Response:
The process is consistent with the ICAO rules.
Responsible entity:
• Federal State Unitary Enterprise “State Air Traffic
Management Corporation of the Russian Federation”
• Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Aeronautical Information Centre”
References:
Aeronautical Information Services Manual, ICAO Doc
8126, Sixth Edition, 2003.
Manual Concerning Safety Measures Relating to Military
Activities Potentially Hazardous to Civil Aircraft Operations, ICAO Doc 9554, First Edition, 1990.
Federal Aviation Regulations “Requirements for legal entities and individual entrepreneurs performing commercial
air transport operations. Form of and procedure for issuing
a document verifying compliance of legal entities and individual entrepreneurs performing commercial air transport
operations with the requirements set out in federal aviation
regulations” approved by Order No. 246 of the Ministry of
Transport of the Russian Federation of 13 August 2015.
Federal Aviation Regulations “Preparation for and
performance of civil aircraft operations in the Russian
Federation” approved by Order No. 128 of the Ministry of
Transport of the Russian Federation of 31 July 2009.
Procedure for production and rules for provision of
aeronautical information approved by Order No. 305 of
the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation of 31
October 2014.
Process and timeline:
Production of aeronautical information includes compilation (generation) of raw aeronautical data and raw
aeronautical information, their submission to the aeronautical information authority, subsequent processing
and verification by the aeronautical information authority

and transmission to the users of the official aeronautical
data and official aeronautical information, processors
of the official aeronautical data and official aeronautical
information, and providers of the official aeronautical
information and official aeronautical data. After receiving
raw aeronautical data and raw aeronautical information, the aeronautical information authority shall verify,
register and process them for inclusion in the AIP of
Russia, Annex to the AIP of Russia, notices transmitted
via communication channels and containing information
about the condition of the aeronautical equipment and
airspace structure elements that are crucial to be timely
warned of for the personnel involved in the performance
of aircraft operations, and NOTAMs and AICs, as well as
provision to the users of the official aeronautical data and
official aeronautical information, processors of the official
aeronautical data and official aeronautical information,
and providers of the official aeronautical data. If the raw
aeronautical data and raw aeronautical information do
not meet the requirements, the aeronautical information
authority shall send them back to the providers (compilators) of raw aeronautical data and raw aeronautical
information for refinement.
Actual implementation:
Please describe the organizations involved in the
preparation of aeronautical information, verification of
the use of the ICAO AIS procedures and terminology,
and validation of the correctness and transmission of
the aeronautical information to its users.
• Federal Air Transport Agency (Rosaviatsiya)
• Federal State Unitary Enterprise “State Air Traffic
Management Corporation of the Russian Federation”
• Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Aeronautical Information Centre”
Changes introduced after 17 July 2014:
No changes have been introduced.

CQ1. What threat information about the presence of
air defence equipment in eastern Ukraine that was
not controlled by government forces and which could
have reached the respective airspace in URVV FIR
above Flight Level 250 was identified, when and by
which authority?
Answer:
The Russian authorities did not have any information
regarding the presence of air defense equipment on the
territory of Ukraine that was not controlled by the armed
forces of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine and which
could hit targets in the Rostov-on-Don FIR above FL 250.
Statements by Ukraine’s officials implied that Ministry
of Defence of Ukraine delivered different types of weapons, including combat aircraft, to the armed conflict zone.
In accordance with ICAO Rules, Ukrainian authorities
were responsible for obtaining, analyzing and disseminating flight safety information over armed conflict zone.
NOTAMs (A1383/14, A1384/15, A1492/14, A1493/14)
issued by Ukraine mentioned only flights of state aircraft as a source of threat to flight safety of civil aircraft.
The real situation in eastern Ukraine differed from the
information presented in NOTAMs. Therefore, as it was
outlined in the answer to Q2 of the Questionnaire of 4
September 2020, Rosaviatsiya identified a threat to flight
safety itself due to Ukraine’s regular shooting of the Russian border areas.
We would deem it important to draw the Flight Safety
Foundation’s attention to the fact that it is incorrect to
focus only on threats posed exclusively by air defense
systems capable of hitting targets at high altitudes when
assessing flight safety risks over eastern Ukraine. The
same mistake was made in the final DSB report where
the analysis of the actions and decisions taken by the
Ukrainian side was focused on the speculation that the
AN-26 aircraft of the Armed Forces of Ukraine had been
downed on 14 July 2014 with some “heavy weapon” (pages
181–185, Section 5.3).
The final DSB report concludes that the reason why
Ukraine restricted the use of the airspace below FL320
remains unclear (page 10, Subsection “Ukraine’s airspace
management,” paragraph two).
In April 2014, the Ukrainian authorities declared areas
in eastern Ukraine “an anti-terrorist operation zone.”
Regulation on the Use of Airspace of Ukraine approved
by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Resolution No.
401 of 29 March 2002 (https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/401-2002-п#Text)

