A. Parties:
1. Conflict between states.
2. Conflict between non-state armed groups and
state(s) or civil wars.
3. Conflict between non-state armed groups.

Conflict between non-state armed groups and state(s) or civil wars.
Conflict between states.
The conflicting parties in the Bosnian war were: Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Herzeg-Bosnia, Republika Srpska, Serbian Krajina, Western Bosnia, FR Yugoslavia.
NATO Operation Deny Flight and Operation Deliberate Force.

B. Armed conflict scale and/or tensions:
1. Terrorism and/or international political tension.
2. Insurgency (small-scale military activities) and/
or medium increasing political tension.
3. Large-scale military activities and/or
heightened international political tension

Large-scale military activities and/or heightened international political
tension.
There were more than 20 large military operations or battles during the war,
including the siege of Sarajevo.
On 29 August 1995 Operation Deliberate Force was launched by NATO involving
400 aircraft and over 3,515 sorties. It continued until 20 September 1995.

C. Military air transport activities:
1. Military air transport activities not reported.
2. Occasional use of aircraft to transport ground
troops or military equipment.
3. More than occasional use of aircraft to transport
ground troops or military equipment by at least
one party

More than occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military
equipment by at least one party (such aircraft may be more difficult to
distinguish from civil aircraft, particularly where operating near airways
and close to civil aircraft cruising altitudes).
In 1992 the United Sates recognized the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina
and soon after began airlifting food and supplies from Italy.
United Nations forces took control of the Sarajevo airport and authorized an
international airlift of humanitarian supplies.
United States launched Operation Provide Promise on 3 July 1992 to provide
airlift.

D. Military air combat activities:
1. No military air combat activities.
2. Small-scale (occasional) military air combat
activities and/or some activities above FL 250.
3. Large- to medium-scale military air combat
activities and/or regular activities above FL 250

Large- to medium-scale military air combat activities.
Military combat activities involving multiple reginal parties and NATO.

E. Known attacks:
1. Conflict area without publicly reported security
incidents involving military and civil aviation.
2. Conflict area with single security-related
reported incident/accident involving military
(or civil) aviation.
3. Conflict area with multiple reported securityrelated incidents/accidents involving military
(or civil) aviation.

Conflict area with multiple reported security-related incidents/accidents
involving military (or civil) aviation.
On 3 September 1992 an Italian Air Force (Aeronautica Militare Italiana) G.222
was shot down when approaching Sarajevo airfield while conducting a United
Nations relief mission. It crashed 18 miles (29 km) from the airfield.
On 28 February 1994, six Republika Srpska Air Force J-21 Jastreb jets were
engaged, and four of them shot down, by NATO warplanes from the U.S. Air Force
On 16 April 1994 a Sea Harrier of the UK Royal Navy 801 Naval Air Squadron,
operating from the aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal, was brought down by a Igla-1
surface-to-air missile fired by the Army of Republika Srpska while attempting to
bomb two Bosnian Serb tanks over Gorazde.
On 28 May 1995 a Mi-17 was shot down by a missile from an 2K12 Kub mobile
SAM launcher. The attack killed the Bosnian Minister Irfan Ljubijankić, a few other
politicians, and the helicopter’s Ukrainian crew.
On 2 June 1995 a US Air Force F-16C was shot down at 6000 meters altitude by a
missile launch from an 2K12 Kub mobile SAM launcher.
On 30 August 1995 a French Air Force Dassault Mirage 2000N was shot down by
SAM-14 or DCA after bomb release on munition storage — Deny Flight mission.

F. Capability to attack by at least one party:
1. No information for capability to attack with
range above FL 250.
2. Air-to-air missiles launched from fighter aircraft
(and no SAMs).
3. Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that
can hit an aircraft at cruising level.

Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that can hit an aircraft at cruising
altitude.
2K12 Kub mobile SAM. The 2K12 “Kub” (NATO reporting name: SA-6 “Gainful”)
mobile surface-to-air missile system is a Soviet low to medium-level air defence
system designed to protect ground forces from air attack.

Decision-making
Describes the source(s) of the threat information;
who made the decision regarding the restrictions and
with whom was the decision coordinated; was the
decision-making process different from the normal or
standard airspace decision-making process.

The first step in the closure of airspace was done indirectly. Namely, the two
neighboring states, the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) (successor
Serbia), and Croatian aviation authorities stopped the traffic to/from Bosnia and
Herzegovina. This essentially closed the airspace for international traffic.
In March 1993, the United Nations passed Resolution 816, which banned all
flights over Bosnia-Herzegovina not authorized by the United Nations. It also
authorized NATO to enforce the ban on military flights by shooting down
violators. At the request of UN Security Council, NATO declared ‘Operation Deny
Flight’ and a ‘no fly zone’.
In 1997 FRY, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and NATO signed agreement on the
opening of the airspace above FL285 for commercial air traffic. It was agreed that
ATM would be provided by Belgrade and Zagreb ACCs, while Search and Rescue
was provided by Bosnia and Herzegovina. Operational boundary for the traffic
above FL285 was on the old FIR boundary between Belgrade and Zagreb FIR. It
was 40NM west of Sarajevo and Mostar. The whole airspace below FL 285 was
controlled by NATO Stabilization Forces (SFOR).

