MH17: êàê è êòî?

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Q13. What organisations are involved and what are the procedures for coordinating airspace restrictions in the conflict zone among adjacent FIRs?

Answer:
The area of flight information in which the armed conflict
was taking place was not in the Russian Federation.
Ukraine has not published information about the reasons for the restrictions imposed by NOTAM.
Responsible:
Competent authorities and airspace users exchanging
information related to aviation security.
References:
Aeronautical Information Services Manual, ICAO document No. 8126, Sixth Edition — 2003.
Manual Concerning Safety Measures Relating to Military
Activities Potentially Hazardous to Civil Aircraft Operations, ICAO document No. 9554, First Edition — 1990.
Process and timeline:
Aeronautical data and information should be complete,
timely and of the required quality. In the presence of
sources of hazard to air navigation, as well as the establishment of prohibited areas, hazardous areas or zones of
restriction, the issuance of NOTAMs is required.
The text of a NOTAM is generated using the values/
uniform abbreviated phraseology required for the ICAO
NOTAM code, supplemented by ICAO abbreviations,
dash numbers, discriminant, indexes, callsigns, frequencies, numbers and plain text [1].
NOTAMs shall contain information about the hazard,
operating condition or mode of operation of the means
that are the subject of the message.
An example of information on the hazard to be included
in NOTAMs relating to an armed conflict zone is given in
Appendix “B” of the document [2].
Actual implementation:
Describe if and how the airspace restrictions were
coordinated with the adjacent FIRs and what
organisations were involved in the coordination.
Ukraine has full sovereignty over its airspace. There was
no additional information from the Ukrainian aviation
authorities about the hazards other than those published
in Ukrainian issued NOTAMs.
Published by the Russian side NOTAMs on July 16,
2014 were available for the Ukrainian side (see the answer
to question Q12)

Changes introduced after 17 July 2014:
According to the DSB Final Report, the investigation found
that Ukraine had made a decision to issue NOTAMs to
restrict access to the airspace below FL320 based on the necessity to “set additional buffer zone FL260-FL320 in order
to ensure flight safety of civil aircraft related to operations of
the state aircraft of Ukraine within the prohibited airspace”
(para. 6.3, p. 196 of the DSB Final Report).
The contents of NOTAMs does not allow to set the
altitude for a buffer zone.
According to the latest NOTAM issued by Ukraine on
14 July 2014, military aircraft could operate at the levels
up to FL320, resulting in a 300-meter altitude difference
between a military aircraft and a civil aircraft flying at
an altitude of 10050 meters (Flight MH17 was at FL330),
which complied with the reduced vertical separation
minimum (RVSM). Furthermore, FL320 is part of the
RVSM airspace that is subject to the ICAO rules establishing special security measures and requirements for aircraft
on-board equipment, cabin crew and ground personnel
training, as well as accuracy and reliability characteristics
of the ground equipment.
Military aircraft do not fall under the requirements
for the on-board equipment for RVSM flights. Besides,
military aircraft are not subject to the height keeping requirements. Therefore, they cannot fly in RVSM airspace
without special procedures applied.
Paragraph 5.2.5. of the Manual on a 300 m (1000 ft)
Vertical Separation Minimum Between FL 290 and FL 410
Inclusive (ICAO Doc 9574) points out the need to develop
procedures to accommodate military flight operations that
do not meet the equipment requirements but are carried
out at FL 290. Possible methods include:
a) the provision of temporary airspace reservations;
b) the provision of block altitudes;
c) the provision of special routes applicable only to military aircraft; and
d) the provision of special routes applicable to air traffic
requiring a 600 m (2 000 ft) VSM above FL 290.
Therefore, Ukraine, when issuing a NOTAM permitting
military aircraft flights at the levels up to FL320 inclusive,
failed to consider or implement the ICAO requirements
in question. UkSATSE and the civil aviation authority of
Ukraine had to make a decision prohibiting the use of
airspace by civil aircraft above the armed conflict zone.

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Q14. What is the process to decide if there is a need for aeronautical information publication and to choose the communication tool for it (e.g. NOTAMs, ÀIÑ)?

Response:
The process is consistent with the ICAO rules.
Responsible:
• Federal Air Transport Agency (Rosaviatsiya)
• Federal State Unitary Enterprise “State Air Traffic
Management Corporation of the Russian Federation”
• Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Aeronautical Information Centre”
• Airspace user, whose activities create a hazard to the
safe use of airspace.
References:
Federal Law No. 60-FZ “The Air Code of the Russian
Federation” of 19 March 1997.
Federal Rules for the Use of the Airspace of the Russian
Federation approved by Resolution No. 138 of the Government of the Russian Federation of 11 March 2010.
Federal Aviation Regulations “Airspace Use Planning in
the Russian Federation” approved by Order No. 6 of the
Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation of 16
January 2012.
Instruction on the development, establishment, implementation and removal of temporary, local and short-term
restrictions approved by Order No. 171 of the Ministry of
Transport of the Russian Federation of 27 June 2011.

oint order No. 139/202 of the Federal Aeronautical Agency and the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation on “Organizing the Issuance of Notice to Airmen
(NOTAMs)” of 29 December 2007.
Process and timeline:
The process is described in the response to Q11.
To ensure planning of airspace use, the Unified System
centers employ an aviation ground data and telegraph network, public telephone network, restricted telephone and/
or telegraph network, and the Internet, as well as receive
information in paper format, including fax. Planning of
airspace use is carried out in the Unified System centers
equipped with automated airspace use planning systems
using the said systems.
Actual implementation:
Describe how it was decided if there is a need for
aeronautical information publication and how it was
chosen what communication tool for it (e.g. NOTAMs
AIC).
The decision-making process regarding the issuance of
NOTAMs V6158/14 and A2681/14 is described in the
response to Q12.
Changes introduced after 17 July 2014:
No changes have been introduced.

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Q15. What organisations are involved in and what are the processes to prepare, verify if ICAO AIS procedures and terminology are used, validate for correctness and transmit aeronautical information to the users of it (e.g. airlines and ANSPs)?

Response:
The process is consistent with the ICAO rules.
Responsible entity:
• Federal State Unitary Enterprise “State Air Traffic
Management Corporation of the Russian Federation”
• Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Aeronautical Information Centre”
References:
Aeronautical Information Services Manual, ICAO Doc
8126, Sixth Edition, 2003.
Manual Concerning Safety Measures Relating to Military
Activities Potentially Hazardous to Civil Aircraft Operations, ICAO Doc 9554, First Edition, 1990.
Federal Aviation Regulations “Requirements for legal entities and individual entrepreneurs performing commercial
air transport operations. Form of and procedure for issuing
a document verifying compliance of legal entities and individual entrepreneurs performing commercial air transport
operations with the requirements set out in federal aviation
regulations” approved by Order No. 246 of the Ministry of
Transport of the Russian Federation of 13 August 2015.
Federal Aviation Regulations “Preparation for and
performance of civil aircraft operations in the Russian
Federation” approved by Order No. 128 of the Ministry of
Transport of the Russian Federation of 31 July 2009.
Procedure for production and rules for provision of
aeronautical information approved by Order No. 305 of
the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation of 31
October 2014.
Process and timeline:
Production of aeronautical information includes compilation (generation) of raw aeronautical data and raw
aeronautical information, their submission to the aeronautical information authority, subsequent processing
and verification by the aeronautical information authority

and transmission to the users of the official aeronautical
data and official aeronautical information, processors
of the official aeronautical data and official aeronautical
information, and providers of the official aeronautical
information and official aeronautical data. After receiving
raw aeronautical data and raw aeronautical information, the aeronautical information authority shall verify,
register and process them for inclusion in the AIP of
Russia, Annex to the AIP of Russia, notices transmitted
via communication channels and containing information
about the condition of the aeronautical equipment and
airspace structure elements that are crucial to be timely
warned of for the personnel involved in the performance
of aircraft operations, and NOTAMs and AICs, as well as
provision to the users of the official aeronautical data and
official aeronautical information, processors of the official
aeronautical data and official aeronautical information,
and providers of the official aeronautical data. If the raw
aeronautical data and raw aeronautical information do
not meet the requirements, the aeronautical information
authority shall send them back to the providers (compilators) of raw aeronautical data and raw aeronautical
information for refinement.
Actual implementation:
Please describe the organizations involved in the
preparation of aeronautical information, verification of
the use of the ICAO AIS procedures and terminology,
and validation of the correctness and transmission of
the aeronautical information to its users.
• Federal Air Transport Agency (Rosaviatsiya)
• Federal State Unitary Enterprise “State Air Traffic
Management Corporation of the Russian Federation”
• Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Aeronautical Information Centre”
Changes introduced after 17 July 2014:
No changes have been introduced.

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Q16. What are the procedures for disseminating civil aviation security threat information to operators within and outside the conflict zone FIR?

Response:
The process is consistent with the ICAO rules.
Responsible:
• Aircraft operator
• Federal State Unitary Enterprise “State Air Traffic
Management Corporation of the Russian Federation”
• Federal State Unitary Enterprise “Aeronautical Information Centre”
References:
Aeronautical Information Services Manual, ICAO Doc
8126, Sixth Edition, 2003.
Manual Concerning Safety Measures Relating to Military
Activities Potentially Hazardous to Civil Aircraft Operations, ICAO Doc 9554, First Edition, 1990.
Federal Aviation Regulations “Requirements for legal entities and individual entrepreneurs performing commercial air transport operations. Form of and procedure for
issuing a document verifying compliance of legal entities
and individual entrepreneurs performing commercial
air transport operations with the requirements set out in
federal aviation regulations” approved by Order No. 246 of
the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation of 13
August 2015.
Federal Aviation Regulations “Preparation for and
performance of civil aircraft operations in the Russian
Federation” approved by Order No. 128 of the Ministry of
Transport of the Russian Federation of 31 July 2009.
Procedure for preparation and rules for provision of
aeronautical information approved by Order No. 305 of

the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation of 31
October 2014.
Process and timeline:
The aeronautical information authority publishes aeronautical information documents containing official
aeronautical information and official aeronautical data.
Official aeronautical information is issued as a NOTAM
if the raw aeronautical information is of temporary and
short-term nature or if permanent or long-term temporary changes that are important in terms of operation are
urgently introduced, with the exception of extensive text
and/or graphic materials. The aeronautical information
authority issues NOTAMs, as well as checklists of valid
NOTAMs and NOTAM checklists. NOTAMs are transmitted as one communication message via AFS.
Russian aircraft operators, including those performing
international flights, shall ensure provision of aeronautical
information to the cabin crews. In case of commercial
air transport operations, the operator ensures during the
preparation for the flight that the cabin crew is provided
with aeronautical and meteorological information.
Actual implementation:
Please describe whether and, if so, how the civil aviation
security threat information was disseminated to
operators within and outside the conflict zone FIR?
All users of the airspace of the Russian Operation were
sent NOTAM V6158/14 via the AFTN channel in telegram No. 141707 of 16 July 2014 and NOTAM A2681/14
in telegram No. 161709 of 16 July 2014.
Changes introduced after 17 July 2014:
No changes have been introduced.

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Appendix C
Clarifying Questions Responses from Russian Federation

This appendix contains the responses received from the Russian Federation to clarifying questions. The responses are provided as received without additional editing or modification. Note: Unofficial translation from Russian.

