystrategic perspective: what would the consequences be for Ukraine’s domestic political
stability and what risks would this and the possible Russian involvement entail for security
in Europe? The same applied to the information that NATO possessed concerning
military developments and the build-up of weapons in and around the conflict area, as
described by General Breedlove (see Section 5.4).
During the aforementioned discussions, the diplomats present did not pose any
questions about the safety of the airspace for civil aviation. Insofar as the Dutch Safety
Board has been able to ascertain, the diplomats saw no reason, based on the content of
the available information, to inform aviation authorities in their states about the situation
in Ukraine. One of the sources stated: ‘At no point whatsoever did we think about the
fact that civil aircraft were flying over the area.’
In response to such statements, made in interviews conducted by the Dutch Safety
Board, diplomatic documents in which there were discussions about weapon systems on
the ground and risks to civil aviation were expressly sought. The only relevant diplomatic
document that the Dutch Safety Board was able to fnd is a memorandum about the
situation in Crimea that Ukraine’s permanent representative to the OSCE issued to all
OSCE delegations and cooperation partners. This memorandum, dated 7 March 2014,
mentions, among other things, that Russian military troops had tried to take control of an
air defence regiment, including the Buk missiles located there, belonging to the Ukrainian
armed forces in Crimea. In this context the memorandum states: ‘The Ministry of Defense
of Ukraine underlines that this kind of interference of the Russian servicemen in operation
of the military unit of Ukraine causes real threat of illegal use of weapons against aircrafts
in the airspace of Ukraine.’ However, this document does not explicitly mention risks to
civil aviation either; it is also possible that the statement refers to risks to Ukrainian
military aircraft. It must be emphasised that this memorandum refers to Crimea, not to
the eastern part of Ukraine, and that it is dated the beginning of March, so before there
was any armed conflict in the eastern part of Ukraine and over four months prior to the
crash of flight MH17.
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*102 Therein a flight altitude of 6,200 metres was mentioned. Also see Section 8.4 and Appendix T.

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6 FLIGHT MH17 ON 17 JULY 2014 - UKRAINE’S
MANAGEMENT OF THE AIRSPACE
This Section addresses the question why the airspace above the eastern part of Ukraine,
a conflict area where the fghting had expanded into the airspace, was open above a
certain restriction, allowing civil aviation to continue to fly over the conflict area. The
central role of the Ukrainian State in this Section arises from the system of the distribution
of responsibility in accordance with the Chicago Convention (see the diagram in Section
4.2). As a sovereign state, Ukraine exerts full control over its airspace and thus bears
primary responsibility for its safety. Therefore, it can decide whether it is necessary to
restrict or close the airspace to air traffc.*103 The signals related to the armed conflict and
its expansion to the airspace, as described in Section 5, provide the context in which the
State of Ukraine made decisions about the airspace above the eastern part of Ukraine.
The following topics are addressed in this Section:
• The organisation of Ukraine’s airspace management;
• The airspace restrictions issued by Ukraine;
• Airspace management in other conflict areas.
In some cases the answers provided by the parties involved to the questions posed by
the Dutch Safety Board were inconsistent. This is specifed where applicable, and if
necessary clarifcation is provided by the Dutch Safety Board.

6.1 The organisation of Ukraine’s airspace management

Ukraine’s airspace was originally divided into fve flight information regions (FIRs), namely:
L’viv FIR, Kyiv FIR, Odesa FIR, Simferopol FIR and Dnipropetrovsk FIR (see Figure 78). On
3 March 2014, Simferopol FIR was decommissioned and management of that part of the
airspace was divided between the Odesa and Dnipropetrovsk air traffc management
centres.
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*103 Convention on International Civil Aviation, ICAO Doc 7300, Articles 1, 2 and 3a

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Requests for airspace closures or restrictions are assessed on a regular basis if the
requests are made for military training purposes. Requests for airspace restrictions are
carried out without any further question if they are deemed necessary by the military
authorities in relation to an armed conflict (the red dashed line in the diagram of
Figure 79). These types of requests are considered to be decisions that have been taken
at the highest level and are not discussed or influenced by UkSATSE or SASU.

Figure 79: Organisational chart for the air navigation services in Ukraine. (Source: UkSATSE)

The Ukrainian aviation authority (SASU) took the formal decisions to close part of the
airspace or restrict its use. Two of these decisions, namely restricting the use of the
airspace below FL260 and expanding this restriction to the airspace below FL320, are
discussed in more detail below, because they are relevant to the assessment of the crash
of flight MH17.

