Review Committee
on the Intelligence and
Security Services
CTIVD nr. 43
REVIEW REPORT
arising from the crash of fl ight MH17

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1 Introduction
On 21 November 2014, the Dutch Review Committee for the Intelligence and Security Services (the
Committee) received the request from the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the
Minister of Defence to conduct an investigation into the role of the AIVD and the MIVD in the decisionmaking related to the security of fl ight routes.
The Dutch Safety Board asked the ministers to submit this request to the Committee. Following the
crash of Malaysia Airlines fl ight MH17 on 17 July 2014 in Eastern Ukraine, the Dutch Safety Board is
investigating, inter alia, the decision-making related to the selection of fl ight routes. This investigation
raised three research questions related to the role of the AIVD and the MIVD that the Dutch Safety
Board wanted the Committee to investigate.
The following research questions were presented to the Committee:
a) What is the formal structure between the AIVD or the MIVD respectively and the parties relevant
to aviation security, such as airlines, air navigation service providers and ministries, with regard to
the provision of information about security threats?
b) What are the two Services’ specifi c activities related to exchanging information with parties relevant
to aviation security?
c) What information did the AIVD and the MIVD possess prior to the crash regarding the security
situation in Eastern Ukraine, and to what extent did they share this information with parties
involved in aviation security and safety? What were the considerations for doing / not doing so?
On 6 January 2015, the Committee announced that it would conduct the requested investigation.
This review report is structured as follows:
• Chapter 2 describes the procedure followed for this report and the Committee’s research method.
• Chapter 3 includes the legal framework that applies to the role of the AIVD and the MIVD in the
decision-making related to fl ight routes.
• Chapter 4 focuses on research questions (a) and (b): the consultation structure and the information
exchange between the AIVD and the MIVD and the civil aviation sector.
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2 The organisation of the investigation

2.1 Procedure
The Committee’s task is laid down in the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002 (Wiv 2002). The
Committee monitors the legality of the AIVD’s and the MIVD’s operations. The research questions that
the Dutch Safety Board presented to the Committee do not directly fall under this task. The Committee
did, however, conduct this investigation in accordance with the application of the Wiv 2002. This was
based on the request submitted by the two ministers.
In contrast to what is stipulated in the Wiv 2002, in this particular case the Committee reports its
fi ndings directly to the Dutch Safety Board. The ministers will not send the report to both Chambers of
the States General accompanied by their response. The Dutch Safety Board will make the Committee’s
report public, along with its own report. In this respect, the ministers and the Dutch Safety Board
agreed that the Dutch Safety Board will fi rst present the Committee’s report to both ministers to
examine it for the presence of any State secret information before the Dutch Safety Board makes the
Committee’s report public.
This report does not contain any secret appendix.
2.2 Methodology
Shortly after receiving the letter from both ministers, the Committee launched a preparatory
investigation. In this phase the Committee held exploratory interviews with the management of the
AIVD and the MIVD, conducted an exploratory case study of both Services and developed an action
plan for the investigation.
In its investigation, the Committee focused on the period from 1 January 2014 through 17 July 2014. The
Committee interviewed seventeen people during the investigation. Several people were interviewed
twice. In total, the Committee conducted twenty interviews. They mainly involved staff from both
Services. The Committee also conducted an extensive case study of both Services.
The investigation consisted of two phases. The initial phase was characterised by a process of
familiarisation and elaboration. In this phase an initial investigation of the systems took place and a
request was submitted for the material that the Services had gathered as part of internal investigations
into the level of knowledge prior to the crash.
This material was studied and then assessed and supplemented by interviews with the staff members
involved. During the second phase, the Committee performed a cross-check in the Service’s digital
systems. Broad investigative activities were conducted to examine the systems and ascertain whether
all the relevant documents had been identifi ed. This approach provided the Committee with a complete
picture of the level of knowledge both Services possessed prior to the crash of fl ight MH17.
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There is another aspect that is closely related to the limitations of central government’s responsibility
outlined here. It involves the decision-making of Dutch airlines with regard to the use of open foreign
airspace, whether subject to a compulsory fl ight altitude or not. This does not involve the demarcation
of responsibilities between sovereign States, but between the authorities and the business community.
