32

Figure 4: Excerpt from the passenger list (anonymised) of flight MH17 on 17 July 2014. (Source: Malaysia
Airlines)

After the crash of flight MH17 was reported, this was the frst passenger list that was
handed over to the authorities at Schiphol (see Chapter 4).
3.3 Analysis
3.3.1 Passenger information pertaining to flight MH17
Passenger list
The passenger list compiled by the ground handling agent based on the information
present in the Departure Control System turned out to correspond with the passengers
that were actually on board the aeroplane. This leads to the conclusion that the changes
that were made prior to departure - including changes due to rebooking several
passengers, for example - had been processed in the Departure Control System. The
names corresponded, with the exception of a few clerical errors, with the names of the
passengers who had actually boarded. The name and gender of the children who sat on
one of their parents’ lap were not listed. The information per passenger was limited, but
complied with the provisions of the Chicago Convention.

34

3.3.2 Registration of passenger information prior to a flight
The fact that relevant information about the passengers after the crash was not available
at the push of a button can be explained by the manner in which the registration of
passenger information is organised in civil aviation. This section deals with:
a. the registration process - from booking to departure;
b. the type of information being recorded;
c. the consequences of both (a and b) for the availability of passenger information
following an aircraft accident.
This section describes the usual departure process as applicable in the aviation sector
for flights outside the Schengen Area.37
a. Passenger information from booking to departure
There are various steps involved in the process of obtaining passenger information from
booking a flight to compiling a passenger list when a flight departs. Figure 5 illustrates
how the passenger information passes through these steps.

37 The Schengen Area consists of 26 countries, including 22 EU Member States, Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and
Liechtenstein. These countries have signed the Schengen Convention to allow the free movement of persons
within the European Union.

36

system. This could be a central reservation system or a global distribution system.39
These systems combine the demand for and supply of flights. The systems are supplied
with flight data, such as availability of seats, prices and reservations, as well as with new
reservations with the corresponding passenger information.
As soon as a combination of a booking and a flight is made, the airline reservation system
creates a so-called passenger name record, linking the personal information to the flight
data. Based on this information, the airline can issue an e-ticket for the flight.
Check in
Approximately 48 hours before the flight’s departure, the passenger information is
transferred from the airline’s reservation system to the Departure Control System. This
only involves the information necessary for handling the flight. This information is
accessible to the airline and/or its ground handling agent at the beginning of the check-in
procedure.
Passengers can check in online or at the airport (at Schiphol this is done at the selfservice kiosk or at the check-in desk). When checking in at the desk, passenger
information in the Departure Control System is verifed by means of the passport. It
depends on the fnal destination and on the airline whether or not passport information
is recorded.

Figure 6: Malaysia Airlines check­in desk at Schiphol Airport. (Source: ANP/E. Elzinga)

39 In the aviation sector, the term ‘central reservation system’ is used for the reservation system of one airline and
‘the term global distribution system’ for the collective reservation system of a large number of airlines.

38

b. Type of passenger information
Personal data
Airline passengers must possess a valid travel document, such as a passport or other
proof of identity. Travellers are obliged to provide their passport information when
booking the flight and/or when checking in, if it is requested by the airline. Some travel
organisations and airlines ask all travellers for their passport information, nationality and/
or date of birth, regardless of whether there is an obligation to do so. Most airlines do
not do this, because of the additional time and costs associated with processing the
additional information.
Relatives’ details (contact persons at home)
Travel organisations largely determine themselves which personal data they request and
record in addition to the aforementioned compulsory information; no specifc related
requirements exist.
As a rule, travel organisations offer the possibility, as revealed by the investigation, to
provide details of contact persons at home so that they can be informed in case of an
emergency. European aviation regulations41 specify that airlines must offer travellers the
opportunity to provide contact details of a relative. Travellers are not obliged to provide
details of contact persons at home. If they do, the airline may only use this information in
the event of an accident or disaster; the information may not be passed on to third
parties or used for commercial purposes.
Reliability of information
Until a passenger checks in, the passenger information that is requested, recorded and
shared is not checked. This means that travellers - either consciously or not - can provide
incorrect information and can choose to omit non-compulsory information. A frst check
of part of the information is done during check-in and/or during boarding. In the meantime,
some details may have changed. A proof of identity may have expired, for example, which
means that a passenger is travelling with an identity document other than the one used to
book the flight. Lastly, contamination may occur because information is not transferred
properly from one system to the other or because errors are made during registration.