6.2 Restricting the use of the airspace below FL260

The investigation revealed that Ukraine’s military authorities had received information in
June, prior to the crash of flight MH17, that ‘illegal armed units within the area of the AntiTerrorist Operation’ *104 possessed weapons and the portable surface-to-air missile
systems ‘Igla’ and ‘Strela’. The Ministry viewed the fact that Ukraine’s military aircraft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*104 The quote is taken from the reply of Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence. The Dutch Safety Board is not responsible for
the terminology used.

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aviation. The assumption was that civil aeroplanes that flew above the altitude of FL240,
which was deemed safe for military aeroplanes, were also safe.
In an interview, those responsible at UkSATSE stated that they had no influence on the
decision to restrict the use of airspace. They stated that they were merely informed of
the decision. With regard to the background of the decision, they stated that they only
knew that it was to protect civil aviation in relation to military activities.
The Dutch Safety Board deduces, from answers to written questions and documents that
were supplied, that the Ukrainian Air Force submitted the request to UkSATSE for further
processing of the temporary airspace restriction below FL260. UkSATSE processed this
request and sent it to the military authorities for verifcation. Once the General Staff
agreed to the details, it sent the request to the Ukrainian aviation authority, SASU.
Therefore, the decision pertaining to the request involved the General Staff of the Armed
Forces, the Ukrainian Air Force, the aviation authority SASU and air navigation service
provider UkSATSE.

Figure 80: Diagram of Ukraine’s decision-making process related to FL260. (Source: Dutch Safety Board)

It has not been clarifed whether all parties involved were fully aware of all the available
information. The sources are contradictory on this matter. However, it is clear that the
initiative to restrict airspace use originated from the military authorities and that the other
parties were indeed informed of the formal decision. Other parties’ influence was limited
despite existing consultation structures and the cited provision of information. UkSATSE
said that it did not receive any detailed information related to the threat or about the
exact reasons for the requested restrictions.
In later interviews of the Dutch Safety Board with, for example, the Ukrainian Ministry of
Defence, interviewees stated that, due to a lack of technical resources, the armed forces
would not have been able to observe whether aircraft (including military aircraft) made
unauthorised use of the airspace. According to the authorities, it was also impossible to
obtain an effective picture of the potential presence of powerful missile systems in the
area under the control of the armed groups that are fghting the Ukrainian government.
However, the military authorities had no indications that the armed groups possessed
medium or long-range surface-to-air missiles.

6.3 Restricting the use of the airspace below FL320

Following the restriction of the use of the airspace below FL260, Ukraine issued a
restriction for the airspace below FL320 on 14 July 2014. That was three days before
flight MH17 crashed and the same day as an Antonov An-26 was downed, according to

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that flight MH17 had crashed, UkSATSE made the decision at 15.00, at the tactical level,
to also restrict the airspace above FL320. From that moment, only military aircraft were
permitted to fly in that area (NOTAM A1507/14). This meant that the entire airspace above
the eastern part of Ukraine was closed to civil aviation.

6.4 Consequences of the airspace restrictions

6.4.1 Air traffc
EUROCONTROL data from 2014 and interviews conducted with Ukrainian air navigation
service provider UkSATSE revealed that the airspace restrictions from 6 June (FL260) and
14 July 2014 (FL320) barely resulted in any changes to the number of civil flights in and
through Ukraine’s airspace as a whole (see Figure 82). At the end of March/beginning of
April 2014, a decrease in the total number of flight movements was observed (see
Figure 82). Around this time, Ukraine issued a NOTAM and ICAO published a State Letter
about the situation in Crimea (see Section 5) that possibly explains this decrease. Since
this fgure relates to Ukraine as a whole, it is not easy to see what happened in the eastern
part of Ukraine. Possible seasonal effects may also have affected the fgures.

Figure 82: Daily flight movements in Ukraine’s airspace as a whole. (Source: EUROCONTROL)

After the airspace had been completely closed on 17 July 2014, the average number of
flight movements in Ukrainian airspace as a whole fell from approximately 1,300 per day
to approximately 700 a day (see Figure 83).

