4.1. Purpose of the Conflict Zones Analysis
Within the context of this study, the purpose of the
conflict zones analysis was to set data-defined context for
other research components by providing an overview of
state practices regarding airspace restrictions above and/or
around conflict zones. Among other things, the Foundation focussed on determining the presence of air defence
equipment (both air-to-air and surface-to-air) during a
conflict and the restrictions that were applicable to the use
of the airspace.
4.2. Conflict Zones Sample
Conflict zones were selected in the following manner:
• Based on publicly available information for the major
conflict zones in the world.
• Conflict zones were active during the period
1990‒2014.
• There was a reasonable expectation, prior to commencing the analysis, of the existence of capability to
attack at altitudes above FL 250. As defined previously, the scope of the study is determined by the overall
objective of the research related to Flight MH17 and
does not include the risk from MANPADS. In this
respect, the study scope is restricted to the airspace
management state practices for cruising altitudes that
are more than 25 000 ft above ground level. FL 250 is
also the altitude limit that is often used in state advisories or restrictions for operations in particular airspace with regard to risk associated with MANPADS.
Following the above-outlined study-specific requirements,
and including the results of the hostile events analysis, the
conflict zones selected for analysis are:
• Bosnian war, 1992‒1997.
• Croatian war, 1991‒1995.
• Democratic Republic of the Congo — it is to be
noted that this conflict zone is the only one from the
sample for which the analysis concluded that there
was low likelihood of the presence of capability to
attack above FL 250. However, the analysis is kept in
the sample to provide context and perspective.
• Egypt (Sinai).
• Georgia-Russia, 2008.
• Iraq war, 1991.
• Iraq war, 2003–2011.
• Kosovo, Allied Force 1999.
• Libya, 2011

• Slovenia, 1991.
• Afghanistan, 2001‒present.
• Armenia Azerbaijan.
• Ivory Coast, 2002‒2004.
• Indonesia (Aceh), 1990‒1998.
• Mali, 2012‒2015.
4.3. Conflict Zone Indicators
The situation in each conflict zone was reviewed relative
to a set of 10 predetermined “indicators of likelihood of
attack,” such as the presence of SAMs capable of reaching
a target in flight above FL 250.
Each of the indicators is considered as a question with
possible answers numbered from 1 to 3. The number of
the answer is an indication of likelihood, with 1 indicating, in general and with all other conditions being equal,
the lowest likelihood of attack. The higher the number of
the answer, the greater is the indication of the likelihood
of attack.
The indicators are defined as follows:
A. Parties:
1. Conflict between states.
2. Conflict between non-state armed groups and
state(s) or civil wars.
3. Conflict between non-state armed groups.
B. Armed conflict scale and/or tensions:
1. Terrorism and/or international political tension.
2. Insurgency (small-scale military activities) and/
or medium increasing political tension.
3. Large-scale military activities and/or heightened
international political tension.
C. Military air transport activities ‒ Use of aircraft to
transport ground troops or military equipment by
at least one party (such aircraft may be difficult to
distinguish from civil aircraft, particularly when
they operate near airways and close to civil aircraft
cruising altitudes):
1. Military air transport activities not reported.
2. Occasional use of aircraft to transport ground
troops or military equipment.
3. More than occasional use of aircraft to transport
ground troops or military equipment (by at least
one party).
D. Military air combat activities ‒ Use of military aircraft in a combat role or for hostile reconnaissance

