of that airspace after the downing of Flight MH17 on 17
July 2014. In addition, this inquiry will provide contextual
background, through a representative inventory of state
practices 20 to 30 years prior to 2014, regarding the use by
civil aviation of airspace above conflict zones.
This inquiry was conducted from April 2020 to January 2021.
The scope of the inquiry did not include drawing
(normative) conclusions on the question of whether, prior
to the moment of the downing of Flight MH17, responsible authorities did or did not take adequate measures to
prevent the downing of the aircraft.
The following elements were covered within the scope
of the inquiry:
• A study of previous hostile events and state practice
in regard to the use by civil aviation of airspace above
conflict zones.
• An inquiry into the facts concerning the closure
of airspace above eastern Ukraine as of 1 March
2014 up to and including the moment of complete
closure of that airspace subsequent to the downing of
Flight MH17 on 17 July 2014.
• An inquiry into the facts concerning the closure of
airspace above the territory of the Russian Federation bordering eastern Ukraine as of 1 March
2014 up to and including the moment of complete
closure of that airspace subsequent to the downing of
Flight MH17 on 17 July 2014.
In this report, in accordance with ICAO and the other
referenced sources, the terms “airspace restriction”¹ and
“airspace closure”² are used interchangeably. Wherever
applicable, these terms are used with the addition of their
vertical limits.
Inquiry Limitations
There are a number of limitations associated with carrying
out this inquiry that should be considered. The limitations
are related to the characteristics of the scope, purpose, and
approach to the inquiry and to the sources and quality of
information available for use in the inquiry. Readers of the
report should keep in mind the following:
• The findings about airspace closure decisions in
Ukraine and the Russian Federation are based on
two specific sources of information: (a) public source
information available during 2020 discovered by
the Foundation and (b) information received by the
Foundation from Ukraine and the Russian Federation through responses to questionnaires. Other
sources of information, such as private sources and

information from intelligence services, were not
available for the inquiry.
• The findings from the hostile events analysis and
from the historical conflict zones analysis are based
on the information discovered by the Foundation
from public sources.
• The inquiry into airspace closure decisions in
Ukraine and the Russian Federation is focused on
information about: (a) the threat awareness of the
authorities responsible for airspace security risk
analysis and decision-making and not about the
potential threat awareness of other entities within
each government, and (b) facts reported publicly by
organisations and authorities and does not include
conclusions and inferences from these facts made by
organisations and authorities.
• The inquiry was carried out remotely due to COVID-19 travel restrictions. The Foundation requested
access to engage directly with identified relevant authorities and specialists in Ukraine and the Russian
Federation, which would have been possible through
teleconferencing or video conferencing. Ultimately,
Ukraine and the Russian Federation preferred providing information through written questionnaires
developed by the Foundation. Information was
transmitted via the respective diplomatic channels.
The Foundation does not have visibility on how the
information was collected and processed within the
relevant authorities in the two countries.
• The process of sending questionnaires, waiting for
the written responses and then processing those responses took considerable time and limited the number of iterations to two — the first set of questions
to each state and then a set of clarifying questions to
each. These circumstances limited the depth of the
inquiry.
• While the findings about airspace closure decisions
in Ukraine and the Russian Federation and the findings from the historical conflict zones analysis are
for the defined time periods ending on 17 July 2014,
numerous changes have been implemented since
then, including changes initiated by ICAO, sovereign
states, aviation authorities, airlines, and air navigation service providers. The findings are not directly
transferable to the current practices.
• Because six years have passed since the downing
of Flight MH17, it is more challenging to obtain
information on procedures, decisions and practices in place at the time in 2014. Key personnel and
decision makers who were in place in 2014 may not

catastrophic outcome from an effective attack is highly
probable. The presence of SAMs should therefore be a
key indicator in any airspace risk analysis and avoid/
overfly decision.
Information about the engagement altitude was found in
34 of the 57 hostile events in the Foundation’s “Hostile
Events in Civil Aviation” database. Four of the events
occurred above Flight Level (FL) 250 and 19 occurred below FL 50. Five occurrences, which are depicted in red in
Figure 3 (p. 6), were identified as involving a SAM attack.
The occurrences depicted in blue involved a capability to
attack other than a SAM.
Table 1 (p. 6) presents information about unintentional
attack occurrences extracted from the Foundation database. There are eight such events identified and all but one
involved military misidentification of the target’s identity
and/or intentions. The remaining 49 events involved either an intentional attack or events for which the Foundation did not find information regarding intent.
Conflict Zones Analysis: 1990–2014
Apart from hostile events, the Foundation built an inventory of state practices up to 25 years prior to 2014 regarding the use by civil aviation of airspace above conflict
zones. Among other things, the Foundation focused on
determining the presence of air defence equipment (both
air-to-air and surface-to-air) during a conflict and the
restrictions applicable to the use of the airspace.
Within the context of this study, the purpose of the
conflict zones analysis was to set data-defined context for