Promulgation
Describes how the restrictions were published,
number of the NOTAMs if available, AIS

FRY and Croatia published NOTAMs (references not available).
NATO published information as well (references not available).
Opening of the airspace above FL285 was done by the NOTAM coordinated
between FRY, Croatia and supported by the assistance of EUROCONTROL
(references not available)

Notes
Other relevant information

LOAs were signed between all actors in the opening of Bosnia and Herzegovina
airspace for civilian traffic.
References:
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Yugoslavia: Military Dynamics of a Potential
Civil War, March 1991
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Combat forces in former Yugoslavia, July 1993
Daniel L. Haulman, Air Force historical Research Agency, MANNED AIRCRAFT
LOSSES OVER THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 1994–1999, October 2009
Jaffe S., Airspace Closure and Civil Aviation, 2015

F. Capability to attack by at least one party:
1. No information for capability to attack with
range above FL 250.
2. Air-to-air missiles launched from fighter aircraft
(and no SAMs).
3. Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that
can hit an aircraft at cruising level

Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that can hit an aircraft at cruising
altitude.
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia:
At the start of the war, the Yugoslav national air defence force possessed more
than 100 search radars, eight battalions of SA-2s, six battalions of SA-3s, one
battalion of SA-5s, four battalions of SA-6/11s, and 15 regiments of anticraft guns.
For support of army, there were also SA-9, SA-13 mobile IR-guided SAMs, and
thousands of SA-7 and SA-16 shoulder-fired SAMs.
S-75 Dvina (NATO reporting name SA2) is a Soviet-designed, high-altitude air
defence system with engagement altitude of 82,000ft.
S-125 Neva/Pechora (NATO reporting name SA3) mobile surface-to-air missile
system is a Soviet-made SAM system with engagement altitude of 59,000 ft.
S-200 (NATO reporting name SA-5) is a very long range, medium-to-high altitude
SAM system to defend large areas from bomber attack or other strategic aircraft.
It has an engagement altitude of 130,000 ft.
2K12 Kub mobile SAM. The 2K12 “Kub” (NATO reporting name: SA-6 “Gainful”)
low- to medium-level air defence system designed to protect ground forces from
air attack with engagement altitude, depending on the modification, of up to
46,000ft.
Other capabilities for lower altitudes: 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7), 9K31 Strela-1 (SA-9),
9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13), 9K34 Strela-3 (SA-14), 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16) and mobile
AAA batteries (multiple types).
Republika Srpska
2K12 Kub mobile SAM. The 2K12 “Kub” (NATO reporting name: SA-6 “Gainful”)
mobile surface-to-air missile system is a Soviet low to medium-level air defence
system designed to protect ground forces from air attack.
Croatian Army:
The Croatian Army was developed and equipped during the war

G. Capability to differentiate between civil and
military aircraft:
1. Differentiation supported by radar, electronic
identification and non-cooperative target
recognition systems measuring signature using
acoustic and thermal radiation, radio emissions,
radar techniques.
2. Differentiation supported by radar and
electronic identification (e.g., identification,
friend or foe (IFF), secondary surveillance radar
(SSR).
3. Differentiation supported only by radar tracks.

Differentiation supported only by radar tracks.

H. SAM/AAM operators’ experience and chain of
command:
1. Regular forces.
2. SAMs in the possession of irregular military
forces OR an absence of robust SAM/AAM
command and control procedures for
authorizing launch.
3. SAMs in the possession of irregular military
forces AND an absence of robust SAM/
AAM command and control procedures for
authorizing launch.

SAMs in the possession of poorly trained, inexperienced personnel OR
an absence of robust command and control procedures for authorizing
launch.

I. Known intent to attack:
1. Known intent to attack military aircraft.
2. Known intent to attack civil aircraft.
3. Communication of intent and a plan to attack
civil aircraft or actual attack against civil aircraft.

Known intent to attack military aircraft.
See the incidents and accidents reported in section E.

A. Parties:
1. Conflict between states.
2. Conflict between non-state armed groups and
state(s) or civil wars.
3. Conflict between non-state armed groups.

Conflict between non-state armed groups.
Second Congo War, pitting Congolese forces against rebels and soldiers backed
by Uganda and Rwanda, ended in 2002/2003. In 2013, a UN offensive force and
Congolese army defeated rebel group M23 Movement. However, more than 100
armed groups, such as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), which was driven
out of Uganda in the late 1990s, are believed to operate in the eastern region of
the DRC. ADF has pledged allegiance to ISIL (ISIS) but researchers say there is no
evidence of close collaboration. More than 16,000 UN peacekeepers are stationed
in the country as part of what is described as a stabilization mission. There also is
tension with neighbouring Rwanda.