The decision whether to use foreign airspace or not falls beyond the Dutch central government’s
sphere of infl uence. The Dutch Aviation Act does not contain any explicit provision for imposing a fl ight
ban on Dutch airlines with regard to fl ying in foreign airspace. In the Netherlands the airlines are the
ones that decide whether they use other countries’ open airspace or not. This decision also includes
the consideration of any relevant safety aspects. To this end, in practice, the airlines use risk analyses
that they produce in-house.
The answer to the question posed is: Central government has no control over the decision-making
related to opening foreign airspace and therefore no responsibility for the safety of that airspace; it
has no control either over the choices made by Dutch airlines with regard to use of the airspace and
therefore it does not bear responsibility for those choices.
3.3 The security tasks of the AIVD and the MIVD
In short, the legal security duties of the AIVD and the MIVD3 involve the Services conducting
investigations into threats to national security. In doing so the AIVD focuses on civil aspects and the
MIVD on military aspects. Investigating threats includes monitoring the security situation so that new
threats can be identifi ed. The objective of these investigations is to enable the central government to
assume its responsibility for protecting national security.
In the previous paragraph, the Committee established that the Dutch central government has no
control over, and consequently does not bear responsibility for, decisions related to opening foreign
airspace, or for the choices made by Dutch airlines with regard to using the airspace. Since the AIVD
and the MIVD’s task allocation is linked to the central government’s responsibilities, the Committee
concludes that the AIVD and the MIVD do not have a legal duty related to the safety of foreign airspace
and consequently for the safety of fl ight routes that pass through them.
3.4 The intelligence tasks of the AIVD and the MIVD
The AIVD and the MIVD are charged with the task of conducting investigations concerning other
countries.4 This is the foreign intelligence task. The Services perform this task with regard to matters
that are referred to in the Foreign Intelligence Designation Order. This order does not mention the
safety of foreign airspace or foreign civil aviation fl ight routes. Conducting investigations into the
safety of foreign fl ight routes and the decision to use them is not part of this task.

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3 This is the so-called ‘a’ task of the AIVD (Article 6 paragraph 2 subsection a Wiv 2002) and the ‘a’ and ‘c’ tasks of the
MIVD (Article 7 paragraph 2 subsections a and c).
4 This is the so-called ‘d’ task of the AIVD (Article 6 paragraph 2 subsection d Wiv 2002) and the ‘e’ task of the MIVD
(Article 7 paragraph 2 subsection e).
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• Other information that is relevant to security
With regard to other information that the AIVD possesses, it will be diffi cult for the Service to
independently estimate exactly what the civil aviation parties need. Close collaboration with these
parties is therefore required to properly implement this information provision.9 The AIVD will not
generally be aware of the fl ight routes taken by Dutch airlines or of the foreign airports at which the
airlines land. In this respect, the initiative must be taken by the airlines and not the AIVD. This means
that information requests from airlines must constitute the basis for the provision of information by
the AIVD (except in the event of an actual threat). Subsequently it is up to the AIVD to consider whether
it falls within its legal tasks to provide information.10 Chapter 4 explores this matter in more detail.
3.6 Threat reporting by the MIVD
In contrast to the AIVD, the MIVD does not have a legal duty that relates to civil aviation security.
Therefore, the MIVD cannot generally be expected to provide civil aviation parties with information
that is important for civil aviation security.
Specifi c threat information11 constitutes an exception to this. The Committee is of the opinion that if
ongoing investigations conducted by the MIVD reveal a specifi c threat to civil aviation, the MIVD must
take the initiative to report it as quickly as possible, either directly to the civil aviation party concerned
or to the NCTV. This arises from the principle of balanced interests that is part of the general principles
of good governance.12
3.7 Collaboration between the AIVD and the MIVD
The law stipulates that the Services must collaborate with each other as much as possible.13 This
collaboration can at any rate involve providing data that may be important to the other Service.14
Since the AIVD has a security promotion task that also includes civil aviation security, the MIVD can be
expected to cooperate in this area. This is important because, given the MIVD’s military orientation, it
often possesses specifi c knowledge of weapons and weapons systems.