⁴ 25,000 ft (7,600 m)

other research components by providing an overview of
state practices regarding airspace restrictions above and/or
around conflict zones.
Conflict zones were selected by choosing those cases in
which security risk for civil aircraft above FL 2504 could
be reasonably expected. This was determined by the
overall objective of the inquiry, which focuses on threats
to civil aviation above airspace that was already closed to
civil aviation in Ukraine and the Russian Federation prior
to the downing of Flight MH17 and above the altitude
where MANPADS can pose a risk.
In total, 16 conflict zones were selected, based on the
information available for the studied period and where
there was a reasonable expectation, prior to commencing
the analysis, of the existence of capability to attack at
altitudes above FL 250. The selected conflict zones were
reviewed relative to a set of 10 pre-determined “indicators of likelihood of attack,” such as the capability to attack a target in flight above FL 250 (e.g., the presence of
surface-to-air missiles), the known intent to attack and
the missile operators’ experience and chain of command.
For each of the 16 selected conflict zones, the Foundation researched the actual airspace restrictions and used
proprietary risk analysis algorithms to assess the overall
likelihood of attack on civil aircraft. The intent was to
set data-defined context for other research components
by providing an overview of state practices regarding
airspace restrictions above and/or around conflict zones.
The results of the analysis are summarised in Table 4
(p. 31) of the report.

The Foundation concluded that restricting the airspace
above conflict zones is a very effective measure to reduce
the assessed likelihood of attack against civil flights. As
illustrated in Figure 4, in the studied sample, there were
eight cases in which an entity (the sovereign state or a
third party) introduced partial or full airspace restrictions.
This comparative assessment of likelihood of attack with
and without airspace restrictions reveals that in six of the
eight cases where airspace restrictions were introduced,
the assessed likelihood of attack against civil aviation was
reduced considerably.
However, the Foundation did not find a uniform practice of states closing their own airspace when there were
indications of a likelihood of attack against civil aircraft. Of
the 16 studied conflict zones, there were only two instances
in which the sovereign state responsible for that airspace
completely closed its own airspace (Figure 5).
Finding 3: The analysis of selected conflict zones over the
period of 1990‒2014 did not identify a uniform practice
of states closing their own airspace when there were
indications of a likelihood of attack against civil aircraft
in the context of an armed conflict on the territory of
that state.
Finding 4: The analysis of selected conflict zones over
the period of 1990‒2014 identified that, on the rare
occasions when a state restricted its own airspace above
FL 250, it was associated with the loss of effective control over the relevant airspace by the state.
Also, when a state does restrict its own airspace above
FL 250, or such a restriction is imposed by a third party
(such as in the introduction of a “no fly zone” by an
entity like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), the

predominant concerns are the security of military operations and of the population rather than the security of
civil aviation.
Finding 5: The analysis of selected conflict zones over
the period of 1990‒2014 identified that whenever a
state closed or restricted its own airspace above FL 250,
or such a restriction was imposed by a third party, the
predominant concerns were the security of military operations and of the population rather than the security
of civil aviation.
Airspace Restrictions Over and Around Eastern Ukraine
After setting the wider background of the inquiry by characterising the historical occurrences of hostile events and
the state practices of airspace management over conflict
zones, the Foundation focused on airspace restrictions in
Ukraine and the Russian Federation immediately prior to
the downing of Flight MH17. The Foundation considered
studying the airspace restrictions timeline and specifics to
be important because restrictions are the main outcome of
airspace restrictions decision-making, which is the focus
of this inquiry.
Both Ukraine and the Russian Federation introduced
restrictions on the airspace above and around eastern
Ukraine, but neither state completely closed its airspace
above or near the conflict zone before the downing of
Flight MH17. The airspace in question was first restricted
up to FL 260 and subsequently, but before the downing
of Flight MH17, up to FL 320. These airspace restrictions
were promulgated with notices to airmen (NOTAMs).
The Foundation analysed 1,310 NOTAMs regarding
their relevance to the studied area and time. It selected 15
NOTAMs to be analysed in detail.

