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MH17 About
the investigation

The Hague, October 2015
The reports issued by the Dutch Safety Board are open to the public.
All reports are available on the Safety Board’s website wwwsafetyboard.nl.
Source photo cover: Dutch Safety Board

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CONTENTS

Foreword                                                                                                                       6
List of Abbreviations                                                                                                        8
1 The Dutch Safety Board’s Working Method                                                                    10
1.1 Why this report about the investigation? .............................................................    10
1.2 Which subjects did the investigation look into?....................................................11
1.3 Legal framework................................................................................................... 12
1.4 Conducting the investigation............................................................................... 17
2 Preliminary Repor................................................................................................... 28
2.1 Introduction.......................................................................................................... 28
2.2 Provisions of Annex 13 ......................................................................................... 28
2.3 Publication of the preliminary report ................................................................... 28
2.4 Erratum................................................................................................................. 29
3 Crash: Cause                                                                                                              30
3.1 Design of the investigation ................................................................................. 30
3.2 Data collection ..................................................................................................... 30
3.3 Analysis and assessment ...................................................................................... 32
4 Crash: Flight Route ..................................................................................................38
4.1 Design of the investigation .................................................................................. 38
4.2 Data collection ..................................................................................................... 39
4.3 Analysis and assessment ...................................................................................... 42
5 Crash: The Occupants .............................................................................................44
5.1 Design of the investigation ................................................................................. 44
5.2 Data collection ..................................................................................................... 45
5.3 Analysis and assessment ...................................................................................... 46
6 Passenger Information............................................................................................ 48
6.1 Design of the investigation ................................................................................. 48
6.2 Data collection ..................................................................................................... 49
6.3 Analysis and assessment ...................................................................................... 51
7 Exceptional Circumstances .......................................................................................52
7.1 Visiting the wreckage area and recovery of the wreckage................................... 52
7.2 Reconstruction of the aeroplane ......................................................................... 58
7.3 International data collection................................................................................. 59
7.4 Concurrence with the criminal investigation ........................................................ 63
7.5 Classifed information .......................................................................................... 65

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FOREWORD
Aviation disasters shock the world. In today’s society an incredible amount of information
regarding the circumstances, the possible causes and who could be responsible is shared
immediately after a crash. This instantly reveals the extent and the impact of the crash to
the world, but brings uncertainties with it as well. A thorough investigation determines
exactly the causes of a crash, presents the facts and removes the distress of speculations.
This can contribute to aviation safety and also provides clarity to the relatives of the
victims.
The Dutch Safety Board is appointed by law to investigate aviation accidents. Because of
the large number of victims with Dutch nationality, the Dutch Safety Board was ready to
contribute to the investigation into the crash of flight MH17. Therefore, when Ukraine
requested that the Netherlands take over the investigation into the causes of the crash,
the answer could only be positive.
Right from the start, the investigation applied four principles: maintaining independence;
aiming for high quality; focusing on determining the causes as accurately as possible in
order to exclude other scenarios; aiming to achieve as much international acknowledgment
as possible for the investigation.
The investigation was carried out under exceptional circumstances. The Dutch Safety
Board was not blind to the geopolitical implications of the crash but in the investigation
deliberately kept its distance from international politics. The facts were leading in the
investigation and the views of parties were evaluated against those facts, a proven
protocol that is used worldwide for aircraft accident investigations under the guidelines of
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The Dutch Safety Board has
endeavoured to complete the investigation in the shortest possible time, without
compromising on content quality. Within ffteen months, it has completed the investigation
into four different subjects regarding the crash of flight MH17.
Immediately after the crash of flight MH17, initiatives were taken at international level to
further improve aviation safety, which is a complicated diplomatic process. Now that the
recommendations of the Dutch Safety Board are available, they can be included in the
initiatives for improvement.
The relatives of the victims have the right to know the answers to their questions. What
happened, why did the aeroplane fly over that area, were the passengers aware of
anything and why did it take two to four days to confrm who were on board? Those
were questions that arose immediately after the crash, but could only be answered
after thorough investigation that required time. In the meantime, the relatives of the
victims were confronted with all kinds of stories in the media. The conclusions in the
Dutch Safety Board’s reports regarding the crash of flight MH17 are based on facts,