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9 Dutch Parliamentary Papers (Kamerstukken) II 1999/00, 25 877, no. 8, p. 122.
10 See Article 36 Wiv 2002.
11 This term is elaborated in the MIVD’s policy. See Chapter 4, paragraph 4.3.1.
12 These legal principles arise from jurisprudence. See: Damen et al., Bestuursrecht (Administrative Law) 1, The Hague:
Boom Juridische uitgevers 2005, p. 336-342.
13 Article 58 paragraph 1 Wiv 2002.
14 Article 58 paragraph 2 subsection a Wiv 2002.
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4.2.1 Contact with the vital sectors
Joint consultation with the vital sectors
Based on its security promotion task, the AIVD maintains contact with the so-called vital sectors in the
Netherlands. These include transport sectors, such as the railways and Amsterdam Airport Schiphol,
as well as major events and the gas and electricity sector. The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations has designated fourteen sectors.15 The failure of the products or services that fall under
these sectors may cause social disruption.
The AIVD holds formal joint consultations with the vital sectors two to four times a year. KLM represents
the Dutch civil aviation sector at these consultations. During the meetings, the AIVD shares information
that is deemed relevant for the security of the vital sectors. In doing so, the AIVD does not share any
State secret information. It involves, for example, political analyses.
Schiphol Security and Public Safety Platform (BPVS)
The AIVD also contributes to informing civil aviation parties about security in other ways. One example
is its participation in the Schiphol Security and Public Safety Platform (BPVS). This platform is a
consultation body with a coordinating and steering role. Public and private parties cooperate in the
Platform to improve the eff ectiveness and effi ciency of security and crime management at Schiphol. It
was founded following the diamond heist at Schiphol in 2005.
The Platform is chaired by the director of Schiphol and the NCTV. The NCTV is jointly responsible for
the security of national airports. In addition, parties that have an interest in and can contribute to
security at Schiphol are represented, such as the Mayor, the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee, the
Public Prosecution Service (OM), customs, the national police, KLM, air traffi c control, the Ministry of
Infrastructure and the Environment and the AIVD. The Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment
and Air Traffi c Control the Netherlands are (partly) responsible, on behalf of the government, for the
safety of Dutch airspace and for inbound, outbound and domestic air traffi c.
The Platform convenes twice a year. At this level the AIVD is represented by a member of its management.
Operating below the Platform is a steering group that meets every two months. The steering group
mainly focuses on aligning policy. A head of unit from the AIVD participates in this group. Another
working group operates below the latter, convening on a monthly basis. The working group especially
serves to share needs and questions. The AIVD is represented in this group by its civil aviation account
manager. The AIVD has several account managers that maintain contact with the vital sectors.
In the Platform, the AIVD shares unclassifi ed information about threats to Schiphol airport. This
concerns information about the situation on the ground in the Netherlands. Examples of this kind of
information are: What general impression does the Service have with regard to Schiphol? Is left-wing
extremism stirring things up at Schiphol? Are there any problems expected involving factions related
to asylum policy or animal rights extremism? The Platform also addresses themes such as security
investigations involving employees.
Consultation with regional airports
Each regional airport is also involved in a similar biannual consultation to discuss, among other
things, security issues. The AIVD account manager participates in the consultation in his/her capacity
as relationship manager. This allows the AIVD to reach airports that do not participate in the BPVS
Platform.

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15 Information brochure on vital sectors, Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (BZK), 25 June 2010, available
(in Dutch) at wwwrijksoverheid.nl.
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An important component of the AIVD’s contact, via the account manager, with Dutch airlines involves
sharing information that is relevant to civil aviation security. The AIVD can do so in a solicited or
unsolicited manner (see below). Dutch airlines bear independent responsibility with regard to selecting
the fl ight routes they use, selecting the foreign airports at which they land and the safe execution of
their fl ights.18 In addition to the information that airlines obtain independently and the risk analyses
they compile in-house, the AIVD can be a link in the chain of information provision for airlines.