B. Armed conflict scale and/or tensions:
1. Terrorism and/or international political tension.
2. Insurgency (small-scale military activities) and/
or medium increasing political tension.
3. Large-scale military activities and/or
heightened international political tension

Insurgency or small-scale military activities.
DRC military is primarily ground-based. DRC military and UN Peacekeepers are
battling insurgent groups in eastern DRC.

C. Military air transport activities:
1. Military air transport activities not reported.
2. Occasional use of aircraft to transport ground
troops or military equipment.
3. More than occasional use of aircraft to transport
ground troops or military equipment by at least
one party).

Occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military
equipment.
DRC military currently has about a dozen transport aircraft.
UN peacekeeping force has 11 fixed wing and 30 rotary wing aircraft.

D. Military air combat activities:
1. No military air combat activities.
2. Small-scale (occasional) military air combat
activities and/or some activities above FL 250.
3. Large- to medium-scale military air combat
activities and/or regular activities above FL 250

No military air combat activities.
Insurgents not known to have aircraft. DRC forces have six fixed wing and eight
rotary wing attack aircraft, but most combat activities seem restricted to ground
operations.

E. Known attacks:
1. Conflict area without publicly reported security
incidents involving military and civil aviation.
2. Conflict area with single security-related
reported incident/accident involving military
(or civil) aviation.
3. Conflict area with multiple reported securityrelated incident/accident involving military (or
civil) aviation.

Conflict area with single reported security-related incident/accident
involving military (or civil) aviation.
In Oct. 1998, a 727 crashed after reportedly being struck by a MANPADS while inflight. Various accounts put death toll at 40 or 41. (In a 1999 incident, a Fokker F27
was struck by gunfire and a possible RPG while parked at an airport.)

F. Capability to attack by at least one party:
1. No information for capability to attack with
range above FL 250.
2. Air-to-air missiles launched from fighter aircraft
(and no SAMs).
3. Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that
can hit an aircraft at cruising level.

No information about capability to attack with range above FL 250
DRC military has 53 “rocket projectors,” which are most likely RPGs.

G. Capability to differentiate between civil and
military aircraft:
1. Differentiation supported by radar, electronic
identification and non-cooperative target
recognition systems measuring signature using
acoustic and thermal radiation, radio emissions,
radar techniques.
2. Differentiation supported by radar and
electronic identification (e.g., identification,
friend or foe (IFF), secondary surveillance radar
(SSR).
3. Differentiation supported only by radar tracks

NA

A. Parties:
1. Conflict between states.
2. Conflict between non-state armed groups and
state(s) or civil wars.
3. Conflict between non-state armed groups.

Conflict between non-state armed groups and state(s) or civil wars.
Ongoing conflict pitting Egyptian armed forces, including army, air force and
police, against IS of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) and Wilayah Sinai. Wilayat Sinai
emerged as a terrorist organization in the Sinai Peninsula following a popular
uprising and subsequent overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak in 2011.
In November 2014, Wilayat Sinai declared its allegiance to the Islamic State
and has since claimed responsibility for numerous attacks, including an attack
on a mosque that killed more than 300 people, the April 2017 attack on Coptic
churches that killed at least 44 people, the December 2016 attack on a Coptic
chapel in Cairo that killed at least 25 people, and the October 2015 downing (with
a planted IED) of a Russian A321 that killed all 224 people aboard.

B. Armed conflict scale and/or tensions:
1. Terrorism and/or international political tension.
2. Insurgency (small-scale military activities) and/
or medium increasing political tension.
3. Large-scale military activities and/or
heightened international political tension.

Insurgency (small-scale military activities) and/or medium increasing
political tension.
In addition to attacks referenced in A., two coordinated attacks in one day in Oct.
2014 killed 33 Egyptian security personnel in the Sinai Peninsula. Rocket propelled
grenades were used in one of the attacks.
Scale and pace of operations increased in 2018 during government offensive prior
to presidential election.
Scale of conflict has been influenced by pressure from other States, including the
U.S. and Israel.

C. Military air transport activities:
1. Military air transport activities not reported.
2. Occasional use of aircraft to transport ground
troops or military equipment.
3. More than occasional use of aircraft to transport
ground troops or military equipment by at least
one party).

More than occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military
equipment
Egypt has a more than 40 C-130Hs and C-295 cargo transports, as well as smaller
utility aircraft. Use likely dictated by launching of govt. offensives and/or in
response to attacks by insurgents.

