Promulgation
Describes how the restrictions were published,
number of the NOTAMs if available, AIS.

NOTAM, AIS. Germany NOTAM: B0437/20. USA A0038/20. UK AIP ENR 1.4.5 valid
from 8 Oct 2015 https://www.aurora.nats.co.uk/htmlAIP/P … s/2018-11-
08-AIRAC/html/eAIP/EG-ENR-1.1-en-GB.html

Notes
Other relevant information

References:
Jaffe S., Airspace Closure and Civil Aviation, 2015

F. Capability to attack by at least one party:
1. No information for capability to attack with
range above FL 250.
2. Air-to-air missiles launched from fighter aircraft
(and no SAMs).
3. Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that
can hit an aircraft at cruising level.

Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that can hit an aircraft at cruising
altitude.
Azerbaijani MiG-25 was shot down near Cherban on 20 August 1992 by an SA-7A
MANPADS.
Azerbaijani Su-22 was shot down on 19 February 1994 over Verdenisskiy by an SA-
14 MANPADS.
Azerbaijani Su-25 flown by Kurbanov was shot down over Mkhrdag on 13 June
1992 by a MANPADS.
Azerbaijani Su-25 shot down near Malibeili on 10 October 1992 using MANPADS.
Azerbaijan: BUK SAM, S-300PMU2, Perchora-T 2M SAM
Armenia: BUK, OSA, Pechora-T2M, 2K11Krug, SA-13 Gopher, KUB-M-3, S-300PS,
S-300PT-1

G. Capability to differentiate between civil and
military aircraft:
1. Differentiation supported by radar, electronic
identification and non-cooperative target
recognition systems measuring signature using
acoustic and thermal radiation, radio emissions,
radar techniques.
2. Differentiation supported by radar and electronic identification (e.g., identification, friend
or foe (IFF), secondary surveillance radar (SSR).
3. Differentiation supported only by radar tracks.

Differentiation supported by radar and electronic identification (e.g.,
identification, friend or foe (IFF), secondary surveillance radar (SSR).

H. SAM/AAM operators’ experience and chain of
command:
1. Regular forces.
2. SAMs in the possession of irregular military
forces OR an absence of robust SAM/AAM
command and control procedures for
authorizing launch.
3. SAMs in the possession of irregular military
forces AND an absence of robust SAM/
AAM command and control procedures for
authorizing launch.

Regular forces.
Azerbaijan’s Defense Ministry said its forces on May 15, 2017 “destroyed an Osa
air defense system along with its crew.” The ministry added that the system’s
deployment near the line of control was a “provocation” and a threat to
Azerbaijani aircraft.
All versions of the 9K33 feature all-in-one 9A33 transporter erector launcher and
radar (TELAR) vehicles which can detect, track and engage aircraft independently
or with the aid of regimental surveillance radars. The six-wheeled transport
vehicles BAZ-5937 are fully amphibious and air transportable. The road range is
about 500 km.

I. Known intent to attack:
1. Known intent to attack military aircraft.
2. Known intent to attack civil aircraft.
3. Communication of intent and a plan to attack
civil aircraft or actual attack against civil aircraft.

Communication of intent and a plan to attack civil aircraft or actual attack
against civil aircraft — reference 1991 hostile events sample.

J. Civil aircraft operations over or close to conflict
zone (with and without the airspace restrictions
if any):
1. No or occasional traffic.
2. Small to moderate traffic volume (for example
restricted to arrivals and departures to airports).
3. Considerable traffic volume, including
international overflights.

No traffic after the restrictions.
Moderate traffic volume, mainly restricted to arrivals and departures to
airports prior to the restrictions.

Airspace restrictions
Describes when airspace restrictions were introduced,
what airspace they affected and how they evolved
over time including:
• Restrictions by the responsible for the airspace
sovereign authority (the state).
• Restrictions by others — third parties and/or
neighboring states.