41 Article 20, paragraph 3, EU Regulation 996/2010.

40

The fact that airlines can record more information than is strictly necessary is
demonstrated by the initiatives of Malaysia Airlines to record passport details (nationality,
passport number and date of birth) for all passengers. Clarity with regard to the
nationalities involved is one of the frst points on the agenda following an accident. The
authorities must be informed if any of their nationals are involved in the accident.
Furthermore, identity-related information, such as a passport number or date of birth, is
valuable for compiling a victim profle. Rapid availability of contact details of persons at
home assists the process of locating relatives.
Accessibility
In order to retrieve the information that is not recorded in the Departure Control System,
but in other systems (such as those of travel agencies), several actions will be needed.
Airlines have no access to the booking systems of travel organisations. Moreover, there is
no guarantee that the information required is available in the relevant systems,
because - as mentioned in the previous section - there are no obligations with regard to
the booking information that has to be recorded. The information entered in the system
depends on the travel organisation/airline (with respect to what it requests) and the
passenger (with respect to what information he/she provides when booking). Conversely,
travel organisations do not have access to the airline’s Departure Control System. This
also applies to the code share airline that is not involved in handling the flight (in this
case, KLM). Code share partners and travel organisations can only consult the booking
information. Therefore they do not know if the persons that booked the flight through
their services actually boarded the aeroplane. This information is only known to the
airline that operates the flight and/or its handling agent.

3.4 To summarise
Malaysia Airlines compiled a passenger list that complied with the guidelines that apply
to the aviation sector. This passenger list contained information about the passengers’
names and gender. More information was needed to determine with certainty who was
actually on board the aeroplane.43 This information could not be retrieved from the
systems immediately because of the organisation of passenger information on the one

43 Information about the nationality, date of birth and passport number.

42

4 PASSENGER INFORMATION
AFTER THE CRASH
4.1 Introduction
It is extremely important for relatives and other persons close to victims to receive a
defnite answer about the fate of their loved ones as quickly as possible following an
aircraft accident. Fast and reliable information provision related to the question of who
were on board the aircraft and their condition is therefore crucial. The passenger list
provided by the airline shortly after an aircraft accident forms the starting point; it is a list
with the passenger information available at that time, as described in the previous
chapter. The quality and composition of the passenger list varies from one airline to the
other, as well as per flight (regional, intercontinental). It is clear that the passenger list
does not contain the information that the authorities need in order to confrm to the
relatives of victims that their loved ones were on the flight. To do so, the available
information about victims and their relatives must frst be gathered, linked and verifed.44
This chapter begins with an overview of the relevant parties and processes in Section 4.2.
The following sections describe how the information process unfolded in practice after
the crash of flight MH17. It examines the planning in the preparatory phase (Section 4.3)
as well as the implementation in the acute phase: scaling up (Section 4.4), registering
relatives (Section 4.5), collecting, distributing and verifying passenger information
(Section 4.6) and informing the relatives (Section 4.7). Section 4.8 describes the relatives’
perceptions.
4.2 Relevant parties and processes
When an aircraft accident occurs, several parties may be assigned a role in collecting,
distributing and verifying passenger information, depending on the situation. The same
parties are not involved and/or do not play a primary role in all cases. When an aeroplane
crashes in the Netherlands, the safety region involved plays a prominent role in the
process of registering victims and relatives and in informing the latter. When Dutch
nationals are involved in an aircraft accident abroad, it is up to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs to get an overview of the victims and to make sure that their relatives are
informed.45 If an aircraft crashes on route to or from a Dutch airport, the public and
private organisations in and around the airport, for various reasons, also have a
responsibility related to collecting, distributing and verifying information regarding
victims and relatives and informing the latter.