CQ1. What threat information about the presence of
air defence equipment in eastern Ukraine that was
not controlled by government forces and which could
have reached the respective airspace in URVV FIR
above Flight Level 250 was identified, when and by
which authority?
Answer:
The Russian authorities did not have any information
regarding the presence of air defense equipment on the
territory of Ukraine that was not controlled by the armed
forces of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine and which
could hit targets in the Rostov-on-Don FIR above FL 250.
Statements by Ukraine’s officials implied that Ministry
of Defence of Ukraine delivered different types of weapons, including combat aircraft, to the armed conflict zone.
In accordance with ICAO Rules, Ukrainian authorities
were responsible for obtaining, analyzing and disseminating flight safety information over armed conflict zone.
NOTAMs (A1383/14, A1384/15, A1492/14, A1493/14)
issued by Ukraine mentioned only flights of state aircraft as a source of threat to flight safety of civil aircraft.
The real situation in eastern Ukraine differed from the
information presented in NOTAMs. Therefore, as it was
outlined in the answer to Q2 of the Questionnaire of 4
September 2020, Rosaviatsiya identified a threat to flight
safety itself due to Ukraine’s regular shooting of the Russian border areas.
We would deem it important to draw the Flight Safety
Foundation’s attention to the fact that it is incorrect to
focus only on threats posed exclusively by air defense
systems capable of hitting targets at high altitudes when
assessing flight safety risks over eastern Ukraine. The
same mistake was made in the final DSB report where
the analysis of the actions and decisions taken by the
Ukrainian side was focused on the speculation that the
AN-26 aircraft of the Armed Forces of Ukraine had been
downed on 14 July 2014 with some “heavy weapon” (pages
181–185, Section 5.3).
The final DSB report concludes that the reason why
Ukraine restricted the use of the airspace below FL320
remains unclear (page 10, Subsection “Ukraine’s airspace
management,” paragraph two).
In April 2014, the Ukrainian authorities declared areas
in eastern Ukraine “an anti-terrorist operation zone.”
Regulation on the Use of Airspace of Ukraine approved
by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Resolution No.
401 of 29 March 2002 (https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/401-2002-ï#Text)

did not provide for procedures in case of internal armed conflicts.
As it was found out during the investigation of
Flight MH17 crash, due to the operational use of the
aircraft of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (MIG-29, SU-27,
SU-25 aircraft), larger airspace in Denepropetrovsk FIR
was reserved by issuing NOTAMs from 29 June to 14 July
2014 by the necessity to set “a buffer zone” FL260-FL320
(page 196, Section 6.3, paragraph two).
Regulation No. 401 of 29 March 2002 contains a definition of the term “a buffer zone” which is a part of the airspace around restricted areas, hazardous areas, prohibited
areas and areas related to temporarily reserved airspace
intended to ensure safety requirements while carrying
activities related to the use of airspace in the mentioned
areas and beyond them. However, Regulation No. 410 of
29 March 2002 does not describe the order of buffer zones
settings.
Ukraine did not publish information regarding “the
buffer zone” around the conflict zone. Moreover, NOTAMs A1492/14 and A1493/14 issued by the Ukraine did
not prohibit state aircraft to fly between FL260 and FL320.
In this connection, it is still unclear how the Ministry of
Defence of Ukraine was going to provide and the Ukraerocenter to control the observance of the so-called “buffer
zone.”
Clarifications concerning the reasons for issuing NOTAMs A1492/14 and A1493/14 on setting “a buffer zone”
provided during the investigation of Flight MH17 crash,
give grounds for assuming that military activity in the
armed conflict zone related to the military aviation flights
was more dangerous than it was reflected in NOTAMs.
In accordance with para. 12.2. of the Rules for the
Performance of Flights and Air Traffic Management in the
Airspace of Ukraine with a Reduced Vertical Separation
Minimum approved by Order of the Ministry of Transport of Ukraine No. 9 of 11 January 2002, “The required
vertical separation minimum between the vertical limits
of the restricted and reserved airspace and other aircraft
not engaged in such activities and flying in airspace with
RVSM should be: 600 meters (2000 feet) above the upper
limit of the zone of the aforementioned activities for the
upper limits at FL290 and above; …”(https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/z0041-02#Text).
Therefore, given FL320 which is, according to NOTAMs
A1492/14 and A1493/14, the upper limit of the restricted
zone, civil aircraft could fly in this area at no less than
FL340, i.e. Flight MH17 authorised by the Ministry of

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Internal Affairs of Ukraine at FL330 did not answer the
safety requirements over the armed conflict zone. The
investigation conducted by the DSB did not establish the
reason why the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine
allowed the Flight MH17 to proceed at an altitude lower
than provided for by the Ukrainian legislation.
CQ2. What intent to attack with air defence equipment in eastern Ukraine that was not controlled by
government forces and which could have reached the
respective airspace in URVV FIR above Flight Level 250
was identified, when and by which authority?
Answer:
When taking a decision to issue NOTAM V6158/14, the
Russian airspace authorities did not have information
that governmental or non-governmental entities on the
territory of Ukraine deployed air defense equipment
capable of downing aircraft at high altitudes in the conflict
zone and could use it in the armed conflict by mistake or
negligence.
Responsibility for assessing the intent to use air defense equipment by governmental and non-governmental
armed groups on the territory of Ukraine rests with the
Ukrainian authorities. This follows from the recommendations given in para. 10.2 of ICAO Document 9554: “The
responsibility for initiating the co-ordination process rests
with the States whose military forces are engaged in the
conflict. The responsibility for instituting special measures
to ensure the safety of international civil aircraft operations remains with the States responsible for providing air
traffic services in the airspace affected by the conflict, even
in case where co-ordination is not initiated or completed.”
CQ3. What were the specific reasons for restricting
the airspace with NOTAM V6158/14, why were there
several restrictions in one NOTAM, and to which of the
restrictions in the NOTAM apply the items F) and G),
specifying surface as lower height limit and FL530 as
upper height limit?
Answer:
In the period from March to August 2014 analysed by
the Foundation, there were no armed conflicts on the
territory of the Russian Federation adjacent to the state
border with Ukraine. However, statements by the Russian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided information concerning the risks to people and objects on the territory
of the Russian Federation and in its airspace and in this
regard, Rosaviatsiya took preventive flight safety measures
(issuance of NOTAMSs V6158/14 and A2681/14).
The specific reason for airspace restrictions imposed
by NOTAM V6158/14 is stated in the field E) of the
NOTAM: “Due to combat actions on the territory of the
Ukraine near the state border with the Russian Federation

and the facts of firing from the territory of the Ukraine
towards the territory of the Russian Federation….” This
explanation was included in the NOTAM subject to the
requirements of ICAO Rules, including para. 6.3.8. of
ICAO Document 8126 and recommendations given in
Appendix B to ICAO Document 9554.
Items Q), F) and G) of NOTAM V6158/14 stated that it
applied to the airspace from the ground to FL530. However, regarding the airway sections adjacent to the state
border of the Russian Federation listed in the field E), the
stated height limit was “SFC — FL320” which corresponded to the upper limit on the use of airways in NOTAMs
A1492/14 and A1493/14 published earlier (on 14 July
2014) by Ukraine.
The difference in the upper limit values of the airspace
restrictions is related to the information published in the
second part of the field E) of the NOTAM, concerning
the use of the arrival/exit routes to and from the Rostovon-Don airport from and to the Dnepropetrovsk flight
information region (FIR), with FL340 and above stated
(FL330 and above respectively). Therefore, when writing
the NOTAM, the maximum value of the highest possible
FL530 for the airways sections used for the departure (arrival) from (to) the Rostov-on-Don airport, was chosen.
Flight MH17 following airway L980 in the airspace of
Ukraine to the compulsory reporting point TAMAK and
further, according to the flight plan, from the waypoint
TAMAK, following airway A87 in the Russian airspace,
was subject to NOTAM V6158/14 restrictions for the airspace below FL 320 (airway section “A87 TMAK — SARNA” stated in NOTAM V6158/14).
The content of the field E) of NOTAM V6158/14 consists
of two parts the first one concerns restrictions on airway
sections, while the second one concerns those on approach
and exit routes to and from the area of Rostov-on-Don
airport (URRR). Meanwhile, the second part regarding
Rostov-on-Don airport was repeated in NOTAM A2681/14.
CQ4. NOTAM V6158/14 promulgated, among other things, a restriction with an upper height limit
of FL320 referring to “…the facts of firing from the
territory of the Ukraine towards the territory of
Russian Federation….” What was the precise threat
that required airspace restriction over the territory
of the Russian Federation up to FL320 but not above,
considering that in the references you provided the
statements (1570-28-06-2014, 1678-10-07-2014 and
1688-13-07-2014) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
the Russian Federations refer to low altitude artillery
shootings?
Answer:
NOTAMs A1383/14, A1384/14, A1387/14, A1389/14,
A1492/14, and A1493/14 issued by the Ukrainian side
did not contain information concerning the nature of the

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military actions as required by the ICAO Rules, including
para. 6.3.8. of ICAO Document 8126 and recommendations given in Appendix B to ICAO Document 9554. From
the Ukrainian NOTAMs, it formally followed that they
were in order to ensure state aviation flights.
However, the use of different types of weapons and
methods of warfare (flights with the use of combat
aviation weapons; tanks and artillery shooting; jamming
support) in close proximity to the territory of the Russian
Federation, not declared in the NOTAM, pointed to the
fact that the Ukrainian authorities did not fulfil the requirements of the ICAO Rules, according to which, co-ordination is aimed at providing optimal conditions which
allow to avoid the creation of hazards to civil aircraft and
minimizing interference with the normal flight operations
of such aircraft.
For instance:
• On 24 April 2014, one of the Russian air companies
informed Rosaviatsiya of disappearing GPS signal
when flying within the Dnepropetrovsk FIR area
of responsibility. Navigation equipment resumed
its work after entering the airspace of the Russian
Federation;

• On 5 June 2014, the Ukrainian plane SU-27 violated
the state border by trespassing over the Russian border and going 1.5km deep into the Russian territory
in the area of the populated area Kuybyshevo (the
Rostov region). On 12 June 2014, in the same area, a
MI-8 helicopter with Ukrainian symbols flying at the
height of 50m trespassed into the airspace of the Russian Federation going up to 3km deep into it (extract
from the Statement by the Russian MFA No. 1422 of
14 June 2014).
As it was mentioned earlier in the answers to Questions
No. 1 and 2, proceeding from the information in the latest
statements by the Russian MFA (No. 1570 of 28 June
2014, N0. 1678 of 10 July 2014, No. 1688 of 13 July 2014),
Rosaviatsiya decided to partially close the airspace in the
Rostov-on-Don FIR area of responsibility.
FL320 was taken as the limit for the NOTAM V6158/14,
same as in the Ukrainian NOTAMs A1492/14 and
A1493/14. The decision to set a vertical limit of FL320
was taken as Rosaviatsiya did not have any other, more
or less credible information provided by the Ukrainian
side, which would allow to forecast the vertical limit of the
hazard zone for civil aviation flights.

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Appendix D
Questionnaire Responses: Ukraine standard procedures and threat knowledge

This appendix contains the responses received from Ukraine to standard procedures and threat knowledge questionnaire. The responses are provided as received without additional editing or modification.
Q1. Is information in social media used as a trigger for security threat analysis for civil aviation, including information about capability of attack and/or intend to attack civil aircraft?