1. Restrictions by the responsible for the airspace sovereign authority (the
state)
Restricted
A0024/11 NOTAMN Q) UBBA/QRPXX/IV/NBO/W /000/999/3936N04642E045
A) UBBA B) 1102111240 C) PERM E) ACCORDING TO AIP OF AZERBAIJAN
REPUBLIC REF.ENR 5.1 DUE TO CONFLICT SITUATION THE PROHIBITED AREA
UBP3 GND/UNL IS ESTABLISHED OVER THE TERRITORY OF THE NAGORNY
KARABAKH AND CONTROLLED BY THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF THE
REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN. INTERCEPTION OF OFFENDERS BY THE AIR FORSE
IS MANDATORY ACTION F) GND G) UNL

A. Parties:
1. Conflict between states.
2. Conflict between non-state armed groups and
state(s) or civil wars.
3. Conflict between non-state armed groups.

Conflict between non-state armed groups and state(s) or civil wars.
Official government forces, the National Army (FANCI), also called loyalists,
formed and equipped essentially since 2003.
Mercenaries recruited by president Gbagbo:
• Belarusian pilots;
• Former combatants of Liberia, including under-17 youths, forming the so-called
“Lima militia”;
• New Forces (Forces Nouvelles, FN), ex-northern rebels;
• Liberian government forces;
• French military forces: troops sent within the framework of Operation Unicorn
and under UN mandate (UNOCI);
• Soldiers of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), White
helmets, also under the UN;
• NATO forces.

B. Armed conflict scale and/or tensions:
1. Terrorism and/or international political tension.
2. Insurgency (small-scale military activities) and/
or medium increasing political tension.
3. Large-scale military activities and/or
heightened international political tension.

Insurgency or small-scale military activities.
Mutiny in Abidjan by soldiers unhappy at being demobilized grows into full-scale
rebellion, with Ivory Coast Patriotic Movement rebels seizing control of the north.
They launched attacks in many cities, including Abidjan. Attacks were launched
almost simultaneously in most major cities; the government forces maintained
control of Abidjan and the south, but the new rebel forces had taken the north
and based themselves in Bouake. Particular importance for the case study is the
2004 French–Ivorian clashes that represent air-to-air capability to attack.

C. Military air transport activities:
1. Military air transport activities not reported.
2. Occasional use of aircraft to transport ground
troops or military equipment.
3. More than occasional use of aircraft to transport
ground troops or military equipment by at least
one party).

More than occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military
equipment by at least one party (such aircraft may be more difficult to
distinguish from civil aircraft, particularly where operating near airways
and close to civil aircraft cruising altitudes).
Evidence of NATO and French mobilized and airborne force movement and
deployments.

D. Military air combat activities:
1. No military air combat activities.
2. Small-scale (occasional) military air combat
activities and/or some activities above FL 250.
3. Large- to medium-scale military air combat
activities and/or regular activities above FL 250

Small-scale (occasional) military air combat activities.
Military combat activities involving multiple regional parties and NATO.
French forces conducted attacks on airports destroying SU25s and helicopters are
shot down.

E. Known attacks:
1. Conflict area without publicly reported security
incidents involving military and civil aviation.
2. Conflict area with single security-related
reported incident/accident involving military
(or civil) aviation.
3. Conflict area with multiple reported securityrelated incident/accident involving military (or
civil) aviation.

Conflict area with multiple reported security-related incidents/accidents
involving military (or civil) aviation.
On 4 November 2004, Gbagbo ordered the counter-offensive to the rebel town of
Bouaké to be backed by air strikes. France does not react but on 5 November put
three Dassault Mirage F.1 jet fighters based in nearby Gabon on standby.
On 6 November, two Ivorian Sukhoi Su-25 bombers, crewed by two Belarusian
mercenaries and two Ivorian pilots, fired on the Ivorian rebels led by Issiaka
Ouattara. One of the bombers attacked the French peacekeeping position in
the town at 1 pm, killing nine French soldiers and wounding 31. The Ivorian
government claimed the attack on the French was unintentional, but the French
insisted that the attack had been deliberate

F. Capability to attack by at least one party:
1. No information for capability to attack with
range above FL 250.
2. Air-to-air missiles launched from fighter aircraft
(and no SAMs).
3. Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that
can hit an aircraft at cruising level.

Air-to-air missiles launched from fighter aircraft (and no SAMs)

Promulgation
Describes how the restrictions were published,
number of the NOTAMs if available, AIS.