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EUROCONTROL’s statement revealed that in 2013, Ukraine had received over EUR
199 million in route charges for all international flights that had flown through Ukraine’s
airspace. EUROCONTROL could not provide any fgures for 2014 due to the agreement
with Ukraine ending.
In order to give an indication of the fnancial consequences of the closure of the
Dnipropetrovsk FIR after 17 July 2014, the Dutch Safety Board estimated the revenues
per day using EUROCONTROL’s statement of the number of international flights that had
flown through the Dnipropetrovsk FIR between May and July 2014. To do so, the Dutch
Safety Board counted the number of flights per aircraft type on two random days, 1 April
and 15 June 2014, and then calculated the route charges. The estimated charges
amounted to approximately € 176,000 on 1 April 2014 and approximately € 248,000 on
15 June 2014.*111
According to UkSATSE, the decrease in revenues resulted in fnancial problems that were
solved by adjusting the budget and obtaining external funding. In an interview with the
Dutch Safety Board in December 2014, UkSATSE estimated that the closure of the
airspace above the eastern part of Ukraine in the second half of 2014 resulted in a 7-9%
loss in revenues compared with the budgeted revenue for 2014. In 2015, from the fgures
provided by UkSATSE, it appeared that revenues from route charges in 2014 had
decreased by 13% compared with 2013. This was the result of all the measures combined
and operators’ reactions to the developments in Ukraine in the second half of 2014. In an
interview, UkSATSE stated that the decrease in revenues played no role in the decision to
restrict use of the airspace.

6.5 Airspace management in other conflict zones

To put the decision-making process in Ukraine into perspective, the Dutch Safety Board
also examined airspace management in other states where an armed conflict is taking
place. There are multiple conflict areas throughout the world with potential risks for
international civil aviation. Each conflict area has its own characteristics, but there are
also common factors. The Dutch Safety Board compiled an inventory of possible air
restrictions above a number of conflict areas based on the situation up to and including
mid-July 2015. It also broadly examined available information related to the weapon
systems present. Where medium or long-range surface-to-air missiles are mentioned,
the Dutch Safety Board refers to missiles that can hit a civil aeroplane at cruising altitude.
This Section also describes the measures taken by states with regard to the airspace in
the conflict areas.*112
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*111 The route charges depend on the maximum weight of the aircraft, a state’s unit rate and the distance travelled
through the airspace of the state concerned. For the dates mentioned, the weight factor per aeroplane type was
calculated for all flights and multiplied by the unit rate and the distance. The average distance was estimated at
1,000 kilometres. The unit rate for 2014 was estimated using route charge data from 2013.
*112 The Board was not in all cases able to ascertain when the frst warnings or NOTAMs concerning the airspace were
published by other states. The warnings or NOTAMs that were in force at the moment of investigation could have
been preceded by others that are no longer visible in the databases concerned.

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The U.S. FAA and U.K. CAA,*117 and also the German CAA,*118 prohibited operators from
flying in the Tripoli FIR. The French authorities have issued a similar request to French
operators. Additionally, ICAO issued a warning in January 2015 about flying in the Tripoli
FIR as did EASA in March 2015. The restrictions related to the airspace originate from
before 17 July 2014.
6.5.4 Syria
In Syria there is a conflict between the government and various armed groups. It is unclear
whether these groups possess medium or long-range surface-to-air missiles. There are
military air activities, some of them on a large scale. In this conflict, it is important that
intelligence services assume that the groups have the intention of hitting Western targets.
On 22 March 2013, ICAO issued a State Letter related to Syria. It warns states about
potential serious safety risks in the Damascus FIR. Syria has not issued a NOTAM. On
31 July 2014, France issued a warning to French operators not to fly in the Damascus FIR.
Since 18 August 2014, an FAA flight prohibition has been in place prohibiting U.S.
operators from flying in the Damascus FIR.*119 On 30 March 2015, the U.K. has published a
warning not to fly over Syria.*120 The U.S. flight prohibition and French warning date from
after the crash of flight MH17. EASA also issued another warning in August 2014.*121
6.5.5 Iraq
The armed conflict in Syria has expanded to Iraq. The intensity of this conflict increased
throughout 2014. The non-state related groups possess anti-aircraft missiles, including
MANPADS, as well as light weapons. Since the armed groups operate in both Syria and
Iraq, there is the chance that they get hold of medium or long-range surface-to-air
missiles in Iraq. There are ongoing military air activities too, some of them on a large
scale. Western intelligence services assume that the armed groups have the intention of
hitting Western targets.
Iraq has not issued any NOTAMs pertaining to the armed conflict. On 1 July 2013, the
U.S. FAA decided that U.S. operators and airmen were only permitted to fly over the area
above FL200.*122 Following the crash of flight MH17, most operators reviewed decisions to
fly over this area. On 8 August 2014, the FAA announced a flight ban for the entire
Baghdad FIR.*123 The United Kingdom and France issued a warning not to fly in Iraqi
airspace. Mid-July 2015, Germany also issued a warning. In February 2015, ICAO issued
an urgent recommendation to assess the safety risk related to using Iraqi airspace.*124 In
April 2015, EASA issued a bulletin that highlights a number of these warnings.*125
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*117 US SFAR 112 and UK V0017/15.
*118 http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/s … rtikel/LR/
verbot-luftraum-libyen.html%3Fnn%3D62482+andcd=1andhl=nlandct=clnkandgl=nl, consulted on 21-08-2015. This
prohibtion was in force till 31 July 2015 and was no longer visible in the ICAO repository in August 2015.
*119 US FDC NOTAM 4/4936 and US SFAR 114.
*120 UK NOTAM v0016/15.
*121 EASA SIB 2014-25.
*122 US SFAR 77.
*123 US FDC NOTAM 4/1621 followed by FDC NOTAM 4/2185.
*124 ICAO Electronic Bulletin EB 2015/15.
*125 EASA SIB 2014-24/R1.