Answer:
Information from open sources, including social media, is
used in the assessment of threats to civil aviation security
in accordance with relevant regulatory documents.
Responsible:
• State Aviation Administration of Ukraine;
• Security Service of Ukraine;
• Ministry of Defense of Ukraine;
• Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine;
• Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine;
• airport operators;
• aircraft operators;
• air navigation service providers.
References:
Law of Ukraine “On the State Civil Aviation Security Program” dated February 20, 2003 No 545-IV;
Law of Ukraine “On Combating Terrorism” dated March
20, 2003 No 638-IV (as amended).
Decree of the President of Ukraine “On Regulations
regarding the Anti-Terrorist Center and its coordination
groups at the regional bodies of the Security Service of
Ukraine” dated April 14, 1999 No 379/99 (as amended).
Order of the Ministry of Transport and Communications
of Ukraine “On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the
Level of Threat to Civil Aviation Security of Ukraine”
dated 11.05.2007 No 390 (restricted), registered by the
Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on May 25, 2007, registration No 542/13809 (as amended).
These documents are developed in accordance with relevant ICAO provisions, in particular Annex 17 and ICAO
Doc 8973.
Process and timeline:
In accordance with the legislation, the State Aviation
Administration of Ukraine constantly conducts a general

assessment of threats to civil aviation security on the
basis of information received from the Security Service
of Ukraine; Ministry of Defense of Ukraine; Ministry of
Internal Affairs of Ukraine; Foreign Intelligence Service of
Ukraine; airport operators; aircraft operators; air navigation service providers; and other sources, social media
included.
Actual implementation:
Describe here what social media civil aviation threat
information about presence of air defense equipment or
intent to attack was identified by which authority.
According to the established procedures, the State
Aviation Administration of Ukraine used information
on threats to civil aviation security from the Ministry of
Defense of Ukraine, law enforcement and intelligence
agencies of Ukraine, and other sources. This information
is the one marked “For official use (restricted).” The information mentioned above is specified in the final report
on the investigation of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’
Boeing-777-200. https://www.onderzoeksr aad.nl/en/page/3546/crash-mh17-17-july-2014.
Changes after 17 July 2014:
Have been improved in line with updated ICAO Standards
and Recommended Practices, Annex 17 to the Chicago
Convention on International Civil Aviation, and current
legislation. In particular, the following have been adopted:
• Amendments to the laws of Ukraine “On the Security
Service of Ukraine,” “On Combating Terrorism,” “On
Counterintelligence Activities,” “On Operational and
Investigative Activities”;
• State Civil Aviation Security Program, approved
by the Law of Ukraine, dated March 21, 2017 No.
1965-VIII;
• Order of the Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine
“On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the Level of
Threat to Civil Aviation Security of Ukraine,” dated
17.06.2020 No356 registered by the Ministry of Justice
of Ukraine on 01.10.2020, registration No 960/35243

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Q2. What are the sources of public and private threat information and the processes for gathering information relative to civil aviation security (including in a conflict zone)

Answer:
Information from all available sources is used to assess
threats to civil aviation security in accordance with
relevant regulatory documents. Also, when assessing the
threats to civil aviation security, they consider the information pertaining to restrictions on flights in certain
areas from international civil aviation organizations and
civil aviation authorities of other states (Along with this,
attention ought to be paid to the fact that at the time the
air crash occurred, there was no concept or definition for
a “conflict zone”).
Responsible:
• State Aviation Administration of Ukraine;
• Security Service of Ukraine;
• Ministry of Defense of Ukraine;
• Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine;
• Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine;
• airport operators; aircraft operators;
• air navigation service providers;
• civil aviation authorities of foreign states;
• international civil aviation organizations.
References:
Law of Ukraine “On the State Civil Aviation Security Program” dated February 20, 2003 No 545-IV;
Law of Ukraine “On Combating Terrorism” dated March
20, 2003 No 638-IV (as amended).
Decree of the President of Ukraine “On Regulations
regarding the Anti-Terrorist Center and its coordination
groups at the regional bodies of the Security Service of
Ukraine” dated April 14, 1999 No 379/99 (as amended).
Order of the Ministry of Transport and Communications
of Ukraine “On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the
Level of Threat to Civil Aviation Security of Ukraine”
dated 11.05.2007 No 390 (restricted), registered by the
Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on May 25, 2007, registration No 542/13809 (as amended).
These documents are developed in accordance with relevant ICAO provisions, in particular Annex 17 and ICAO
Doc 8973.
Process and timeline:
In accordance with the legislation, the State Aviation
Administration of Ukraine constantly conducts a general

assessment of threats to civil aviation security on the
basis of information received from the Security Service
of Ukraine; Ministry of Defense of Ukraine; Ministry of
Internal Affairs of Ukraine; Foreign Intelligence Service of
Ukraine; airport operators; aircraft operators; air navigation service providers; civil aviation authorities of foreign
states; international civil aviation organizations.
Actual implementation:
Describe here what other sources of civil aviation threat
information about presence of air defence equipment
and intent to attack was identified by which authority.
According to the established procedures, the State
Aviation Administration of Ukraine used information
on threats to civil aviation security from the Ministry of
Defense of Ukraine, law enforcement and intelligence
agencies of Ukraine, civil aviation authorities of foreign
states; international civil aviation organizations. This information is the one marked “For official use (restricted).”
The information mentioned above is specified in the final
report on the investigation of the air crash of Malaysia
Airlines’ Boeing-777-200. https://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/en/page/3 … july-2014.
Changes after 17 July 2014:
National regulations and procedures pertaining to gathering and analyzing information about threats to civil
aviation security have been improved in line with updated
ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices, Annex 17
to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, and current legislation. In particular, the following
have been adopted:
• amendments to the laws of Ukraine “On the Security
Service of Ukraine,” “On Combating Terrorism,” “On
Counterintelligence Activities,” “On Operational and
Investigative Activities”;
• State Civil Aviation Security Program, approved
by the Law of Ukraine, dated March 21, 2017 No.
1965-VIII;
• Order of the Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine
“On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the Level of Threat to Civil Aviation Security if Ukraine,”
dated 17.06.2020 No 356 registered by the Ministry
of Justice of Ukraine on 01.10.2020, registration No
960/35243

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Q3. What is the level of involvement of airlines, air navigation service providers (ANSPs), the military and adjacent states or other states publishing advisories in gathering information about aviation security (including information for conflict zones)?

Answer:
National airlines, air navigation service providers, the
military and law enforcement agencies are involved in
gathering information about aviation security. According
to relevant regulatory documents, information received
from adjacent or other states (if available) is taken into
consideration as well.
(Along with this, attention ought to be paid to the fact
that at the time the air crash occurred, there was no concept or definition for a “conflict zone”).
Responsible:
• State Aviation Administration of Ukraine;
• Security Service of Ukraine;
• Ministry of Defense of Ukraine;
• Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine;
• Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine;
• airport operators; aircraft operators;
• air navigation service providers;
• civil aviation authorities of foreign states;
• international civil aviation organizations.
References:
Law of Ukraine “On the State Civil Aviation Security Program” dated February 20, 2003 No 545-IV;
Law of Ukraine “On Combating Terrorism” dated March
20, 2003 No 638-IV (as amended).
Decree of the President of Ukraine “On Regulations
regarding the Anti-Terrorist Center and its coordination
groups at the regional bodies of the Security Service of
Ukraine” dated April 14, 1999 No 379/99 (as amended).
Order of the Ministry of Transport and Communications
of Ukraine “On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the
Level of Threat to Civil Aviation Security of Ukraine”
dated 11.05.2007 No 390 (restricted), registered by the
Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on May 25, 2007, registration No 542/13809 (as amended).
These documents are developed in accordance with relevant ICAO provisions, in particular Annex 17 and ICAO
Doc 8973.
Process and timeline:
In accordance with the legislation, the State Aviation
Administration of Ukraine constantly conducts a general

assessment of threats to civil aviation security on the
basis of information received from the Security Service
of Ukraine; Ministry of Defense of Ukraine; Ministry of
Internal Affairs of Ukraine; Foreign Intelligence Service of
Ukraine; airport operators; aircraft operators; air navigation service providers; civil aviation authorities of foreign
states; international civil aviation organizations.
Actual implementation:
Describe specifically what airlines, air navigation
service provider (ANSP), the military and adjacent
states or other states publishing advisories were used
as a source for what information about security risk for
civil aircraft.
According to the established procedures, the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine used information on
threats to civil aviation security from national airlines, air
navigation service providers, the military and law enforcement agencies, considering information from adjacent or
other states (if available) as well.
This information is the one marked “For official use (restricted).” The information mentioned above is specified
in the final report on the investigation of the air crash of
Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200. https://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/en/page/3 … july-2014.
Changes after 17 July 2014:
National regulations and procedures pertaining to gathering and analyzing information about threats to civil
aviation security have been improved in line with updated
ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices, Annex 17
to the Chicago Convention on International Aviation, and
current legislation. In particular, the following have been
adopted:
• amendments to the laws of Ukraine “On the Security
Service of Ukraine,” “On Combating Terrorism,” “On
Counterintelligence Activities,” “On Operational and
Investigative Activities”;
• State Civil Aviation Security Program, approved
by the Law of Ukraine, dated March 21, 2017 No.
1965-VIII;
• Order of the Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine
“On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the Level of Threat to Civil Aviation Security of Ukraine,”
dated 17.06.2020 No 356, registered by the Ministry
of Justice of Ukraine on 01.10.2020, registration No
960/35243

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Q4. What are the procedures for routine review and analysis of NOTAMs, security warnings and airspace restrictions for adjacent flight information regions (FIRs) to ensure civil aircraft security?

Answer:
Information pertaining to NOTAMs, security warnings
and airspace restrictions for adjacent flight information
regions (FIRs) is constantly reviewed and analyzed in
accordance with relevant regulatory documents.
Responsible:
• State Aviation Administration of Ukraine;
• Security Service of Ukraine;
• Ministry of Defense of Ukraine;
• aircraft operators;
• air navigation service providers;
• EUROCONTROL.
References:
Law of Ukraine “On the State Civil Aviation Security Program” dated February 20, 2003 No 545-IV;
Rules of aeronautical information service provision (Order of the Ministry of Transport and Communications of
Ukraine (dated 01.07.2004 No564).
Regulation on Use of Airspace of Ukraine, approved by
the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated
29.03.2002 No 401
These documents are developed in accordance with relevant ICAO provisions, in particular Annexes 11, 15 and
17, Doc 8973, Doc 9554, Doc 8126, Cir 330
Process and timeline:
State Aviation Administration of Ukraine; Security Service
of Ukraine; Ministry of Defense of Ukraine; aircraft operators; air navigation service providers constantly review
and analyze NOTAMs, security warnings and airspace
restrictions for adjacent flight information regions (FIRs).
EUROCONTROL analyzes such information in order to
provide centralized services related to flight planning and
air traffic flow management.
Actual implementation:
Describe what civil aviation security threat information
was identified by which authority based on the
NOTAMs, security warnings and airspace restrictions
for adjacent fight information regions FIRs.
According to the established procedures, the State
Aviation Administration of Ukraine; Security Service of
Ukraine; Ministry of Defense of Ukraine; aircraft operators; air navigation service providers constantly review

and analyse NOTAMs, security warnings and airspace
restrictions for adjacent flight information regions (FIRs).
EUROCONTROL analyzes such information in order to
provide centralized services related to flight planning and
air traffic flow management. The information mentioned
above is specified in the final report on the investigation
of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200.
https://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/en/page/3 … july-2014.
Changes after 17 July 2014:
National regulations and procedures pertaining to gathering and analyzing information about threats to civil
aviation security have been improved in line with updated
ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices, Annexes
11, 15, 17 to the Chicago Convention on International
Civil Aviation, Doc 10084, Doc 10066, and current legislation. In particular, the following have been adopted:
• State Civil Aviation Security Program, approved
by the Law of Ukraine, dated March 21, 2017 No.
1965-VIII;
• Order of the Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine
“On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the Level of
Threat to Civil Security Aviation of Ukraine,” dated
17.06.2020 No356 registered by the Ministry of Justice
of Ukraine on 01.10.2020, registration No 960/35243;
• New edition of the Regulations on Use of Airspace
of Ukraine, approved by the decree of the Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine, dated 06.12.2017 No 954.
• “Rules of the Use of Airspace of Ukraine,” approved
by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of
Ukraine and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, dated 11.05.2018 No 430/210, registered by the Ministry
of Justice of Ukraine on 14.09.2018, registration No
1056/32508;
• Aviation Regulations of Ukraine “Aeronautical Information Service Provision,” approved by the Order of
the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine dated
on 13.05.2019 No 582, registered by the Ministry
of Justice of Ukraine on 09.07.2019, registration No
760/33731;
• Aviation Regulations of Ukraine “Air Traffic Service,” approved by the Order of the State Aviation
Administration of Ukraine, dated 16.04.2019 No 475,
registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on
04.07.2019, registration No 727/33698.

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Q5. What is the process for deciding on the source credibility and for verifying information, including information on capability of attack and intent to attack, relative to an active armed conflict that could impact civil aviation?

Answer:
Information on threats to civil aviation security is analyzed, verified and assessed in accordance with relevant
regulatory documents (additional information is provided
in Appendix 3).
Responsible:
• Security Service of Ukraine;
• Ministry of Defense of Ukraine;
• Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine
References:
The detailed process of gathering, analyzing, verifying and
assessing information is classified. The general provisions
related to this process are specified in the following legislative documents:
• Laws of Ukraine “On Combating Terrorism,” “On the
Security Service of Ukraine” (as amended), “On Operational and Investigative Activities” (as amended),
“On Counterintelligence activities” (as amended);
• Decree of the President of Ukraine “On the Regulations regarding the Anti-Terrorist Center and its coordination groups at the regional bodies of the Security
Service of Ukraine,” dated April 14, 1999 No 379/99
(as amended).
• Regulations on the unified state system of prevention,
response and cessation of terrorist acts and minimization of their consequences, approved by the resolution
of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated February
18, 2016 No 92.
• Order of the Ministry of Transport and Communications of Ukraine “On Approval of the Guidance to
Assess the Level of Threat to Civil Aviation Security
of Ukraine” dated 11.05.2007 No 390 (restricted), registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on May
25, 2007, registration No 542/13809 (as amended);
• classified internal departmental documents.
Process and timeline:
Information on possible threats to aircraft flights in areas
of military conflicts is intelligence one. The procedure for
determining the reliability of the source of information
depends on the method of obtaining such information
and the type of information source. This information is
classified.