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AAIB                Air Accidents Investigation Branch
ACI                  Airports Council International
AIVD               General Intelligence and Security Service (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst)
AWACS            Airborne Warning and Control System azM Maastricht University Hospital (Academisch Ziekenhuis Maastricht)
CANSO            Civil Air Navigation Services Organisation
CTIVD             Dutch Review Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services
                      (Commissie van Toezicht betreffende de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten)
EASA               European Aviation Safety Agency FL flight level
HCSS              The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies
IAC                 Interstate Aviation Committee
IATA                International Air Transport Association
ICAO               International Civil Aviation Organization
IIC                  Investigator-In-Charge
JIT                  Joint Investigation Team
KNMI              Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute (Koninklijk Nederlands
                      Meteorologisch Instituut)
LTFO               National Forensic Investigation Team (Landelijk Team Forensische
                      Opsporing)
MIVD              Military Intelligence and Security Service (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst)
NATO              North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBAAI             National Bureau of Air Accidents Investigation of Ukraine
NCC                National Crisis Centre (Nationaal CrisisCentrum)
NCTV              National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (Nationaal
                      Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid)

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1 THE DUTCH SAFETY BOARD’S
WORKING METHOD
1.1 Why this report about the investigation?
On 17 July 2014, a Malaysia Airlines passenger aeroplane crashed in the eastern part of
Ukraine. All 298 people on board the Boeing 777-200 lost their lives. Flight MH17 had
taken off from Amsterdam Airport Schiphol in the Netherlands for a flight to Kuala Lumpur
International Airport in Malaysia.
The National Bureau of Air Accidents Investigation of Ukraine (NBAAI) instituted an
investigation into the crash, in which the Dutch Safety Board was asked to participate. In
addition to the Ukrainian investigation into the causes of the crash, the Dutch Safety
Board decided on 18 July 2014 to launch its own investigation into the decision-making
related to flight routes over conflict areas and the availability of passenger information
following the crash.
On Wednesday 23 July 2014, Ukraine delegated the execution of the investigation into
the causes of the crash to the Netherlands. As the accident investigation authority of the
Netherlands, the Dutch Safety Board was effectively put in charge of the investigation.
From that moment, the Dutch Safety Board’s objective was to obtain an accurate picture
of the crash and the relevant circumstances within the shortest time frame possible. This
included the decision-making related to the flight route and the availability of passenger
information. In a later stage, the question of what happened to the occupants of the
aeroplane became subject of investigation as well.
When the investigation was delegated to the Netherlands, it was clear that the investigation
into the crash of flight MH17 would take place under exceptional circumstances. Soon after
the crash, which received a great deal of international media attention, suspicions circulated
that the crash of flight MH17 could not be attributed to a technical defect or pilot error, but
that the aeroplane had been shot down. Wreckage of the aeroplane was scattered over a
large area, spanning a total of approximately 50 km² in the Dnipropetrovsk region - an area
where, at the time, there was an armed conflict. Because of regular fghting, the safety
situation in the area initially did not allow the investigation to be conducted at the crash
site. The scenario that the aeroplane had been shot down meant that it was of great
importance for the investigation to be conducted in an independent manner. There were
calls for an independent investigation into the causes and the circumstances of the crash of
flight MH17, underlined by a UN Security Council Resolution.1 The geopolitical dimension
meant that it was even more important to substantiate the fndings of the investigation
with as many sources as possible, so that the answer to the question of what happened to
flight MH17 will be totally indisputable.