general, this type of information gives less confidence about potential threat awareness of relevant
authorities because it is just information about what
has been seen, heard or otherwise discovered but
made known only after the downing of Flight MH17.
• Foresight knowledge of authorities’ awareness: quadrant 3.
This is information that was known prior to the
downing of Flight MH17 about what the relevant
authorities knew about the presence of weapons.
In general, this type of information gives the most
confidence about potential threat awareness because
it is mainly self-reporting by relevant authorities
about their knowledge prior to the downing of
Flight MH17 — hence clear of any hindsight bias.
• Hindsight public knowledge of authorities’ awareness: quadrant 4.
This is information that was made known after the
downing of Flight MH17 about what the relevant
authorities knew before the downing of Flight MH17
about the presence of weapons.
With the above-described four types of information, the
Foundation looked at two main sources of information:
• Publicly available information from primarily online
media, including Ukrainian and Russian news
services and other news aggregation sites, internationally available aviation trade media, government announcements and news releases, as well as
information available on social media, including
Twitter and Facebook, and in the DSB accident
investigation report.

The responses from Ukraine and the Russian Federation to the standard procedure and threat knowledge
questionnaires that were specifically developed for
this inquiry and to the subsequent responses to some
clarifying questions. The Russian Federation and the
Ukrainian governments were approached with and
responded to the information collection template
containing the questionnaires. Following the analysis
of the information received, the Foundation concluded that there are number of questions that remain
open and formulated and received answers to some
additional clarifying questions.
To ensure a systematic coverage and a comprehensiveness
of the information collection, we identified the need to use
certain standard process descriptions when drafting the
information collection questionnaires. For that purpose,
we used the Foundation’s “best process” description that
is based on our accumulated experience and analyses up
to the moment of this inquiry. Namely, the Foundation’s
integrated standard for airspace security risk assessment,
as illustrated in Figure 7, addresses the five main functions to be assigned to one or more different authorities,
organised as an integrated process and performed within a
given sovereign state.
The Foundation standard defines a statewide process
for airspace security risk management that is distributed around different authorities and organisations, yet
functional from end to end. In this way, the organisational
scope of the process is not restricted to the more traditional perspective of civil-military aviation coordination (e.g,

The Foundation identified from information made
publicly known after (quadrant 4 in Figure 6) the downing
of Flight MH17 that some Ukrainian authorities (counterintelligence services) suspected the presence of air
defence equipment that could reach high altitudes — “first
information ‘hinting’ at a Buk launcher in the possession of
the non-state forces was received on 14 July and came from
counterintelligence units.”⁶ This information corresponds
to Group A of the Foundation Standard, namely threat
watch, as shown in Figure 8.
However, no facts were found that this information
had been verified per the functions in Group B from the
Foundation Standard — “But we could not confirm directly
that it was Buk missile launcher that trespassed illegally
[in] Ukrainian territory.”⁷ Similarly, no facts were found
by the Foundation to indicate that the information was
disseminated throughout the statewide process to reach
the authorities responsible for risk assessment and decision-making regarding airspace closure.
Finding 6: This inquiry did not find sufficient facts that
Ukrainian authorities responsible for analysing security
risk levels in civil aviation airspace and those establishing restriction of airspace in a conflict zone⁸ were
aware of a threat to civil aviation before the downing of
Flight MH17.
The discussion of the potential threat awareness is about
what information existed in the public and private space
(social media, other publications, and intelligence sources)
about a weapon. This discussion is not about the reported
threat awareness of the relevant authorities (discussed
previously).
It is clear from publicly available information that the
conflict in eastern Ukraine was in an active combat phase
in the weeks prior to the downing of Flight MH17.
Both the Ukrainian military and armed non-state
forces were using small arms, heavy calibre machine guns,
artillery, anti-tank weapons, tanks and various air defence
systems. In addition, Ukraine was employing rotary- and
fixed-wing aircraft for transport and attack purposes;
Ukraine alleged that Russian aircraft also had been used
to attack Ukrainian aircraft. Ukraine apparently had some
success attacking non-state ground forces with aircraft and
also suffered numerous aircraft losses.
There was a widespread belief among Ukraine and
Western states that the Russian Federation was supplying