44 The information is only fully validated and reliable after identifcation of the victim.
45 As a rule, in the Netherlands the task of informing relatives is carried out by the police.

44

National Police / National Forensic Investigation Team (LTFO) / Family liaison offcers
The responsibilities of the National Police include enforcing public order and detecting
criminal offences. Additionally, the police provides assistance in emergency situations
such as disasters. The police tasks performed by the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee
within the scope of the Schiphol Crisis Response Plan, are handled outside that scope (in
the Netherlands) by the National Police. The National Police also uses its knowledge and
expertise to beneft the crisis organisation.
The LTFO is a national team of specialists in the feld of forensic investigations and victim
identifcation at large and complex crime scenes.⁵² The team is deployed in the event of
disasters in the Netherlands, such as the Bijlmer disaster and the freworks disaster in
Enschede. The team can also be deployed abroad, as has been the case for the crash of
flight MH17 in Ukraine. The LTFO is only deployed abroad by order of the Minister of
Security and Justice at the request of the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations.
The family liaison offcers of the National Police are called in for assistance in the event of
major disasters. They inform relatives about the fate of their loved ones. From the time
they inform family members, they act as the relatives’ contact with the authorities.
Victims’ and relatives’ data are necessary for identifying victims. To this end, the LTFO
creates so-called ante mortem fles. Family liaison offcers are also charged with collecting
additional information for these fles. The LTFO coordinates the deployment of the family
liaison offcers.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Each ministry takes measures to deal with disasters and crises in their own policy areas.
To do so, each ministry has a departmental coordination centre (DCC). When Dutch
nationals are possibly affected by a disaster, accident or crisis abroad, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs is the ministry responsible for handling the resulting consular activities. In
addition to international coordination, for example with embassies, a priority task of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs is to establish the details of victims and missing persons and
inform relatives accordingly. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has its own crisis telephone
team, which in the event of major disasters can be deployed to provide and record
information. This means that, in the event of a civil aviation accident involving Dutch
victims abroad, the subsequent actions aimed at registering details of the victims and
their relatives fall under the formal responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The Ministry of Security and Justice and the National Coordinator for Security and
Counterterrorism (NCTV)
The Minister of Security and Justice is the coordinating minister with regard to crisis
management. He is responsible for the organisation, the operations, coherence and
integral approach to the crisis management policy and related system. The NCTV fulfls
this task ⁵³ in the so-called ‘cold’ phase (in preparation for a crisis) as well as the ‘warm’

⁵² The LTFO is a team of police and other partners, such as Defence, university hospitals and forensic dentists. The
LTFO has two main tasks: 1. forensic investigation, focused on the possible perpetrator (or perpetrators) and
establishing the circumstances surrounding the incident, and 2. recovery and identifcation of the victims.
⁵³ NCTV, National Manual on Decision-making in Crisis Situations (Nationaal Handboek Crisisbesluitvorming), April
2013, and wwwnctv.nl.

46

The National Crisis Centre (NCC)
In the event of a crisis, the NCC plays an important role. The NCC is part of the Ministry
of Security and Justice and falls under the authority of the NCTV. The NCC acts as the
interdepartmental coordination centre and hub for administrative information provision
and crisis communication. The NCC is the support staff and facilitates interdepartmental
crisis decision-making (and the relevant preparation for it) at the civil-service as well as
the political-governmental level in the event of a crisis.⁵⁸ With regard to the preparation
for interdepartmental decision-making, several key areas of concern can be distinguished,
including:
• Information: The assembling (monitoring, collecting and initial assessment) of factual
information including subject-related information. What is actually happening?
• Measures: What does the factual information mean and what measures are or need to
be taken and by whom? This involves a combination of administrative and operational
measures.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ In the ICCb and MCCb.
⁵⁹ NCTV, National Manual on Decision­making in Crisis Situations (Nationaal Handboek Crisisbesluitvorming), April 2013