Unsolicited sharing of threat-related information
The AIVD informs Dutch airlines in an unsolicited manner about a specifi c threat to civil aviation. This
may, for example, involve a terrorist attack on board an aircraft or a specifi c threat targeting civil
air traffi c above a certain area. The information supplied by the AIVD may relate to areas (ground
situations) over which fl ights will or may pass. It may also involve risks to foreign airports where fl ights
will or may land.
One instance of an actual threat about which the AIVD informed Dutch airlines took place at the end of
2013. It involved a threat from a terrorist group in the Sinai desert, in Egypt, that specifi cally targeted
civil aviation. At the time, the AIVD issued a report to the NCTV, the Ministry of Foreign Aff airs and the
Dutch airlines. The latter subsequently decided not to fl y over the Sinai desert temporarily.
In accordance with the AIVD policy, an actual threat exists if there are three threat factors. These
factors denote the severity and probability of a threat. These factors are:
• Capacity (the availability of resources)
• Potential (capabilities of resources and actors)
• Intention (motives)
This policy applies to all threats, not only threats to civil aviation. For example, an actual threat exists
if a person or a faction possesses a resource such as a weapon or explosives (capacity) that enables
it (potential) to target civil aviation, for example, and the person or faction also has the motivation to
use that resource as such (intention). If the AIVD possesses such information (intelligence), it often
constitutes classifi ed material (State secret), such as that from sensitive sources. Therefore, the AIVD
cannot simply make this intelligence public. However, the AIVD can issue a report (alert) to enable the
authorities and the business community to take the necessary measures.
The Committee is of the opinion that these factors constitute an eff ective basis for assessing whether
an actual threat exists.
With regard to issuing such a report, the AIVD, the NCTV and the Ministry of Foreign Aff airs established
joint agreements (including procedural agreements) following the situation in the Sinai. They agreed
that, if the occasion arises, the AIVD, together with the NCTV, will contact the Dutch airlines (or their
security managers). If the information is relevant to all Dutch airlines, their representatives, the NCTV
and the AIVD’s account manager for civil aviation will meet to discuss it. If it involves an individual
airline, the NCTV and the AIVD’s account manager for civil aviation would specifi cally approach the
airline concerned.
Solicited sharing of information
Dutch airlines can ask the AIVD account manager for specifi c information about the security of its
foreign destinations. Questions may pertain to the security of fl ight routes, as well as whether it is
safe enough to land in certain countries or for crews to stay overnight there. The AIVD may possess
relevant information in this respect.

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18 See section 3.2.
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In accordance with the MIVD’s policy, an assessment is made of whether a genuine threat is involved
using three threat factors20:
• Intention
• Capacity
• Activity
These factors provide an indication of the severity and probability of a threat. They apply regardless of
the nature of the threat. Thus they do not only apply to a threat to civil aviation.
The policy says the following with regard to these factors. The intention describes an actor’s (i.e.
an enemy’s or faction’s) willingness and desire to carry out a particular threat. The intention may
be deduced from the enemy or faction’s objective (or strategic objective), political and/or military
ideology, military doctrine, socio-cultural context or statements made, etc. The intention may also be
deduced from actions performed in the past. Capacity refers to the resources and possibilities that
an actor possesses to carry out the threat. The activity factor comprises all of an actor’s activities
that directly or indirectly relate to carrying out an identifi ed threat. The threat factor activity can be
viewed as a ‘list’ of critical indicators or necessary conditions. In other words: a minimum number of
conditions must be met before a threat manifests itself.
The Committee is of the opinion that these factors constitute an eff ective basis for assessing whether
a genuine threat exists.
The Committee recognises that the Services do not use the same terminology. It has established
that both Services use the capacity factor for the availability of resources. The AIVD uses a separate
‘potential’ factor to refer to the possibilities of the resources and of the actors. The MIVD includes the
possibilities of the resources and of the actors in the capacity factor. Both Services use the intention
factor to refer to the actors’ motivation for focusing on a particular goal. In addition, the MIVD uses
another factor, ‘activities’, that the AIVD does not use separately.
The Committee proposes that the Services examine the extent to which they can align the terminology
related to the threat factors that they use.