1 UN Security Council, Resolution 2166 (2014), S/res/2166 (2014), 21 July 2014

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1.3 Legal framework
The provisions of Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention are followed for investigations
into civil aviation accidents. The position, working method and authority of the Dutch
Safety Board are stipulated in the Kingdom Act Dutch Safety Board. Annex 13 and the
Kingdom Act Dutch Safety Board have the same objective: to conduct an impartial,
thorough, learning based investigation that helps prevent similar accidents from recurring
in the future, without apportioning blame or liability.
As previously pointed out, the Dutch Safety Board had already started its own
investigation, based on the Kingdom Act Dutch Safety Board, into the decision-making
related to flight routes and the availability of passenger information when it took over the
investigation from its Ukrainian sister organisation. This meant that the investigation had
to be conducted within a legal framework consisting of two regimes.
This section explores specifc provisions of Annex 13 and the Kingdom Act Dutch Safety
Board, and explains the choices made in the investigation. It also deals with the agreements made between Ukraine and the Netherlands when the international investigation
was delegated.
1.3.1 Chicago Convention
Article 26 of the Chicago Convention provides for investigations into civil aviation
accidents. Ukraine and the Netherlands, as well as the other states involved in this
investigation, have ratifed this Convention.

Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention provides Standards and Recommended Practices
for the investigation of accidents. Some relevant aspects are explained below.
According to Annex 13 investigations into civil aviation accidents should focus exclusively
on preventing future incidents. Article 3 of the Annex reads as follows: ‘The sole objective
of the investigation of an accident or incident shall be the prevention of accidents and
incidents. It is not the purpose of this activity to apportion blame or liability.’ To this end,
the Annex establishes that states should have an independent accident investigation

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and consent, to another state. Ukraine made use of this option and, a few days after the
crash, asked the Netherlands to conduct the investigation into the crash of flight MH17.
The delegation of the investigation by Ukraine to the Netherlands, which took place in
consultation with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), was laid down in
two agreements, being a Memorandum of Understanding between the Ukrainian and
the Dutch Ministers of Foreign Affairs and an agreement between Ukraine’s NBAAI and
the Dutch Safety Board. Both documents are included as appendices to this report
(Appendices C and D). As from 23 July 2014, the Dutch Safety Board was effectively in
charge of the international investigation into the causes of the crash.
The preamble to the Memorandum defnes the objective of the investigation: ‘…to
ensure that the investigations […] will be conducted with the maximum impartiality and
objectivity that will meet the expectations of the international community.’ The
Memorandum and agreement therefore stipulate that the investigation into the crash of
flight MH17 is conducted in accordance with Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention.
1.3.3 The Kingdom Act Dutch Safety Board
The tasks, responsibilities and authorities of the Dutch Safety Board are defned in the
Kingdom Act Dutch Safety Board. The Dutch Safety Board’s statutory task is to explain
how an accident or incident could have occurred, how to prevent a similar accident from
happening in the future or how to limit its impact. In relation to this, the legislator
considers that an investigation performed by the Dutch Safety Board can help alleviate
public unrest caused by an incident.4 The Kingdom Act Dutch Safety Board stipulates that
the Dutch Safety Board must refrain from statements that apportion blame or liability.
The Kingdom Act Dutch Safety Board provides for the Dutch Safety Board’s independent
position, which allows it to decide autonomously whether to conduct an investigation
without taking into account the interests of the parties concerned, political offcials or
other stakeholders.5 This concerns independence from parties that are involved in an
accident or incident as well as independence from the (central) government. Members of
the Dutch Safety Board are appointed, suspended and dismissed by Royal Decree, after
consultation with the Board. The members sitting on the Board are not bound by a
mandate. The way in which the Dutch Safety Board is funded, does not offer any
possibility for exercising influence over the organisation.
The Kingdom Act Dutch Safety Board and the subordinate regulations include provisions
related to the investigation process and the way in which the Dutch Safety Board must
handle investigation material. In brief, these provisions give the Dutch Safety Board
extensive authority to request data and information that it needs for its investigations, or
to request that parties cooperate with the investigation. Statements made to the Dutch

4 Parliamentary Paper II, 2003/2004, 28 634, no. 3. p. 6.
5 In certain circumstances, the Dutch Safety Board is obliged to conduct an investigation. Certain political offcials
can also request the Dutch Safety Board to conduct an investigation. However, the Dutch Safety Board does not
have to respond to these requests.