or NOTAM warnings are issued. Operators will balance
insurance costs against the cost of flying a less efficient
avoidance route as part of their own risk assessment for a
given flight; however, state authorities can lawfully direct
their certificated operators to avoid a given area regardless
of any efficiency penalties.
The indicators based on the behaviour of airlines and
underwriters, although considered important in general, were not retained for the conflict zone risk analysis
because of the lack of access to such historical information
for the studied conflict zones.
Apart from the conflict zone likelihood of attack, and
within the context of this study, there is another important
indicator — the indicator of airspace restrictions. This
indicator describes when airspace restrictions were introduced, what airspace they affected and how they evolved
over time including:
• Restrictions by the sovereign authority (state) responsible for the airspace.
• Restrictions by others — third parties (for example,
introducing a no-fly zone) and/or neighbouring
states.
4.4. Overview of the Conflict Zone Analysis
Table 4 (p. 31) provides an overview of the analysed conflict zones.
The individual indicators of likelihood of attack (A
to J) are coloured to illustrate how each contributes to the
overall likelihood of attack. Green boxes indicate a low
contribution to the likelihood, red boxes indicate a high
contribution to the likelihood and yellow means a medium contribution to the likelihood.
The overall likelihood of attack is defined qualitatively
as follows:
• High means a very plausible scenario that includes
the presence of civil aircraft operations and evidence
of capability and intent to attack or high indication
of likelihood of unintentional attack.
• Low means a scenario with no information about capability to attack or without civil aircraft operations
or low indication of unintentional attack.
• Medium means a scenario that is not covered by the
either the high or low likelihood to attack definitions.
The overall likelihood of attack is not just a simple
aggregation of the 10 indications of likelihood of attack
provided by the 10 individual indicators. For example, the
indicator “capability to attack by at least one party,” apart
from influencing the risk factors for an unintentional
attack, is also a key filtering factor that, in the beginning of
the risk analysis, defines with its indication the subsequent
course of the risk analysis. Indeed, if in a given conflict
zone there is (certainty of) no capability to attack above

FL 250, then there is no need to analyse the other indicators, and the likelihood of attack there can be considered
to be low.
Another example of the complex interactions of the
indicators and their influence on the likelihood of attack
can be illustrated by discussing the “intent to attack” and
“capability to attack” indicators. High likelihood of attack
is determined not simply by the intent of one of the conflict parties to attack, but also by their capability to attack
at that altitude.
Similarly, fusing the information from the six indicators related to the likelihood of unintentional attack only
makes sense when military aviation assets are in possession of the enemies of the parties that possess capability.
With the aim of providing an overall assessment of the
likelihood of attack in a conflict zone while at the same
time addressing all the complexities related to the interactions of the individual indicators in their influence the
likelihood of attack, the Foundation used proprietary risk
analysis algorithms. The algorithms were parametrised to
assess the overall likelihood of attack above FL 250, and
the results are provided in Table 4.
Using the algorithms, two sets of assessment were performed — one factoring the civil aviation traffic volume
for the situation after introducing the airspace restrictions
(if any), and the other for assessing the situation as if
airspace restrictions were not in effect. The latter assessment is hypothetical and is not the same as the assessment
of the likelihood before the introduction of the airspace
restrictions. The reason for that is because before the
introduction of airspace restrictions, many of the other
indicators were often also different — the military combat
activities have not commenced, the armed conflict scale
was still to be seen and the attacks on military aircraft
were still to be performed.
For each set of assessments, separate “algorithm runs”
were performed for each credible capability to attack.
Here are some examples of risk scenarios that determine
separate runs of the algorithm:
• Long-range SAM capability of one conflict party that
could result in intentional or unintentional attack
against civil aircraft;
• AAM capability of a party that could result in intentional or unintentional attack against civil aircraft;
and,
• A scenario (specific to the mountainous terrain in
places like Afghanistan) where MANPADS can reach
above FL 250.
The overall likelihood for a given set of algorithm runs is
determined by the highest risk assessed for the scenarios
within the set. For example, in a given set (with or without
airspace restrictions), if the likelihood of attack associated