Actual implementation:
How was the security threat information verified, the
source judged for credibility, and by what authority /
organization? What were the results of the credibility
decision and the verification?
The information was analyzed, verified and assessed by
the Security Service of Ukraine, the Ministry of Defense of
Ukraine, and the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine.
This information is classified.
Changes after 17 July 2014:
Based on the adopted Decree of the President of Ukraine
dated 30.03.2018 No 116/2018 “On approval of the
Resolution of the National Security and Defense Council
“On large-scale anti-terrorist operation in Donetsk and
Luhansk regions” (restricted), the Law of Ukraine dated
21.06.2018 No 2469-VIII “On the National Security of
Ukraine,” Law of Ukraine dated 17.09.2020 No 912-IX
“On Intelligence,” appropriate amendments have been
made to the following legislation:
• Laws of Ukraine “On Combating Terrorism,” “On
the Security Service of Ukraine,” “On Operational
and Investigative Activities,” “On Counterintelligence
activities”;
• State Civil Aviation Security Program, approved
by the Law of Ukraine, dated March 21, 2017 No.
1965-VIII.
• Decree of the President of Ukraine “On the Regulations regarding the Anti-Terrorist Center and its coordination groups at the regional bodies of the Security
Service of Ukraine,” dated April 14, 1999 No 379/99
(as amended).
• Regulations on the unified state system of prevention,
response and cessation of terrorist acts and minimization of their consequences, approved by the resolution
of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated February
18, 2016 No 92.
Ukraine has adopted the Order of the Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine “On Approval of the Guidance
to Assess the Level of Threat to Civil Aviation Security
of Ukraine” dated 17.06.2020 No356, registered by the
Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on 01.10.2020, registration
No960/35243.
Also, some classified internal departmental documents
have been amended.

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Q6. What are the determining risk factors for unintentional attack that may not allow civil aviation to fly over a conflict zone? For example, scale of the conflict, military air transport or air combat activities, previous attacks against aircraft, level of training and experience of SAM operators, level of robustness of command and control mechanism for authorizing launch, civil aviation flight proximity to strategic assets, technical capability of SAMs to distinguish between civil and military aircraft.

Answer:
According to relevant regulatory documents, all factors
that pose a potential threat to civil aviation security are
taken into account when establishing restrictions, prohibitions and terms on the use of airspace over or near areas
of military conflicts. (Along with this, attention ought to
be paid to the fact that at the time the air crash occurred,
there was no concept or definition for a “conflict zone”).
(Additional information is provided in Appendix 3).
Responsible:
• State Aviation Administration of Ukraine;
• Security Service of Ukraine;
• Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine;
• Ministry of Defense of Ukraine;
• Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine;
• air navigation service providers.
References:
Regulation on Use of Airspace of Ukraine, approved by
the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated
29.03.2002 No 401
Law of Ukraine “On the State Civil Aviation Security Program” dated February 20, 2003 No 545-IV;
Order of the Ministry of Transport and Communications
of Ukraine “On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the
Level of Threat to Civil Aviation Security of Ukraine”
dated 11.05.2007 No 390 (restricted), registered by the
Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on May 25, 2007, registration No 542/13809 (as amended).
These documents are developed in accordance with relevant ICAO provisions, in particular Annexes 11 and 17,
Doc 8973, Doc 9554, Doc 9433, Cir 330
Process and timeline
In accordance with the legislation, the State Aviation
Administration of Ukraine constantly conducts a general
assessment of threats to civil aviation security on the basis
of information received from Security Service of Ukraine;
Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine; Ministry of Defense
of Ukraine; Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, air navigation service providers, and make a decision on establishing restrictions and prohibitions on the use of airspace.
The information mentioned above is specified in the final report on the investigation of the air crash of Malaysia
Airlines’ Boeing-777-200. https://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/en/page/3 … -july-2014

Actual implementation:
Describe what risk factors for unintentional attack
were identified by what authority / organization. See
examples of risk factors listed in Q6
According to the established procedures, on the basis of
available information, appropriate restrictions and prohibitions on the use of airspace were established.
Changes after 17 July 2014:
National regulations and procedures pertaining to gathering
and analyzing information about threats to civil aviation security, risk assessment and implementation of prohibitions,
restrictions and terms on the use of airspace, have been
improved in line with updated ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices Annexes 11, 17 to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Doc 10084, and current
legislation. In particular, the following have been adopted:
• Laws of Ukraine “On Combating Terrorism,” “On
the Security Service of Ukraine,” “On Operational
and Investigative Activities,” “On Counterintelligence
activities.”
• Ukraine has adopted the following legislative
documents:
• State Civil Aviation Security Program, approved
by the Law of Ukraine, dated March 21, 2017 No.
1965-VIII;
• Order of the Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine
“On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the Level of
Threat to Civil Aviation Security of Ukraine,” dated
17.06.2020 No356 registered by the Ministry of Justice
of Ukraine on 01.10.2020, registration No 960/35243;
• New edition of the Regulations on Use of Airspace
of Ukraine, approved by the decree of the Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine, dated 06.12.2017 No 954.
• “Rules of the Use of Airspace of Ukraine,” approved
by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of
Ukraine and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, dated 11.05.2018 No 430/210, registered by the Ministry
of Justice of Ukraine on 14.09.2018, registration No
1056/32508;
• Aviation Regulations of Ukraine “Air Traffic Service,” approved by the Order of the State Aviation
Administration of Ukraine, dated 16.04.2019 No 475,
registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on
04.07.2019, registration No 727/33698.

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Q7. What organizations are involved, how do they coordinate, and what is the process for determining acceptable security risk levels in civil aviation airspace over a conflict zone?

Note: These are general security level targets to be met if specified, that are not specific to an event or situation.

Answer:
According to relevant regulatory documents, the process
of determining the acceptable level of civil aviation safety
risks is carried out within appropriate coordination based
on an analysis of available threat information (along with
this, attention ought to be paid to the fact that at the time
the air crash occurred, there was no concept or definition
for a “conflict zone”).
Responsible:
• State Aviation Administration of Ukraine;
• Security Service of Ukraine;
• Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine;
• Ministry of Defense of Ukraine;
• Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine;
• air navigation service providers.
References:
Regulation on Use of Airspace of Ukraine, approved by
the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated
29.03.2002 No 401
Law of Ukraine “On the State Civil Aviation Security Program” dated February 20, 2003 No 545-IV;
Law of Ukraine “On Combating Terrorism” dated March
20, 2003 No 638-IV (as amended);
Order of the Ministry of Transport and Communications
of Ukraine “On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the
Level of Threat to Civil Aviation Security of Ukraine”
dated 11.05.2007 No 390 (restricted), registered by the
Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on May 25, 2007, registration No 542/13809 (as amended).
These documents are developed in accordance with relevant ICAO provisions, in particular Annexes 11 and 17,
Doc 8973, Doc 9554, Doc 9433, Cir 330
Process and timeline:
In accordance with the legislation, the State Aviation
Administration of Ukraine constantly conducts a general
assessment of threats to civil aviation security in coordination with the Security Service of Ukraine; Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine; Ministry of Defense of Ukraine;
Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, air navigation
service providers.
The information mentioned above is specified in the
final report on the investigation of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200. https://www.onderzoeksraa
d.nl/en/page/3546/crash-mh17-17-july-2014.

Actual implementation:
Describe what organisations determined the acceptable
security risk levels for civil aircraft. How this was
determined and what were the determined acceptable
security levels?
According to the established procedures, the detailed
information is specified in the final report on the investigation of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200.
https://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/en/page/3 … july-2014.
Changes after 17 July 2014:
National regulations and procedures regarding risk assessment in relation to threats to civil aviation security have been
improved in line with updated ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices, Annexes 11, 17 to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Doc 10084, and current
legislation. In particular, the following have been adopted:
• Laws of Ukraine “On Combating Terrorism,” “On the
Security Service of Ukraine,” “On Operational and Investigative Activities,” “On Counterintelligence activities.”
Ukraine has adopted the following legislative documents:
• Law of Ukraine “On the specifics of state policy to
ensure the state sovereignty of Ukraine in the temporarily occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk
regions” dated January 18, 2018 No 2268-VIII;
• State Civil Aviation Security Program, approved
by the Law of Ukraine, dated March 21, 2017 No.
1965-VIII;
• Order of the Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine
“On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the Level of Threat to Civil Aviation Security of Ukraine,”
17.06.2020 No356 registered by the Ministry of Justice
of Ukraine on 01.10.2020, registration No 960/35243;
• New edition of the Regulations on Use of Airspace
of Ukraine, approved by the decree of the Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine, dated 06.12.2017 No 954.
• “Rules of the Use of Airspace of Ukraine,” approved
by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of
Ukraine and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, dated 11.05.2018 No 430/210, registered by the Ministry
of Justice of Ukraine on 14.09.2018, registration No
1056/32508;
• Aviation Regulations of Ukraine “Air Traffic Service,” approved by the Order of the State Aviation
Administration of Ukraine, dated 16.04.2019 No 475,
registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on
04.07.2019, registration No 727/33698.

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Q8. What is the process of determining how civil aviation can be affected based on threat information in a conflict zone? For example, what part of the airspace, what altitudes or types of aircraft?

Answer:
The process of determining how civil aviation can be affected based on threat information has been implemented
on the basis of relevant regulatory document (Additional
information is provided in Appendix 3). (Along with this,
attention ought to be paid to the fact that at the time the
air crash occurred, there was no concept or definition for
a “conflict zone”).
Responsible:
• State Aviation Administration of Ukraine;
• Security Service of Ukraine;
• Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine;
• Ministry of Defense of Ukraine;
• Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine;
• air navigation service providers.
References:
Law of Ukraine “On the State Civil Aviation Security Program” dated February 20, 2003 No 545-IV;
Regulation on Use of Airspace of Ukraine, approved by
the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated
29.03.2002 No 401;
Order of the Ministry of Transport and Communications
of Ukraine “On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the
Level of Threat to Civil Aviation Security of Ukraine”
dated 11.05.2007 No 390 (restricted), registered by the
Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on May 25, 2007, registration No 542/13809 (as amended).
These documents are developed in accordance with relevant ICAO provisions, in particular Annexes 11 and 17,
Doc 8973, Doc 9554, Doc 9433, Cir 330
Process and timeline:
In accordance with the legislation, the State Aviation
Administration of Ukraine constantly conducts a general assessment of threats to civil aviation security on the
basis of information received from the Security Service of
Ukraine; Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine; Ministry of Defense of Ukraine; Ministry of Internal Affairs
of Ukraine, air navigation service providers, and make
a decision on establishing restrictions, prohibitions and
terms on the use of airspace. The information mentioned
above is specified in the final report on the investigation
of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200,
https://www.onderzoeksraa d.nl/en/page/3546/crash-mh17-17-july-2014.