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The Somali authorities have issued a warning to be extremely cautious when operating
flights to Mogadishu Airport, due to the lack of information pertaining to armed activities
and a lack of aeronautical information.*134 The U.S. authorities have imposed a long-term
prohibition for U.S. operators and airmen flying over Somalia below FL200.*135 Non-U.S.
operators also apply this lower limit to their flights over Somalia.
6.5.9 Yemen
In Yemen, non-state groups are involved in an armed conflict with the government and
neighbouring states. There are many weapons in the area, including MANPADS. There
are also extensive activities with unmanned aircraft. Large-scale military air operations
have been underway since the end of March 2015. There are no indications that point to
medium or long-range surface-to-air missiles being present in the area.
Yemen has NOTAMs pertaining to shifting routes over the sea in order to avoid the
armed conflict. Saudi Arabia has airspace restrictions on the border with Yemen. The U.S.
FAA issued an emergency regulation constituting a total flight prohibition on flying in
Yemen’s airspace.*136 The authorities in the United Kingdom and France issued a warning
with the same scope as the U.S. flight prohibition.*137 Germany *138 and the United Arab
Emirates also issued a flight prohibition.
6.5.10 Democratic Republic of the Congo
In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, there is an ongoing armed conflict in the
eastern part of the country. The state’s control over that area is limited. Various non-state
groups are active. Insofar as the Dutch Safety Board has been able to ascertain, there are
no indications that medium or long-range surface-to-air missiles are present in the area,
or that military air operations of any scale are being carried out.
The Democratic Republic of the Congo has not issued any NOTAMs referring to the
conflict. The U.S. FAA has issued a warning to U.S. operators, advising them to make
sure that they are informed about the current situation before flying in that area.*139
Table 21 summarises this information.
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*134 HCMM A0006/15, 27 February 2015.
*135 US SFAR 107 and FDC NOTAM 7/7201. In May 2015 this was raised to FL260.
*136 US FDC NOTAM 5/8051 (A0010/15).
*137 UK NOTAM V0012/15 and AIC FRANCE A 05/15.
*138 Germany NOTAM 19-07-2015. http://www.bmvi.de/SharedDocs/DE/Artike … emen.html.
Consulted on 19 august 2015.
*139 US FDC NOTAM 8/7569

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Armed conflicts, specifcally involving non-state groups, are characterised by a high
degree of unpredictability. It is diffcult to establish who possesses which type of
weapons systems and whether or how they will be used in the conflict. Non-state parties
in a conflict do not necessarily feel bound by international treaties and conventions, in
which shooting at civil aeroplanes is emphatically condemned. Moreover, the spread of
powerful weapon systems increases the risk of civil aeroplanes being shot down
unintentionally. As a result of the above, such conflicts can carry risks to civil aviation.
The weapon systems that could hit civil aviation at cruising altitude are primarily powerful
anti-aircraft missiles. MANPADS are present in most of these conflict areas, but their
range is inferior to the altitude at which civil aircraft overfly. However, weapon systems
may also be present in a state where an armed conflict is being fought, which can actually
constitute a risk to civil aviation at cruising altitude. In conflicts in which states which
possess these types of weapon systems are (directly or indirectly) involved, it is possible
that these weapons will be used, by the state itself or by others. A number of conflict
areas have seen fghting groups seizing such types of systems that pose a threat to civil
aviation from the state’s armed forces. It cannot be ruled out that these groups possess
the knowledge and skill needed to actually use the seized systems, or that they are able
to obtain the necessary knowledge and skill to do so. Current threat analyses assume the
indication of the actual possession of weapons and not the possibility of non-state parties
being able to acquire powerful weapon systems.

