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“We have not seen any of the air defense vehicles across the border yet, but we’ve seen
them training in the western part of Russia, et cetera. So I think that there are several
types and capabilities of heavy weaponry that are moving across that border.”
The Dutch Ministers of Security and Justice, of Foreign Affairs and of Defence also sent
information to the House of Representatives of the Dutch Parliament on 13 October
2014. The ministers stated that on the day of the crash of flight MH17, NATO AWACS
aeroplanes had carried out missions in Poland and Romania.
The Dutch Safety Board was interested in the information sources on which the
statements by General Breedlove and the Dutch ministers were based. These sources
were of interest for the investigation into the causes of the crash and for the investigation
into the flight route. For this reason, the Dutch Safety Board asked NATO to provide
information about the number of military aircrafts that had been shot down since the
beginning of the conflict and about radar data or other data that NATO’s AWACS
aeroplanes had collected that could be relevant to the investigation into the crash of
flight MH17.
NATO stated that since NATO is not responsible for Ukraine’s airspace, it could not
supply any defnitive data. NATO also declared that NATO specialists, at request of the
Dutch Safety Board, had re-examined the data from the AWACS aeroplanes but that
these data did not contain any information relevant to the investigation into the crash of
flight MH17.
Consequences for the investigations of not receiving information
As explained, the Dutch Safety Board was not able to talk to everyone it wished in
relation to the investigation into the crash of flight MH17. For various reasons the Dutch
Safety Board did not receive all the requested information. In some cases, the interviews
or other information exchanges only took place during a late stage of the investigation,
causing a delay. Relevant parties in Ukraine and Malaysia could only be interviewed in
2015, and various documents requested from (parties in) these countries only became
available in the course of that year. The investigations into the flight route and the causes
of the crash in particular, were hindered by the fact that this information had not been
available for a long time.
The Dutch Safety Board put much effort into obtaining access to all information relevant
to the investigation. Not all of the requested information turned out to be available and
not all information available was provided to the Dutch Safety Board. Nevertheless, the
Dutch Safety Board was able to substantiate the fndings in the report with various
sources.
In one case the lack of information caused the Dutch Safety Board to be unable to draw
conclusions on a specifc aspect of the investigation. The extent to which Malaysian
intelligence services or government possessed information about the situation in the
eastern part of Ukraine, did not become clear in the investigation into the flight route.

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Examination of the wreckage
As mentioned elsewhere in this report, the Dutch Safety Board was responsible for
recovering the wreckage pieces and their transport to the Netherlands. The recovered
material was inspected and sorted at Gilze-Rijen Air Base in the presence of the Dutch
Public Prosecution Service, who indicated which pieces could be relevant to the criminal
investigation. These pieces were marked.
After this, the material became available for examination to both parties simultaneously.
Destructive examination (meaning: an examination of an irreversible nature) could only
take place once both parties had investigated the relevant material for damage patterns
and traces, and after both parties consented. All pieces of wreckage, parts or secured
evidence were only to leave the hangar in Gilze-Rijen for investigation after the Dutch
Safety Board and the Dutch Public Prosecution Service had agreed. This applied, for
example, to material analyses that were performed by external agencies.
Examination of the human remains
The Dutch Public Prosecution Service seized the human remains when they arrived in the
Netherlands, after which the injuries and the fragments that were found in the bodies
were forensically examined. The Dutch Safety Board was informed of the results of these
examinations, and used these for its own investigation. The Dutch Safety Board did not
perform its own examination of the human remains.
Recorders from flight MH17
During the investigation, the Dutch Safety Board provided the Dutch Public Prosecution
Service with the data fles from the flight data recorder and some of the data from the
cockpit voice recorder. The Dutch Safety Board was very cautious with providing the
recordings in order to guarantee the cockpit crew’s privacy. In the presence of the Dutch
Safety Board and the Public Prosecution Service, specialised staff listened to the sound
recordings on the Dutch Safety Board’s premises, with the objective of determining what
information could be essential to the criminal investigation. The entire 30-minute
recording was found not to be relevant in that respect, with the exception of the fnal
milliseconds, the moment when the aeroplane was hit. After consultation with the Dutch
Public Prosecution Service it was decided, for the abovementioned reasons, to hand over
only the recording of this short period of time. The data carriers themselves were not
handed over. These remained in the hands of the Dutch Safety Board.
Examination of the fragments
Both the Dutch Public Prosecution Service and the Dutch Safety Board arranged for the
fragments found in and on victims’ bodies and in and on in the pieces of wreckage to be
analysed. Both parties outsourced this process separately to external agencies, but
jointly coordinated this process, since the outcomes constituted a substantial source of
information for both the criminal investigation and the Dutch Safety Board’s investigation.
With regard to the fragments found in the victims’ bodies, a selection of human remains
was made of which scans revealed that they contained ‘foreign’ fragments. The selection
included the human remains of the crew in the cockpit. The fragments were removed
from the bodies by forensic investigators commissioned by the Dutch Public Prosecution
Service. The fragments were removed from the wreckage pieces by the Dutch Safety