4.3.2 Contact with KLM
In contrast to the AIVD, the MIVD does not maintain any extensive, structured network of relationships
with the civil aviation sector in the Netherlands. Given the MIVD’s military orientation, this is not to
be expected. Consequently, at the MIVD there is no account manager role for civil aviation. A number
of years ago, informal communications with KLM were established, however. In this context, KLM
can submit specifi c questions to the MIVD related, for example, to the security of fl ight routes. The
MIVD provides, for example, information about weapons systems, such as the range and possibilities
of MANPADS21 or about the situation in a particular area. This exclusively concerns unclassifi ed
information.

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20 These factors are in line with the working method and defi nition with regard to threat analyses as used by NATO.
21 This stands for man-portable air-defence systems. This is a weapon that is fi red from the shoulder
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5 The MIVD and AIVD’s level of knowledge prior to
the crash of fl ight MH17
5.1 Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of the information related to the security situation in Eastern
Ukraine, which the MIVD and the AIVD possessed prior to the crash of fl ight MH17. It also addresses
whether the Services shared information on this matter externally and the Services’ consideration for
doing or not doing so. This answers the following research question:
c) What information did the AIVD and the MIVD possess prior to the crash regarding the security
situation in Eastern Ukraine, and to what extent did they share this information with parties
involved in aviation security? What were the considerations for doing / not doing so?
In contrast to the previous chapters, in this chapter the Committee fi rst discusses the MIVD followed
by the AIVD. This is because the MIVD, due to its military orientation, possessed more information
regarding the security situation in Eastern Ukraine than the AIVD.22
In discussing the information related to the security situation in Eastern Ukraine that the Services
possessed prior to the crash, the Committee focused on the information that is relevant for identifying
a threat to civil aviation. This information relates to the threat factors that were discussed in the
previous chapter.
The Committee will treat the three threat factors in the following sections in a specifi c order, which it
will fi rst explain. First, the threat factors capacity (MIVD)/capacity and potential (AIVD) are addressed
(i.e., military resources and possibilities), because the Committee is of the opinion that these factors
can serve as a clear indicator for identifying a threat (a so-called ‘red fl ag’). The availability of certain
military resources may constitute a reason for examining the other factors. In most cases, intention
will not be easy to establish and will therefore only constitute a red fl ag in exceptional cases. The
‘activity’ factor used by the MIVD will generally form the fi nal element in the assessment, because it
involves examining indications that the ‘enemy’ has begun carrying out the identifi ed threat (on which
the intention is focused).23
Since the Dutch airlines were not fl ying to destinations in Eastern Ukraine, only threat information that
was relevant to civil aircraft fl ying over the area plays a role.
With regard to the confl ict in Eastern Ukraine, there were three relevant actors with military capacities
in the period prior to the crash:
• Russian armed forces
• Ukrainian armed forces and
• Pro-Russian separatists
The information that the Services possessed concerning these three actors will be treated per threat
factor.

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22 See paragraphs 5.2.1 (MIVD) and 5.3.1 (AIVD) for the Services’ investigative assignments
23 However, it cannot be ruled out that specifi c information related to a particular intention or particular activities
represents the fi rst indication of a threat.
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The general impression with regard to anti-aircraft defence systems was that the Russian armed
forces possessed advanced systems that had been installed in the territory of the Russian Federation
close to the border with Ukraine. These systems had suffi cient range to be able to hit a civil aircraft at
cruising altitude, which is a height of at least 7.5 kilometres.24 Anti-aircraft systems that have suffi cient
range to reach this height are referred to hereafter as powerful anti-aircraft systems.
According to the MIVD’s information, the Ukrainian armed forces mainly possessed outdated resources,
including, however, certain powerful anti-aircraft systems. A number of these systems were located
in the eastern part of the country.
The Separatists’ capacity
The MIVD’s information indicates that the Separatists were procuring an increasing number of weapons
in the months prior to the crash. Since they were also attacked from the air by the Ukrainian armed
forces, mainly after the Ukrainian government had reactivated its so-called anti-terrorism operation in
the course of May 2014, the Separatists tried to acquire anti-aircraft systemswith the aim of defending
themselves.