with air-to-air unintentional attack is assessed as medium and the likelihood of attack with long range SAMs is
assessed as high, then the likelihood of attack for the set is
considered high. This is intuitively logical because for an
aircraft operator and the general public, what is important
is not how the attack will be performed but the likelihood
of attack when flying in a given airspace.
4.5. Discussion of the Conflict Zone Analysis
In this section, we analyse the data in Table 4 and draw
conclusions based on the historical evidence and our
expert analysis.
In analysing these conflict zones, sometimes the evidence and expert interpretations led to clear conclusions,
and in other cases, due to lack of information, a conclusion could not be definitively established.
The overview of the conflict zones analysis provided in
Table 4 reveals (see the two columns under the common
title “Overall indication of likelihood of attack above
FL 250”) that in the studied sample there are only two
conflict zones where a state completely closed its own
airspace. These are the conflict zones of “Slovenia, 1991”
and “Armenia-Azerbaijan.”
In one conflict zone, “Croatian war, 1991‒1995,” the airspace was partially closed. In five of the analysed conflict
zones, the airspace was closed by other states or organisations and not the sovereign state — for example by a U.N.
Security Council resolution, as in the case of “Libya, 2011,”
or by the neighbouring states, as in the case of “Kosovo,
Allied Force, 1999.”
For eight conflict zones, either there were no airspace
restrictions or no information about airspace restrictions
could be found.
The analysis of airspace restrictions for the studied sample of 16 conflict zones is illustrated in Figure 15.
Overall, there are 11 conflict zones with medium or
high indication of likelihood of attack without airspace
restrictions. Of these 11 conflict zones, there was only
one instance in which the sovereign state responsible
for that airspace introduced airspace restrictions — see
Figure 16.
Finding 3: The analysis of selected conflict zones over the
period of 1990‒2014 did not identify a uniform practice
of states closing their own airspace when there were
indications of a likelihood of attack against civil aircraft
in the context of an armed conflict on the territory of
that state.
In the few cases in the sample where states partially
or completely closed their airspace, this was often associated with the loss of effective control over the relevant
airspace by the state — Yugoslavia with the “Croatian war,
1991‒1995” and with “Slovenia, 1991” and the conflict
zone “Armenia-Azerbaijan.”

Finding 4: The analysis of selected conflict zones over
the period of 1990‒2014 identified that, on the rare
occasions when a state restricted its own airspace above
FL 250, it was associated with the loss of effective control over the relevant airspace by the state.
Whenever a state closes or restricts its own airspace above
FL 250, or such a restriction is imposed by a third party
(such as in the introduction of a “no fly zone” by an entity
like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), the predominant concerns historically have related to the security of
military operations, military aircraft traversing airspace,
and the protection of ground infrastructure and of the
Figure 15
Sample of 16 Conflict Zones

Figure 16
11 Conflict Zones With Medium or High
Indications of Likelihood of Attack Without
Airspace Restrictions

5.1. Objectives of the Airspace Restrictions Analysis
After setting the wider background of the inquiry by characterising the historical occurrences of hostile events and
the state practices of airspace management over conflict
zones, the Foundation focused on airspace restrictions in
Ukraine and the Russian Federation immediately prior to
the downing of Flight MH17. The Foundation considered
studying the airspace restrictions timeline and specifics to
be important because restrictions are the main outcome of
airspace restrictions decision-making, which is the study
focus of this inquiry.
5.2. Scope of the Airspace Restrictions Analysis
The scope of the airspace restrictions analysis is defined as
follows:
• The analysed information is from NOTAMs.
• Information was sourced and analysed for the period
from 1 March 2014 up to and including the moment of complete closure of the respective airspace
subsequent to the downing of Flight MH17 on 17
July 2014.
• The respective airspace is contained in the Dnepropetrovsk Flight Information Region (FIR), UKDV,
and in the Rostov-on-Don FIR, URRV (which borders the UKDV FIR).
• The specific focus of the analysis is on the restrictions above FL 250.
5.3. Technical Background
5.3.1. Background
The situation at the time involved several airspace restrictions, introduced by both Ukraine and Russian Federation, of airspace above and around eastern Ukraine. These
airspace restrictions were promulgated with NOTAMs.
To introduce the technical context of airspace restrictions,
what follows is a short overview of airspace restrictions as
a measure and of NOTAMs as aeronautical information
products that are often used to promulgate this measure.
5.3.2. Airspace Sovereignty, FIRs and ATS Routes
States have sovereignty over the airspace above their
territory and exercise complete and exclusive control of
it. As provided in reference [2]: “For reasons of safety, a
state may impose limitations on the use of its airspace and
determine along which routes and at which minimum
altitude aircraft may fly within that airspace. The managing state can also partly or fully close its airspace if this is
necessary for safety reasons.”
Global airspace is divided by ICAO into nine air navigation regions. Airspace is divided further into FIRs. An FIR