No evidence of airspace closures or restrictions other than those cited for Port
Bouët Airport.

Notes
Other relevant information

References:
“Cote d’Ivoire, since 2002.” Acig.org.
“Civil War in Côte d Ivoire (Ivory Coast Civil War).” The Polynational War
Memorial, wwwwar-memorial.net. Retrieved 5 June 2017.
Asante, Molefi Kete (2014). The History of Africa: The Quest for Eternal Harmony.
New York and London: Routledge.
State.gov

H. SAM/AAM operators’ experience and chain of
command:
1. Regular forces.
2. SAMs in the possession of irregular military
forces OR an absence of robust SAM/AAM
command and control procedures for
authorizing launch.
3. SAMs in the possession of irregular military
forces AND an absence of robust SAM/
AAM command and control procedures for
authorizing launch.

Regular forces.
Indonesia has traditional military command structure.
GAM rebels were irregular forces with some training from Libya.

I. Known intent to attack:
1. Known intent to attack military aircraft.
2. Known intent to attack civil aircraft.
3. Communication of intent and a plan to attack
civil aircraft or actual attack against civil aircraft

Known intent to attack military aircraft.
In 2000, which is two years after the period in review, two chartered aircraft
carrying oil field workers were hit by small arms fire, including one aircraft that
was hit while it was taxiing, resulting in two injuries.

J. Civil aircraft operations over or close to conflict
zone (with and without the airspace restrictions
if any):
1. No or occasional traffic.
2. Small to moderate traffic volume (for example
restricted to arrivals and departures to airports).
3. Considerable traffic volume, including
international overflights.

Considerable traffic volume, including international overflights.
Because of the number of islands in the Indonesian archipelago, the country
has a well-developed and busy air transport system. Its proximity to Singapore
and Malaysia, both of which have a lot of aviation traffic, and its location in a
fast-growing region of the world result in a great deal of traffic. Indonesia tightly
controls overflights.

Airspace restrictions
Describes when airspace restrictions were introduced,
what airspace they affected and how they evolved
over time including:
• Restrictions by the responsible for the airspace
sovereign authority (the state).
• Restrictions by others — third parties and/or
neighboring states

1. Restrictions by the responsible for the airspace sovereign authority (the
state)
No information found
2. Others
No information found

Reasons for airspace restrictions
Describes the reasons for airspace restrictions,
weapons known to be in the area and their range/
capabilities, what traffic was vulnerable, known or
suspected intent to attack civil aviation and whether
there was concern about unintentional attack.

Decision-making
Describes the source(s) of the threat information;
who made the decision regarding the restrictions and
with whom was the decision coordinated; was the
decision-making process different from the normal or
standard airspace decision-making process

Information on decision-making during this period was not available, but
generally speaking it is a process complicated by the proximity of Singapore and
Malaysia and the high level of air traffic in the region. According to at least one
document, Indonesia’s military pilots must seek clearance from ATC at Singapore’s
Changi Airport before taking off on training flights. There is tension between
Singapore and Indonesia over FIRs and control of sovereign airspace.

Promulgation
Describes how the restrictions were published,
number of the NOTAMs if available, AIS.

A. Parties:
1. Conflict between states.
2. Conflict between non-state armed groups and
state(s) or civil wars.
3. Conflict between non-state armed groups.

Conflict between non-state armed groups and state(s) or civil wars.
In January 2012 the Northern Mali Conflict or Mali Civil War started when
several insurgent groups (mainly MNLA [National Movement for the Liberation
of Azawad] and Ansar Dine) began fighting against the Malian government for
independence for north Mali. On 5 April the MNLA proclaimed the independence
of northern Mali from the rest of the country. However, by 17 July 2012, the MNLA
had lost control of most of northern Mali’s cities. The government of Mali asked
for foreign military help to re-take the north. On 11 January 2013, the French
military began operations against the Islamists. Forces from other African Union
states were deployed shortly after. By 8 February, the Islamist-held territory had
been re-taken by the Malian military, with help from the international coalition.
However, attacks against the Malian military continued until a peace deal
between the government and Tuareg rebels was signed on 18 June 2013. On
26 September 2013 the rebels pulled out of the peace agreement and fighting
continued. Despite a peace accord was signed on 15 April 2015, low-level fighting
continues.