Prior to the crash, the MIVD knew that, in addition to light aircraft artillery, the Separatists also possessed
short-range portable air defence systems (man-portable air-defence systems; MANPADS) and that
they possibly possessed short-range vehicle-borne air-defence systems. Both types of systems are
considered surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). Due to their limited range they do not constitute a danger
to civil aviation at cruising altitude.
On 29 June 2014, the Separatists captured a Ukrainian armed forces military base in Donetsk. At this
base, there were Buk missile systems.25 These are powerful anti-aircraft systems. This development
was reported extensively in the media prior to the crash. The MIVD also received intelligence
information on the subject, on 30 June and 3 July 2014 as well as on other dates. During the course
of July, several reliable sources indicated that the systems that were at the military base were not
operational. Therefore, they could not be used by the Separatists.
Since the beginning of the unrest in Eastern Ukraine, the question arose whether the Separatists were
receiving material support and training from the Russian Federation. It was fi tting that attention would
be devoted to this matter in the MIVD’s investigation. Even though there was information pointing to
the fact that the Separatists had been supplied with heavy weapons by the Russian Federation, there
were no indications that these were powerful anti-aircraft systems. Certain documents from the end
of June 2014 state that material was being assembled at collection sites in the west of the Russian
Federation to subsequently be supplied to the Separatists. One document (from a publicly accessible
source), dating from 14 July 2014, states that advanced anti-aircraft systems (further details unknown)
had also arrived at a collection point. However, according to this document, such systems, if they
were indeed powerful anti-aircraft systems, had not (or not yet) been delivered to the Separatists in
Ukraine.

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24 Based on the ‘Report on the development of best practice guidance for conducting and sharing risk assessments’
by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), adopted at the conference held in Montreal on 2-5 February
2015. This document States that the cruising altitude for civil aircraft is at least 25,000 feet. This is equal to 7.620
metres.
25 Another name for it is SA-11.
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The intentions of the Russian armed forces, the Ukrainian armed forces and the Separatists
Prior to the crash, the MIVD did not possess any indication that one of the three actors involved in the
confl ict in Eastern Ukraine had the intention to shoot down a civil aircraft.
However, unlike the other two actors, the Separatists were not a homogeneous group. They were
composed of factions with diff erent specifi c objectives and working methods. It was clear, however,
that the Separatists all shared the intention to shoot Ukrainian air force fi ghter aeroplanes and
helicopters out of the air.
In a threat analysis performed at the end of June 2014, as part of the potential police training mission
in Eastern Ukraine, the MIVD reported that the Separatists were attacking Western targets of
opportunity. This involved the kidnapping of OSCE offi cials in Donetsk and Slavyanks. According to the
MIVD, the Separatists’ intention was probably to keep ‘unwanted’ outsiders at a distance or to kidnap
foreign offi cials to use them as bargaining chips in negotiations. This information does not reveal any
indication of the intention to shoot down a civil aircraft.
The activities of the Russian armed forces, the Ukrainian armed forces and the Separatists
As is clear from the above, the MIVD had no indication that one of the three actors (the Russian armed
forces, the Ukrainian armed forces or the Separatists) had the intention, combined with the necessary
capacity, to shoot down a civil aircraft. There was no information either pertaining to activities aimed
at carrying out a threat to civil aviation, such as preparatory actions.
Information from foreign partner services
During the investigative period (1 January 2014 through 17 July 2014) the MIVD did not receive any
warnings from its foreign partner services pertaining to a risk to civil aviation above Eastern Ukraine.
The messages that the MIVD received from partner services during this period also did not contain any
passages that - even with hindsight - should have served as a warning.
5.3 The AIVD’s level of knowledge
5.3.1 The AIVD’s focus
During the investigative period (1 January 2014 through 17 July 2014) a team from the AIVD (referred to
hereafter as: the Team) conducted an investigation into matters related to the domestic, foreign and
energy policies of the Russian Federation. In this context, the Team predominantly examined Russia’s
political intentions and Russian geopolitics, with a special focus on relationships with the Netherlands,
the EU, NATO and neighbouring countries such as Ukraine.