did not provide for procedures in case of internal armed conflicts.
As it was found out during the investigation of
Flight MH17 crash, due to the operational use of the
aircraft of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (MIG-29, SU-27,
SU-25 aircraft), larger airspace in Denepropetrovsk FIR
was reserved by issuing NOTAMs from 29 June to 14 July
2014 by the necessity to set “a buffer zone” FL260-FL320
(page 196, Section 6.3, paragraph two).
Regulation No. 401 of 29 March 2002 contains a definition of the term “a buffer zone” which is a part of the airspace around restricted areas, hazardous areas, prohibited
areas and areas related to temporarily reserved airspace
intended to ensure safety requirements while carrying
activities related to the use of airspace in the mentioned
areas and beyond them. However, Regulation No. 410 of
29 March 2002 does not describe the order of buffer zones
settings.
Ukraine did not publish information regarding “the
buffer zone” around the conflict zone. Moreover, NOTAMs A1492/14 and A1493/14 issued by the Ukraine did
not prohibit state aircraft to fly between FL260 and FL320.
In this connection, it is still unclear how the Ministry of
Defence of Ukraine was going to provide and the Ukraerocenter to control the observance of the so-called “buffer
zone.”
Clarifications concerning the reasons for issuing NOTAMs A1492/14 and A1493/14 on setting “a buffer zone”
provided during the investigation of Flight MH17 crash,
give grounds for assuming that military activity in the
armed conflict zone related to the military aviation flights
was more dangerous than it was reflected in NOTAMs.
In accordance with para. 12.2. of the Rules for the
Performance of Flights and Air Traffic Management in the
Airspace of Ukraine with a Reduced Vertical Separation
Minimum approved by Order of the Ministry of Transport of Ukraine No. 9 of 11 January 2002, “The required
vertical separation minimum between the vertical limits
of the restricted and reserved airspace and other aircraft
not engaged in such activities and flying in airspace with
RVSM should be: 600 meters (2000 feet) above the upper
limit of the zone of the aforementioned activities for the
upper limits at FL290 and above; …”(https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/z0041-02#Text).
Therefore, given FL320 which is, according to NOTAMs
A1492/14 and A1493/14, the upper limit of the restricted
zone, civil aircraft could fly in this area at no less than
FL340, i.e. Flight MH17 authorised by the Ministry of

military actions as required by the ICAO Rules, including
para. 6.3.8. of ICAO Document 8126 and recommendations given in Appendix B to ICAO Document 9554. From
the Ukrainian NOTAMs, it formally followed that they
were in order to ensure state aviation flights.
However, the use of different types of weapons and
methods of warfare (flights with the use of combat
aviation weapons; tanks and artillery shooting; jamming
support) in close proximity to the territory of the Russian
Federation, not declared in the NOTAM, pointed to the
fact that the Ukrainian authorities did not fulfil the requirements of the ICAO Rules, according to which, co-ordination is aimed at providing optimal conditions which
allow to avoid the creation of hazards to civil aircraft and
minimizing interference with the normal flight operations
of such aircraft.
For instance:
• On 24 April 2014, one of the Russian air companies
informed Rosaviatsiya of disappearing GPS signal
when flying within the Dnepropetrovsk FIR area
of responsibility. Navigation equipment resumed
its work after entering the airspace of the Russian
Federation;

• On 5 June 2014, the Ukrainian plane SU-27 violated
the state border by trespassing over the Russian border and going 1.5km deep into the Russian territory
in the area of the populated area Kuybyshevo (the
Rostov region). On 12 June 2014, in the same area, a
MI-8 helicopter with Ukrainian symbols flying at the
height of 50m trespassed into the airspace of the Russian Federation going up to 3km deep into it (extract
from the Statement by the Russian MFA No. 1422 of
14 June 2014).
As it was mentioned earlier in the answers to Questions
No. 1 and 2, proceeding from the information in the latest
statements by the Russian MFA (No. 1570 of 28 June
2014, N0. 1678 of 10 July 2014, No. 1688 of 13 July 2014),
Rosaviatsiya decided to partially close the airspace in the
Rostov-on-Don FIR area of responsibility.
FL320 was taken as the limit for the NOTAM V6158/14,
same as in the Ukrainian NOTAMs A1492/14 and
A1493/14. The decision to set a vertical limit of FL320
was taken as Rosaviatsiya did not have any other, more
or less credible information provided by the Ukrainian
side, which would allow to forecast the vertical limit of the
hazard zone for civil aviation flights.