Actual implementation:
Describe what were the impact analysis results, if any
— how civil aviation can be affected based on threat
information — what airspace, what altitudes or type of
aircraft.
According to the established procedures, the detailed information is specified in the final report on the investigation of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200,
https://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/en/page/3 … july-2014.
Changes after 17 July 2014:
National regulations and procedures regarding risk assessment in relation to threats to civil aviation security have been
improved in line with updated ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices, Annexes 11, 17 to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Doc 10084, and current
legislation. In particular, the following have been adopted:
• Laws of Ukraine “On Combating Terrorism,” “On
the Security Service of Ukraine,” “On Operational
and Investigative Activities,” “On Counterintelligence
activities.”
Ukraine has adopted the following legislative documents:
• Law of Ukraine “On the specifics of state policy to
ensure the state sovereignty of Ukraine in the temporarily occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk
regions” dated January 18, 2018 No 2268-VIII;
• State Civil Aviation Security Program, approved
by the Law of Ukraine, dated March 21, 2017 No.
1965-VIII;
• Order of the Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine
“On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the Level of Threat to Civil Aviation Security of Ukraine,”
17.06.2020 No356 registered by the Ministry of Justice
of Ukraine on 01.10.2020, registration No 960/35243;
• New edition of the Regulations on Use of Airspace
of Ukraine, approved by the decree of the Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine, dated 06.12.2017 No 954.
• “Rules of the Use of Airspace of Ukraine,” approved
by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of
Ukraine and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, dated 11.05.2018 No 430/210, registered by the Ministry
of Justice of Ukraine on 14.09.2018, registration No
1056/32508;
• Aviation Regulations of Ukraine “Air Traffic Service,” approved by the Order of the State Aviation
Administration of Ukraine, dated 16.04.2019 No 475,
registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on
04.07.2019, registration No 727/33698.

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Q9. What analysis methodology or risk matrix is used to assess the likelihood of a threat presenting itself and the potential consequences for civil aircraft flying over the conflict zone?

Answer:
An analysis methodology or risk matrix used to assess the
likelihood of a threat and potential consequences for civil
aircraft has been developed and approved in accordance
with relevant regulatory documents. (Along with this, attention ought to be paid to the fact that at the time the air crash
occurred, there was no concept or definition for a “conflict
zone”).
Responsible:
• State Aviation Administration of Ukraine;
• Security Service of Ukraine;
• Foreign Intelligence
• Service of Ukraine;
• Ministry of Defense of Ukraine;
• Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine.
References:
Law of Ukraine “On the State Civil Aviation Security Program” dated February 20, 2003 No 545-IV;
Regulation on Use of Airspace of Ukraine, approved by
the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated
29.03.2002 No 401;
Order of the Ministry of Transport and Communications
of Ukraine “On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the
Level of Threat to Civil Aviation Security of Ukraine”
dated 11.05.2007 No 390 (restricted), registered by the
Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on May 25, 2007, registration No 542/13809 (as amended).
These documents are developed in accordance with relevant ICAO provisions, in particular Annex 17 and ICAO
Doc 8973.
Process and timeline:
In accordance with the legislation, the State Aviation
Administration of Ukraine constantly conducts a general
assessment of threats to civil aviation security on the
basis of information received from the Security Service of
Ukraine; Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine; Ministry
of Defense of Ukraine; Ministry of Internal Affairs of
Ukraine, air navigation service providers, and make a
decision on establishing restrictions, prohibitions and
terms on the use of airspace. The information mentioned
above is specified in the final report on the investigation
of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200.
https://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/en/page/3 … july-2014.

Actual implementation:
Describe if and how risk was assessed and what levels of
security risk were determined for what airspace, what
altitudes or what type of aircraft.
According to the established procedures, the detailed information is specified in the final report on the investigation of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200.
https://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/en/page/3 … july-2014.
Changes after 17 July 2014:
National regulations and procedures regarding risk assessment in relation to threats to civil aviation security have
been improved in line with updated ICAO Standards and
Recommended Practices, Annexes 11, 17 to the Chicago
Convention on International Civil Aviation, Doc 10084,
and current legislation. In particular, the following have
been adopted:
• Laws of Ukraine “On Combating Terrorism,” “On
the Security Service of Ukraine,” “On Operational
and Investigative Activities,” “On Counterintelligence
activities.”
Ukraine has adopted the following legislative documents:
• Law of Ukraine “On the specifics of state policy to
ensure the state sovereignty of Ukraine in the temporarily occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk
regions” dated January 18, 2018 No 2268-VIII;
• State Civil Aviation Security Program, approved
by the Law of Ukraine, dated March 21, 2017 No.
1965-VIII;
• Order of the Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine
“On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the Level of Threat to Civil Aviation Security of Ukraine,”
17.06.2020 No356 registered by the Ministry of Justice
of Ukraine on 01.10.2020, registration No 960/35243;
• New edition of the Regulations on Use of Airspace
of Ukraine, approved by the decree of the Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine, dated 06.12.2017 No 954;
• “Rules of the Use of Airspace of Ukraine,” approved
by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of
Ukraine and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, dated 11.05.2018 No 430/210, registered by the Ministry
of Justice of Ukraine on 14.09.2018, registration No
1056/32508.

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Q10. What is the process to determine security mitigations that would permit civil aviation to overfly a conflict zone?

Answer:
The process to determine security risk mitigations has
been established on the basis of the analysis of identified
threats in accordance with relevant regulatory documents. (To answer this question, the phrase “Security risk
mitigations” has been used instead of the phrase “security
mitigations”). (Additional information is provided in Appendix 3). (Along with this, attention ought to be paid to
the fact that at the time the air crash occurred, there was
no concept or definition for a “conflict zone”).
Responsible:
• State Aviation Administration of Ukraine;
• Security Service of Ukraine;
• Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine;
• Ministry of Defense of Ukraine;
• Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine;
• air navigation service providers.
References:
Law of Ukraine “On the State Civil Aviation Security Program” dated February 20, 2003 No 545-IV;
Regulation on Use of Airspace of Ukraine, approved by
the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated
29.03.2002 No 401;
Order of the Ministry of Transport and Communications
of Ukraine “On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the
Level of Threat to Civil Aviation Security of Ukraine”
dated 11.05.2007 No 390 (restricted), registered by the
Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on May 25, 2007, registration No 542/13809 (as amended).
These documents are developed in accordance with relevant ICAO provisions, in particular Annexes 11 and 17,
Doc 8973, Doc 9554, Doc 9433, Cir 330
Process and timeline:
In accordance with the legislation, the State Aviation
Administration of Ukraine constantly conducts a general
assessment of threats to civil aviation security on the
basis of information received from the Security Service of
Ukraine; Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine; Ministry
of Defense of Ukraine; Ministry of Internal Affairs of
Ukraine, air navigation service providers, and make a
decision on establishing restrictions, prohibitions and terms
on the use of airspace. The information mentioned above
is specified in the final report on the investigation of the air
crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200. https://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/en/page/3 … july-2014.

Actual implementation:
Describe if and what security mitigations were
determined that would permit civil aviation to overfly
the conflict zone.
According to the established procedures, the detailed information is specified in the final report on the investigation of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200.
https://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/en/page/3 … july-2014.
Changes after 17 July 2014:
National regulations and procedures regarding security risk mitigations based on identified threats to civil
aviation have been improved in line with updated ICAO
Standards and Recommended Practices, Annexes 11, 17
to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Doc 10084, and current legislation. In particular, the
following have been amended:
• Laws of Ukraine “On Combating Terrorism,” “On
the Security Service of Ukraine,” “On Operational
and Investigative Activities,” “On Counterintelligence
activities.”
Ukraine has adopted the following legislative documents:
• Law of Ukraine “On the specifics of state policy to
ensure the state sovereignty of Ukraine in the temporarily occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk
regions” dated January 18, 2018 No 2268-VIII;
• State Civil Aviation Security Program, approved
by the Law of Ukraine, dated March 21, 2017 No.
1965-VIII;
• Order of the Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine
“On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the Level of
Threat to Civil Aviation Security of Ukraine,” dated
17.06.2020 No356 registered by the Ministry of Justice
of Ukraine on 01.10.2020, registration No 960/35243;
• New edition of the Regulations on Use of Airspace
of Ukraine, approved by the decree of the Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine, dated 06.12.2017 No 954.
• “Rules of the Use of Airspace of Ukraine,” approved
by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of
Ukraine and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, dated 11.05.2018 No 430/210, registered by the Ministry
of Justice of Ukraine on 14.09.2018, registration No
1056/32508;
• Aviation Regulations of Ukraine “Air Traffic Service,” approved by the Order of the State Aviation
Administration of Ukraine, dated 16.04.2019 No 475,
registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on
04.07.2019, registration No 727/33698

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Q11. What are your normal (not during conflict) criteria for establishing restriction or segregation of airspace and what are the coordination procedures both internally and externally?

Answer:
Criteria for the implementation of appropriate restrictions
and reservations of airspace and coordination procedures
have been established in accordance with relevant regulatory documents.
Responsible:
• State Aviation Administration of Ukraine;
• Security Service of Ukraine;
• Ministry of Defense of Ukraine;
• Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine;
• air navigation service providers;
• air space users.
References:
Regulation on Use of Airspace of Ukraine, approved by
the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated
29.03.2002 No 401
Rules of aeronautical information service provision (Order of the Ministry of Transport and Communications of
Ukraine (dated 01.07.2004 No564).
Instruction on planning and usage of temporarily reserved airspace and conditional ATS routes, approved by
decree of the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine
22.05.2006 No 354
These documents are developed in accordance with
relevant ICAO provisions, in particular Annexes 2, 11 and
15, Doc 9426, Doc 9554, Doc 9433, Cir 330, documents of
EUROCONTROL, and EU legislation.
Process and timeline:
Prohibitions or restrictions on the use of airspace are established by the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine
or the authorities involved in the Joint Civil-Military
System at the request of the competent authorities and
users of airspace.
The detailed information is specified in the final report
on the investigation of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’
Boeing-777-200. https://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/en/page/3 … july-2014.
Actual implementation:
Not applicable—no answer required.
According to the established procedures, the detailed information is specified in the final report on the investigation of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200.
https://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/en/page/3 … july-2014.

Changes after 17 July 2014:
National regulations and procedures regarding the
implementation of appropriate restrictions and reservations of airspace, with ensuring appropriate coordination
procedures, have been improved in line with updated
ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices Annexes 2,
11, 15 to the Chicago Convention on International Civil
Aviation, Doc 10084, Doc 10066 documents of EUROCONTROL, and with current national and EU legislation
considered. In particular, the following have been adopted:
• New edition of the Regulations on Use of Airspace
of Ukraine, approved by the decree of the Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine, dated 06.12.2017 No 954.
• “Rules of the Use of Airspace of Ukraine,” approved
by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of
Ukraine and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, dated 11.05.2018 No 430/210, registered by the Ministry
of Justice of Ukraine on 14.09.2018, registration No
1056/32508;
• Aviation Regulations of Ukraine “Air Traffic Service,” approved by the Order of the State Aviation
Administration of Ukraine, dated 16.04.2019 No 475,
registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on
04.07.2019, registration No 727/33698.

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Q12. What are the decision processes for security of airspace, including establishing restriction or segregation of airspace in a conflict zone? What are the ANSP and military coordination procedures for active civil flights and their safety?

Answer:
Procedures for decision-making and civil- military coordination in the introduction of bans, restrictions and terms
on the use of airspace are established in accordance with
relevant regulatory documents. (Additional information
is provided in Appendix 3). (Along with this, attention
ought to be paid to the fact that at the time the air crash
occurred, there was no concept or definition for a “conflict
zone”).
Responsible:
• State Aviation Administration of Ukraine;
• Security Service of Ukraine;
• Ministry of Defense of Ukraine;
• Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine;
• air navigation service providers;
• air space users.
References:
Regulation on Use of Airspace of Ukraine, approved by
the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated
29.03.2002 No 401
Rules of aeronautical information service provision (Order of the Ministry of Transport and Communications of
Ukraine (dated 01.07.2004 No564).
Instruction on planning and usage of temporarily reserved airspace and conditional ATS routes, approved by
decree of the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine
22.05.2006 No 354
“Instructions on the organization of interaction between
the bodies of the joint civil-military air traffic management system of Ukraine and the governing bodies of
the Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine” dated
29.02.2012;
These documents are developed in accordance with
relevant ICAO provisions, in particular Annexes 2, 11 and
15, Doc 9426, Doc 9554, Doc 9433, Cir 330, documents of
EUROCONTROL, and EU legislation.
Process and timeline:
Prohibitions or restrictions on the use of airspace are established by the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine
or the authorities involved in the Joint Civil-Military
System at the request of the competent authorities and
users of airspace.