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decisions about flying over conflict areas are made in general. For the investigation into
flying over conflict areas, the Dutch Safety Board approached various parties in and outside
the Netherlands to request their cooperation in the investigation. It was not always clear to
these parties whether the Dutch Safety Board requested them to cooperate on the basis
of Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention, or on the basis of the Kingdom Act Dutch Safety
Board. These parties, such as sister organisations and airlines, provided information to the
Dutch Safety Board and cooperated with this part of the investigation anonymously and on
a voluntary basis.
During the investigation it became increasingly clear that parties all over the world attach
great value to improving the safety of civil aviation regarding flying over conflict areas.
This was demonstrated, for example, by a joint declaration (on 29 July 2014) from ICAO,
the international branch organisations of airlines (IATA), airports (ACI) and air navigation
service providers (CANSO). Following the crash, various international initiatives were
taken with the aim of reducing the chance of an accident, such as that involving flight
MH17, occurring in the future. In August 2014, for example, ICAO set up a task force to
advise on adapting roles and procedures focused on limiting risks that conflict areas
pose to civil aviation.8 On 27 October 2014, ICAO also adopted a resolution advocating
for the investigation into the crash of flight MH17 to be used to improve international
standards and to share best practices for the safety of civil air traffc flying over conflict
areas.9 The subject was also on the agenda of the ICAO High Level Safety Conference in
Montreal in February 2015. Flying over conflict areas and MH17’s flight above the eastern
part of Ukraine was a recurring theme in the media too.
In the investigation into the decision-making related to flight routes, the Dutch Safety
Board attempted to do justice to these international developments and included them in
its investigation where possible. In addition, because of the international importance of
the investigation into flight routes, the Dutch Safety Board followed the provisions of
Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention as closely as possible. The Dutch Safety Board
involved representatives of sister organisations where possible and when necessary for
the investigation. The investigation into the general decision-making related to flying
over conflict areas made it possible to place the outcomes of the investigation into flight
MH17’s route in an international perspective and created the opportunity to learn deeper
and broader lessons from this disaster.
Crash: Occupants
According to Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention the investigation should include the
injuries suffered by the victims, medical and pathological information and their chances
of survival, depending on the circumstances of the accident. The provisions of Annex 13
do not primarily focus on answering questions that relatives may have about what the
occupants may have experienced of the accident. The Dutch Safety Board decided to
conduct a more thorough investigation into the consequences of the crash for the
occupants than is customary on the basis of Annex 13. Apart from the aspects listed
there, the Dutch Safety Board attempted to answer the question as to what conditions

8 Task Force on Risks to Civil Aviation arising from Conflict Zones (TF RCZ).
9 ICAO Council Resolution on Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17, Destroyed over Eastern Ukraine on 17 July 2014.
27 October 2014.

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observance of the aforementioned dependencies. The Dutch Safety Board must at all
times be able to formulate an autonomous and impartial perspective, fed by the
perspectives of others.
The investigation into the crash of flight MH17 took place in an extraordinary context. The
large number of victims, the considerable media attention and the public involvement in
the crash, the simultaneous occurrence of an international criminal investigation and the
geopolitical interests involved, made it even more important for the Dutch Safety Board
to safeguard its independence. To this end measures were taken in the investigation
process, which are explored in more detail in the following part of this section. The way in
which the investigation by the Dutch Safety Board was related to the international criminal
investigation is described separately in Section 7.4.
The Dutch Safety Board would like to state that neither the Cabinet, nor the judicial
authorities nor other parts of the Dutch (central) government at any time attempted to
influence the investigation into the crash of flight MH17. Naturally, the central government,
as well as other interested parties, put forward its requests and expectations with regard
to the subjects to be investigated. The central government was occasionally informed
about the schedule of the publishing of the investigation reports.
Reflection meetings
From the very beginning of the investigation into the crash of flight MH17, the Dutch
Safety Board was aware that the risk of political influence could be higher than usual,
given the tense international relations. To effectively identify and manage this risk, the
Dutch Safety Board held two reflection meetings with experts that have extensive
experience in conducting investigations in a political playing feld. These meetings
focused on obtaining advice about the right strategy for working and interacting with
parties in this context. The meetings also aimed to explore what the Dutch Safety Board
could do to ensure that the results and recommendations of the investigation optimally
matched the expectations of the outside world. The Dutch Safety Board used the results
of these meetings in its decision-making processes throughout the investigation.
Stakeholder analysis
To arrive at independent and authoritative conclusions in a complex array of forces, it is
important that the investigative body has an effective understanding of these forces:
what interests do the various parties have, how could they influence the course of the
investigation and how can the investigative body best deal with those forces? A stakeholder analysis was performed to systematically answer these questions.
International collaboration in aviation accident investigation
Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention provides for the participation of states having a
special interest in the investigation into a civil aviation accident. Depending on the
nature of their involvement in the occurrence, states can participate in the investigation
through an accredited representative or an expert. The rationale behind involving
various states in the investigation is that parties with potentially conflicting interests
have the opportunity to take note of the facts frst-hand and present their views in the