weapons, including heavy weapons, and personnel to
support armed non-state forces in the conflict area. But
as the DSB report stated: “despite the Western political and
military focus on the conflict, its escalation and its air component, none of the politicians or authorities quoted publicly
made a connection between the military developments in
the eastern part of Ukraine and risks to civil aviation.”
There were numerous reports about the presence of
heavy weapons in the region, such as tanks, MANPADS,
artillery and large calibre machine guns. However, there
were few reports in the public space about armed nonstate forces possessing weapons with a capability to attack
above FL 320.⁹ There are conflicting accounts relating to
the altitude of a Ukrainian An-26 when it was shot down
on 14 July, although the aircraft was thought by some to
have been brought down with a SAM system.
The most notable publicly available information about
the capability to attack at high altitudes before the downing of Flight MH17 was from social media posts about
Buk missile systems. Some of these posts were about the
movement of Buk batteries in the Russian territory bordering Ukraine and some were about Buk missile systems
being observed in eastern Ukraine a few hours before the
downing of Flight MH17. The Foundation acknowledges
that these were just a few instances of published social
media posts out of probably millions of posts made in
the region at that time. It should also be stressed that the
veracity of published social media accounts is difficult
to establish.
In addition, the Foundation did not identify any information available in the public space prior to the attack
that would have verified the reports about the capability to
attack above FL 320. The identified number of examples
of publicly available information indicating the potential
capability to attack above FL 320 were few, relative to the
volume of all the publicly available information about the
conflict zone at the time.
With hindsight, some facts made available after the
downing of Flight MH17 pointed to the possibility for
some authorities to have processed information and
understood that there may have been a threat to civil
aviation. Namely, these are the 150,000 telephone conversations¹⁰ intercepted and the counterintelligence field
information discussed previously.
However, without knowing the actual technological
capabilities and preparedness to p

Federation risk analysis and decision-making can be deduced from the Russian Federation standard procedure and
decision-making protocols. In response to a Foundation inquiry relating to standard procedures and threat knowledge,
the Russian Federation stated that, “Threats to air traffic
safety in the Rostov-on-Don FIR stemmed from the dangerous activities in the area of responsibility of the adjacent Dnepropetrovsk FIR.” Further, it was also stated that “all possible
risk factors for an unintended attack should be considered”
and that “such preparations should include an assessment of
the risk to civil aircraft operations due to a military conflict or
incidents of unlawful interference with civil aviation.”
After acknowledging the source of the threat in the
neighbouring territory and, in general the need to
consider all risk factors, the Russian Federation did not

acknowledge the responsibility to determine the risk factors for an unintentional attack in Russian Federation airspace originating from the close proximity to the conflict
zone in the eastern Ukraine. With respect to the issue of
which authorities were responsible, the response was: “The
state responsible for compliance with the rules for the introduction of restrictions on the use of airspace over an armed
conflict zone (Ukraine, in relation to the MH17 crash).”
Finding 9: This inquiry did not find sufficient facts that
the Russian Federation authorities responsible for
analysing security risk levels in civil aviation airspace
and those establishing restriction of airspace in a conflict zone¹⁶ could have had a proper awareness of the
high-altitude threat.

Within the context of a still prominent risk, this report
also attempts to advance further the understanding of risk
assessment of attack from the ground on civil aircraft and
on the state processes for integrated airspace security risk
assessment.
1.3. Scope
This inquiry is focused on the factual circumstances
surrounding the decision-making regarding the closure of
airspace above and around eastern Ukraine from 1 March
2014 up to and including the moment of complete closure
of that airspace after the downing of Flight MH17 on 17
July 2014. In addition, this inquiry will provide contextual
background, through a representative inventory of state
practices 20 to 30 years prior to 2014, regarding the use by
civil aviation of airspace above conflict zones.
This inquiry was conducted from April 2020 to January 2021.
The scope did not include drawing (normative) conclusions on the question of whether, prior to the moment of
the downing of Flight MH17, responsible authorities did
or did not take adequate measures to prevent the downing
of the aircraft.
The following elements were covered within the scope
of the inquiry:
• A study of previous hostile events and state practice
in regard to the use by civil aviation of airspace above
conflict zones.
• An inquiry into the facts concerning the closure
of airspace above eastern Ukraine as of 1 March
2014 up to and including the moment of complete
closure of that airspace subsequent to the downing of
Flight MH17 on 17 July 2014.
• An inquiry into the facts concerning the closure of
airspace above the territory of the Russian Federation bordering eastern Ukraine as of 1 March
2014 up to and including the moment of complete
closure of that airspace subsequent to the downing of
Flight MH17 on 17 July 2014.
1.4. Inquiry Limitations
There are a number of limitations associated with carrying
out this inquiry that should be considered. The limitations
are related to the characteristics of the scope, purpose, and
approach to the inquiry and to the sources and quality of
information available for use in the inquiry. Readers of the
report should keep in mind the following:
• The findings about airspace closure decisions in
Ukraine and the Russian Federation are based on
two specific sources of information: (a) public
source information available during 2020 discovered
by the Foundation and (b) information received
by the Foundation from Ukraine and the Russian