48

their residents are involved. The draft protocol provides an overview of tasks and
responsibilities of the various parties that play a role in such a case, but it does not focus
on an aircraft accident. Several relevant parties that can play a role in and around the
airport are not specifed in the document, such as the safety region, the Committee of
Consultation and the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee.
The national risk assessment and regional risk profles of the safety regions with major
airports⁶² do not include a scenario for an aircraft accident abroad involving a large
number of Dutch nationals either. The Dutch Safety Regions Act makes it compulsory for
airports to have a disaster response plan in place. In the Kennemerland Safety Region,
this plan is part of the Schiphol Crisis Response Plan. The Kennemerland Safety Region
has included a scenario for aircraft accidents outside Kennemerland in this plan.⁶³
According tot the plan this scenario can be used for aircraft accidents outside the
Netherlands,⁶⁴ however, its elaboration focuses exclusively on Dutch safety regions as
source areas.⁶⁵ The plans of these (and other) safety regions cited above do not appear
to make any connection between the activities in the region and those of national
authorities with regard to obtaining and sharing passenger information and the process
of registering and informing relatives.
4.3.2 Analysis
The Dutch authorities were not prepared on either a national or regional level for a
scenario involving an aircraft accident abroad involving a large number of Dutch victims.
More specifcally, it appears that the entire process of collecting, distributing and
verifying the information necessary to inform relatives about the fate of their loved ones
had not been thought through in advance for this scenario. This is remarkable because,
to a large extent, the same steps must be followed for every accident involving a
passenger aeroplane before relatives can be informed about the fate of their loved ones.
The possibilities and limitations of airline systems that contain passenger information do
not vary per scenario. Moreover, it is striking because accidents involving a large number
of Dutch victims have happened before, as with the crash of an aeroplane in Tripoli.
Although the relatives of the Dutch victims of the accident were informed relatively
quickly,⁶⁶ the crash in Tripoli led to the NCC developing the draft protocol for releasing
names of victims abroad. However, to date, this protocol has still not been adopted.
Moreover, the protocol in its current form would not have led to the coordination of the
overall process, given that it does not provide a comprehensive approach in this respect.

⁶² Kennemerland (Schiphol), Rotterdam-Rijnmond (Rotterdam-The Hague Airport), Brabant Zuid-Oost (Eindhoven),
Drenthe (Eelde) and Zuid-Limburg (Maastricht).
⁶³ If such a scenario does unfold, it could have an impact on the airport, or processes at the airport, in the region in
which the airport is located. This is for example due to the presence of people dropping off or collecting others,
the need to provide information, psychological after-care et cetera. The disaster response plans of several other
airports include a similar scenario.
⁶⁴ The plan states that the scenario, which was included following incidents such as the aeroplane crash in Tripoli and
the ash cloud in Iceland, is to be used in the event of an aircraft accident abroad (outside of the Netherlands)
involving an aircraft that is heading for or that departed from Schiphol. In its elaboration, the scenario includes a
sentence meaning that the ‘safety region source area’ may also be read as ‘foreign power’.
⁶⁵ The Kennemerland Safety Region recognised this and indicated that it will integrate the lessons learned from the
crash of flight MH17 in the crisis organisation. Among other things, this concerns further specifying the preparations
for aircraft incidents abroad.
⁶⁶ Relatives could be informed more quickly because, apart from nine people, all the Dutch victims had booked their
trip with two travel organisations.