D. Military air combat activities:
1. No military air combat activities.
2. Small-scale (occasional) military air combat
activities and/or some activities above FL 250.
3. Large- to medium-scale military air combat
activities and/or regular activities above FL 250

Large- to medium-scale military air combat activities and/or regular
activities above FL 250
Egyptian AF has a range of fighters (including F-16s, Mirages, Rafales and MiG-
29s) and attack helicopters and has been accused of using air launched cluster
bombs in Sinai.
Media reports include a number of references to air attacks, including one that
killed eight Mexican tourists.
There also have been reports of Israeli warplanes attacking ISIL in Sinai with the
secret approval of Egypt; Egypt has denied the reports.

E. Known attacks:
1. Conflict area without publicly reported security
incidents involving military and civil aviation.
2. Conflict area with single security-related
reported incident/accident involving military
(or civil) aviation.
3. Conflict area with multiple reported securityrelated incident/accident involving military (or
civil) aviation

Conflict area with multiple reported security-related incidents/accidents
involving military (or civil) aviation.
In addition to claimed IED attack on a Russian airliner in 2015, current FAA
background information says in June 2015 ISIS fired rockets toward El Gora
Airport (HEGR) in northern Sinai, fired at Egyptian military aircraft with small
arms and used MANPADS to shoot down a military helicopter flying at low
altitude.
In late 2013, the Dutch government informed Dutch carriers about a threat
specifically targeting civil aviation.
Although MANPADS have not been used to target civil aircraft in the Sinai,
extremists/militants could potentially do so at any time with little or no warning,
says FAA.

F. Capability to attack by at least one party:
1. No information for capability to attack with
range above FL 250.
2. Air-to-air missiles launched from fighter aircraft
(and no SAMs).
3. Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that
can hit an aircraft at cruising level.

Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that can hit an aircraft at cruising
level.
Egyptian navy has ships equipped with French-made VL (vertically launched)-
MICA SAMs that can reach 30,000 ft
Egyptian military also has long-range, Russian-made SAMs and a large fleet of a
fighter aircraft, including F-16s, Mirages, Rafales and MiG-29s.

Decision-making
Describes the source(s) of the threat information;
who made the decision regarding the restrictions and
with whom was the decision coordinated; was the
decision-making process different from the normal or
standard airspace decision-making process.

Promulgation
Describes how the restrictions were published,
number of the NOTAMs if available, AIS.

FAA KICZ NOTAM A0040/20
EASA CZIB-2017-09R5

F. Capability to attack by at least one party:
1. No information for capability to attack with
range above FL 250.
2. Air-to-air missiles launched from fighter aircraft
(and no SAMs).
3. Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that
can hit an aircraft at cruising level.

Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that can hit an aircraft at cruising
altitude.
Russian Federation possess multiple types of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that
can hit an aircraft at cruising altitude. However, there were reports that Russian
military forces in the war did not have long-range surface-to-air missiles that
could be fired beyond the air-defence zones of an adversary.
At least one 9K37 Buk was captured by Russian and Russian backed forces during
the war.
Georgia:
9K37 Buk (NATO reporting name SA-11 Gadfly, SA-17 Grizzly) is a Soviet mediumrange SAM
designed to counter cruise missiles, smart bombs, fixed- and rotarywing aircraft,
and unmanned aerial vehicles. It has an engagement altitude of 20,000ft.
9K330 Tor (NATO reporting name SA-15 “Gauntlet”) is a Soviet all-weather low
to medium altitude, short-range surface-to-air missile system designed for
destroying airplanes, helicopters, cruise missiles, precision guided munitions,
unmanned aerial vehicles and short-range ballistic threats. It has an engagement
altitude of 46,000ft.
SPYDER (Surface-to-air PYthon and DERby) is an Israeli short and medium range
mobile air defence system. It has an engagement altitude of 30,000 ft or 52,000 ft
depending on the modification.
S-125 Neva/Pechora (NATO reporting name SA3) is Soviet-made a mobile SAM
system with engagement altitude of 59,000 ft.
Other capabilities include up to three Osa-AK/AKM SAM system batteries, a large
number of man-portable SAM systems, as well as a few С-60 57-mm anti-aircraft
guns, ZU-23-2 twin 23-mm anti-aircraft guns, and ZSU-23-4 Shilka quad 23-mm
self-propelled anti-aircraft gun systems.

G. Capability to differentiate between civil and
military aircraft:
1. Differentiation supported by radar, electronic
identification and non-cooperative target
recognition systems measuring signature using
acoustic and thermal radiation, radio emissions,
radar techniques.
2. Differentiation supported by radar and
electronic identification (e.g., identification,
friend or foe (IFF), secondary surveillance radar
(SSR).
3. Differentiation supported only by radar tracks.

Differentiation supported by radar and electronic identification (e.g.
identification, friend or foe (IFF), SSR).
The Georgian air-defence early-warning and command-control tactical system
was linked via Turkey to a NATO Air Situation Data Exchange (ASDE), which
provided Georgia with intelligence during the conflict.

H. SAM/AAM operators’ experience and chain of
command:
1. Regular forces.
2. SAMs in the possession of irregular military
forces OR an absence of robust SAM/AAM
command and control procedures for
authorizing launch.
3. SAMs in the possession of irregular military
forces AND an absence of robust SAM/
AAM command and control procedures for
authorizing launch.