Answer:
Information from all available sources is used to assess
threats to civil aviation security in accordance with
relevant regulatory documents. Also, when assessing the
threats to civil aviation security, they consider the information pertaining to restrictions on flights in certain
areas from international civil aviation organizations and
civil aviation authorities of other states (Along with this,
attention ought to be paid to the fact that at the time the
air crash occurred, there was no concept or definition for
a “conflict zone”).
Responsible:
• State Aviation Administration of Ukraine;
• Security Service of Ukraine;
• Ministry of Defense of Ukraine;
• Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine;
• Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine;
• airport operators; aircraft operators;
• air navigation service providers;
• civil aviation authorities of foreign states;
• international civil aviation organizations.
References:
Law of Ukraine “On the State Civil Aviation Security Program” dated February 20, 2003 No 545-IV;
Law of Ukraine “On Combating Terrorism” dated March
20, 2003 No 638-IV (as amended).
Decree of the President of Ukraine “On Regulations
regarding the Anti-Terrorist Center and its coordination
groups at the regional bodies of the Security Service of
Ukraine” dated April 14, 1999 No 379/99 (as amended).
Order of the Ministry of Transport and Communications
of Ukraine “On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the
Level of Threat to Civil Aviation Security of Ukraine”
dated 11.05.2007 No 390 (restricted), registered by the
Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on May 25, 2007, registration No 542/13809 (as amended).
These documents are developed in accordance with relevant ICAO provisions, in particular Annex 17 and ICAO
Doc 8973.
Process and timeline:
In accordance with the legislation, the State Aviation
Administration of Ukraine constantly conducts a general

assessment of threats to civil aviation security on the
basis of information received from the Security Service
of Ukraine; Ministry of Defense of Ukraine; Ministry of
Internal Affairs of Ukraine; Foreign Intelligence Service of
Ukraine; airport operators; aircraft operators; air navigation service providers; civil aviation authorities of foreign
states; international civil aviation organizations.
Actual implementation:
Describe here what other sources of civil aviation threat
information about presence of air defence equipment
and intent to attack was identified by which authority.
According to the established procedures, the State
Aviation Administration of Ukraine used information
on threats to civil aviation security from the Ministry of
Defense of Ukraine, law enforcement and intelligence
agencies of Ukraine, civil aviation authorities of foreign
states; international civil aviation organizations. This information is the one marked “For official use (restricted).”
The information mentioned above is specified in the final
report on the investigation of the air crash of Malaysia
Airlines’ Boeing-777-200. https://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/en/page/3 … july-2014.
Changes after 17 July 2014:
National regulations and procedures pertaining to gathering and analyzing information about threats to civil
aviation security have been improved in line with updated
ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices, Annex 17
to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, and current legislation. In particular, the following
have been adopted:
• amendments to the laws of Ukraine “On the Security
Service of Ukraine,” “On Combating Terrorism,” “On
Counterintelligence Activities,” “On Operational and
Investigative Activities”;
• State Civil Aviation Security Program, approved
by the Law of Ukraine, dated March 21, 2017 No.
1965-VIII;
• Order of the Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine
“On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the Level of Threat to Civil Aviation Security if Ukraine,”
dated 17.06.2020 No 356 registered by the Ministry
of Justice of Ukraine on 01.10.2020, registration No
960/35243

Answer:
Information pertaining to NOTAMs, security warnings
and airspace restrictions for adjacent flight information
regions (FIRs) is constantly reviewed and analyzed in
accordance with relevant regulatory documents.
Responsible:
• State Aviation Administration of Ukraine;
• Security Service of Ukraine;
• Ministry of Defense of Ukraine;
• aircraft operators;
• air navigation service providers;
• EUROCONTROL.
References:
Law of Ukraine “On the State Civil Aviation Security Program” dated February 20, 2003 No 545-IV;
Rules of aeronautical information service provision (Order of the Ministry of Transport and Communications of
Ukraine (dated 01.07.2004 No564).
Regulation on Use of Airspace of Ukraine, approved by
the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated
29.03.2002 No 401
These documents are developed in accordance with relevant ICAO provisions, in particular Annexes 11, 15 and
17, Doc 8973, Doc 9554, Doc 8126, Cir 330
Process and timeline:
State Aviation Administration of Ukraine; Security Service
of Ukraine; Ministry of Defense of Ukraine; aircraft operators; air navigation service providers constantly review
and analyze NOTAMs, security warnings and airspace
restrictions for adjacent flight information regions (FIRs).
EUROCONTROL analyzes such information in order to
provide centralized services related to flight planning and
air traffic flow management.
Actual implementation:
Describe what civil aviation security threat information
was identified by which authority based on the
NOTAMs, security warnings and airspace restrictions
for adjacent fight information regions FIRs.
According to the established procedures, the State
Aviation Administration of Ukraine; Security Service of
Ukraine; Ministry of Defense of Ukraine; aircraft operators; air navigation service providers constantly review