is an airspace of defined dimensions within which flight
information service and alerting service are provided. The
nature and scope of air traffic services, which include the
flight information service and alerting service, are defined
in Annex 11 to the Convention on International Civil
Aviation, Air Traffic Services. In some cases, FIRs are split
vertically into lower and upper sections. The lower section
remains referred to as an FIR, but the upper portion is
referred to as an upper information region (UIR).
Each FIR is managed by a controlling authority that
has responsibility for ensuring that air traffic services are
provided to the aircraft flying within it. Smaller countries
may have one FIR in the airspace above them and larger
countries may have several. Airspace over international
waters (e.g., the oceans) is typically divided into FIRs that
are delegated to controlling authorities within countries
that border it.
Airspace within an FIR is usually divided into airspace
structural elements. The airspace structural elements vary
in their function, size and classification. Classifications
determine the rules for flying within a part of airspace and
whether it is controlled or uncontrolled airspace. Aircraft
flying in controlled airspace must follow instructions from
air traffic controllers. Air traffic control’s main purpose
is preventing collisions between aircraft. Aircraft flying
in uncontrolled airspace are not provided with air traffic
control services.
One airspace structural element, particularly important for flights overflying a given territory, is an air traffic
services (ATS) route.
An ATS route is a specified route designed for channelling the flow of traffic as necessary for the provision of air
traffic services. ATS routes serve a purpose similar to that
of roads on the ground. ATS routes are also used to plan
the trajectory of flights that are recorded in flight plans.
Flight plans are documents filed by a pilot or flight
dispatcher prior to departure which indicate the airplane’s
planned route or flight path. Flight plan format is specified in ICAO Doc 4444, “Air Traffic Management.” Flight
plans, among other things, have to ensure that the planned
airplane flight trajectory respects all airspace constraints,
including airspace restrictions known at the time the flight
plan is filed.
5.3.3. Airspace Restrictions
Airspace restrictions can be introduced by sovereign states
at different time horizons and different levels of airspace
management.
Published airspace restrictions, as part of airspace
management practices, are normally promulgated through
Aeronautical Information Publications (AIPs) or through

the NOTAM. For example, “4820N03716E119” identifies a
circle with centre 4820N and 03716E and radius of 119 nm
(220 km).
Item A is the 4-letter ICAO code for the location — the
affected aerodrome or FIR for the NOTAM.
Item B is the 10-figure group that indicates the year,
month, date and time at which any change to already
published information comes into force. Alternatively, the
date/time group may be written in plain language.
Item C is the 10-figure group giving the year, month,
date and time at which the NOTAM ceases to have effect.
Item C may be omitted if the information is permanent, or
“PERM” (permanent) or “UFN” (until further notice) may
be inserted.
Item D gives the schedule of dates and times when the
NOTAM will be active.
Item E describes, in plain language but using simple
abbreviations where appropriate, the nature of the event
that is the subject of the NOTAM. It is in English but can
be abbreviated.
Items F and G, when present, indicate the lower and
upper limit of activity of navigation warnings or airspace
restrictions. If the lower limit is ground level, Item F is
usually omitted, but “SFC” (surface) or “GRD” (ground)
may be inserted.
5.4. Analysis of the NOTAMs
The studied NOTAMs were extracted from the European
AIS Database (EAD) archive for the studied period (1
March 2014 up to and including the moment of complete closure of the respective airspace subsequent to the
downing of Flight MH17 on 17 July 2014). The selected
NOTAMs for URRV FIR and UKDV FIR, start from 01
January 2014 to make sure that NOTAMs that had been
created earlier and that were still valid after 01 March 2014
are also included in this extraction. The archive facility
has limited extraction capabilities as compared to the
production system for more recent periods. The initially
extracted files included all NOTAMs (i.e., the files were
not limited to those involving airspace restrictions above
FL 250) because it was not possible to make such a specific
extraction from the NOTAM archive. However, the NOTAM text allowed for more filtering to narrow the search
as needed for the scope of the analysis.