SAMs in the possession of irregular military forces OR an absence of robust
command and control procedures for authorizing launch.
At least one 9K37 Buk was captured by Russian and Russian-backed forces during
the war.

I. Known intent to attack:
1. Known intent to attack military aircraft.
2. Known intent to attack civil aircraft.
3. Communication of intent and a plan to attack
civil aircraft or actual attack against civil aircraft.

Known intent to attack military aircraft.
See the incidents and accidents reported in section E.

A. Parties:
1. Conflict between states.
2. Conflict between non-state armed groups and
state(s) or civil wars.
3. Conflict between non-state armed groups.

Conflict between non-state armed groups and state(s) or civil wars.
The Persian Gulf War, also known as “The Gulf War,” was a conflict between Iraq
and 34 other countries, led by the United States. The conflicting parties were: The
Allied Coalition Forces consisting of 34 nations and the Iraqi Armed Forces (Army,
Air Force, Navy, Iraqi Republican Guard).
The conflict started with the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq on August 2, 1990, with
the Allied Coalition military offensive beginning January 16, 1991. The official
ceasefire was declared February 28, 1991.¹⁰²

B. Armed conflict scale and/or tensions:
1. Terrorism and/or international political tension.
2. Insurgency (small-scale military activities) and/
or medium increasing political tension.
3. Large-scale military activities and/or
heightened international political tension.

Large-scale military activities.
The Allied Coalition’s Operation Desert Storm involved approximately 750,000
troops. The coalition aerial strike-force comprised over 2,250 combat aircraft
(including 1,800 US aircraft). By contrast, the Iraqi Forces were estimated to be
1,000,000 personnel, having 934 combat-capable aircraft (including trainers) of
which 550 were operational.
The air campaign of the Gulf War was an extensive aerial bombing campaign.
The Coalition of the Gulf War flew over 100,000 sorties, dropping 88,500 tons of
bombs, widely destroying military and civilian infrastructure.¹⁰³

C. Military air transport activities:
1. Military air transport activities not reported.
2. Occasional use of aircraft to transport ground
troops or military equipment.
3. More than occasional use of aircraft to transport
ground troops or military equipment by at least
one party).

Use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military equipment by at
least one party (such aircraft may be more difficult to distinguish from civil
aircraft, particularly where operating near airways and close to civil aircraft
cruising altitudes).
More than 145 C-130 aircraft deployed in support of Desert Shield/Desert Storm.
The C-130s flew 46,500 sorties and moved more than 209,000 people and 300,000
tons of supplies within the theater. C-141 aircraft operated 8,536 strategic airlift
missions, followed by the C-5 with 3,770; the KC-10 with 379 and the C-9 with 209.
UK C-130, VC10 and L1011 Tristar also operated across the operational area.

D. Military air combat activities:
1. No military air combat activities.
2. Small-scale (occasional) military air combat
activities and/or some activities above FL 250.
3. Large- to medium-scale military air combat
activities and/or regular activities above FL 250

Military air combat activities.
Military combat activities involving the Allied Coalition and the Iraqi Air Force.

E. Known attacks:
1. Conflict area without publicly reported security
incidents involving military and civil aviation.
2. Conflict area with single security-related
reported incident/accident involving military
(or civil) aviation.
3. Conflict area with multiple reported securityrelated incident/accident involving military (or
civil) aviation.

Conflict area with multiple reported incidents/accidents involving military
(or civil) aviation.
Military armed conflict existed throughout the airspace. UNSCR 678 authorised
use of all necessary means to force Iraqi forces out of Kuwait after 15 Jan 1991.
Widely reported by international media.

F. Capability to attack by at least one party:
1. No information for capability to attack with
range above FL 250.
2. Air-to-air missiles launched from fighter aircraft
(and no SAMs).
3. Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that
can hit an aircraft at cruising level.

Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that can hit an aircraft at cruising
level.
Both parties in this conflict had the capability to hit civilian aircraft in the region
with SAM and air-to-air missiles.¹⁰⁴

Reasons for airspace restrictions
Describes the reasons for airspace restrictions,
weapons known to be in the area and their range/
capabilities, what traffic was vulnerable, known or
suspected intent to attack civil aviation and whether
there was concern about unintentional attack.

Military wartime operations area.

Decision-making
Describes the source(s) of the threat information;
who made the decision regarding the restrictions and
with whom was the decision coordinated; was the
decision-making process different from the normal or
standard airspace decision-making process.

No documentation of decisions by Iraqi government can be found. The airspace
limitations were driven by UN, Allied, US and European authorities. Certain
restrictions existed limiting traffic above FL200, with numerous sectors prohibited.

Promulgation
Describes how the restrictions were published,
number of the NOTAMs if available, AIS.

NOTAM and EUROCONTROL AIM.