B. Armed conflict scale and/or tensions:
1. Terrorism and/or international political tension.
2. Insurgency (small-scale military activities) and/
or medium increasing political tension.
3. Large-scale military activities and/or
heightened international political tension.

Insurgency (small-scale military activities) and/or medium increasing
political tension.
French military intervention: Operation Serval from 11 January 2013 till 15 July
2014.
US forces arrived in Niger in early 2013 to support the French military intervention
in Mali; 150 US personnel set up a surveillance drone operation over Mali that
was conducted out of Niamey. As of 2017, there are about 800 US troops in Niger,
the majority of whom are construction crews working to build up a second drone
base in northern Niger.

C. Military air transport activities:
1. Military air transport activities not reported.
2. Occasional use of aircraft to transport ground
troops or military equipment.
3. More than occasional use of aircraft to transport
ground troops or military equipment by at least
one party)

More than occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military
equipment

D. Military air combat activities:
1. No military air combat activities.
2. Small-scale (occasional) military air combat
activities and/or some activities above FL 250.
3. Large- to medium-scale military air combat
activities and/or regular activities above FL 250

Small-scale (occasional) military air combat activities and/or some activities
above FL 250.

E. Known attacks:
1. Conflict area without publicly reported security
incidents involving military and civil aviation.
2. Conflict area with single security-related
reported incident/accident involving military
(or civil) aviation.
3. Conflict area with multiple reported securityrelated incident/accident involving military (or
civil) aviation.

Conflict area with multiple reported security-related incidents/accidents
involving military (or civil) aviation.
In January one Malian Air Force MIG-21 jet was shot down by the Tuareg.
On 11 January 2013, a French Army Gazelle helicopter was shot down by small
arms fire.

F. Capability to attack by at least one party:
1. No information for capability to attack with
range above FL 250.
2. Air-to-air missiles launched from fighter aircraft
(and no SAMs).
3. Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that
can hit an aircraft at cruising level.

Air-to-air missiles launched from fighter aircraft (and no SAMs).

Airspace restrictions
Describes when airspace restrictions were introduced,
what airspace they affected and how they evolved
over time including:
• Restrictions by the responsible for the airspace
sovereign authority (the state).
• Restrictions by others — third parties and/or
neighboring states.

1. Restrictions by the responsible for the airspace sovereign authority (the
state)
No information found
2. Others
No information found
Note:
27/02/2017 The Algerian CAA has published in 2012 airspace closures along their
southern border due to the conflict.
FAA (27/02/2017)
Feb 27th, 2017: The FAA issued warnings for Kenyan and Malian airspace, warning
US operators of the potential dangers in operating through both the Nairobi and
Malian FIR’s.
Published on Feb 26th, the new advice also adds new language with clarification
of the type of weapons and phases of flight that the FAA is concerned about,
specifically:
• fire from small arms,
• indirect fire weapons (such as mortars and rockets), and
• anti-aircraft weapons such as MANPADS.
The scenarios considered highest risk include:
• landings and takeoffs,
• low altitudes, and
• aircraft on the ground.
The FAA uses the same wording for both Kenya and Mali.
The updated guidance is intended for US operators and FAA License holder.
Warnings are addressing flights below FL300/2607250
2017 (referring to EASA CZIB No 2017-01R1 and FAA warning
EASA 29/04/2020–31/1072020
This CZIB was issued on the basis of information available to EU Member States
and EU institutions.
The presence of terrorist groups with access to anti-aviation weaponry is assessed
to pose a HIGH risk to operations within the portion of the Niamey FIR, which is
situated above Mali territory, at altitudes below FL 250. Terrorist groups continue
attacks on the country with the risk of mortar shelling on airstrips and airports.
Additionally, the Agency draws the attention of the aviation community to the
above referenced information, copies of which are attached to this CZIB.
France (AIC 08/20) 09/04/2020–ongoing
From 09/04/2020 and until further notice, French air carriers and aircraft owners
registered in France are requested to ensure that their aircraft maintain at all
times a flight level above or equal to FL320 in the part of the Niamey FIR (DRRR)
located above the Malian territory

Reasons for airspace restrictions
Describes the reasons for airspace restrictions,
weapons known to be in the area and their range/
capabilities, what traffic was vulnerable, known or
suspected intent to attack civil aviation and whether
there was concern about unintentional attack.