The search of NOTAMs for the studied period identified 291 NOTAMs for the Dnepropetrovsk UKDV FIR.
Of these NOTAMs, 96 concerned airspace restrictions.
Airspace restrictions above FL 250 were defined in 39
NOTAMs. Analysis of the geographical coverage of these
39 NOTAMs resulted in the final selection of 15 NOTAMs
that were analysed and for which an illustration map
was produced.
Similarly, the search of NOTAMs for the studied period
identified 1019 NOTAMs for the Rostov-on-Don FIR
URRV. Of these NOTAMs, 799 concerned airspace restrictions. Airspace restrictions above FL 250 were defined
in 37 NOTAMs. Analysis of the geographical coverage of
these 37 NOTAMs resulted in the final selection of two
NOTAMs that were analysed and for which an illustration
map was produced. The final 15 NOTAMs for UKDV
FIR and 2 NOTAMs for URRV FIR are represented in the
next sections.
5.5. Adopted Format for NOTAM Description
The 17 NOTAMs analysed are further described separately. Each NOTAM description is provided in a separate
subsection of this report that contains the NOTAM content, an illustration map of the restricted airspace elements
introduced by the NOTAM (where the illustration is
approximate and the maps cannot be used for navigation
or other purposes) and the description of the restrictions
the NOTAM introduces.
The description of the restrictions includes the validity of the NOTAM, the description of the restriction, the
description of any exemptions provided (e.g., for state
aircraft) and the altitude limits.
The restrictions promulgated by the studied NOTAMs
are two types — restricting ATS routes or restricting
three-dimensional area of airspace. The restricted ATS
routes are depicted on the illustration map as lines, and
the restricted areas are depicted as polygons.
The illustrations of the restrictions of the ATS routes use
different colours. These colours do not have any specific
significance and are only used to help the reader identify
similarity between the different restrictions. For example,
the illustrations of the restrictions of NOTAM A0942/14
and NOTAM A0820/14 depict a line in the same colour
that illustrate the same restricted ATS route.

A0942/14 NOTAMN
Q) UKDV/QARLC/IV/NBO/E
/100/350/4915N03848E056
A) UKDV B) 1405120400 C) 1405201800
D) DAILY 0400-1800
E) SEGMENT ATS ROUTE MASOL-EDUGO-LUGAT T242
CLOSED.
FM 3050M AMSL UP TO FL350.

Restrictions
The NOTAM A0942/14 introduced restrictions:
• Valid from 0400 UTC on 12 May 2014 until 1800
UTC on 20 May 2014.
• For a defined segment of ATS route (MASOL-EDUGO-LUGAT T242).
• Closed daily from 0400 UTC until 1800 UTC.
• From 3050 m above mean sea level to FL 350
inclusive.

A1229/14 NOTAMN
Q) UKDV/QARLC/IV/NBO/E
/000/280/4839N03844E069
A) UKDV B) 1406031801 C) 1406041700
E) SEGMENTS ATS ROUTES CLOSED:
LS-DIMAB A83
TOMKA-NALEM L32
AMPUL-LUGAT M996
LUSIG-GUKOL M996
LS-IRBAT P851
EDUGO-NALEM T242
DW-LUGAT W533
TOROS-BESPI W533
BELOL-LUGAT W633
FROM SFC TO FL280.

Restrictions
The NOTAM A1229/14 introduced restrictions:
• Valid from 1801 UTC on 03 June 2014 until 1700
UTC on 04 June 2014.
• For defined segments of ATS routes (LS-DIMAB
A83, TOMKA-NALEM L32, AMPUL-LUGAT
M996, LUSIG-GUKOL M996, LS-IRBAT P851,
EDUGO-NALEM T242, DW-LUGAT W533,
TOROS-BESPI W533, BELOL-LUGAT W633).
• Closed.
• From surface to FL 280 inclusive.

A1234/14 NOTAMN
Q) UKDV/QARLC/IV/NBO/E
/000/280/4910N03640E064
A) UKDV B) 1406041600 C) 1406052359
E) SEGMENTS ATS ROUTES CLOSED:
IRBAT-SODRA P851
TOMKA-KW L32
INSUM-LUSIG G476.
FROM SFC TO FL280.