Notes
Other relevant information

G. Capability to differentiate between civil and
military aircraft:
1. Differentiation supported by radar, electronic
identification and non-cooperative target
recognition systems measuring signature using
acoustic and thermal radiation, radio emissions,
radar techniques.
2. Differentiation supported by radar and electronic identification (e.g., identification, friend
or foe (IFF), secondary surveillance radar (SSR).
3. Differentiation supported only by radar tracks.

Differentiation supported by radar, electronic identification and noncooperative target recognition systems measuring signature using acoustic
and thermal radiation, radio emissions, radar techniques.

H. SAM/AAM operators’ experience and chain of
command:
1. Regular forces.
2. SAMs in the possession of irregular military
forces OR an absence of robust SAM/AAM
command and control procedures for
authorizing launch.
3. SAMs in the possession of irregular military
forces AND an absence of robust SAM/
AAM command and control procedures for
authorizing launch.

Regular forces.
Capability existed on both sides.¹¹⁰
Extensive use of SAMs by the Iraqi military. Iraq fired approximately 1,600 radar
guided SAMs during the invasion, failing to down a single allied aircraft.
US Patriot batteries mistakenly shot down a UK Tornado GR4 and a USN FA-18 in
separate friendly fire incidents.

I. Known intent to attack:
1. Known intent to attack military aircraft.
2. Known intent to attack civil aircraft.
3. Communication of intent and a plan to attack
civil aircraft or actual attack against civil aircraft

Known intent to attack military aircraft.
Iraqi military forces were openly motivated to attack allied aircraft. Reports
indicate that Saddam Hussein personally encouraged the shooting of allied
aircraft, offering $5000 to any unit that shot down a US aircraft and $2500 to any
soldier capturing a pilot

J. Civil aircraft operations over or close to conflict
zone (with and without the airspace restrictions
if any):
1. No or occasional traffic.
2. Small to moderate traffic volume (for example
restricted to arrivals and departures to airports).
3. Considerable traffic volume, including
international overflights

Small to minimal traffic volume.
Iraq airspace was closed to civilian traffic at the beginning of the war. Coalition
forces, in collaboration with ICAO and other stakeholders, opened the airspace to
civil overflights in August 2003, leading to overflight traffic increasing. However,
the development of optional routes around the airspace limited the number

Airspace restrictions
Describes when airspace restrictions were introduced,
what airspace they affected and how they evolved
over time including:
• Restrictions by the responsible for the airspace
sovereign authority (the state).
• Restrictions by others — third parties and/or
neighboring states

1. Restrictions by the responsible for the airspace sovereign authority (the
state)
No information found
2. Others
Several national aviation authorities and third-party organisations closed
Iraq airspace to civilian traffic at the beginning of the war. Coalition forces, in
collaboration with ICAO and other stakeholders opened the airspace to civil
overflights in August 2003.

Reasons for airspace restrictions
Describes the reasons for airspace restrictions,
weapons known to be in the area and their range/
capabilities, what traffic was vulnerable, known or
suspected intent to attack civil aviation and whether
there was concern about unintentional attack.

Military operations area.

Decision-making
Describes the source(s) of the threat information;
who made the decision regarding the restrictions and
with whom was the decision coordinated; was the
decision-making process different from the normal or
standard airspace decision-making process.

No documentation of decisions by Iraqi government can be found. The
airspace limitations were driven by national organisations outside Iraq and by
international coalition forces.

A. Parties:
1. Conflict between states.
2. Conflict between non-state armed groups and
state(s) or civil wars.
3. Conflict between non-state armed groups

Conflict between non-state armed groups and state(s) or civil wars.
Conflict between states.
The conflicting parties in the Kosovo war were: Kosovo Liberation Army, Republic
of Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and NATO (since 24 March 1999). It
started in late February 1998 and lasted until 11 June 1999.
In early 1998, violence erupted within Kosovo between Yugoslavian (Serb) forces
and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). United Nations Security Council Resolution
1199, passed on 23 September 1998, demanded a ceasefire in Kosovo. On 13
October 1998, NATO’s North Atlantic Council authorized activation orders for air
strikes. The crisis intensified in November and December 1998. NATO launched
Operation Allied Force on 24 March 1999.

B. Armed conflict scale and/or tensions:
1. Terrorism and/or international political tension.
2. Insurgency (small-scale military activities) and/
or medium increasing political tension.
3. Large-scale military activities and/or
heightened international political tension.

Large-scale military activities.
Operation Allied Force involved close to 1000 NATO aircraft in an air campaign
that lasted 78 days. NATO flew more than 38,000 sorties, of which 10,484 were
strike sorties.

C. Military air transport activities:
1. Military air transport activities not reported.
2. Occasional use of aircraft to transport ground
troops or military equipment.
3. More than occasional use of aircraft to transport
ground troops or military equipment by at least
one party).