The AIVD did not have a separate investigative assignment focusing on Ukraine. The investigation
into the Russian Federation originated from the 2011-2016 Foreign Designation Order. It concerns the
AIVD’s foreign intelligence task. As part of this task, the AIVD gathers intelligence that can support
the government in determining foreign policy and conducting international negotiations. This is also
called ‘political intelligence’.
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In its investigative assignment, the Team focused on the question how the Russian Federation exerted
political infl uence on Ukraine and on the confl ict. This also extended to the question whether the
Russian Federation was involved in the Separatists’ activities in Eastern Ukraine. The Team possessed
several pieces of intelligence that referred to the Russian Federation’s involvement with the Separatists
with more or less certainty. The information contained indications that the Separatists (or some of
them) were probably under the control of the Russian Federation. There were also indications that
the Russian Federation provided the Separatists with support in the form of manpower and weapons.
Those cited included artillery, anti-tank weapons, tanks and MANPADS. The AIVD had no indications
that the Russian Federation had provided the Separatists with powerful anti-aircraft systems.
The AIVD had indications that the Separatists were being trained to use weapon systems, including
MANPADS, in the Russian Federation. There were no indications that they were being trained to use
powerful anti-aircraft systems.
On 14 July 2014, the Team received a concise report from the Ministry of Foreign Aff airs concerning
a briefi ng by Ukraine’s presidential administration in Kiev. The report revealed that the Ukrainian
Minister of Foreign Aff airs, Klimkin, declared that the situation in the east had reached a new and
dangerous phase because the Russian Federation was now openly providing the Separatists with
military support. As an example of the escalation Klimkin cited the Antonov’s being shot down in the
area of Lugansk.
During the morning of 17 July 2014, the AIVD received the MIVD’s daily intelligence summary
(‘dagintsum’). In this summary the MIVD reports, among other things, on its investigation into the
circumstances related to the Antonov’s crash. We refer you to paragraph 5.2.2 for these fi ndings.
The intention of the Separatists, the Russian armed forces and the Ukrainian armed forces
The Team did not possess any indication that the Separatists in Eastern Ukraine had the intention of
shooting down civil aeroplanes above Eastern Ukraine. The same applied to the other two parties, the
Ukrainian armed forces and the Russian armed forces.
The information did make the Team aware of the fact that the Separatists harboured the motivation to
shoot down military aeroplanes and helicopters of the Ukrainian airforce.
Information from foreign partner services
During the investigative period (1 January 2014 through 17 July 2014), the AIVD did not receive any
explicit or implicit warning from its foreign partner services regarding a risk to civil air traffi c above
Eastern Ukraine, as was the case at the MIVD.
5.4 Collaboration between the MIVD and the AIVD
In March 2014, the two Teams from the AIVD and the MIVD that were working on the crisis in Ukraine
and Russia’s role in this crisis established a close collaboration. The Teams made agreements regarding
the exact details and established them in writing. The Committee has viewed the agreements and
discussed their practical implementation with the Teams.
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• According to the information the Services possessed, the Russian and Ukrainian armed forces had
the capacity and potential to hit a civil aeroplanes at cruising altitude. However, they did not have
the intention. There were no indications that they were engaged in activities (such as preparations)
targeted against civil aeroplanes.
• The AIVD and the MIVD did not have any indication that the Separatists had the capacity to hit civil
aeroplanes at cruising altitude. Moreover, there were no indications either that they would target
civil aeroplane or that they were engaged in activities with this objective in mind.
• The AIVD and the MIVD did not receive any information from partner services that explicitly or
implicitly indicated a risk to civil aviation above Eastern Ukraine.
• The AIVD and the MIVD’s assessment is that, prior to the crash, there were no indications that
pointed to a specifi c threat to civil aircraft above Eastern Ukraine.
• The Services did not provide any information to external parties due to the absence of information
related to a specifi c threat.
The Committee’s assessment
The above fi ndings constitute the answer to the research question. The Committee believes that
it is also important to draw its own conclusion based on the information the Services possessed.
Ultimately, it is the only body to have had access to all the State secret material, apart from the Services
themselves.
The Committee believes that the material available to the Services does not reveal any factors that
point to a specifi c threat to civil aviation prior to the crash of fl ight MH17. The information available
to the Services does not indicate that one or more actors that were involved in the confl ict in Eastern
Ukraine prior to the crash displayed a combination of military resources, possibilities and the intention
to shoot down a civil aeroplane at cruising altitude.