Rebels were expected to possess MANPADS
With instability in the Sahel-Saharan region, fears were growing al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) could have acquired portable surface-to-missiles from
Libya.

Decision-making
Describes the source(s) of the threat information;
who made the decision regarding the restrictions and
with whom was the decision coordinated; was the
decision-making process different from the normal or
standard airspace decision-making process.

Promulgation
Describes how the restrictions were published,
number of the NOTAMs if available, AIS.

AIC, warnings by FAA, EASA CZIB

A. Parties:
1. Conflict between states.
2. Conflict between non-state armed groups and
state(s) or civil wars.
3. Conflict between non-state armed groups.

Conflict between non-state armed groups and state(s) or civil wars.
Conflict involved multiple players during the period in question; first it involved
the newly independent state of Georgia against separatists from South Ossetia,
which had previously declared itself an autonomous Soviet Republic. A three-way
power struggle involving Georgian, Ossetian and Soviet military forces broke
out. The first democratically elected president of Georgia lost power in a coup;
his armed attempts to regain power were later defeated. Also during this time,
separatists from the Abkhasia region, with help from Russian troops, fought
against Georgia.

B. Armed conflict scale and/or tensions:
1. Terrorism and/or international political tension.
2. Insurgency (small-scale military activities) and/
or medium increasing political tension.
3. Large-scale military activities and/or
heightened international political tension.

Large-scale military activities and/or heightened international political
tension.
Armed conflict involved multiple players, including Russia, and military
equipment left over from the Soviet military

C. Military air transport activities:
1. Military air transport activities not reported.
2. Occasional use of aircraft to transport ground
troops or military equipment.
3. More than occasional use of aircraft to transport
ground troops or military equipment by at least
one party).

More than occasional use of aircraft to transport ground troops or military
equipment by at least one party.

D. Military air combat activities:
1. No military air combat activities.
2. Small-scale (occasional) military air combat
activities and/or some activities above FL 250.
3. Large- to medium-scale military air combat
activities and/or regular activities above FL 250

Large- to medium-scale military air combat activities and/or regular
activities above FL 250
Georgian Su-25s flew more than 200 sorties during conflict in Abkhazia region.
Helicopters also were used extensively.

E. Known attacks:
1. Conflict area without publicly reported security
incidents involving military and civil aviation.
2. Conflict area with single security-related
reported incident/accident involving military
(or civil) aviation.
3. Conflict area with multiple reported securityrelated incident/accident involving military (or
civil) aviation.

Conflict area with multiple reported security-related incidents/accidents
involving military (or civil) aviation.
A number of military aircraft, including both fighters and helicopters, were shot
down during the conflicts.
Two civil type aircraft, a Tu-134 and a Tu-154, also were attacked on consecutive
days in Sept. 1993, resulting in 135 fatalities.

F. Capability to attack by at least one party:
1. No information for capability to attack with
range above FL 250.
2. Air-to-air missiles launched from fighter aircraft
(and no SAMs).
3. Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that
can hit an aircraft at cruising level.

Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that can hit an aircraft at cruising
level.
Long-range SAMs were in the Georgian arsenal and Georgian military aircraft
were brought down by what are believed to have been SAMs, leading to
speculation that Russian military units were supporting separatists.

G. Capability to differentiate between civil and
military aircraft:
1. Differentiation supported by radar, electronic
identification and non-cooperative target
recognition systems measuring signature using
acoustic and thermal radiation, radio emissions,
radar techniques.
2. Differentiation supported by radar and
electronic identification (e.g., identification,
friend or foe (IFF), secondary surveillance radar
(SSR).
3. Differentiation supported only by radar tracks.