50

the Committee of Consultation. From 21.45 CET (19.45 UTC) onward, the meetings of
the Operations Team were also attended by a liaison of the NCC. Obtaining the
passenger list and setting up a national information number were important topics at
the meetings of the Operations Team.⁷¹
• Initially the NCC did not feel that the Netherlands was facing a national crisis. The
NCC’s original impression was based on the fact that the crash of flight MH17 had not
taken place in the Netherlands and that media reports during the initial period
following the crash suggested that only a few Dutch nationals were on board. The
NCC did not yet believe there was a need to scale up. The NCC did monitor reports
in the media (including social media), interpreted this information and informed
various people and parties (including the NCTV in person and the Minister of Security
and Justice) about the news. As it gradually became apparent that it concerned a
flight originating from Schiphol with many Dutch passengers on board, the need for
the NCC’s signifcant involvement became clear and it began scaling up to the
national crisis structure around 18.00 CET (16.00 UTC). At 19.00 CET (17.00 UTC)
feedback from the crisis meeting with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs revealed that the
national crisis structure would be activated and that the ICCb would convene. At that
moment, the NCC’s priority was to obtain a clear picture of the number of Dutch
nationals on board and it tried to obtain relevant information from the various
organisations involved.
• After reading the media reports, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs immediately activated
its own crisis organisation. It called up members of the crisis telephone team, followed
soon by the frst crisis meeting at the Ministry. At that meeting, it was considered very
important to achieve clarity concerning the passenger list. At the frst crisis meeting
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it was decided to convene the Interdepartmental
Commission for Crisis Management (ICCb). The Ministerial Commission for Crisis
Management (MCCb) was slated to meet later that evening.
• On Thursday evening, the National Forensic Investigation Team (LTFO) also scaled
up. A number of senior offcials met at Schiphol to make initial preparations regarding
victim identifcation and repatriation from Ukraine. On Friday evening, 18 July, a
delegation of the LTFO left for Ukraine. Other offcials of the LTFO in the Netherlands
continued to focus on preparing a list of missing persons and on identifying the
victims.
Several offcials of the national authorities made different statements in interviews. The
Dutch Safety Board concludes from these interviews that there was a difference of
opinion both between and within the ministries regarding who was in charge of the crisis
organisation with respect to the information process. Some offcials of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs believed that the Ministry was in charge of the process of registering and
verifying information about victims and their relatives. The higher offcial level was of the
opinion that the Ministry of Security and Justice was in charge. Different opinions on the
matter also existed within the Ministry of Security and Justice itself. For example, the

⁷¹ Shortly after the disaster was reported, several offcials from the Municipality of Haarlemmermeer (subsequently
followed by the Operations Team) committed to opening a national information number. Opinions on why that
number was not opened at that time range from the belief that too few Dutch victims were involved, to the fact
that they had to wait for adequate staff to man the emergency telephone team before the number could be
opened.

52

independent of GRIP Rijk. What’s more, even if GRIP Rijk had been declared effective,
there would not have been a scenario nor an elaborated plan for dealing with an
aeroplane accident abroad involving many Dutch nationals.
Separate from the option to declare GRIP Rijk effective, there are other possibilities for
the parties involved clarifying the division of tasks between them. National authorities,
the region and Malaysia Airlines could, for example, have made working agreements on
sharing relevant information.

4.5 Registration of relatives
4.5.1 Findings
Registration at Schiphol
Following news of the crash of flight MH17, worried relatives who feared for the fate of their
loved ones gathered at Schiphol in the hope of getting answers as to whether their relatives
were on board the crashed aeroplane. The frst group of people arrived at Schiphol at
about 19.00 CET (17.00 UTC). They were received at the panorama restaurant Dakota’s. As
the number of relatives arriving at Schiphol grew during the course of the evening, the
reception was moved to the nearby Steigenberger Hotel. Malaysia Airlines took the lead in
receiving the relatives.⁷³ The airport authorities, the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee and
several other parties ⁷⁴ offered support. Among other things, registration forms were
handed out to be completed by the relatives. These forms were then collected by Malaysia
Airlines with primary assistance mainly from the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee. Malaysia
Airlines provided the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee with copies of the collected forms.
No attempts were made by any authority to take over the responsibility for registering
relatives from Malaysia Airlines.
That same Thursday evening, however, a few employees from the Municipality of
Haarlemmermeer responsible for tasks related to public safety, including the offcer on
duty for population management, arrived at Schiphol. These employees of the Municipality