and analyse NOTAMs, security warnings and airspace
restrictions for adjacent flight information regions (FIRs).
EUROCONTROL analyzes such information in order to
provide centralized services related to flight planning and
air traffic flow management. The information mentioned
above is specified in the final report on the investigation
of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200.
https://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/en/page/3 … july-2014.
Changes after 17 July 2014:
National regulations and procedures pertaining to gathering and analyzing information about threats to civil
aviation security have been improved in line with updated
ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices, Annexes
11, 15, 17 to the Chicago Convention on International
Civil Aviation, Doc 10084, Doc 10066, and current legislation. In particular, the following have been adopted:
• State Civil Aviation Security Program, approved
by the Law of Ukraine, dated March 21, 2017 No.
1965-VIII;
• Order of the Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine
“On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the Level of
Threat to Civil Security Aviation of Ukraine,” dated
17.06.2020 No356 registered by the Ministry of Justice
of Ukraine on 01.10.2020, registration No 960/35243;
• New edition of the Regulations on Use of Airspace
of Ukraine, approved by the decree of the Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine, dated 06.12.2017 No 954.
• “Rules of the Use of Airspace of Ukraine,” approved
by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of
Ukraine and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, dated 11.05.2018 No 430/210, registered by the Ministry
of Justice of Ukraine on 14.09.2018, registration No
1056/32508;
• Aviation Regulations of Ukraine “Aeronautical Information Service Provision,” approved by the Order of
the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine dated
on 13.05.2019 No 582, registered by the Ministry
of Justice of Ukraine on 09.07.2019, registration No
760/33731;
• Aviation Regulations of Ukraine “Air Traffic Service,” approved by the Order of the State Aviation
Administration of Ukraine, dated 16.04.2019 No 475,
registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on
04.07.2019, registration No 727/33698.

Answer:
According to relevant regulatory documents, all factors
that pose a potential threat to civil aviation security are
taken into account when establishing restrictions, prohibitions and terms on the use of airspace over or near areas
of military conflicts. (Along with this, attention ought to
be paid to the fact that at the time the air crash occurred,
there was no concept or definition for a “conflict zone”).
(Additional information is provided in Appendix 3).
Responsible:
• State Aviation Administration of Ukraine;
• Security Service of Ukraine;
• Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine;
• Ministry of Defense of Ukraine;
• Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine;
• air navigation service providers.
References:
Regulation on Use of Airspace of Ukraine, approved by
the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated
29.03.2002 No 401
Law of Ukraine “On the State Civil Aviation Security Program” dated February 20, 2003 No 545-IV;
Order of the Ministry of Transport and Communications
of Ukraine “On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the
Level of Threat to Civil Aviation Security of Ukraine”
dated 11.05.2007 No 390 (restricted), registered by the
Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on May 25, 2007, registration No 542/13809 (as amended).
These documents are developed in accordance with relevant ICAO provisions, in particular Annexes 11 and 17,
Doc 8973, Doc 9554, Doc 9433, Cir 330
Process and timeline
In accordance with the legislation, the State Aviation
Administration of Ukraine constantly conducts a general
assessment of threats to civil aviation security on the basis
of information received from Security Service of Ukraine;
Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine; Ministry of Defense
of Ukraine; Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, air navigation service providers, and make a decision on establishing restrictions and prohibitions on the use of airspace.
The information mentioned above is specified in the final report on the investigation of the air crash of Malaysia
Airlines’ Boeing-777-200. https://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/en/page/3 … -july-2014

Actual implementation:
Describe what risk factors for unintentional attack
were identified by what authority / organization. See
examples of risk factors listed in Q6
According to the established procedures, on the basis of
available information, appropriate restrictions and prohibitions on the use of airspace were established.
Changes after 17 July 2014:
National regulations and procedures pertaining to gathering
and analyzing information about threats to civil aviation security, risk assessment and implementation of prohibitions,
restrictions and terms on the use of airspace, have been
improved in line with updated ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices Annexes 11, 17 to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Doc 10084, and current
legislation. In particular, the following have been adopted:
• Laws of Ukraine “On Combating Terrorism,” “On
the Security Service of Ukraine,” “On Operational
and Investigative Activities,” “On Counterintelligence
activities.”
• Ukraine has adopted the following legislative
documents:
• State Civil Aviation Security Program, approved
by the Law of Ukraine, dated March 21, 2017 No.
1965-VIII;
• Order of the Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine
“On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the Level of
Threat to Civil Aviation Security of Ukraine,” dated
17.06.2020 No356 registered by the Ministry of Justice
of Ukraine on 01.10.2020, registration No 960/35243;
• New edition of the Regulations on Use of Airspace
of Ukraine, approved by the decree of the Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine, dated 06.12.2017 No 954.
• “Rules of the Use of Airspace of Ukraine,” approved
by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of
Ukraine and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, dated 11.05.2018 No 430/210, registered by the Ministry
of Justice of Ukraine on 14.09.2018, registration No
1056/32508;
• Aviation Regulations of Ukraine “Air Traffic Service,” approved by the Order of the State Aviation
Administration of Ukraine, dated 16.04.2019 No 475,
registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on
04.07.2019, registration No 727/33698.