Federation through responses to questionnaires.
Other sources of information, such as private sources
and information from intelligence services, were not
available for the inquiry.
• The findings from the hostile events analysis and
from the historical conflict zones analysis are based
on the information discovered by the Foundation
from public sources.
• The inquiry into airspace closure decisions in
Ukraine and the Russian Federation is focused on
information about: (a) the threat awareness of the
authorities responsible for airspace security risk
analysis and decision-making and not about the
potential threat awareness of other entities within
each government, and (b) facts reported publicly by
organisations and authorities and does not include
conclusions and inferences from these facts made by
organisations and authorities.
• The inquiry was carried out remotely due to COVID-19 travel restrictions. The Foundation requested
access to engage directly with identified relevant authorities and specialists in Ukraine and the Russian
Federation, which would have been possible through
teleconferencing or video conferencing. Ultimately,
Ukraine and the Russian Federation preferred providing information through written questionnaires
developed by the Foundation. Information was
transmitted via the respective diplomatic channels.
The Foundation does not have visibility on how the
information was collected and processed within the
relevant authorities in the two countries.
• The process of sending questionnaires, waiting for
the written responses and then processing those responses took considerable time and limited the number of iterations to two — the first set of questions
to each state and then a set of clarifying questions to
each. These circumstances limited the depth of the
inquiry.
• While the findings about airspace closure decisions
in Ukraine and the Russian Federation and the findings from the historical conflict zones analysis are
for the defined time periods ending on 17 July 2014,
numerous changes have been implemented since
then, including changes initiated by ICAO, sovereign
states, aviation authorities, airlines, and air navigation service providers. The findings are not directly
transferable to the current practices.
• Because six years have passed since the downing
of Flight MH17, it is more challenging to obtain
information on procedures, decisions and practices in place at the time in 2014. Key personnel and
decision makers who were in place in 2014 may not

The conceptual framework for this study is provided in
Figure 9 below.
The conceptual framework defines two study spaces:
risk situation and state practices. These study spaces are
described below.
Risk situation defines the objective evolution of the circumstances associated with civil aviation security or safety
risk above conflict zones. It should be noted that the ICAO
definition of conflict zones (CZ) is restrictively confined
to armed conflict that is occurring or is likely to occur
between militarized parties. The conceptual framework
acknowledges that there may be other situations (OS) that
do not fall within the ICAO CZ definition but that can
still be associated with civil aviation security threats. An
example of an OS is a situation associated with insurgents
or terrorists that is not an armed conflict.
A security threat (ST) can be associated with conflict
zones or other situations and can be assessed with the help
of the following groups of indicators:
• Capability to attack — this study will not exclude
other capabilities but will be mainly focused on the
presence of long-range SAMs and AAMs that can hit
an aircraft flying at cruising level20.
• Intent to attack — the plan for a deliberate act against
civil aviation

• Possibility of an unintentional attack — shaped by the
presence of one or more risk factors.
• Conflict parties’ command and control — the rigorousness and reliability of the command and control
procedures and practices for authorizing a capability
launch.
A security threat associated with a security risk situation
may be dormant and never materialise. Whenever it is
actively manifested, however, the security threat usually
materialises in a hostile event (HE). Hostile events are
intentional or unintentional engagement of a capability
against civil aviation. Hostile events can lead to aircraft
damage and/or injuries to flight crew and/or passengers,
but also can be inconsequential.
A hostile event and, in some instances, the actions of
the involved actors to manage the security threat, can
lead to safety hazards (SH) that are part of the overall
consequence of a risk situation and may need also to be
assessed. An example of a safety hazard is a civil flight in
dangerous proximity to military flights.
State practices (SP) are the actions of bodies and organisations authorised by the state to manage the airspace over
which the state has sovereignty. It should be noted that state
practices can be explicitly coded into rules and procedures
but also can be an implicitly established way of working.