⁷³ The municipality bears ultimate responsibility for (coordinating) acute reception and looking after people. This
also applies to Schiphol airport. The airlines are expected to perform a number of tasks (including compiling
inventories and offering support/assistance) and providing people to perform these tasks. The airport plays a
facilitating role, such as organising transport to a temporary reception centre.
⁷⁴ KLM Care Team, Airport Medical Services, the Airport Chaplaincy, Community Health Services - Psychosocial
Support (GGD­Psychosociale Hulpverlening).

54

number were connected to the Malaysia Airlines headquarters in Kuala Lumpur,
where they were able to communicate with staff in English. On Friday, Malaysia
Airlines, with assistance from KLM, set up a telephone exchange in the Netherlands
in order to facilitate communication in Dutch. Malaysia Airlines registered the
information of the relatives who called the information number.
• Ministry of Foreign Affairs: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs opened an emergency
number for relatives at about 21.20 CET (19.20 UTC). This number was to be used for
the purpose of collecting information about potential Dutch victims and their relatives
and to inform the latter as effectively as possible about options for additional
assistance. The number was not intended as a means to inform the relatives about
who was or was not on the passenger list of flight MH17. Malaysia Airlines presented
this number at 22.30 CET (20.30 UTC) at a press conference at Schiphol and requested
relatives to call that number. Following this announcement, calls flooded in and
overloaded the information number.⁷⁹ To register relatives’ information (and
information about the victims), the Ministry used its own crisis registration system,
Kompas. For the registration process the Ministry did not utilise Malaysia Airlines’
registration forms that were completed at the airport by the relatives. The Ministry of
Foreign Affairs also failed to use and integrate the information about relatives
gathered by Malaysia Airlines in Kuala Lumpur, into the Kompas system.
Use of victim information system (SIS)
Investigations into past accidents, such as the 2012 train collision in Amsterdam and the
Turkish Airlines crash in 2009, revealed victim registration as one of the bottlenecks. In
2010, the Minister of Security and Justice asked the Security Council to solve the
bottlenecks cited in the investigation reports with respect to the issues pertaining to
victim registration.80 This resulted in the development of a national victim information
system (see blue box).
Shortly after the crash of flight MH17 was reported, the NCC obtained information about
the possibility of activating the SIS, which would be usable in this situation. The NCC was
to bring this possibility to the attention of the crisis meeting at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. The reports from this crisis meeting, however, do not allude to any discussions
about the use of the SIS. Instead, the Ministry opted to use a system it was familiar with.

⁷⁹ Consequently, many people at home and abroad called the number, also, for example, to book a flight. The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not attempt to clarify the purpose of the telephone number by means of external
communication and in that way help people navigate to the right contact point.
80 A joint investigation conducted by the Inspectorate of Security and Justice and the Health Care Inspectorate into
the train collision that occurred at Amsterdam Central Station on 21 April 2012 led the Inspectorates to conclude
that the victim registration system was not managed properly.