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How to handle classifed information in the investigation into flight MH17 was determined
in consultation with the organisations that were owner of the information. The central
question in this consideration was whether use of this information could endanger the
security of the Netherlands. An additional consideration was the extent to which the
information was necessary for arriving at a conclusion or whether the information could
also be used in a supporting capacity.
In the investigation into the crash of flight MH17, classifed information was used in several
ways. Firstly, there were classifed documents that the Dutch Safety Board had requested
in the context of the investigation and of which it kept copies at its The Hague offce.
Internal agreements applied to consulting, storing and archiving these documents, with
special guarantees for the protection of and access to the information.
Secondly, it concerned classifed information that was available for the Dutch Safety
Board for inspection only. The Dutch Safety Board was able to see into relevant classifed
information regarding flight MH17 that was in the possession of the MIVD and the AIVD.
This concerned information from the MIVD and the AIVD themselves and from intelligence
services of other countries. This classifed information included the results of the
application of intelligence-gathering methods. The Dutch Safety Board used this
classifed information to verify its fndings. The fndings of the Dutch Safety Board as
described in the report about the crash of flight MH17 agree with this classifed
information. The classifed information confrms the fndings about the causes of the
crash described in de investigation report. Because of national security reasons, this
classifed information could not be publicised.
Since it is unusual for the Dutch Safety Board to make use of classifed military information,
an agreement was concluded between the Dutch Safety Board and the MIVD for this
specifc investigation. This agreement stipulates that both organisations may provide the
other with the information it needs to perform its legal tasks, either or not on request.
The Dutch Safety Board was allowed to consult classifed information under strict
confdentiality. Consultation of the secret information was limited to Board members and
a small number of Dutch Safety Board employees who had undergone an extensive
security screening for handling secret information.31
Lastly, classifed information was included in the investigation which the Dutch Safety
Board neither had access to nor was able to see into. This concerned information from
the Dutch Intelligence and Security Services (AIVD and MIVD) related to the armed
conflict in the eastern part of Ukraine. At the Dutch Safety Board’s request, the Minister
of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the Minister of Defence asked the Dutch
Review Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services (CTIVD) in their letter dated
21 November 2014 to examine this information.32 The Ministers asked the CTIVD to
report the fndings directly to the Board members of the Dutch Safety Board. The letter
also mentions the agreement that the Dutch Safety Board shall frst submit the CTIVD
report to both Ministers to check it for any state secrets prior to the Dutch Safety Board

31 This concerns a so-called Level A security screening.
32 The CTIVD has far-reaching mandate for the execution of its legal task. It has access to all relevant information of
the AIVD and the MIVD and may interrogate all staff members of these organisations.

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STATEMENT BY THE BOARD
In its reports, the Dutch Safety Board gives an account of the investigations it has
conducted following the crash of flight MH17. In this document, the Dutch Safety Board
gives an account of the manner in which the investigations were set up and carried out.
From the very beginning, the efforts of the Dutch Safety Board were aimed at executing
the investigation independently, profesionally and transparently within the frameworks
provided by the Chicago Convention and by Dutch law.
The Board concludes that the information gathered is suffcient and suitable for
substantiating the fndings and conclusions that are presented in the separate investigation
reports.
The Board points out that the investigation and the related decision-making process
were carried out in an independent manner. The Board was able to gather information
without influence from other parties and arrive at autonomous conclusions based on that
information. Consulting the accredited representatives and the organisations involved
about the draft reports has contributed to the high quality of the reports and underlines
the care that was taken in the work.
The Board feels it is unlikely that further investigation will lead to a noticeably greater
certainty as to the reliability and completeness of the information obtained. In addition,
the Board does not consider it desirable to make society, in particular the relatives, wait
any longer for the answers that the investigation provides. For that reason, the Dutch
Safety Board has decided to conclude its investigation and to publish its fndings and
conclusions.
<->
T.H.J. Joustra
Chairman, Dutch Safety Board

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APPENDIX A
PROJECT TEAM
The project team of this report ‘MH17 - About the investigation’ was made up of the
following individuals:

E.K. Verolme              Investigation Manager
E. Leydesdorff            Project Manager
M. Giesen                  Investigator
A.J. van der Kolk        Investigator
S. Pijnse van der Aa   Investigator
N. Smit                     Investigator
A. van der Zande       Investigator

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APPENDIX C
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING UKRAINE-THE NETHERLANDS
WITH REGARD TO THE DELEGATION OF THE INVESTIGATION

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APPENDIX D
AGREEMENT NBAAI - DUTCH SAFETY BOARD WITH REGARD TO THE
DELEGATION OF THE INVESTIGATION
Published on the Dutch Safety Board’s website on 13 October 2014

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APPENDIX E
CONFIRMATION OF PARTICIPATION IN THE INVESTIGATION BY
AUSTRALIA

N.B. For privacy reasons, names of individuals, their signatures and some contact details have been blanked
out in this document.

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APPENDIX G
AGREEMENTS ABOUT THE RECOVERY OF THE WRECKAGE
Published on the Dutch Safety Board’s website on 9 December 2014

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APPENDIX H
REQUEST WITH REGARD TO RECOVERY OF THE WRECKAGE

N.B. For privacy reasons, names of individuals, their signatures and some contact details have been blanked
out in this document

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N.B. For privacy reasons, names of individuals and some contact details have been blanked out in this
document