Answer:
Analysis of flight safety threats is carried out on the basis
of ICAO documents which address flight safety in the areas of military and other kinds of danger for civil aviation,
including ICAO Doc 9554.
Responsible:
Competent authorities that exchange information related
to aviation security.
References:
Aeronautical Information Services Manual, ICAO Doc
8126, Sixth Edition, 2003.
Manual Concerning Safety Measures relating to Military
Activities Potentially Hazardous to Civil Aircraft Operations, ICAO Doc 9554, First Edition 1990.
Air Traffic Services Planning Manual, ICAO Doc 9426,
First Edition (Provisional), 1984.
Process and timeline:
Preparations for activities that pose a potential hazard to
civil aircraft over the territory of states or the open sea are
coordinated with relevant competent air traffic service
authorities. This coordination is carried out sufficiently
in advance to ensure timely publication of information
concerning such activities in accordance with existing
regulations.
Such coordination is aimed at providing optimal conditions that will allow to avoid the creation of hazards for
civil aircraft and minimize interference with the normal
conduction of flights by such aircraft. If activities that
pose a potential hazard to civil aircraft are conducted on
a regular or ongoing basis, special committees should be
established, as appropriate, to ensure the necessary coordination of the needs of all stakeholders.
States should make preparations, if necessary, to ensure
that timely action is taken in case of unforeseen circumstances. Such preparations should include a risk assessment to civil aircraft due to a military conflict or acts of
unlawful interference with civil aviation. Preparatory activities should include development of special contingency

plans in case of natural disasters, public health emergencies, military conflicts or acts of unlawful interference in
the activities of civil aviation, which may affect the use of
airspace for flights of civil aircraft and/or provision of air
traffic services and support services.
Authorized air traffic service bodies organize and
implement close cooperation with the military authorized
bodies responsible for activities that may affect the flights
of civil aircraft. Air traffic service authorities and relevant
military authorities reach an agreement regarding the
immediate exchange of information related to the safe and
unhindered performance of civil aircraft flights.
Based on the information available, the state responsible
for air traffic service should determine the geographic
area of the conflict, assess the danger or potential danger
to civil aircraft of international aviation and determine
whether to avoid flights in or through the conflict area or
whether flights may continue under certain conditions.
Thereafter, an international NOTAM containing necessary
information, recommendations and security measures
to be taken should be issued; it should be updated as
events evolve.
In general, planning is a dynamic process in which facts
are identified, existing or newly proposed methods are
checked and information is sought. It is also an ongoing
process that requires insight, imagination and courage to
interpret existing data and to develop concepts in order to
prove and defend one’s beliefs. […] Due attention should
also be paid to the often conflicting requirements with
regard to special military flights and allocation of some
airspace for national security.
Actual implementation:
Describe here what social media civil aviation threat
information about presence of air defense equipment or
intent to attack was identified by which authority.
Information is used in accordance with ICAO rules.
Changes after 17 July 2014:
The use of Doc 10084 “Risk Assessment Manual for Civil
Aircraft Operations Over or Near Conflict Zones.”

Answer:
The source selection process is described in ICAO documents. Recommended procedures with regard to collection and use of information on threats originating from
armed conflict zones are discussed in ICAO Doc 9554.
Information on the basis for the issuance of NOTAMs
V6158/14 and A2681/14 is contained in the answer to Q2.
Responsible:
The competent authorities and the procedure for their
interaction are considered in ICAO documents (references
to some documents are given below).
References:
Aeronautical Information Services Manual, ICAO Doc
8126, Sixth Edition, 2003.
Manual Concerning Safety Measures relating to Military
Activities Potentially Hazardous to Civil Aircraft Operations, ICAO Doc 9554, First Edition 1990.
Air Traffic Services Planning Manual, ICAO Doc 9426,
First Edition (Provisional), 1984.
Process and timeline:
Airlines, military or other organizations were not involved
in the issuance of NOTAMs V6158/14 and A2681/14.