Restrictions
• The NOTAM A1234/14 introduced restrictions:
• Valid from 1600 UTC on 04 June 2014 until 2359
UTC on 05 June 2014.
• For defined segments of ATS routes (IRBAT-SODRA
P851, TOMKA-KW L32, INSUM-LUSIG G476).
• Closed.
• From surface to FL 280 inclusive.

A1255/14 NOTAMN
Q) UKDV/QARLC/IV/NBO/E
/000/260/4829N03721E114
A) UKDV B) 1406060000 C) 1406302359
E) SEGMENTS ATS ROUTES CLOSED:
KHR-GOBUN A137 LS-TP A83
RUBES-FASAD B493 OLGIN-MASOL G476
KERTA-FASAD L140 LS-NALEM L32
DNP-GONED L69 PW-FASAD L984
DNP-TAMAK M70 KHR-KUBOK M987
LI-OLGIN M995 KHR-GUKOL M996
LS-LI P851 MASOL-LUGAT T242
PW-ELBAM W531 TOROS-KERTA W533
LI-FASAD W538 RUBES-KUBIR W546
ELBAM-OLGIN W617 GOBUN-LI W624
RUBES-LUGAT W633 DON-TAGAN W644.
FROM SFC TO FL260.

Restrictions
The NOTAM A1255/14 introduced restrictions:
• Valid from 0000 UTC on 06 June 2014 until 2359
UTC on 30 June 2014.
• For defined segments of ATS routes (KHR-GOBUN
A137 LS-TP A83, RUBES-FASAD B493 OLGIN-MASOL G476, KERTA-FASAD L140 LS-NALEM L32, DNP-GONED L69 PW-FASAD L984,
DNP-TAMAK M70 KHR-KUBOK M987, LI-OLGIN
M995 KHR-GUKOL M996, LS-LI P851 MASOLLUGAT T242, PW-ELBAM W531 TOROS-KERTA
W533, LI-FASAD W538 RUBES-KUBIR W546,
ELBAM-OLGIN W617 GOBUN-LI W624, RUBESLUGAT W633 DON-TAGAN W644).
• Closed.
• From surface to FL 260 inclusive.

A1383/14 NOTAMN
Q) UKDV/QRAXX/IV/NBO/W
/000/260/4833N03731E111
A) UKDV B) 1407010000 C) 1407282359
E) TEMPORARY RESERVED AREA BOUNDED BY
COORDINATES:
501900N 0364942E 490600N 0365000E 481520N
0360510E
475542N 0355136E 472200N 0363900E 465400N
0370500E
464700N 0373000E 465900N 0382000E 470642N
0381324E
THEN ALONG STATE BOUNDARY UNTIL POINT
501900N 0364942E.
AUTHORIZED FLIGHTS OF STATE ACFT OF UKRAINE.
FOR FLIGHTS OF CIVIL ACFT NEED HAVE PERMISSION
HEADQUARTERS OF ARMED FORCES UKRAINE NOT
LESS
ONE DAY BEFORE FLIGHT.
F) SFC G) FL260

Restrictions
The NOTAM A1383/14 introduced restrictions:
• Valid from 0000 UTC on 01 July 2014 until 2359
UTC on 28 July 2014.
• For a defined by geographic coordinates area bordering Russian Federation.
• From surface to FL 260 inclusive.
• Not applicable for flights of state aircraft of Ukraine.
• Civil aircraft need permission to fly in the area from
the headquarters of the armed forces of Ukraine not
less than one day before the flight.

A1492/14 NOTAMN
Q) UKDV/QRTCA/IV/BO /W
/260/320/4822N03807E095
A) UKDV B) 1407141800 C) 1408142359EST
E) TEMPO RESTRICTED AREA INSTALLED WITHIN FIR
DNIPROPETROVSK
BOUNDED BY COORDINATES:
495355N 0380155E 485213N 0372209E 480122N
0370253E
471352N 0365856E 465018N 0374325E 465900N
0382000E
470642N 0381324E THEN ALONG STATE BOUNDARY
UNTIL POINT 495355N 0380155E.
RESTRICTION NOT APPLIED FOR FLIGHTS OF STATE
ACFT OF UKRAINE.
F) FL260 G) FL320

Restrictions
The NOTAM A1492 introduced restrictions:
• Valid from 1800 UTC on 14 July 2014 until 2359
UTC on 14 August 2014 (estimated duration).
• For a defined by geographic coordinates area bordering Russian Federation.
• From FL 260 to FL 320 inclusive.
• Not applicable for flights of state aircraft of Ukraine.