6.6 Analysis: Ukrainian airspace management

Management of the airspace above a country is an exclusive right of the sovereign
state.*144 From this exclusive right, the Dutch Safety Board also derives a large responsibility
borne by the state concerned. For the purpose of this management, the state has the
exclusive power to close the airspace (or a part thereof) or restrict its use if there is a
reason to consider such a measure. Safety and security risks to civil aviation constitute an
important reason for restricting airspace use. Formal management at the strategic level
of the airspace in Ukraine is the responsibility of the Ministry of Infrastructure*145 in
accordance with the Ministry of Defence. The actual management is the responsibility of
the executing civil and military organisations between which, under normal circumstances,
management is coordinated.
6.6.1 Airspace management measures and assessing risks to civil aviation
During the armed conflict in the eastern part of Ukraine, the initiative for taking measures
related to the airspace, based on safety analyses, originated from the military authorities.
The fndings of the Dutch Safety Board, as reported above, mean that it is plausible that
decisions related to the airspace were primarily taken from the perspective of the
military’s interest, in which a potential risk to civil aviation was not the subject of any
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*144 Chicago Convention, Articles 1 and 2. See also Section 4 and Appendix Q.
*145 See the fgure in Section 6.1.

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However, the safety of a state’s airspace is the exclusive responsibility of the sovereign
state concerned, in this case, Ukraine. As of 14 July, the threat posed by attacks from
weapon systems with a greater range than MANPADS, whether or not originating from
another state was, in any case, real to the Ukrainian authorities. This was confrmed on
16 July, when a Sukhoi Su-25 was shot down, while flying, according to the Ukrainian
authorities, at an altitude of 6,250 metres (an altitude of 8,250 metres was originally stated
in a press statement dated 18 July 2014). The Ukrainian authorities claimed that this was
also attacked from the Russian Federation, probably using an air-to-air missile, but they
did not exclude the possibility of a surface-to-air missile. This incident did not lead to any
further restriction or closure of the airspace. Though the Ukrainian Air Force did suspend
military sorties for tactical reasons on 16 July, after the shooting of the Su-25. Since the
authorities assumed that the weapons were exclusively used against military aeroplanes
and because no new flights were planned after 16 July 2014, they assumed that there
were no additional threats to civil aviation. The Dutch Safety Board considers this risk
assessment to be incomplete because it does take threats to military aircraft into account,
but does not account for the consequences to civil aviation of potential errors or slips.
6.6.3 Other considerations related to airspace management
It is conceivable that considerations other than those related to safety could also have
played a part in Ukraine’s decision not to completely close the airspace to civil aviation,
such as possible fnancial consequences. A complete closure may also have given the
impression that the state had lost control over a part of its airspace. Such factors do not
appear to have played a role in the decision to keep the airspace open at cruising altitude.
6.6.4 Airspace management pertaining to conflict areas
Risks to civil aviation may arise in conflict areas if military air activities are being carried
out and if medium or long-range surface-to-air missiles or air-to-air missiles are being
used in the armed conflict. The study of a number of conflict areas shows that sovereign
states, which are responsible for managing the airspace, rarely close the airspace; they
may, on occasion, and possibly temporarily, restrict the altitude at which civil aircraft are
allowed to fly and they do not share any or virtually any information about the armed
conflict with airspace users. The airspace management by the State of Ukraine above the
conflict area in the eastern part of Ukraine fts this pattern.
Ukraine’s NOTAMs related to the eastern part of Ukraine do not state the reason for the
airspace restrictions, as recommended in ICAO Doc 9554-AN/932. As a result, airspace
users were not informed to the greatest possible extent. States involved in other conflict
areas also barely inform airspace users, which is inconsistent with ICAO recommendations.
Section 7 discusses the decision-making process related to the use of the airspace in the
eastern part of Ukraine.
In the (non-binding) document Doc 9554-AN/932, ICAO recommends that, in the case of
conflicts, information should be provided in NOTAMs about the nature of a threat that
forms the rationale for the NOTAM. Below is an example from Doc 9554 of how this type
of information could be provided.