This analysis reveals that, based on the available information, the MIVD and the AIVD could not have
been expected to identify any specifi c threat to civil aircraft above Eastern Ukraine or share it with
external parties.
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Research question c
What information did the AIVD and the MIVD possess prior to the crash related to the security
situation in Eastern Ukraine, and to what extent did they share this information with the parties
relevant to aviation security? What were the considerations for doing / not doing so?
What information did the AIVD and the MIVD possess prior to the crash related to the security
situation in Eastern Ukraine?
Prior to the crash of fl ight MH17, the AIVD and the MIVD possessed the following information regarding
the security situation in Eastern Ukraine that was relevant for assessing a threat to civil aircraft fl ying
over the area:
• The Russian and the Ukrainian armed forces did have the capacity and potential to hit a civil aircraft
at cruising altitude. However, they did not have the intention. There were no indications that they
were engaged in activities (such as preparations) targeting civil aviation.
• There were no indications that the Separatists had the capacity to hit civil air traffi c at cruising
altitude. Moreover, there were no indications that they would target civil air traffi c or that they were
engaged in activities with this objective in mind.
Prior to the crash, the MIVD and the AIVD did not possess any information that indicated that one or
more of the three actors involved in the confl ict in Eastern Ukraine displayed a combination of military
resources, possibilities or the intention to shoot down a civil aeroplane at cruising altitude. The AIVD
and the MIVD did not receive any information from partner services either that explicitly or implicitly
pointed to a risk to civil aviation above Eastern Ukraine. Based on its fi ndings, the Committee shares
the assessment made by the MIVD and the AIVD: the available information did not reveal a specifi c
threat to civil air traffi c fl ying over the area.
To what extent did the Services share this information with parties relevant to aviation security
and what were the considerations for doing/not doing so?
The AIVD and the MIVD did not issue any notifi cations to external parties concerning a specifi c threat
to civil aircraft above Eastern Ukraine. The reason for not providing any information to external parties
was that, prior to the crash of fl ight MH17, the AIVD and the MIVD did not possess any information that
pointed to a specifi c threat.
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Review Committee
on the Intelligence and
Security Services
CTIVD nr. 43
GLOSSARY
arising from the crash of fl ight MH17
This list explains a number of terms that are used in this review report. In the defi nitions provided, the
Committee has not aimed for completeness but rather to provide the reader with an explanation of
these terms that is as specifi c as possible.
Airspace The volume of air above the earth’s surface in which air traffi c can
take place. The airspace above a State is part of the territory over
which the State has sole power (sovereignty). The airspace above
the Netherlands is part of the territory of the Dutch State. The
Dutch Government is responsible for the safety of Dutch airspace.
AIVD Account Manager A position that focuses on maintaining a network of relationships
with a vital sector. The objective is the mutual provision of
information. One example is the AIVD giving presentations to
increase security awareness in the sector concerned. The AIVD
has a number of account managers, such as for the Dutch aviation
sector (which includes civil aviation).
AIVD head of unit AIVD offi cial who is hierarchically embedded in the organisation as
follows: head, director, head of unit, team head.
Anti-aircraft weapons Weapons intended for shooting down airborne targets such as
aeroplanes or helicopters. Today, these are often guided systems,
such as the radar-guided Buk/SA-11. They can also be non-guided
systems, such as anti-aircraft guns or certain machine guns.
Anti-aircraft systemsare often mobile (eg, mounted on a truck or
trailer) so that it can be transported easily.
Anti-tank weapon Any weapon that can disable armoured vehicles such as tanks.
These include missile launchers, cannon and mines. These
weapons do not have suffi cient range to hit aeroplanes that are
fl ying at a great altitude.
BPVS Platform Schiphol Security and Public Safety Platform. This is a cooperative
partnership between public and private parties aimed at improving
security and crime control at Schiphol airport. The Platform is a
consultation body with a coordinating and steering role. The AIVD
is one of the participants. It was founded following the diamond
heist at Schiphol in 2005.
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