Answer:
The process of determining how civil aviation can be affected based on threat information has been implemented
on the basis of relevant regulatory document (Additional
information is provided in Appendix 3). (Along with this,
attention ought to be paid to the fact that at the time the
air crash occurred, there was no concept or definition for
a “conflict zone”).
Responsible:
• State Aviation Administration of Ukraine;
• Security Service of Ukraine;
• Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine;
• Ministry of Defense of Ukraine;
• Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine;
• air navigation service providers.
References:
Law of Ukraine “On the State Civil Aviation Security Program” dated February 20, 2003 No 545-IV;
Regulation on Use of Airspace of Ukraine, approved by
the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated
29.03.2002 No 401;
Order of the Ministry of Transport and Communications
of Ukraine “On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the
Level of Threat to Civil Aviation Security of Ukraine”
dated 11.05.2007 No 390 (restricted), registered by the
Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on May 25, 2007, registration No 542/13809 (as amended).
These documents are developed in accordance with relevant ICAO provisions, in particular Annexes 11 and 17,
Doc 8973, Doc 9554, Doc 9433, Cir 330
Process and timeline:
In accordance with the legislation, the State Aviation
Administration of Ukraine constantly conducts a general assessment of threats to civil aviation security on the
basis of information received from the Security Service of
Ukraine; Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine; Ministry of Defense of Ukraine; Ministry of Internal Affairs
of Ukraine, air navigation service providers, and make
a decision on establishing restrictions, prohibitions and
terms on the use of airspace. The information mentioned
above is specified in the final report on the investigation
of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200,
https://www.onderzoeksraa d.nl/en/page/3546/crash-mh17-17-july-2014.

Actual implementation:
Describe what were the impact analysis results, if any
— how civil aviation can be affected based on threat
information — what airspace, what altitudes or type of
aircraft.
According to the established procedures, the detailed information is specified in the final report on the investigation of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200,
https://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/en/page/3 … july-2014.
Changes after 17 July 2014:
National regulations and procedures regarding risk assessment in relation to threats to civil aviation security have been
improved in line with updated ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices, Annexes 11, 17 to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Doc 10084, and current
legislation. In particular, the following have been adopted:
• Laws of Ukraine “On Combating Terrorism,” “On
the Security Service of Ukraine,” “On Operational
and Investigative Activities,” “On Counterintelligence
activities.”
Ukraine has adopted the following legislative documents:
• Law of Ukraine “On the specifics of state policy to
ensure the state sovereignty of Ukraine in the temporarily occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk
regions” dated January 18, 2018 No 2268-VIII;
• State Civil Aviation Security Program, approved
by the Law of Ukraine, dated March 21, 2017 No.
1965-VIII;
• Order of the Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine
“On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the Level of Threat to Civil Aviation Security of Ukraine,”
17.06.2020 No356 registered by the Ministry of Justice
of Ukraine on 01.10.2020, registration No 960/35243;
• New edition of the Regulations on Use of Airspace
of Ukraine, approved by the decree of the Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine, dated 06.12.2017 No 954.
• “Rules of the Use of Airspace of Ukraine,” approved
by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of
Ukraine and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, dated 11.05.2018 No 430/210, registered by the Ministry
of Justice of Ukraine on 14.09.2018, registration No
1056/32508;
• Aviation Regulations of Ukraine “Air Traffic Service,” approved by the Order of the State Aviation
Administration of Ukraine, dated 16.04.2019 No 475,
registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on
04.07.2019, registration No 727/33698.