56

4.6 Collection, distribution and verifcation of the passenger information
Firstly, it was Malaysia Airlines’ responsibility to provide authorities with the best possible
information about all passengers who were on board the aeroplane. This information was
very important to the crisis organisations in the ten countries that were mourning victims.
It provided them with an important starting point for obtaining an overview of the victims
and their relatives. Several private and public parties were involved in this process in the
Netherlands.
This section broadly outlines:
a. the distribution of the initial Malaysia Airlines passenger list and subsequent updates
to and between the various parties, and
b. the efforts made by the four authorities who compiled lists of information about the
victims and their relatives.
4.6.1 Findings
a. Distribution of the passenger list
Malaysia Airlines’ headquarters in Kuala Lumpur informed the Malaysia Airlines branch at
Schiphol of the missing of flight MH17 around 16.00 CET (14.00 UTC). Immediately
thereafter, Malaysia Airlines’ emergency response plan was implemented both in Kuala
Lumpur (headquarters) as well as at Schiphol. The headquarters set up an Emergency
Operations Center (EOC), which as of that moment was responsible for handling the
missing of flight MH17. One of the EOC’s frst tasks was to safeguard the passenger
information by sealing it. At 17.15 CET (15.15 UTC) the manager responsible for this asked
the administrator of the system containing the passenger information to block the
passenger information for flight MH17 in the system. As of that moment, the passenger
information was sealed, and a very limited number of persons had access to the list.
At Schiphol, Malaysia Airlines’ support centre played an important role as soon as the
crash became known in handling the airline’s crisis tasks. The Regional Senior Vice
President was in charge of the branch. The goal was to coordinate with headquarters in

58

Initially, the Malaysian government was responsible for when this information would be
released. With time, Malaysia Airlines was able to determine the nationality of an
increasing number of passengers. Accordingly various updates of the passenger list were
released, circulating between the different parties:
• On Thursday evening at 20.20 CET (18.20 UTC), the parties at Schiphol, namely the
Committee of Consultation and the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee, already
possessed information about the nationalities of a large number of the passengers
(the nationality of 47 passengers at that time was still unknown). The national
authorities, like the NCC and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, did not have this
information. At that moment, the NCC only got hold of the frst passenger list, which
included the name, gender, and seat number. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had not
yet received any list. There was some displeasure within the ICCb and MCCb about
the fact that information about the passengers’ nationalities was not available. This
created a tense atmosphere between the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism
and Security (in person) and the Regional Senior Vice President of Malaysia Airlines.
Both maintained regular contact, but this did not result in practical cooperation in
order to jointly resolve the problems.
• The Ministry of Foreign Affairs initially had no contact with the parties in and around
Schiphol, but rather tried to contact Malaysia Airlines directly and via the Dutch
Ambassador in Kuala Lumpur. During the night from Thursday to Friday, Malaysia
Airlines’ headquarters in Kuala Lumpur provided a list of names and some of the
nationalities (the nationality of 41 passengers was not listed) to the Dutch Ambassador
in Kuala Lumpur. The Ambassador then sent this list to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. On Friday, 18 July at 13.20 CET (11.20 UTC), Malaysia Airlines sent an updated
passenger list containing names, nationalities (the nationality of four passengers was
still unknown at that time) and quite some additional information about the passengers
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁸²
• The NCC tried to obtain passenger information from the airline and from the
Operations Team.⁸³ After midnight (01.18 CET, 23.18 UTC) the NCC obtained a list
containing nationalities for the frst time from the liaison of the Municipality of
Haarlemmermeer.⁸⁴ The nationality of 60 passengers was missing on this list. The
NCC forwarded this information to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the next morning.
The NCC received no subsequent update of the passenger list after this.
The Committee of Consultation and the Operations Team noted on Thursday evening at
19.30 CET (17.30 UTC) and 22.30 CET (20.30 UTC) that coordination of the passenger list
was a cause for concern. This cause for concern was shared with the mayor of the
Municipality of Haarlemmermeer.
On Saturday 19 July, at 13.30 CET (11.30 UTC) Malaysia Airlines published a passenger
list containing all the passengers’ names and nationalities.

⁸² It was not possible during the investigation to examine all of the communications of all parties involved. However,
the information that was available for the Dutch Safety Board provides a clear picture of the parties who were in
contact with each other, whether they shared information and when this took place.
⁸³ From 21.00 CET (19.00 UTC), a NCC liaison was present during meetings of the Operations Team.
⁸⁴ The list originated from the public order and security offcial, who had participated in the Committee of
Consultation as a representative of the municipality on Thursday 17 July 2014.