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Almaz-Antey provided a presentation on behalf of the Russian Federation. The results
presented differed on three important aspects from the presentation by the NLR. These
aspects concerned the angle at which the weapon approached the aeroplane, the location
of the detonation relative to the aeroplane and the possible missile trajectories.
The meeting was closed with conclusions, with mutual agreement on the conclusions
that the aeroplane was hit in flight by high-energy objects from a surface-to-air missile,
that the missile concerned was equipped with a warhead as found in missiles installed on
Buk fring systems and that the location of detonation was on the left side of the
aeroplane close to the cockpit. The Russian Federation did not concur with the fndings
about the possible missile trajectories presented by the NLR on behalf of the Netherlands.
During the third progress meeting (11 - 12 August 2015), the fnal state of affairs was
discussed. All states in the investigation team were represented. An observer of ICAO also
attended the meeting. During the meeting, the comments that the Dutch Safety Board
received from consulting the other states regarding the investigation into the causes of the
crash and the flight route of flight MH17 that needed explaining were discussed. An outline
of the recommendations was also presented. Furthermore, the reconstruction of a section
of the aeroplane was shown to those present. The reconstruction allowed those present to
examine the different damaged parts of the aeroplane in relation to one another and
thereby acquire more insight into the nature of the damage.
During the meeting, the Russian Federation presented its own ballistic investigation. It is
customary to inform the state that is conducting the international accident investigation
of such an investigation in advance. In these cases an invitation is sent to the state
conducting the investigation and possibly to the other participating states to propose
suggestions for the investigation and to be present at the investigation. The investigation
by the Russian Federation was not announced beforehand. It was not part of the
international investigation into the crash of flight MH17, since the Dutch Safety Board and
other participating states did not have the opportunity to form an opinion on the content.
The Russian Federation indicated that the aeroplane was downed by a missile that could
have been fred from either the ground or an aeroplane. This standpoint deviated from
what was jointly subscribed during the frst and second meetings (also by the Russian
Federation). The third meeting was closed with the joint conclusion (thus by the Russian
Federation as well) that the aeroplane was hit by high-energy objects of a missile that
detonated in front of and to the left of the cockpit. This joint conclusion is less far-reaching
than the conclusions in the investigation report on the crash of flight MH17.
Relationships with knowledge institutions and experts
During the investigation the Dutch Safety Board made use of knowledge and information
from third parties. The basic principle consistently adopted was that the Dutch Safety
Board be provided with suffcient information to enable the Board to form a picture of
the reliability of the expert assessment obtained. The Dutch Safety Board used the
expert assessment to arrive at its own and autonomous conclusions.
Guidance committee
To be able to form autonomous conclusions, the Dutch Safety Board obtains advice
about the weighting of the fndings drawn up by the investigation team. For this it