Answer:
The process to determine security risk mitigations has
been established on the basis of the analysis of identified
threats in accordance with relevant regulatory documents. (To answer this question, the phrase “Security risk
mitigations” has been used instead of the phrase “security
mitigations”). (Additional information is provided in Appendix 3). (Along with this, attention ought to be paid to
the fact that at the time the air crash occurred, there was
no concept or definition for a “conflict zone”).
Responsible:
• State Aviation Administration of Ukraine;
• Security Service of Ukraine;
• Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine;
• Ministry of Defense of Ukraine;
• Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine;
• air navigation service providers.
References:
Law of Ukraine “On the State Civil Aviation Security Program” dated February 20, 2003 No 545-IV;
Regulation on Use of Airspace of Ukraine, approved by
the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated
29.03.2002 No 401;
Order of the Ministry of Transport and Communications
of Ukraine “On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the
Level of Threat to Civil Aviation Security of Ukraine”
dated 11.05.2007 No 390 (restricted), registered by the
Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on May 25, 2007, registration No 542/13809 (as amended).
These documents are developed in accordance with relevant ICAO provisions, in particular Annexes 11 and 17,
Doc 8973, Doc 9554, Doc 9433, Cir 330
Process and timeline:
In accordance with the legislation, the State Aviation
Administration of Ukraine constantly conducts a general
assessment of threats to civil aviation security on the
basis of information received from the Security Service of
Ukraine; Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine; Ministry
of Defense of Ukraine; Ministry of Internal Affairs of
Ukraine, air navigation service providers, and make a
decision on establishing restrictions, prohibitions and terms
on the use of airspace. The information mentioned above
is specified in the final report on the investigation of the air
crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200. https://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/en/page/3 … july-2014.

Actual implementation:
Describe if and what security mitigations were
determined that would permit civil aviation to overfly
the conflict zone.
According to the established procedures, the detailed information is specified in the final report on the investigation of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200.
https://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/en/page/3 … july-2014.
Changes after 17 July 2014:
National regulations and procedures regarding security risk mitigations based on identified threats to civil
aviation have been improved in line with updated ICAO
Standards and Recommended Practices, Annexes 11, 17
to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Doc 10084, and current legislation. In particular, the
following have been amended:
• Laws of Ukraine “On Combating Terrorism,” “On
the Security Service of Ukraine,” “On Operational
and Investigative Activities,” “On Counterintelligence
activities.”
Ukraine has adopted the following legislative documents:
• Law of Ukraine “On the specifics of state policy to
ensure the state sovereignty of Ukraine in the temporarily occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk
regions” dated January 18, 2018 No 2268-VIII;
• State Civil Aviation Security Program, approved
by the Law of Ukraine, dated March 21, 2017 No.
1965-VIII;
• Order of the Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine
“On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the Level of
Threat to Civil Aviation Security of Ukraine,” dated
17.06.2020 No356 registered by the Ministry of Justice
of Ukraine on 01.10.2020, registration No 960/35243;
• New edition of the Regulations on Use of Airspace
of Ukraine, approved by the decree of the Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine, dated 06.12.2017 No 954.
• “Rules of the Use of Airspace of Ukraine,” approved
by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of
Ukraine and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, dated 11.05.2018 No 430/210, registered by the Ministry
of Justice of Ukraine on 14.09.2018, registration No
1056/32508;
• Aviation Regulations of Ukraine “Air Traffic Service,” approved by the Order of the State Aviation
Administration of Ukraine, dated 16.04.2019 No 475,
registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on
04.07.2019, registration No 727/33698

Answer:
Procedures for decision-making and civil- military coordination in the introduction of bans, restrictions and terms
on the use of airspace are established in accordance with
relevant regulatory documents. (Additional information
is provided in Appendix 3). (Along with this, attention
ought to be paid to the fact that at the time the air crash
occurred, there was no concept or definition for a “conflict
zone”).
Responsible:
• State Aviation Administration of Ukraine;
• Security Service of Ukraine;
• Ministry of Defense of Ukraine;
• Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine;
• air navigation service providers;
• air space users.
References:
Regulation on Use of Airspace of Ukraine, approved by
the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated
29.03.2002 No 401
Rules of aeronautical information service provision (Order of the Ministry of Transport and Communications of
Ukraine (dated 01.07.2004 No564).
Instruction on planning and usage of temporarily reserved airspace and conditional ATS routes, approved by
decree of the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine
22.05.2006 No 354
“Instructions on the organization of interaction between
the bodies of the joint civil-military air traffic management system of Ukraine and the governing bodies of
the Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine” dated
29.02.2012;
These documents are developed in accordance with
relevant ICAO provisions, in particular Annexes 2, 11 and
15, Doc 9426, Doc 9554, Doc 9433, Cir 330, documents of
EUROCONTROL, and EU legislation.
Process and timeline:
Prohibitions or restrictions on the use of airspace are established by the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine
or the authorities involved in the Joint Civil-Military
System at the request of the competent authorities and
users of airspace.