Rosaviatsiya practices to release urgent information
reports and instructions for the Russian exploiters of
aircraft in case of receiving information on the military
activity hazardous to flight safety. For instance, Rosaviatsiya’s telegrams containing information on tense situation in
India’s, Pakistan’s and Afghanistan’s airspace (information
of 27 February 2019), hazardous situation to flight safety
in Yemen’s airspace (information of 3 April 2015), and in
Libya’s airspace (information of 2 February 2015).
Actual implementation:
Describe specifically what airlines, air navigation
service provider (ANSP), the military and adjacent
states or other states publishing advisories were used
as a source for what information about security risk for
civil aircraft.
Information provided by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was used to issue NOTAMs V6158/14 and
A2681/14 (See the answer to Q2).
Changes after 17 July 2014:
Issuance of NOTAMs V6158/14 and A2681/14 due to
reasons mentioned in the answer to Q2.

Answer:
The Russian Federation used the information of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for NOTAMs V6158/14
and A2681/14.
Responsible:
Federal Air Transport Agency (Rosaviatsiya).
References:
Instructions for the development, establishment, introduction and removal of temporary and local regimes, as well
as short-term restrictions, approved by Order of the Ministry of Transport of Russia No. 171 dated June 27, 2011.
Joint Order of Federal Air Navigation Agency (Rosaeronavigatsya) and the Ministry of Transport of Russia No.
139/202 “On the organization of activities to issue notices to
aviation personnel (NOTAM)” dated December 29, 2007.
Manual Concerning Safety Measures Relating to Military
Activities Potentially Hazardous to Civil Aircraft Operations, ICAO Document No. 9554, First Edition 1990.
Process and timeline:
The texts of statements by the Russian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs: No. 1570 of June 28, 2014, No. 1678 of July 10,
2014, and No. 1688 of July 13, 2014 were published on the
Russian Foreign Ministry official website.

Actual implementation:
How was the security threat information verified, the
source judged for credibility, and by what authority /
organization? What were the results of the credibility
decision and the verification?
Rosaviatsiya has no reason to doubt the reliability of the
information officially published by the Russian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, which was used to issue NOTAMs in
accordance with ICAO rules.
Changes after 17 July 2014:
The initiative to issue NOTAMs V6158/14 and A2681/14
concerning the Rostov-on-Don FIR came on July 12, 2014
from the Rosaviatsiya Southern Interregional Territorial
Administration (responsible for the Rostov-on-Don FIR)
due to the aggravated situation in the areas bordering
on Ukraine, the use of various types of weapons by the
Ukrainian armed forces (statements by the Russian MFA
No. 1570 of June 28, 2014, No. 1678 of July 10, 2014, and
No. 1688 of July 13, 2014).

Answer:
The process should be in conformity with ICAO regulations, including ICAO Document 9554.
The Russian Federation used the information of
the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for NOTAMs
V6158/14 and A2681/14.
There were no armed conflicts in the Rostov-on-Don
flight information region (FIR). The armed clashes took
place on the territory of Ukraine.
Responsible:
Authorized bodies of the State on whose territory an
armed conflict has arisen (Ukraine, in relation to the
Flight MH17 crash).
References:
Manual Concerning Safety Measures Relating to Military
Activities Potentially Hazardous to Civil Aircraft Operations, ICAO Document No. 9554, First Edition 1990.
Civil/Military Cooperation in Air Traffic Management,
ICAO Circular No. 330.
Process and timeline:
Responsibility for initiating the coordination process lies
with the State on whose territory an armed conflict is
taking place. States providing air traffic management in
conflict-affected airspace are responsible for taking special

measures to ensure the safety of international operation
of civil aircraft, even when coordination has not been
initiated or completed. Based on the information available,
the State responsible for air traffic management should
define the geographic area of the conflict, assess the hazard or potential hazard to the international operation of
civil aircraft, and determine whether flights in or over the
conflict area should be avoided or may continue subject to
certain conditions. Then an international NOTAM should
be issued containing the necessary information, recommendations and security measures to be taken; it should
be updated subsequently to follow the developments.
Actual implementation:
Describe what organisations determined the acceptable
security risk levels for civil aircraft. How this was
determined and what were the determined acceptable
security levels?
There were no armed conflicts within the Rostov-on-Don
FIR. NOTAMs V6158/14 and A2681/14 with restrictions
on the use of the airspace of the Rostov-on-Don FIR were
issued due to the hostilities on the territory of Ukraine
near the state border with the Russian Federation, as well
as the shelling of Russian territory from the territory of
Ukraine.
Changes after 17 July 2014:
There were no changes in the Russian regulations.