A1507/14 NOTAM
Q) UKDV/QRTCA/IV/BO /W
/320/660/4822N03807E095 A) UKDV
B) 1407171500 C) 1408172359EST
E) TEMPO RESTRICTED AREA INSTALLED WITHIN FIR
DNIPROPETROVSK BOUNDED BY COORDINATES :
495355N 0380155E 485213N 0372209E 480122N
0370253E 471352N 0365856E 465018N 0374325E
465900N 0382000E 470642N 0381324E THEN ALONG
STATE BOUNDARY UNTIL POINT 495355N 0380155E.
RESTRICTION NOT APPLIED FOR FLIGHTS OF STATE
ACFT OF UKRAINE.
F) FL320 G) UNL

Restrictions
The NOTAM A1507/14 introduced restrictions:
• Valid from 1500 UTC on 17 July 2014 until 2359
UTC on 17 August 2014.
• For a defined by geographic coordinates area bordering Russian Federation.
• Closed.
• From FL 320 to unlimited.
• Not applicable for flights of state aircraft of Ukraine.

V6158/14 NOTAMN
Q)URRV/QARLC/IV/NBO/E/000/530/4818N04023E095
A) URRV B) 1407170000 C) 1408312359EST
E) DUE TO COMBAT ACTIONS ON THE TERRITORY OF
THE UKRAINE NEAR THE STATE BORDER WITH THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE FACTS OF FIRING
FROM THE TERRITORY OF THE UKRAINE TOWARDS
THE TERRITORY OF RUSSIAN FEDERATION, TO ENSURE
INTL FLT SAFETY, ATS RTE SEGMENTS CLSD AS FLW:
A100 MIMRA - ROSTOV-NA-DONU VOR/DME (RND),
B145 KANON - ASMIL, G247 MIMRA - BAGAYEVSKIY
NDB (BA), A87 TAMAK - SARNA, A102 PENEG - NALEM,
A225 GUKOL - ODETA, A712 TAMAK - SAMBEK
NDB (SB), B493 FASAD - ROSTOV-NA-DONU VOR/
DME (RND), B947 TAMAK - ROSTOV-NA-DONU VOR/
DME (RND), G118 LATRI - BAGAYEVSKIY NDB (BA),
G534 MIMRA - TOROS, G904 FASAD - SUTAG, R114
BAGAYEVSKIY NDB (BA)-NALEM.
SFC - FL320.
DEP FM/ARR TO ROSTOV-NA-DONU AD TO/FM
MOSCOW FIR CARRIED OUT ALONG ATS RTE G128
KONSTANTINOVSK NDB (KA) - MOROZOVSK VOR/
DME (MOR) AND R11 MOROZOVSK VOR/DME (MOR) -
BUTRI ON ASSIGNED FL.
DEP FM ROSTOV-NA-DONU AD TO DNEPROPETROVSK
FIR CARRIED OUT ALONG ATS RTE A102
KONSTANTINOVSK NDB (KA) - NALEM ON FL340 AND
ABOVE.
ARR TO ROSTOV-NA-DONU AD FM DNEPROPETROVSK
FIR CARRIED OUT ALONG ATS RTE A712 TAMAK -
SAMBEK NDB (SB) THEN DCT KONSTANTINOVSK NDB
(KA) ON FL330 AND ABOVE.
F)SFC G)FL530)