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Various persons and organisations approached the Dutch Safety Board on their own
initiative with information that could possibly be relevant to the investigation. The Dutch
Safety Board assessed this information for relevance and reliability, and, if relevant and
reliable, incorporated it in the investigation.
1.4.2 Professionalism
The Dutch Safety Board’s objective in conducting its investigations is to provide a defnite
answer about what happened and how this happened, and to draw authoritative
conclusions and lessons from its fndings. From that objective, it is important that the
Dutch Safety Board’s investigations are conducted in such a way that the fndings and
conclusions are valid and reliable. This implies that the Dutch Safety Board guarantees
that the investigation is conducted by persons who have relevant and up-to-date
expertise in both content and methods.
The next part of this section describes how the Dutch Safety Board guaranteed the
professional execution of the investigation into the crash of flight MH17. In this context it
should be noted once more that dependence on expertise forms a risk to the Dutch
Safety Board’s autonomous conclusions. The previous paragraph described how the
Dutch Safety Board approached this issue.
Composition of the investigation teams
The Dutch Safety Board strives to have all the necessary knowledge and skills among its
own personnel and tries to realise this through recruitment, selection and training. The
investigation teams for each project are multidisciplinary and consist of investigators that
possess the knowledge and skills required for the investigation at hand. For the
investigation into flight MH17 the Dutch Safety Board called upon investigators having
expertise on the subject of aviation, defence, health, crisis management, administrative
processes and risk management.
The investigation into flight MH17 was an exceptionally large and complex project for the
Dutch Safety Board. The project took up a great deal of the available resources:
approximately three-quarters of the 72 staff members were at some point assigned to
the investigation or to activities in support of it.
Involving external investigators and support
The Dutch Safety Board is an organisation with a broad scope of activity.11 Thus bringing
in specifc external expertise is unavoidable, especially for extensive investigations such
as that into the crash of flight MH17. The most relevant selection criteria when involving
external staff are relevant expertise, proven quality and impartiality of the external
employee. The Dutch Safety Board prefers to use its own network in the sector related to
an investigation, contacts in sister organisations and independent knowledge institutions
such as universities when recruiting external investigators.
To prevent any conflicts of interest with an external investigator, the Dutch Safety Board
tries not to recruit any persons that work for organisations that are or could become
directly involved in the accident or incident. Each external employee is subject to strict

11 The Dutch Safety Board permanently employs circa 46 investigators (full-time equivalents).

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analysis of the investigation results and comment on the reports. The feedback from
these internal and external assessments were included in the continued investigations
and incorporated in the reports.
Using statements made by experts and parties involved
An important part of the investigation material received by the Dutch Safety Board, in
addition to documents and technical sources, consists of verbal or written statements by
experts and persons that are involved in an accident or incident in some way. As the way
in which the statements are taken is a decisive factor for their reliability, the Dutch Safety
Board devotes special attention to its interviewing techniques. All the investigators
employed by the Dutch Safety Board receive regular training in this area. A key
component of the training course focuses on the interviewer avoiding affecting the
interviewee (intentionally or accidentally). Moreover, usually two investigators are present
and generally an audio recording is made of the interviews. The Dutch Safety Board
works with reports on the interviews, signed by those interviewed.
Even when a statement has been taken in accordance with the highest standards
imaginable, it still constitutes source material with a relatively low degree of reliability.
Therefore, the Dutch Safety Board adopts the basic principle that a statement alone is
not suffcient for substantiating a fnding. A statement must be corroborated by as many
other types of source material as possible.
1.4.3 Transparency
The Dutch Safety Board attaches great value to conducting its investigation in a way that
is comprehensible to others, so that in turn they can form their own opinion on the
investigation’s validity and reliability. Moreover, it is important that the Dutch Safety
Board informs the different stakeholders (relatives, other parties involved, the general
public) about the investigation and its fndings in such a way and at such times that they
are not unnecessarily obstructed from coming to terms with their grief or drawing lessons
from the event.
The extent to which the Dutch Safety Board can practise transparency is limited due to
the legal obligation to protect its sources. Other than the information in the fnal report,
the Dutch Safety Board does not release any underlying source information related to
the investigation, except in exceptional cases.12 The purpose of this source protection is
to enable those involved in an accident or incident to give the Dutch Safety Board full
disclosure without fearing any disciplinary measures or (criminal) prosecution. This means
that the Dutch Safety Board is in an optimal position for discovering the true causes of an
incident and for drawing lessons from it.
The following part of this section describes how the Dutch Safety Board, taking into
account the limitation mentioned above, achieved transparency in the investigation into
the crash of flight MH17.