Answer:
The process should be in line with ICAO rules, including
document No. 9554.
The armed conflict took place on the territory of
Ukraine, so it is not known how the Ukrainian authorities
conducted the relevant analysis and risk assessment.
Responsible:
Competent authorities of the State on the territory of
which the armed conflict took place (Ukraine, in relation
to Flight MH17 plane crash).
References:
Aeronautical Information Services Manual, ICAO document No. 8126, Sixth Edition — 2003.
Manual Concerning Safety Measures Relating to Military Activities Potentially Hazardous to Civil Aircraft

Operations, ICAO document No. 9554, First Edition
— 1990.
Process and timeline:
See the answers to Q7 and Q8.
Actual implementation:
Describe if and how risk was assessed and what levels of
security risk were determined for what airspace, what
altitudes or what type of aircraft.
See the answers to Q7 and Q8.
Changes after 17 July 2014:
Information on the reasons for and the decision process of
releasing NOTAMs V6158/14 and A2681/14 can be found
in the answers to question Q5 and Q12.

Answer:
The process is in line with ICAO rules.
Responsible:
• Rosaviatsiya
• Federal State Unitary Enterprise “State Air Traffic
Management Corporation of the Russian Federation”
• A user of airspace whose activity poses a threat to the
safety of airspace use.
References:
Federal Law No. 60-FZ, “The Aviation Code of the Russian Federation” of March 19, 1997.
Chapter VI, “Prohibition or restriction of the use of
airspace” of the Federal Rules on the Use of the Air Space
of the Russian Federation approved by the Decree of the
Government of the Russian Federation No. 138 of March
11, 2010.
Federal Aviation Regulations, “Organization of Planning
the Use of Airspace of the Russian Federation” approved
by Order of the Ministry of Transport of Russia No. 6
dated January 16, 2012.
Guidelines for the development, establishment, introduction and removal of temporary and local regimes, as well
as short-term restrictions, approved by Order of the Ministry of Transport of Russia No. 171 dated June 27, 2011.
Joint order of Rosaeronavigation and the Ministry of
Transport of Russia from No. 139/202 “On the Organization of activity on publication of notices for the aviation
personnel (NOTAM)” dated December 29, 2007.
Process and timeline:
Organization of the use of airspace provides for safe,
cost-effective and regular air traffic, as well as other activities to use airspace. The organization of the use of airspace
is carried out by the authorized body in the field of airspace
use, the authorities of the unified system of air traffic management, as well as bodies of users of airspace — air traffic

service (flight management) in the designated zones and
areas. The use of airspace or certain areas thereof may be
prohibited or restricted.
If there is a need to use airspace by two or more airspace
users at the same time, prohibition or restriction of their
activities in certain areas of the airspace of the Russian
Federation in accordance with state priorities in the use of
airspace is established by introducing temporary and local
regimes, as well as short-term restrictions.
Submissions for the establishment of temporary and
local regimes shall be submitted by users of airspace via
the aircraft terrestrial data transmission network and
telegraph messages or in hard copy, including facsimile
communication to the relevant centers of the Unified System. The submissions shall provide reliable and complete
information on the planned activities to use airspace.
The terms are determined by the Guidelines for the
development, establishment, introduction and removal of
temporary and local regimes, as well as short-term restrictions, approved by Order of the Ministry of Transport of
Russia No. 171 dated June 27, 2011.
The coordination of the use of airspace ensures efficient
and flexible use and includes:
• ensuring the safety of airspace use in case of changes
in the air, meteorological and aeronautical environment through the implementation of the authorities
of the Unified System centers on air space redistribution in accordance with the state priorities;
• timely introduction and removal of bans and restrictions in the optimal airspace related to temporary and
local regimes, as well as short-term restrictions;
• providing an opportunity to use the airspace of restricted areas, the validity of which is limited by time
period.
Actual implementation:
Not applicable—no answer required.
Changes after 17 July 2014:
There were no changes to the regulatory documents