The detailed information is specified in the final report
on the investigation of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’
Boeing-777-200. https://www.onderzoeksr aad.nl/en/
page/3546/crash-mh17-17-july-2014.
Actual implementation:
Describe who took what decisions for security
of airspace, including establishing restriction or
segregation of airspace. Describe what coordination
took place between the ANSP and military regarding
the security threats.
According to the established procedures, the detailed information is specified in the final report on the investigation of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200.
https://www.onderzoeksr aad.nl/en/page/3546/
crash-mh17-17-july-2014.
Changes after 17 July 2014:
National regulations and procedures regarding the implementation of appropriate restrictions and terms on the
use of airspace, with ensuring civil-military coordination,
have been improved in line with updated ICAO Standards
and Recommended Practices Annexes 2, 11, 15 to the
Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Doc
10084, Doc 10066 documents of EUROCONTROL, and
with current national and EU legislation considered. In
particular, the following have been adopted:
• New edition of the Regulations on Use of Airspace
of Ukraine, approved by the decree of the Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine, dated 06.12.2017 No 954.
• “Rules of the Use of Airspace of Ukraine,” approved
by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of
Ukraine and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, dated 11.05.2018 No 430/210, registered by the Ministry
of Justice of Ukraine on 14.09.2018, registration No
1056/32508;
• Aviation Regulations of Ukraine “Air Traffic Service,” approved by the Order of the State Aviation
Administration of Ukraine, dated 16.04.2019 No 475,
registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on
04.07.2019, registration No 727/33698;
• New edition of “Instructions on the organization of
interaction between the bodies of the joint civil-military air traffic management system of Ukraine and
the governing bodies of the Air Force of the Armed
Forces of Ukraine” dated 29.02.2012.

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Q13. What organisations are involved and what are the procedures for coordinating airspace restrictions in the conflict zone among adjacent FIRs?

Answer:
According to relevant regulatory documents, procedures
for informing about the establishment of restrictions on
the use of airspace in FIRs, including ones that belong
to adjacent are states, introduced in appropriate written agreements between area control centers, as well as
between authorities responsible for air traffic management
in adjacent states. (Along with this, attention ought to be
paid to the fact that at the time the air crash occurred,
there was no concept or definition for a “conflict zone”).
Responsible:
• State Aviation Administration of Ukraine;
• Ministry of Defense of Ukraine;
• air navigation service providers.
References:
The Air Code of Ukraine.
Regulation on Use of Airspace of Ukraine, approved by
the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated
29.03.2002 No 401
Rules of aeronautical information service provision (Order of the Ministry of Transport and Communications of
Ukraine (dated 01.07.2004 No564).
Rules of flights and air traffic service in the classified airspace of Ukraine, approved by the order of the
Ministry of Transport and Communications of Ukraine
16.04.2003 No293.
These documents are developed in accordance with relevant ICAO provisions, in particular Annexes 11 and 15,
Doc 9426, documents of EUROCONTROL.
Process and timeline:
Information pertaining to restrictions on the use of
airspace is published in aeronautical information documents and provided to the competent authorities of
adjacent states.

Actual implementation:
Describe if and how the airspace restrictions were
coordinated with the adjacent FIRs and what
organisations were involved in the coordination.
According to the established procedures, the detailed
information is specified in the final report on the investigation of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200.
https://www.onderzoeksr aad.nl/en/page/3546/
crash-mh17-17-july-2014.
Changes introduced after 17 July 2014:
National regulations and procedures regarding the
dissemination of information about implementation of
appropriate restrictions and reservations of airspace,
with ensuring appropriate coordination procedures, have
been improved in line with updated ICAO Standards and
Recommended Practices, Annexes 11, 15 to the Chicago
Convention on International Civil Aviation, Doc 10084,
Doc 10066 documents of EUROCONTROL. In particular,
the following have been adopted:
• New edition of the Regulations on Use of Airspace
of Ukraine, approved by the decree of the Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine, dated 06.12.2017 No 954.
• “Rules of the Use of Airspace of Ukraine,” approved
by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of
Ukraine and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, dated 11.05.2018 No 430/210, registered by the Ministry
of Justice of Ukraine on 14.09.2018, registration No
1056/32508;
• Aviation Regulations of Ukraine “Air Traffic Service,” approved by the Order of the State Aviation
Administration of Ukraine, dated 16.04.2019 No 475,
registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on
04.07.2019, registration No 727/33698.
• Aviation Regulations of Ukraine “Aeronautical Information Service Provision,” approved by the Order of
the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine dated on
13.05.2019 No 582, registered by the Ministry of Justice
of Ukraine on 09.07.2019, registration No 760/33731.

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Q14. What is the process to decide if there is a need for aeronautical information publication and to choose the communication tool for it (e.g. NOTAMs, ÀIÑ)?

Response:
The decision-making process on the need to publish aeronautical information and the procedure for its publication
has been established in accordance with relevant regulatory documents.
Responsible:
• State Aviation Administration of Ukraine;
• Ministry of Defense of Ukraine;
• air navigation service providers.
References:
The Air Code of Ukraine.
Regulation on Use of Airspace of Ukraine, approved by
the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated
29.03.2002 No 401
Rules of aeronautical information service provision (Order of the Ministry of Transport and Communications of
Ukraine (dated 01.07.2004 No564).
These documents are developed in accordance with relevant ICAO provisions, in particular Annexes 11 and 15,
Doc 9554, Doc 8126, documents of EUROCONTROL.
Process and timeline:
Aeronautical information is published by the decision of
the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine in coordination with the state authorities concerned.
Actual implementation:
Describe how it was decided if there is a need for aeronautical information publication and how it was chosen
what communication tool for it (e.g. NOTAMs AIC).

According to the established procedures, the detailed information is specified in the final report on the investigation of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200.
https://www.onderzoeksr aad.nl/en/page/3546/
crash-mh17-17-july-2014.
Changes introduced after 17 July 2014:
National regulations and procedures regarding the publication of aeronautical information have been improved
in line with updated ICAO Standards and Recommended
Practices Annexes 11, 15 to the Chicago Convention on
International Civil Aviation, Doc 10084, Doc 10066, documents of EUROCONTROL, and current legislation. In
particular, the following have been adopted:
• New edition of the Regulations on Use of Airspace
of Ukraine, approved by the decree of the Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine, dated 06.12.2017 No 954.
• “Rules of the Use of Airspace of Ukraine,” approved
by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of
Ukraine and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, dated 11.05.2018 No 430/210, registered by the Ministry
of Justice of Ukraine on 14.09.2018, registration No
1056/32508;
• Aviation Regulations of Ukraine “Air Traffic Service,” approved by the Order of the State Aviation
Administration of Ukraine, dated 16.04.2019 No 475,
registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on
04.07.2019, registration No 727/33698.
• Aviation Regulations of Ukraine “Aeronautical Information Service Provision,” approved by the Order of
the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine dated on
13.05.2019 No 582, registered by the Ministry of Justice
of Ukraine on 09.07.2019, registration No 760/33731.

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Q15. What organisations are involved in and what are the processes to prepare, verify if ICAO AIS procedures and terminology are used, validate for correctness and transmit aeronautical information to the users of it (e.g. airlines and ANSPs)?

Response:
The processes of preparation, verification and application
of ICAO procedures and terminology, confirmation of
correctness and transfer of aeronautical information to its
users have been established in accordance with relevant
regulatory documents.
Responsible entity:
• State Aviation Administration of Ukraine;
• Ministry of Defense of Ukraine;
• air navigation service providers;
• EUROCONTROL;
• ICAO.
References:
The Air Code of Ukraine.
Regulation on Use of Airspace of Ukraine, approved by
the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated
29.03.2002 No 401
Rules of aeronautical information service provision (Order of the Ministry of Transport and Communications of
Ukraine (dated 01.07.2004 No564).
These documents are developed in accordance with relevant ICAO provisions, in particular Annex 15, Doc 8126,
and EU legislation.
Process and timeline:
The State Aviation Administration of Ukraine, the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, and air navigation service providers in accordance with their competence, check draft
documents of aeronautical information published by the
Aeronautical Information Service (AIS) according to the
decision of the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine
and provided to airspace users.
The State Aviation Administration of Ukraine supervises the established procedures.
Actual implementation:
Please describe the organizations involved in the
preparation of aeronautical information, verification of

the use of the ICAO AIS procedures and terminology,
and validation of the correctness and transmission of
the aeronautical information to its users.
According to the established procedures, the detailed information is specified in the final report on the investigation of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200.
https://www.onderzoeksraa d.nl/en/page/3546/
crash-mh17-17-july-2014.
Changes introduced after 17 July 2014:
National regulations and procedures regarding the publication of aeronautical information and dissemination of
information among users have been improved in line with
updated ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices
Annexes 11, 15 to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Doc 10084, Doc 10066, documents
of EUROCONTROL, and current legislation. In particular, the following have been adopted:
• New edition of the Regulations on Use of Airspace
of Ukraine, approved by the decree of the Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine, dated 06.12.2017 No 954.
• “Rules of the Use of Airspace of Ukraine,” approved
by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of
Ukraine and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, dated 11.05.2018 No 430/210, registered by the Ministry
of Justice of Ukraine on 14.09.2018, registration No
1056/32508;
• Aviation Regulations of Ukraine “Air Traffic Service,” approved by the Order of the State Aviation
Administration of Ukraine, dated 16.04.2019 No 475,
registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on
04.07.2019, registration No 727/33698.
• Aviation Regulations of Ukraine “Aeronautical Information Service Provision,” approved by the Order of
the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine dated
on 13.05.2019 No 582, registered by the Ministry
of Justice of Ukraine on 09.07.2019, registration
No 760/33731.

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Q16. What are the procedures for disseminating civil aviation security threat information to operators within and outside the conflict zone FIR?

Response:
The procedure for disseminating information about
threats to the civil aviation security has been established
in accordance with relevant regulatory documents. (Along
with this, attention ought to be paid to the fact that at
the time the air crash occurred, there was no concept or
definition for a “conflict zone”).
Responsible:
• State Aviation Administration of Ukraine;
• Ministry of Defense of Ukraine;
• air navigation service providers.
References:
Law of Ukraine “On the State Civil Aviation Security Program” dated February 20, 2003 No 545-IV;
Regulation on Use of Airspace of Ukraine, approved by
the decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated
29.03.2002 No 401;
Order of the Ministry of Transport and Communications
of Ukraine “On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the
Level of Threat to Civil Aviation Security of Ukraine”
dated 11.05.2007 No 390 (restricted), registered by the
Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on May 25, 2007, registration No 542/13809 (as amended);
Rules of flights and air traffic service in the classified airspace
of Ukraine, approved by the order of the Ministry of Transport and Communications of Ukraine 16.04.2003 No293.
Rules of aeronautical information service provision (Order of the Ministry of Transport and Communications of
Ukraine (dated 01.07.2004 No564).
These documents are developed in accordance with relevant ICAO provisions, in particular Annexes 11, 15 and
17, ICAO Doc 8973, Doc 8126, Doc 9554, Doc 9433, and
documents of EUROCONTROL.
Process and timeline:
The procedure for conveying information on threats to
civil aviation security to airspace users is determined
and carried out by the State Aviation Administration of
Ukraine, the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, including via
air navigation service providers.
Actual implementation:
Please describe whether and, if so, how the civil aviation
security threat information was disseminated to
operators within and outside the conflict zone FIR?
According to the established procedures, the detailed information is specified in the final report on the investigation of the air crash of Malaysia Airlines’ Boeing-777-200.

https://www.onderzoeksraa d.nl/en/page/3546/
crash-mh17-17-july-2014.
Changes introduced after 17 July 2014:
National regulations and procedures regarding dissemination
of information about threats to civil aviation security have
been improved in line with updated ICAO Standards and
Recommended Practices Annexes 11, 15, 17 to the Chicago
Convention on International Civil Aviation, Doc 10084, Doc
10066, the documents of EUROCONTROL, and current
legislation. In particular, the following have been adopted:
• State Civil Aviation Security Program, approved
by the Law of Ukraine, dated March 21, 2017 No.
1965-VIII;
• Order of the Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine
“On Approval of the Guidance to Assess the Level of
Threat to Civil Aviation Security of Ukraine,” dated
17.06.2020 No356 registered by the Ministry of Justice
of Ukraine on 01.10.2020, registration No 960/35243
• New edition of the Regulations on Use of Airspace
of Ukraine, approved by the decree of the Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine, dated 06.12.2017 No 954.
• “Rules of the Use of Airspace of Ukraine,” approved
by the Order of the State Aviation Administration of
Ukraine and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, dated 11.05.2018 No 430/210, registered by the Ministry
of Justice of Ukraine on 14.09.2018, registration No
1056/32508;
• Aviation Regulations of Ukraine “Air Traffic Service,” approved by the Order of the State Aviation
Administration of Ukraine, dated 16.04.2019 No 475,
registered by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine on
04.07.2019, registration No 727/33698.
• Aviation Regulations of Ukraine “Aeronautical Information Service Provision,” approved by the Order of
the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine dated on
13.05.2019 No 582, registered by the Ministry of Justice
of Ukraine on 09.07.2019, registration No 760/33731.
Appendixes to the responses provided by Ukraine:
1) Ukrainian proposals based on recommendations
made by DSB in the Final Report on the Crash of
Malaysia Airlines, Flight MH17
2) Progress overview of ICAO conflict zone working
programme 2017-2020.
3) General information on setting the Prohibited/Restricted Airspace over armed conflict zones.
The information from appendixes to the responses provided
by Ukraine has been included in the discussion of the specific
answers wherever the appendix was referred by Ukraine.