The detailed information is specified in the final report
on the investigation of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’
Boeing-777-200. https://www.onderzoeksr aad.nl/en/
page/3546/crash-mh17-17-july-2014.
Actual implementation:
Describe who took what decisions for security
of airspace, including establishing restriction or
segregation of airspace. Describe what coordination
took place between the ANSP and military regarding
the security threats.
According to the established procedures, the detailed information is specified in the final report on the investigation of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200.
https://www.onderzoeksr aad.nl/en/page/3546/
crash-mh17-17-july-2014.
Changes after 17 July 2014:
National regulations and procedures regarding the implementation of appropriate restrictions and terms on the
use of airspace, with ensuring civil-military coordination,
have been improved in line with updated ICAO Standards
and Recommended Practices Annexes 2, 11, 15 to the
Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Doc
10084, Doc 10066 documents of EUROCONTROL, and
with current national and EU legislation considered. In
particular, the following have been adopted:
• New edition of the Regulations on Use of Airspace
of Ukraine, approved by the decree of the Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine, dated 06.12.2017 No 954.
• “Rules of the Use of Airspace of Ukraine,” approved
by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of
Ukraine and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, dated 11.05.2018 No 430/210, registered by the Ministry
of Justice of Ukraine on 14.09.2018, registration No
1056/32508;
• Aviation Regulations of Ukraine “Air Traffic Service,” approved by the Order of the State Aviation
Administration of Ukraine, dated 16.04.2019 No 475,
registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on
04.07.2019, registration No 727/33698;
• New edition of “Instructions on the organization of
interaction between the bodies of the joint civil-military air traffic management system of Ukraine and
the governing bodies of the Air Force of the Armed
Forces of Ukraine” dated 29.02.2012.

Response:
The decision-making process on the need to publish aeronautical information and the procedure for its publication
has been established in accordance with relevant regulatory documents.
Responsible:
• State Aviation Administration of Ukraine;
• Ministry of Defense of Ukraine;
• air navigation service providers.
References:
The Air Code of Ukraine.
Regulation on Use of Airspace of Ukraine, approved by
the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated
29.03.2002 No 401
Rules of aeronautical information service provision (Order of the Ministry of Transport and Communications of
Ukraine (dated 01.07.2004 No564).
These documents are developed in accordance with relevant ICAO provisions, in particular Annexes 11 and 15,
Doc 9554, Doc 8126, documents of EUROCONTROL.
Process and timeline:
Aeronautical information is published by the decision of
the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine in coordination with the state authorities concerned.
Actual implementation:
Describe how it was decided if there is a need for aeronautical information publication and how it was chosen
what communication tool for it (e.g. NOTAMs AIC).

According to the established procedures, the detailed information is specified in the final report on the investigation of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200.
https://www.onderzoeksr aad.nl/en/page/3546/
crash-mh17-17-july-2014.
Changes introduced after 17 July 2014:
National regulations and procedures regarding the publication of aeronautical information have been improved
in line with updated ICAO Standards and Recommended
Practices Annexes 11, 15 to the Chicago Convention on
International Civil Aviation, Doc 10084, Doc 10066, documents of EUROCONTROL, and current legislation. In
particular, the following have been adopted:
• New edition of the Regulations on Use of Airspace
of Ukraine, approved by the decree of the Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine, dated 06.12.2017 No 954.
• “Rules of the Use of Airspace of Ukraine,” approved
by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of
Ukraine and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, dated 11.05.2018 No 430/210, registered by the Ministry
of Justice of Ukraine on 14.09.2018, registration No
1056/32508;
• Aviation Regulations of Ukraine “Air Traffic Service,” approved by the Order of the State Aviation
Administration of Ukraine, dated 16.04.2019 No 475,
registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on
04.07.2019, registration No 727/33698.
• Aviation Regulations of Ukraine “Aeronautical Information Service Provision,” approved by the Order of
the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine dated on
13.05.2019 No 582, registered by the Ministry of Justice
of Ukraine on 09.07.2019, registration No 760/33731.