12 Kingdom Act Dutch Safety Board, Article 59, 5th paragraph jo Article 69.

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The Russian Federation submitted a substantial number of comments during the
consultation. Many of those comments contributed to the quality of the report and were
incorporated in it. Some of the comments were not incorporated.
For example, the Russian Federation has stated that it is not possible to ascertain the type
of warhead that detonated and the type of missile that carried it. In its comments, the
Russian Federation referred to outcomes of various tests and calculations that were made
available during the last progress meeting. These concerned among other things the
location of the detonation, the way in which the fragments spread after detonation and the
direction from which these fragments perforated the aeroplane. More information can be
found in Appendix L.
The Russian Federation also commented on the presence of weapon systems in the eastern
part of Ukraine with respect to the fghting parties. However, the investigation only
examined weapon systems that were known to be common in use in the region. The
question of what weapon systems were in the possession of which parties was not part of
the investigation into the causes of the crash.
Lastly, the Russian Federation did not consider the references to the unrest in Crimea at
the beginning of 2014 a possible sign of deteriorating safety in the Ukrainian airspace.
However, these references were made in the report to understand why airlines were
prohibited from flying over Crimea. The impossibility of flying over Crimea was relevant to
the decision-making with respect to flight routes above the eastern part of Ukraine.
The comment from Ukraine requesting the removal of the conclusions pertaining to airspace
management was not accepted. The essence of Ukraine’s comment was that the risk to civil
aviation at cruising altitude posed by the armed conflict in the eastern part of the country
was adequately assessed. However, the facts that were gathered contradict this.
Communication policy
The needs, expectations and perceptions in the outside world have influenced the
choices the Dutch Safety Board made concerning the type and scope of its reporting.
During the investigation, the Dutch Safety Board publicised information about the
investigation process more than had been customary. The Dutch Safety Board also
published a number of relevant documents on its website to provide clarity about some
of the agreements that were made. This concerns the agreements between the Dutch
Safety Board and other parties with regard to taking charge of the investigation into the
crash of flight MH17 and with regard to the recovery of the wreckage.
On several occasions members of the House of Representatives of the Dutch Parliament
asked the involved members of cabinet questions about the investigation. Since the
members of cabinet do not have access to the Dutch Safety Board’s work and have no
insight into its progress, the Dutch Safety Board supplied them with information to
enable them to answer these questions. This information was limited to the investigation
process and was not related to the investigation’s approach or fndings.

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2 PRELIMINARY REPORT
2.1 Introduction
On 9 September 2014, the Dutch Safety Board published its preliminary report (Rapport
van eerste bevindingen) regarding the causes of the crash. In this report, the Dutch
Safety Board reported the frst results of the investigation, which was still in full swing at
that time. For the preliminary report use was made of the investigation material that was
available at that time, including the data from the flight data recorder, the cockpit voice
recorder, data regarding the crew, the flight plan, the state of the maintenance of the
aeroplane, flight-relevant meteorological information, Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) and
data from the relevant air traffc control services. The Dutch Safety Board also had access
to photographs and satellite images of the area (Google Earth), on which pieces of
wreckage of the crashed aeroplane were visible.
It is important to note that the fndings in the preliminary report were established on the
basis of the investigation material that was available up until then. Caution was called for
when drawing conclusions at that time. After the preliminary report was published,
additional investigation material became available, such as a part of the wreckage, the
human remains of the occupants and other physical evidence, which enabled the Dutch
Safety Board to draw authoritative conclusions about the causes of the crash. The Dutch
Safety Board wanted to be very careful at all times not to draw conclusions before the
investigation was fully completed.
2.2 Provisions of Annex 13
According to Annex 13 a preliminary report should be submitted to the relevant states
and ICAO within thirty days after an accident involving an aeroplane with a maximum
mass of over 2,250 kg. The preliminary report may also include safety warnings. The
content depends partially on the progress of the investigation and the need to report
certain results. The Dutch Safety Board chose to publicise the preliminary report.
2.3 Publication of the preliminary report
Given the exceptional circumstances in which the investigation into the causes of crash of
flight MH17 occurred, the time needed to draw up the preliminary report exceeded the
thirty days specifed by Annex 13 for this. Because of this, the report was published about
three weeks later, on 9 September 2014. At the time of publication of the preliminary
report, the investigation into the causes of the crash was still in full swing. The fndings
were therefore based solely on the sources that the Dutch Safety Board had at its disposal
at that time. These data were compared and analysed. Based on these analyses, frst
insights in the crash could be given.