More than occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military
equipment by at least one party (such aircraft may be more difficult to
distinguish from civil aircraft, particularly where operating near airways
and close to civil aircraft cruising altitudes).
3 x AWACS overland orbits manned 24-hrs.
EC–130s served as Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC).
C–17, C–5 Galaxy and C–130 were used to transport cargo into certain airfields.

D. Military air combat activities:
1. No military air combat activities.
2. Small-scale (occasional) military air combat
activities and/or some activities above FL 250.
3. Large- to medium-scale military air combat
activities and/or regular activities above FL 250

Large- to medium-scale military air combat activities.
Military combat activities involving multiple regional parties and NATO.

E. Known attacks:
1. Conflict area without publicly reported security
incidents involving military and civil aviation.
2. Conflict area with single security-related
reported incident/accident involving military
(or civil) aviation.
3. Conflict area with multiple reported securityrelated incident/accident involving military (or
civil) aviation.

Conflict area with multiple reported incident/accident for military (or civil)
aviation.
On 24 March 1999 two Yugoslav Air Force MiG-29s were shot down by two USAF
F-15Cs with AMRAAM missiles. Different sources claim one of the MiG-29s was
downed by friendly ground fire.
On 24 March 1999, during Operation Allied Force, a Dutch F-16AM J-063 shot
down a Yugoslavian MiG-29 with an AMRAAM missile. The pilot of the stricken jet
ejected safely.
On 26 March 1999 two Yugoslavian MiG-29s were shot down by two USAF F-15Cs
with AMRAAM missiles.
On 27 March 1999 an American F-117A Nighthawk stealth bomber was shot
down over Belgrade by a Soviet-made S-125E SAM. The pilot ejected safely and
the plane’s wreckage was recovered by Serbian special forces.
On 2 May 1999 a USAF F-16CG was shot down over Serbia. It was downed by an
S-125 Neva SAM (NATO: SA-3) near Nakucani. The pilot ejected and was later
rescued by a combat search-and-rescue mission.
On 4 May 1999 a lone Yugoslav MiG-29 attempted to intercept a large NATO
formation that was returning to base. It was engaged by a pair of USAF F-16CJs
from the 78th Fighter Squadron and shot down with an AIM-120, killing the pilot.
The falling wreckage was hit by a Strela 2M fired by the Yugoslav army in error.
On 4 May 1999 a Yugoslav Mi-8T was shot down by a French Super Etendard

Airspace restrictions
Describes when airspace restrictions were introduced,
what airspace they affected and how they evolved
over time including:
• Restrictions by the responsible for the airspace
sovereign authority (the state).
• Restrictions by others — third parties and/or
neighboring states.

1. Restrictions by the responsible for the airspace sovereign authority (the
state)
No information found
2. Others
24 Mar 1999–10 June 1999
The entire airspace of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, FYROM, parts of southern Hungary, western Romania and
Bulgaria, northern Greece, entire airspace over Albania and almost entire airspace
over Adriatic Sea was closed.
The airspace closure was immediately associated with Operation Allied Force and
there were no prior airspace restrictions for the period of escalation starting in
1998.
The airspace of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was opened for civilian traffic in
Sep 1999.
An air security zone, including the airspace of Kosovo, remained closed for civil
aircraft until 3 April 2014.

Reasons for airspace restrictions
Describes the reasons for airspace restrictions,
weapons known to be in the area and their range/
capabilities, what traffic was vulnerable, known or
suspected intent to attack civil aviation and whether
there was concern about unintentional attack.

NATO air strikes.
NATO aircraft and Tomahawk missiles from the air and Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia air defence systems from the ground.
US Navy Carrier Air Group in Adriatic Sea

Decision-making
Describes the source(s) of the threat information;
who made the decision regarding the restrictions and
with whom was the decision coordinated; was the
decision-making process different from the normal or
standard airspace decision-making process.

Decision to close the described airspace came from all neighbouring states in
order to stop the traffic to/from/over Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Technical support provided by EUROCONTROL. All flight plans to/from and over
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were rejected.

Promulgation
Describes how the restrictions were published,
number of the NOTAMs if available, AIS.

NOTAM and EUROCONTROL AIM.
A substantial preparation with the inclusion of all states whose airspace was used
by NATO air forces.
EUROCONTROL participated in coordination and provided technical support.

Notes
Other relevant information

References:
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Yugoslavia: Military Dynamics of a Potential
Civil War, March 1991
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Combat forces in former Yugoslavia, July 1993
Daniel L. Haulman, Air Power History, “The U.S. Air Force in the Air War Over
Serbia 1999,” Summer 2015
Daniel L. Haulman, Air Force historical Research Agency, MANNED AIRCRAFT
LOSSES OVER THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 1994–1999, October 2009

F. Capability to attack by at least one party:
1. No information for capability to attack with
range above FL 250.
2. Air-to-air missiles launched from fighter aircraft
(and no SAMs).
3. Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that
can hit an aircraft at cruising level.

Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that can hit an aircraft at cruising
level.
Both parties in this conflict had the capability to hit civilian aircraft in the region.
Armed Forces of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya:
Crotale, SA-7 Grail, SA-9/SA-13 SAMs, and AA guns in Army service. A separate
Air Defence Command had SA-2 Guideline, SA-3 Goa, SA-5 Gammon, and SA-8b
Gecko, plus guns.
S-75 Dvina (NATO reporting name SA2) is a Soviet-designed, high-altitude air
defence system with engagement altitude of 82,000 ft. S-75 — 6 Brigades with 18
launchers each;
S-125 Neva/Pechora (NATO reporting name SA3) mobile surface-to-air missile
system is a Soviet SAM system with engagement altitude of 59,000 ft. S125 — 9
Brigades with 12 launchers each;
S-200 (NATO reporting name SA-5) is a very long range, medium-to-high altitude
SAM system to defend large areas from bomber attack or other strategic aircraft
with engagement altitude of 130,000 ft. S-200– 8 battalions of six launchers each
at four sites and an estimated 380 missiles.
The Crotale EDIR (“InfraRed Differential Ecartometry”) is an all-weather shortrange anti-air missile, originally developed by France, which can be used to
intercept low-flight anti-ship missiles and aircraft with engagement altitude of up
to 30,000 ft. Crotale — nine acquisition and 27 firing units.
The 9K33 Osa (NATO reporting name SA-8 Gecko) is a mobile, low-altitude, shortrange tactical surface-to-air missile system designed in the Soviet Union with
engagement altitude of 39,000 ft. 9K33 Osa/ SA-8 Gecko — 50
9K38 Igla (NATO reporting name SA-18 Grouse) is a Russian/Soviet man-portable
infrared homing surface-to-air missile with and engagement altitude of 11,000 ft.
9K38 Igla — 380;
50 2K12 Kub mobile SAM. The 2K12 “Kub” (NATO reporting name: SA-6 “Gainful”)
low to medium-level air defence system designed to protect ground forces from
air attack with engagement altitude, depending on the modification, of up to
46,000 ft.
Other capabilities for lower altitudes: 200 9K34 Strela-3 (SA-14) — 278;
The National Transitional Council of Libya — The National Liberation Army:
9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7)
NATO:
NATO had the capability to hit civilian aircraft in the region.

G. Capability to differentiate between civil and
military aircraft:
1. Differentiation supported by radar, electronic
identification and non-cooperative target
recognition systems measuring signature using
acoustic and thermal radiation, radio emissions,
radar techniques.
2. Differentiation supported by radar and
electronic identification (e.g., identification,
friend or foe (IFF), secondary surveillance radar
(SSR).
3. Differentiation supported only by radar tracks.

Differentiation supported only by radar tracks.
NATO had more sophisticated capabilities to differentiate.

H. SAM/AAM operators’ experience and chain of
command:
1. Regular forces.
2. SAMs in the possession of irregular military
forces OR an absence of robust SAM/AAM
command and control procedures for
authorizing launch.
3. SAMs in the possession of irregular military
forces AND an absence of robust SAM/
AAM command and control procedures for
authorizing launch.

Regular forces.

A. Parties:
1. Conflict between states.
2. Conflict between non-state armed groups and
state(s) or civil wars.
3. Conflict between non-state armed groups.

Conflict between non-state armed groups and state(s) or civil wars.
The conflicting parties in the Slovenian war in 1991 were Slovenia and Yugoslavia.
The belligerents Slovenian Territorial Defence and Slovenian police on one side
and the Yugoslav People’s Army on the other side.
The war lasted from 27 June 1991 until 7 July 1991, when the Brioni Accords were
signed.

B. Armed conflict scale and/or tensions:
1. Terrorism and/or international political tension.
2. Insurgency (small-scale military activities) and/
or medium increasing political tension.
3. Large-scale military activities and/or
heightened international political tension.

Insurgency or small-scale military activities.

C. Military air transport activities:
1. Military air transport activities not reported.
2. Occasional use of aircraft to transport ground
troops or military equipment.
3. More than occasional use of aircraft to transport
ground troops or military equipment by at least
one party)

Occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military
equipment.

D. Military air combat activities:
1. No military air combat activities.
2. Small-scale (occasional) military air combat
activities and/or some activities above FL 250.
3. Large- to medium-scale military air combat
activities and/or regular activities above FL 250

Small-scale military air combat activities.

E. Known attacks:
1. Conflict area without publicly reported security
incidents involving military and civil aviation.
2. Conflict area with single security-related
reported incident/accident involving military
(or civil) aviation.
3. Conflict area with multiple reported securityrelated incident/accident involving military (or
civil) aviation.

Conflict area with single reported incident/accident involving military (or
civil) aviation.
On 27 June 1991, the Slovenian Territorial Defence shot down two Yugoslav
People’s Army helicopters with SA-7 missiles.