Response:
The procedure for disseminating information about
threats to the civil aviation security has been established
in accordance with relevant regulatory documents. (Along
with this, attention ought to be paid to the fact that at
the time the air crash occurred, there was no concept or
definition for a “conflict zone”).
Responsible:
• State Aviation Administration of Ukraine;
• Ministry of Defense of Ukraine;
• air navigation service providers.
References:
Law of Ukraine “On the State Civil Aviation Security Program” dated February 20, 2003 No 545-IV;
Regulation on Use of Airspace of Ukraine, approved by
the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated
29.03.2002 No 401;
Order of the Ministry of Transport and Communications
of Ukraine “On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the
Level of Threat to Civil Aviation Security of Ukraine”
dated 11.05.2007 No 390 (restricted), registered by the
Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on May 25, 2007, registration No 542/13809 (as amended);
Rules of flights and air traffic service in the classified airspace
of Ukraine, approved by the order of the Ministry of Transport and Communications of Ukraine 16.04.2003 No293.
Rules of aeronautical information service provision (Order of the Ministry of Transport and Communications of
Ukraine (dated 01.07.2004 No564).
These documents are developed in accordance with relevant ICAO provisions, in particular Annexes 11, 15 and
17, ICAO Doc 8973, Doc 8126, Doc 9554, Doc 9433, and
documents of EUROCONTROL.
Process and timeline:
The procedure for conveying information on threats to
civil aviation security to airspace users is determined
and carried out by the State Aviation Administration of
Ukraine, the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, including via
air navigation service providers.
Actual implementation:
Please describe whether and, if so, how the civil aviation
security threat information was disseminated to
operators within and outside the conflict zone FIR?
According to the established procedures, the detailed information is specified in the final report on the investigation of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200.

https://www.onderzoeksraa d.nl/en/page/3546/
crash-mh17-17-july-2014.
Changes introduced after 17 July 2014:
National regulations and procedures regarding dissemination
of information about threats to civil aviation security have
been improved in line with updated ICAO Standards and
Recommended Practices Annexes 11, 15, 17 to the Chicago
Convention on International Civil Aviation, Doc 10084, Doc
10066, the documents of EUROCONTROL, and current
legislation. In particular, the following have been adopted:
• State Civil Aviation Security Program, approved
by the Law of Ukraine, dated March 21, 2017 No.
1965-VIII;
• Order of the Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine
“On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the Level of
Threat to Civil Aviation Security of Ukraine,” dated
17.06.2020 No356 registered by the Ministry of Justice
of Ukraine on 01.10.2020, registration No 960/35243
• New edition of the Regulations on Use of Airspace
of Ukraine, approved by the decree of the Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine, dated 06.12.2017 No 954.
• “Rules of the Use of Airspace of Ukraine,” approved
by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of
Ukraine and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, dated 11.05.2018 No 430/210, registered by the Ministry
of Justice of Ukraine on 14.09.2018, registration No
1056/32508;
• Aviation Regulations of Ukraine “Air Traffic Service,” approved by the Order of the State Aviation
Administration of Ukraine, dated 16.04.2019 No 475,
registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on
04.07.2019, registration No 727/33698.
• Aviation Regulations of Ukraine “Aeronautical Information Service Provision,” approved by the Order of
the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine dated on
13.05.2019 No 582, registered by the Ministry of Justice
of Ukraine on 09.07.2019, registration No 760/33731.
Appendixes to the responses provided by Ukraine:
1) Ukrainian proposals based on recommendations
made by DSB in the Final Report on the Crash of
Malaysia Airlines, Flight MH17
2) Progress overview of ICAO conflict zone working
programme 2017-2020.
3) General information on setting the Prohibited/Restricted Airspace over armed conflict zones.
The information from appendixes to the responses provided
by Ukraine has been included in the discussion of the specific
answers wherever the appendix was referred by Ukraine.

of Ukraine prior to the downing of Flight MH17? How
was the associated security risk assessed and what
airspace management decision was taken?
Answer:
There was no information on the presence of air defense
systems in pro-Russian armed formations with the possibility of defeat above the FL 250 echelon.
CQ9 — What risk factors for unintentional attack
became known by the State Aviation Administration
of Ukraine prior to the downing of Flight MH17 and
how did this information affect their security risk
assessment?
Answer:
Prior to the crash of MH17, the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine was unaware of the threat of an unintentional attack above the FL 250 echelon.
CQ10 — The Netherland DSB investigation report
notes that, “After an emergency beacon was activated

at around 1320, indicating that flight MH17 had
crashed, UkSATSE made the decision at 1500, at
the tactical level, to also restrict the airspace above
FL 320.” It could be deduced that UkSATSE was responsible for threat and risk analysis, but the responses
received notes that “the State Aviation Administration
of Ukraine constantly conducts a general assessment
of threats to civil aviation security.” In that respect,
which authority was responsible prior to the downing
of Flight MH17 for the threat and risk analysis and
assessment?
Answer:
UkSATSE made a decision at the tactical level to limit
the airspace above the FL320 echelon as an immediate
response to the disappearance of the MH17 aircraft, as
stated in paragraph 6.3 of Part B of the final report of
the MH17 crash investigation issued by the Dutch Safety
Board. This fact is fully consistent with the information set
out in section 6.1 of the Final Report.