3.1. Purpose of the Hostile Events Analysis
At the outset of the project, the Foundation gathered and
analysed data on 57 hostile events involving civil aviation in and around conflict zones over a 35-year period
beginning in 1985. The period was selected based on the
information for the hostile events that the Foundation was
able to collect. Included in the sample were intentional and
unintentional attacks from the ground on commercial air
transport and general aviation operations. Hostile events, as
illustrated in Figure 10, are the intentional or unintentional
engagement of a capability to attack²¹ against civil aviation.
Within the context of this study, the purpose of the
hostile events analysis is twofold: to provide an empirically
based context for the study and to inform the selection of
conflict zones for further analysis. These two purposes are
explained further.
The analysis of civil aviation hostile events would provide the necessary, data-defined context for the conflict
zone security risk situation. In order to study the conflict zones, it is necessary to study their potential worst
outcome — hostile events. Additionally, considering that
most hostile events are associated with flights in nonrestricted airspace, this part of the inquiry was an important
source of information about the failure of state practices to
restrict the airspace.
The security threat associated with a security risk
situation may be dormant and may never materialise.
Whenever it is actively manifested, however, the security threat usually materialises in a hostile event. Hostile
events, as illustrated in Figure 10 below, are the intentional

or unintentional engagement of a capability against civil
aviation. Hostile events can lead to hull loss, multiple fatalities, aircraft damage and/or injuries to flight crew and/
or passengers, but they also can be inconsequential (i.e., a
failed attack).
Hostile events are “the tip of the iceberg,” and for each
hostile event that occurred, there were many more precursor situations that sometimes were and sometimes were
not associated with a conflict zone (for example, a terrorist
act not in a conflict zone).
For each hostile event that occurred, there were many
more precursor situations with factors that could lead to
a hostile event — capability and intent to attack and/or
capability and factors for an unintentional attack — were
present, but the situation did not actually result in a hostile event. This is represented in the security threat layer of
the security risk pyramid in Figure 10.
At the bottom of the security risk pyramid, there are
multiple states and zones where the capability to attack
aircraft in flight exists but where there is neither an intent
to attack nor factors for unintentional attack. In general,
the higher the situation is on the security risk pyramid,
the higher is the associated security risk. One can study
all types of situations associated with the above-illustrated
security risk pyramid, including its lower layer of “normal
situations” or the higher risk situations represented by the
upper layers.
This study proposes an analysis of the “tip of the pyramid” — the hostile events. It is acknowledged that this
is the least populated layer of the security pyramid, and

Date

State

Consequences

Aircraft Operator

Capability

Perpetrator

Flight
phase

Altitude

Type

Killed
/Injured
/Uninjured

04-Apr-85

Greece

Fuselage holed, no explosion

Royal Jordanian
Airlines

RPG7

Abu Nidal and Black
September

Takeoff

Ground

B727

0/0/75

04-Sep-85

Afghanistan

Hit after climbing overhead KDH before setting
course, fire, subsequent crash.

Bakhtar Afghan

Shorts Blowpipe

Hezb-i-Islami faction

En route

12,500 ft

AN26

52/0/0

08-Jun-86

Angola

Veer off and wing fire during landing due to
damage

TAAG

UIDM

UNITA

Landing

n/k

L100

0/0/5

16-Aug-86

Sudan

Crashed

Sudan Airways

SA-7

SPLA

Initial climb

<3,000ft

F27

60/0/0

05-May-87

Sudan

Crashed

SASCO Air Charter

MANPADS

SPLA

Initial climb

n/k

C404

13/0/0

11-Jun-87

Afghanistan

Crashed

Bakhtar Afghan

MANPADS

Hezb-i-Islami

En route

n/k

AN26

53/2/0

14-Oct-87

Angola

No. 3 engine hit, caught fire, subsequent crash

Zimex

MANPADS

MPLA or UNITA

Climb

5,000 ft

L100

6/0/0

06-Nov-87

Mozambique

Crashed

Air Malawi

MANPADS

Mozambique Armed
Forces

En route

n/k

SC7

10/0/0

03-Jul-88

Iran

Crashed, missiles fired from ship; flight on
airway A59 in accordance with Iranian ATC
clearance.

ran Air

2 x SM2

U.S. Navy

Climb

13,500 ft

A300

290/0/0

10-Dec-88

Pakistan

Crashed

Ariana Afghan

n/k

Pakistan Armed
Forces

En route

n/k

AN26

25/0/0

xx Feb-89

Angola

Right wing fire; return to Dundo airport where
wing burned off — whole later replaced.