Restrictions
The NOTAM V6158/14 introduced restrictions:
• Valid from 0000 UTC on 17 July 2014 until 2359
UTC on 31 August 2014.
• Reason provided was “due to combat actions on the
territory of Ukraine near the state border with the
Russian Federation and the facts of firing from the
territory of the Ukraine towards the territory of Russian Federation, to ensure international flight ATS
routes closed as follows:
– A100 MIMRA - ROSTOV-NA-DONU VOR/
DME (RND), B145 KANON - ASMIL, G247
MIMRA - BAGAYEVSKIY NDB (BA), A87
TAMAK - SARNA, A102 PENEG - NALEM,
A225 GUKOL - ODETA, A712 TAMAK
- SAMBEK NDB (SB), B493 FASAD - ROSTOV-NA-DONU VOR/DME (RND), B947
TAMAK - ROSTOV-NA-DONU VOR/DME

(RND), G118 LATRI - BAGAYEVSKIY NDB
(BA), G534 MIMRA - TOROS, G904 FASAD
- SUTAG, R114 BAGAYEVSKIY NDB (BA)-NALEM — from surface to FL320.
– Departures from/arrivals to Rostov-on-Don
arrivals departures to/from Moscow FIR carried
out along ATS route G128 KONSTANTINOVSK
NDB (KA) - MOROZOVSK VOR/DME (MOR)
AND R11 MOROZOVSK VOR/DME (MOR) -
BUTRI — on assigned FL.
– Departures from Rostov-on-Don arrival departures to Dnepropetrovsk FIR carried out along
ATS route A102 KONSTANTINOVSK NDB
(KA) - NALEM on FL340 and above.
– Arrivals to Rostov-on-Don arrivals departures
from Dnepropetrovsk FIR carried out along ATS
route 712 TAMAK - SAMBEK NDB (SB) then

A2681/14 NOTAMN
Q) URRV/QFALT/IV/NBO/A /000/999/4716N03949E005
A) URRR B) 1407170000 C) 1408312359EST
E) DUE TO COMBAT ACTIONS ON THE TERRITORY OF
THE UKRAINE NEAR THE STATE BORDER WITH THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE FACTS OF FIRING
FROM THE TERRITORY OF THE UKRAINE TOWARDS
THE TERRITORY OF RUSSIAN FEDERATION, TO ENSURE
INTL FLT SAFETY DEP FM/ARR TO ROSTOV-NA-DONU
AD TO/FM MOSCOW FIR CARRIED OUT ALONG ATS
RTE:
G128 KONSTANTINOVSK NDB (KA) - MOROZOVSK
VOR/DME (MOR) AND R11 MOROZOVSK VOR/DME
(MOR) - BUTRI ON ASSIGNED FL.
DEP FM ROSTOV-NA-DONU AD TO DNEPROPETROVSK
FIR CARRIED OUT ALONG ATS RTE A102
KONSTANTINOVSK NDB (KA) - NALEM ON FL340 AND
ABOVE.
ARR TO ROSTOV-NA-DONU AD FM DNEPROPETROVSK
FIR CARRIED OUT ALONG ATS RTE A712 TAMAK -
SAMBEK NDB (SB) THEN DCT KONSTANTINOVSK NDB
(KA) ON FL330 AND ABOVE.

Restrictions
The NOTAM A2681/14 introduced restrictions:
• Valid from 0000 UTC on 17 July 2014 until 2359
UTC on 31 August 2014.
• Reason provided was “due to combat actions on the
territory of Ukraine near the state border with the
Russian Federation and the facts of firing from the
territory of the Ukraine towards the territory of Russian Federation, to ensure international flight safety
departures from/arrivals to Rostov-na-Donu.”
• For arrivals and departures to/from Moscow FIR that
are carried out along the ATS routes:
– G128 KONSTANTINOVSK NDB (KA) -
MOROZOVSK VOR/DME (MOR) AND R11

MOROZOVSK VOR/DME (MOR) - BUTRI -
Restricted on assigned FL.
– Departures from Rostov-on-Dan arrivals and
departures to Dnepropetrovsk FIR carried out
along ATS route A102 KONSTANTINOVSK
NDB (KA) — NALEM — on FL340 and above.
– Arrivals to Rostov-on-Dan arrivals and departures from Dnepropetrovsk FIR carried out along
ATS route A712 TAMAK - SAMBEK NDB (SB)
then direct to KONSTANTINOVSK NDB (KA)
— on FL 330 and above.