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Appendix E
Clarifying Questions Responses from Ukraine

This appendix contains the responses received from
Ukraine to clarifying questions. The responses are provided as received without additional editing or modification.
CQ1 — On 17 July 2014, before the downing of
Flight MH17, a post from @ostro_v (as reported
and translated into English during the Flight MH17
criminal prosecution court sessions at The Hague)
said, “In Donetsk, at the Intersection of Ilyich Avenue
at 9.15, there was a “Buk” on a tractor, surrounded by
militiamen.” Was that Twitter post known about prior
to the downing of Flight MH17 and by which state
authorities?
Answer:
At the time of the downing of MH17 flight, there were no
means for real-time analysis of the content of all social
networks.
CQ2 — Apart from what is referred to in CQ1, what
other social media threat information about the presence in eastern Ukraine of air defence equipment that
was not controlled by government forces and which
could have reached the respective airspace in UKDV
FIR above Flight Level 250 was identified, when and
by which authority? This includes social media posts
about a BUK missile system being seen.
Answer:
At the time of the downing of the flight MHl7 there were
no technical means for real-time analysis of all social
networks.
CQ3 — What weapon was used in the attack on a
Ukraine An-26 military transport aircraft that occurred
on 14 July? What knowledge of this weapon did the
authorities responsible for security risk analysis have
prior to the downing of the Flight MH17?
Answer:
An-2b aircraft flew along the state border and due to a
missile hit, his crew was forced to land. Ukraine did not
have access to the aircraft after it crashed in territory
controlled by pro-Russian armed forces. Based on the
available information, there was a belief that the plane was
hit by an air-to-air missile.
CQ4 — What authority or authorities knew prior to the
downing of Flight MH17 about the threat information
contained in the 150,000 intercepted telephone conversations mentioned on 28 September 2016, during
the Joint Investigative Team (JIT) presentation of the
first results of the Flight MH17 criminal investigation,
namely the exchange in the morning of 17 July 2014
between Dubinskiy, Semenov, Kharchenko and Pulatov about [the] presence in eastern Ukraine of Buk-M?
Answer:
The analysis of the specified telephone conversations was
made after the event.
CQ5 — What authority or authorities knew prior to the
downing of Flight MH17 about the threat information
described by Vitaly Nayda, the head of counterintelligence for the Ukrainian State Security Service, on 19
July 2014 at a news conference in Kiev, that the first
information “hinting” at a Buk launcher in the possession of the armed non-state forces was received on
14 July? Did State Aviation Administration of Ukraine
know prior to the downing of Flight MH17 about this
information?
Answer:
There was no confirmation of the mentioned information,
therefore, the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine
did not have information about the presence of the “Buk”
missile system in the conflict zone.
CQ6 — Apart from what is referred to in CQ1, CQ3,
CQ4 and CQ5, what other threat information about
the presence in eastern Ukraine of air defence equipment that was not controlled by government forces
and which could have reached the respective airspace
in UKDV FIR above Flight Level 250 was identified,
when and by which authority prior to the downing of
Flight MH17?
Answer:
There was no such information.
CQ7 — What intent to attack aircraft in eastern
Ukraine with air defence equipment that was not controlled by government forces and which could have
reached the respective airspace in UKDV FIR above
Flight Level 250 was identified, when and by which
authority prior to the downing of Flight MH17?
Answer:
There was no such information.
CQ8 — What threat information about the presence
of air defence equipment in eastern Ukraine that
was not controlled by government forces and which
could have reached the respective airspace in UKDV
FIR above Flight Level 250 was known and how did it
become known by the State Aviation Administration

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Ñòð.170

of Ukraine prior to the downing of Flight MH17? How
was the associated security risk assessed and what
airspace management decision was taken?
Answer:
There was no information on the presence of air defense
systems in pro-Russian armed formations with the possibility of defeat above the FL 250 echelon.
CQ9 — What risk factors for unintentional attack
became known by the State Aviation Administration
of Ukraine prior to the downing of Flight MH17 and
how did this information affect their security risk
assessment?
Answer:
Prior to the crash of MH17, the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine was unaware of the threat of an unintentional attack above the FL 250 echelon.
CQ10 — The Netherland DSB investigation report
notes that, “After an emergency beacon was activated

at around 1320, indicating that flight MH17 had
crashed, UkSATSE made the decision at 1500, at
the tactical level, to also restrict the airspace above
FL 320.” It could be deduced that UkSATSE was responsible for threat and risk analysis, but the responses
received notes that “the State Aviation Administration
of Ukraine constantly conducts a general assessment
of threats to civil aviation security.” In that respect,
which authority was responsible prior to the downing
of Flight MH17 for the threat and risk analysis and
assessment?
Answer:
UkSATSE made a decision at the tactical level to limit
the airspace above the FL320 echelon as an immediate
response to the disappearance of the MH17 aircraft, as
stated in paragraph 6.3 of Part B of the final report of
the MH17 crash investigation issued by the Dutch Safety
Board. This fact is fully consistent with the information set
out in section 6.1 of the Final Report.

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Ñòð.171

References
[1] ICAO, 2018, Doc 10084 “Risk Assessment Manual
for Civil Aircraft Operations Over or Near Conflict
Zones,” Second Edition, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
AVIATION ORGANIZATION, Quebec, Canada
[2] Dutch Safety Board, 2015, “Crash of Malaysia Airlines
flight MH17 Hrabove, Ukraine, 17 July 2014,” The
Hague, The Netherlands
[3] International Civil Aviation Organisation, Doc 10066
“Procedures for Air Navigation Services, Aeronautical
Information Management,” First Edition 2018, Montreal, Canada
[4] International Civil Aviation Organisation, Doc 8126
“Aeronautical Information Services Manual,” Sixth
Edition 2003, Montreal, Canada

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Factual inquiry into the airspace closure above and around eastern Ukraine in relation to the downing of Flight MH17
5 februari 2021
https://www.tweedekamer.nl/downloads/document?id=14d31fd2-d839-48b5-85d3-11be55240223&title=Factual inquiry into the airspace closure above and around eastern Ukraine in relation to the downing of Flight MH17.pdf

Deze vertaling wordt aangeboden door het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken. De originele Engelstalige tekst is altijd leidend. Figuren en tabellen die voorkomen in de originele tekst zijn niet vertaald.

Feitenonderzoek naar de sluiting van het luchtruim boven en rondom
het oosten van Oekraïne in relatie tot het neerhalen van Vlucht MH17
Managementsamenvatting

Doel
De Flight Safety Foundation (de Foundation) heeft een onderzoek uitgevoerd naar de
omstandigheden die hebben geleid tot een gedeeltelijke sluiting van het luchtruim boven en
rondom het oosten van Oekraïne in de drie maanden voorafgaand aan 17 juli 2014, de dag waarop
vlucht MH17 van Malaysia Airlines werd neergehaald.
Met het onderzoek werd beoogd een analyse uit te voeren van de besluiten van de autoriteiten in
zowel Oekraïne en de Russische Federatie inzake het sluiten van het luchtruim en inzicht te krijgen
in de processen die tot deze besluiten hebben geleid alsmede de informatie waarop deze besluiten
zijn gebaseerd. De onderdelen van het onderzoek worden nader omschreven in het onderdeel
Reikwijdte.
Achtergrond
Op 17 juli 2014 werd vlucht MH17, onderweg van Amsterdam naar Kuala Lumpur, neergehaald
boven het oosten van Oekraïne waar op dat moment een gewapende conflict gaande was. Alle 298
passagiers en bemanningsleden verloren op tragische wijze het leven. Hoewel er in de voorgaande
decennia al eerder lijntoestellen verloren waren gegaan als gevolg van militaire conflicten, vormde
het verlies van vlucht MH17 een keerpunt waarop de internationale gemeenschap ertoe werd
aangezet proactief de voortdurende dreiging voor de burgerluchtvaart vanuit conflictgebieden aan
te pakken.
In juli 2014 heeft de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties een resolutie aangenomen met
betrekking tot het neerhalen van vlucht MH17. Dit werd gevolgd door een officiële brief van de
Internationale Burgerluchtvaartorganisatie (ICAO) waarin de aandacht van de lidstaten van de
ICAO wordt gevestigd op de internationale bepalingen waarin de verantwoordelijkheden van staten
worden gespecificeerd met betrekking tot de veiligheid en beveiliging van burgerluchtvaartuigen
die vliegen door luchtruim dat door conflict getroffen is.
De ICAO stelde een Taskforce op hoog niveau in die zich zou richten op kwesties met betrekking
tot de veiligheid en beveiliging van burgerluchtvaartuigen die vliegen door luchtruim dat door
conflict getroffen is. De voorzitter van de Raad van Bestuur van de Foundation werd gekozen tot
voorzitter van de Taskforce. De Taskforce heeft een rapport opgesteld met aanbevelingen hoe om
te gaan met de dreiging van militaire conflicten voor de burgerluchtvaart. De internationale
gemeenschap werd aangespoord protocollen in te voeren om soortgelijke incidenten in de
toekomst te voorkomen. De aanbevelingen omvatten een dreigingsevaluatie, het delen van
informatie over dreigingen en het tijdige en doeltreffende beheer van de exploitatie van
luchtvaartuigen en het luchtruim.
De ICAO Raad, die 36 leden telt, heeft het rapport van de Taskforce bestudeerd en in oktober
2014 het werkprogramma conflictzones goedgekeurd. De Raad heeft tevens unaniem een resolutie
aangenomen waarin het neerhalen van vlucht MH17 van Malaysia Airlines boven het oosten van
Oekraïne werd veroordeeld.
Het technisch onderzoek naar de oorzaken van de crash van vlucht MH17 is uitgevoerd door de
Nederlandse Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid (OVV) nadat Oekraïne de onderzoeksbevoegdheid
aan Nederland had overgedragen. De OVV wilde in haar rapport de volgende vier belangrijke
vragen beantwoorden:

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• Wat heeft de crash van vlucht MH17 veroorzaakt?
• Hoe en waarom werd besloten de door vlucht MH17 gebruikte vliegroute te volgen?
• Hoe verloopt het besluitvormingsproces met betrekking tot het vliegen over
conflictgebieden in het algemeen?
• Welke lessen kunnen er uit het onderzoek worden getrokken om de veiligheid en
beveiliging van vluchten te verbeteren?
Het eindrapport van de OVV werd op 13 oktober 2015 gepubliceerd.
Het onderzoek van de Foundation bouwt voort op de informatie in het OVV-rapport. Getracht
wordt de reikwijdte te verbreden en een dieper begrip te krijgen van de feitelijke omstandigheden
die ten grondslag liggen aan luchtruimbeperkingen zowel boven het grondgebied van Oekraïne als
boven het grondgebied van de Russische Federatie.
Reikwijdte
Dit onderzoek richt zich op de feitelijke omstandigheden rond de besluitvorming inzake de sluiting
van het luchtruim boven en rondom het oosten van Oekraïne van 1 maart 2014 tot en met het
moment van het volledig sluiten van dat luchtruim na het neerhalen van vlucht MH17 op 17 juli
2014. Daarnaast wordt in dit onderzoek contextuele achtergrond gegeven door middel van een
representatieve inventarisatie van de statelijke praktijk van het gebruik van vliegroutes door de
burgerluchtvaart boven conflictzones in de afgelopen 20-30 jaar.
Dit onderzoek is uitgevoerd van april 2020 tot en met januari 2021.
Onder de reikwijdte van het onderzoek valt niet het opstellen van (normatieve) conclusies over de
vraag of, voorafgaand het moment waarop vlucht MH17 werd neergehaald, de verantwoordelijke
autoriteiten al dan niet adequate maatregelen hebben getroffen om het neerhalen van het
luchtvaartuig te voorkomen.
De volgende onderdelen vielen wel onder de reikwijdte van het onderzoek:
• Een studie naar eerdere vijandige gebeurtenissen en de statelijke praktijk van het
gebruik van vliegroutes door de burgerluchtvaart boven conflictzones.
• Een onderzoek naar de feiten met betrekking tot het sluiten van het luchtruim boven
het oosten van Oekraïne vanaf 1 maart 2014 tot en met het moment waarop dat
luchtruim volledig werd gesloten na het neerhalen van vlucht MH17 op 17 juli 2014.
• Een onderzoek naar de feiten met betrekking tot het sluiten van het luchtruim boven
de Russische Federatie grenzend aan het oosten van Oekraïne vanaf 1 maart 2014 tot
en met het moment waarop dat luchtruim volledig werd gesloten na het neerhalen van
vlucht MH17 op 17 juli 2014.
In dit rapport worden de begrippen “luchtruimbeperking”1 en “sluiting van het luchtruim”2
afwisselend gebruikt, overeenkomstig de ICAO en andere geraadpleegde bronnen. Waar van
toepassing worden de begrippen gebruikt met toevoeging van hun verticale grenzen.
Onderzoeksbeperkingen
Het uitvoeren van dit onderzoek gaat gepaard met een aantal beperkingen, die in overweging
dienen te worden genomen. Deze beperkingen houden verband met de kenmerken van de
reikwijdte, het doel en de benadering van het onderzoek en met de bronnen en kwaliteit van de
informatie die tijdens het onderzoek ter beschikking stonden. Lezers van het rapport moeten het
volgende voor ogen houden:
• De bevindingen inzake de besluiten over het sluiten van het luchtruim in Oekraïne en
de Russische Federatie zijn gebaseerd op twee specifieke informatiebronnen: a.
informatie uit publieke bronnen die in 2020 beschikbaar was en ontdekt is door de
Foundation en b. informatie die de Foundation van Oekraïne en de Russische Federatie
heeft ontvangen op basis van vragenlijsten. Andere informatiebronnen, zoals private

1 Zoals omschreven in het “Air Traffic Services Planning Manual” van de ICAO.
2 Zoals gebruikt in het “Aeronautical Information Services Manual” van de ICAO.

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bronnen en informatie van inlichtingendiensten, waren niet beschikbaar voor het
onderzoek.
• De bevindingen die voortvloeien uit de analyse van vijandige gebeurtenissen en
historische conflictgebieden zijn gebaseerd op informatie die de Foundation in publieke
bronnen heeft gevonden.
• Het onderzoek naar besluiten over het sluiten van het luchtruim in Oekraïne en de
Russische Federatie heeft zich gericht op informatie over: a. het dreigingsbewustzijn
van de autoriteiten die verantwoordelijk zijn voor het analyseren van risico's voor de
veiligheid van het luchtruim en de besluitvorming en niet over het potentiële
dreigingsbewustzijn van andere entiteiten binnen elke overheid, en b. feiten die in de
openbaarheid zijn gebracht door organisaties en autoriteiten en omvat niet conclusies
en gevolgtrekkingen uit deze feiten door organisaties en autoriteiten.
• Het onderzoek is op afstand uitgevoerd gezien de reisbeperkingen vanwege Covid-19.
De Foundation heeft om toegang verzocht om rechtstreeks te kunnen praten met
geïdentificeerde relevante autoriteiten en specialisten in Oekraïne en de Russische
Federatie, wat via teleconferenties of videoconferenties mogelijk zou zijn geweest.
Uiteindelijk gaven Oekraïne en de Russische Federatie er de voorkeur aan informatie te
verstrekken via schriftelijke vragenlijsten die door de Foundation waren ontwikkeld.
Informatie werd verzonden via de respectieve diplomatieke kanalen. De Foundation
heeft geen zicht op de wijze waarop de informatie is verzameld en verwerkt binnen de
relevante autoriteiten in de twee landen.
• Het proces van het verzenden van vragenlijsten, wachten op schriftelijke antwoorden
en het vervolgens verwerken van deze antwoorden nam veel tijd in beslag, waardoor
het aantal iteraties tot twee beperkt bleef - de eerste set vragen voor elke staat,
gevolgd door een set vragen ter verduidelijking voor beide staten. Deze
omstandigheden beperkten de diepgang van het onderzoek.
• Hoewel de bevindingen inzake besluiten over het sluiten van het luchtruim in Oekraïne
en de Russische Federatie en de bevindingen op grond van analyse van eerdere
conflictgebieden betrekking hebben op omschreven tijdvakken die eindigen op 17 juli
2014, zijn er sindsdien talloze veranderingen doorgevoerd, waaronder veranderingen
geïnitieerd door de ICAO, soevereine staten, luchtvaartautoriteiten,
luchtvaartmaatschappijen en verleners van luchtvaartnavigatiediensten. De
bevindingen kunnen niet zonder meer worden overgezet naar de huidige praktijk.
• Aangezien er zes jaar zijn verstreken sinds het neerhalen van vlucht MH17 is het een
grotere uitdaging om informatie te verkrijgen over procedures, besluiten en praktijken
die in 2014 plaatsvonden. Belangrijke medewerkers en besluitvormers die in 2014 op
hun post waren zouden daar nu niet meer kunnen zijn. We hebben geen
onafhankelijke verificatie of onze vragen zijn beantwoord door mensen met kennis van
de besluitvormingsprocessen en praktijken die gehanteerd werden voorafgaand aan
het neerhalen van vlucht MH17.
Analyse van vijandige gebeurtenissen 1985–2020
Bij aanvang van het project heeft de Foundation gegevens verzameld en geanalyseerd over 57
vijandige gebeurtenissen in en rondom conflictgebieden waarbij de burgerluchtvaart betrokken
was. Gekeken is naar een periode van 35 jaar, te beginnen in 1985. Voor deze periode is gekozen
op basis van de informatie over vijandige gebeurtenissen die de Foundation heeft weten te
verzamelen. De voorbeelden omvatten opzettelijke en onopzettelijke aanvallen vanaf de grond op
commercieel luchtvervoer en algemene luchtvaartactiviteiten. Onder vijandige gebeurtenissen,
zoals te zien is in figuur 1, wordt verstaan het opzettelijk of onopzettelijk inzetten van een
mogelijkheid tot een aanval3 gericht tegen de burgerluchtvaart.
Vijandige gebeurtenissen vormen het “topje van de ijsberg” en voor elke vijandige gebeurtenis die
heeft plaatsgevonden zijn er veel meer voorbodes die soms wel en soms niet werden geassocieerd
met een conflictgebied (een terroristische handeling die niet in een conflictgebied plaatsvond
bijvoorbeeld).

3 Zoals een MANPAD (man-portable air-defense systems) of grond-luchtraketten.

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Om de conflictgebieden te bestuderen moet gekeken worden naar hun slechts mogelijke
uitkomsten - vijandige gebeurtenissen. Aangezien de meeste vijandige gebeurtenissen in verband
worden gebracht met vluchten in luchtruim waarvoor geen beperkingen gelden, vormde dit deel
van het onderzoek een belangrijke bron van informatie over het falen van de statelijke praktijk om
het luchtruim te beperken.
De resultaten van de analyse van vijandige gebeurtenissen wijzen erop dat de meeste vijandige
gebeurtenissen plaatsvonden boven conflictgebieden op het moment waarop er nog geen
beperkingen golden voor het luchtruim.
Bevinding 1: Uit analyse van de Foundation blijkt dat het merendeel van de vijandige
gebeurtenissen in de periode 1985-2020 waarbij civiele vluchten vanaf de grond werden
aangevallen, voorkomen hadden kunnen worden door het beperken van het luchtruim
boven en rondom het conflictgebied en door de beperkingen in acht te nemen.
Uit het onderzoek van de Foundation kwam naar voren dat zogeheten MANPADS (man-portable
air-defense systems, draagbare luchtverdedigingssystemen), doorgaans vrij kleine wapens die
vanaf de schouder kunnen worden gelanceerd en een hoogte tot 15.000 voet kunnen bereiken, de
wapens zijn die het meest worden gebruikt tegen de burgerluchtvaart. (Zie in figuur 2 het aantal
gebeurtenissen in de steekproef gekoppeld aan een gegeven mogelijkheid tot aanval.) MANPADS
zijn doorgaans makkelijker te bemachtigen en te gebruiken dan de grotere niet-draagbare SAMsystemen (surface-to-air missile, grond-luchtraketten), die technisch complexer zijn, moeilijker te
bedienen en die doelen op veel grotere hoogte kunnen treffen.
De omvang van de meeste raketkoppen voor MANPADS (minder dan 2 kg voor een aantal vaak
gebruikte MANPADS) betekent echter dat een catastrofaal gevolg - d.w.z. het neerschieten van het
vliegtuig - geenszins zeker is. Ter vergelijking, uit de geïdentificeerde SAM-gebeurtenissen blijkt
dat een catastrofaal gevolg na een succesvolle aanval zeer waarschijnlijk is, in elk geval deels
vanwege de grotere raketkop (die wel 70 kilo kan zijn bij sommige rakettypes).
Bevinding 2: Uitgaande van een analyse van gemelde grond-luchtaanvallen tegen civiele
vluchten in de periode 1985‒2020, waren MANPADS de wapens die het meest worden
gebruikt tegen de burgerluchtvaart. MANPADS zijn doorgaans gemakkelijker te
bemachtigen en te gebruiken dan de grotere, niet-draagbare SAM-systemen. De omvang
van de meeste MANPAD-raketkoppen echter betekent dat een catastrofaal resultaat
geenszins zeker is. Ter vergelijking, SAM-gebeurtenissen laten zien dat een catastrofaal
gevolg van een effectieve aanval zeer waarschijnlijk is. De aanwezigheid van SAMs dient
derhalve een belangrijke indicator te zijn bij elke luchtruimrisicoanalyse en elk besluit
tot vermijden/overvliegen.
Informatie over de hoogte waarop de gebeurtenis plaatsvond is terug te vinden bij 34 van de 57
vijandige gebeurtenissen in de database van de Foundation over vijandige gebeurtenissen in de
burgerluchtvaart. Vier van de gebeurtenissen vonden plaats op een hoogte boven vluchthoogte
(FL)250 en 19 vonden plaats onder FL50. Bij vijf voorvallen (rood gemarkeerd in figuur 3 op blz.
6) werd vastgesteld dat het een SAM-aanval betrof. Bij de voorvallen in blauw was er een
aanvalsmogelijkheid die geen SAM betrof.
In tabel 1 (blz. 6) wordt informatie gegeven over onopzettelijke aanvallen, die uit de database van
de Foundation zijn gehaald. Er zijn acht gebeurtenissen geïdentificeerd die op één na een
verkeerde militaire identificatie van de identiteit en/of bedoelingen van het doelwit betroffen. Bij
de overige 49 gebeurtenissen was er ofwel sprake van een opzettelijke aanval of kon de
Foundation geen informatie over de opzet vinden.
Analyse van conflictgebieden 1990-2014
Naast vijandige gebeurtenissen heeft de Foundation ook geïnventariseerd welke statelijke
praktijken in de 25 jaar voorafgaande aan 2014 werden gehanteerd met betrekking tot het gebruik
door de burgerluchtvaart van het luchtruim boven conflictgebieden. De Foundation heeft zich
onder andere gericht op het vaststellen van de aanwezigheid van luchtafweersystemen (zowel
lucht-lucht als grond-lucht) tijdens een conflict en de beperkingen die van toepassing waren op het
gebruik van het luchtruim.

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