TransAfrik

MANPADS

UNITA

En route

n/k

L100

0/0/X

08-Apr-89

Angola

No. 2 engine disabled and smoke on flight
deck; crash landing and fire destroyed aircraft.

TransAfrik

Small arms

UNITA

Approach

<2,000 ft

L100

0/0/4

05-Sep-89

U.S.

Aircraft hit by gunshot while landing, bullet
pierced door and grazed passenger’s head

USAir

Small arms

Landing

0/1/??

21-Dec-89

Sudan

Crashed

MSF

SA7

SPLA

Takeoff/
initial climb

<1,000ft

BN2

4/0/0

28-Dec-89

Romania

Crashed after suspected missile exploded in
vicinity causing LOC; cause initially hidden by
Romania, revealed in 2014

TAROM

MANPADS

n/k

En route

n/k

AN24

7/0/0

Date

State

Consequences

Aircraft Operator

Capability

Perpetrator

Flight
phase

Altitude

Type

Killed
/Injured
/Uninjured

21-Sep-93

Georgia

Missile fired from boat; LOC, crashed.

Transair Georgia

Strela-2 (SA7)

Abkhazian
Insurgents

Approach

1,000 ft

T134

27/0/0

22-Sep-93

Georgia

Damaged on short final, crash landed on
runway, fire destroyed aircraft.

Orbi Georgian AW

n/k

Abkhazian
Insurgents

Approach

n/k

T154

108/24/0

28-Jan-95

Angola

Right engine hit just after takeoff, followed by
crash landing.

SAL

Raytheon FIM-
92 Stinger

UNITA

En route

<1,500 ft

BE20

2/0/4

02-Sep-98

Angola

Engine fire, initial attempt to divert to MEG but
then forced landing.

Permtransavia

MANPADS

UNITA

En route

n/k

AN26

24/0/0

29-Sep-98

Sri Lanka

Crashed

Gomelavia

n/k

LTTE

Climb

FL140

AN24

55/0/0

10-Oct-98

DRC

Attempted crash landing in jungle after the rear
engine was struck.

Lignes Aeriennes
Congolaises

Strela-2 (SA7)

Tutsi Militia

Climb

<6,000ft

B727

41/0/0

14-Dec-98

Angola

Crashed

Khors Air

n/k

UNITA

En route

FL150

AN12

10/0/0

26-Dec-98

Angola

Crashed

TransAfrik

anti-aircraft
missile

UNITA

En route

n/k

L100

14/0/0

02-Jan-99

Angola

Crash landing in enemy-held territory during
turnback.

TransAfrik

MANPADS

UNITA

En route

n/k

L100

9/0/0

12-May-99

Angola

Engine hit; forced landing; crew captured by
UNITA.

Volga Atlantic AL

MANPADS

UNITA

En route

n/k

AN26

0/0/4

01-Jul-99

Angola

Crashed

Savanair

MANPADS

UNITA

En route

n/k

AN12

1/0/4

29-Aug-99

Ethiopia

Hit by proximity missile after proceeding into
NOTAM-closed airspace.

Corporate Jets

SAM

Ethiopian Army
Targeting Error

En route

FL410

LJ45

2/0/0

31-Oct-00

Angola

Crashed (UNITA claimed shoot down; CAA and
military blamed a technical problem).

Ancargo NS

n/k

UNITA

En route

n/k

AN26

49/0/0

04-Dec-00

Burundi

Flight continued to normal landing, 13 bullet
holes in fuselage.

Sabena

gunfire

Insurgents

Approach

350ft

A332

0/2/168

08-Jun-01

Angola

Aircraft from World Food Program hit in one
engine; crew regained control and landed
safely at Luena.

TransAfrik

anti-aircraft
missile

Rebels (Unita
admitted the attack)

En route—
Approach

FL 150,
15000 ft
(16,404 ft)

B727

0/0/3