2

Appendices
to report Crash of
Malaysia Airlines
flight MH17

The Hague, October 2015
The reports issued by the Dutch Safety Board are open to the public.
All reports are available on the Safety Board’s website wwwsafetyboard.nl.
Source photo cover: DCA Malaysia

4

CONTENTS

APPENDICES PART A: CAUSES OF THE CRASH                                                7
Appendices A. Investigation activities and participants (Part A)                        8
Appendices B. Reference information (Part A)                                               18
Appendices C. Air Traffc Control flight plan                                                    22
Appendices D. NOTAM information                                                                25
Appendices E. Load information                                                                    34
Appendices F. Weather chart and weather satellite image                                37
Appendices G. ATC Transcript                                                                       38
Appendices H. Recorded data                                                                       48
Appendices I. Radar screen images                                                               56
Appendices J. Aeroplane systems and engines information                              60
Appendices K. Ballistic trajectory analysis methods                                         70
Appendices L. Typical fracture modes                                                            76
Appendices M. Agreement regarding Ukrainian ATC data                                 81
Appendices N. Background to occupants exposure                                          83
APPENDICES PART B: FLYING OVER CONFLICT ZONES                                    87
Appendices O. Participants in the investigation (Part B)                                   88
Appendices P. Developments relevant to the investigation                               90
Appendices Q. Laws and regulations                                                              92
Appendices R. Operators that flew over the eastern part of Ukraine              104

6

Appendices
part A:
Causes of the crash

8

APPENDIX A

INVESTIGATION ACTIVITIES AND PARTICIPANTS (PART A)
This Appendix provides an overview of the activities performed in relation to the
investigation and the parties, persons, and organisations involved. It also gives an
explanation about a number of information sources that were used.
List of activities
The following activities were performed in 2014 and 2015 with regard to the investigation
into the crash of flight MH17:

2014

18 July:                  Deployment of team of investigators to Kyiv, Ukraine.

22 July:                  Recorders were received.

23 July - 24 July:     Delegation of the Annex 13 MH17 investigation: signing of Memorandum of
                              Understanding between Ukraine and the Netherlands, signing of Agreement
                              between NBAAI and Dutch Safety Board. Due to the security situation,
                              investigators could not travel to the crash sites.

23 - 27 July:           Read out of Cockpit Voice Recorder and Flight Data Recorder at AAIB,
                              Farnborough, UK.

28 July:                  Informal meeting ICAO observer with Dutch Safety Board chairman, vice-chairman
                              and project manager.

27 July - 7 August: Team of Dutch Safety Board investigators standby in Kharkiv, Ukraine for
                             deployment to crash site.

4 - 6 August:          Dutch Safety Board investigators on standby in Soledar, Ukraine for deployment
                             to crash site.

2 - 15 August:         Dutch Safety Board Investigation Manager liaisons present in Kyiv.

4 August:               Handover of small wreckage material from Malaysian investigators at Dutch Safety
                             Board offce.

4 - 6 August:          Meeting with investigator ATSB at Dutch Safety Board offce.

5 - 8 August:          Meeting with investigators AAIB UK at Dutch Safety Board offce.

11 August:             Dutch Safety Board investigators back at Dutch Safety Board offce.

25 - 28 August:      Meeting with investigators NBAAI at Dutch Safety Board offce regarding radar
                             data.

10

9 - 13 February:          Meeting Investigator in Charge and Coordinator Reconstruction Operations with
                                  NTSB in Washington and Boeing in Seattle, USA.

17 - 20 February:        1st progress meeting of the Annex 13 investigation participants at Gilze-Rijen Air
                                  Force Base.

27 February:               Meeting for preparations with family liaison offcers of the Dutch National Police
                                 and victim support personnel about relatives’ wreckage visits.

3 - 7 March:                Visits to wreckage by relatives at Gilze-Rijen Air Force Base.

9 March:                     Transfer of Flight Data Recorder data to Public Prosecutor.
                                  Planning and start of detailed forensic investigation and preparation of retrieved
                                  high-energy objects and associated wreckage parts.

9 -10 March:                Meeting Investigator in Charge and Coordinator Reconstruction Operations with
                                   AAIB UK at Farnborough.

20 - 28 March:             Observation of wreckage parts recovered by local habitants near Petropavlivka,
                                   Ukraine by Coordinator Recovery Operations Dutch Safety Board. Preparations for
                                   transport to the Netherlands.

30 March - 2 April:       Special Envoy Dutch Safety Board and Investigator in Charge have several
                                  meetings in Kyiv to retrieve investigation data.

19 April - 2 May:          Recovery of wreckage parts and preparations for transport of eight 40-feet
                                   containers to the Netherlands.

6 - 7 May:                   2nd progress meeting of the Annex 13 investigation participants at Gilze-Rijen Air
                                  Force Base.

12 May:                      Forensic investigation and preparation of retrieved parts in containers from last
                                  recovery mission commenced.

26 May:                      Start 3D reconstruction forward part of aeroplane wreckage at Gilze-Rijen Air
                                  Force Base.

2 June:                       Draft Final Report sent to parties involved for review.

11-12 August:             Closing meeting of the Annex 13 investigation participants at Gilze-Rijen Air Force
                                  Base.

Other material made available to the investigation
The Dutch Safety Board received information from various sources, such as police, news
organisations, social media and individuals regarding the crash. This material included
eye-witness statements, articles, messages, flms of the wreckage and flms and photos
from the sites in east Ukraine where the wreckage hit the ground. The Safety Board has
used this material for as far as it was considered applicable to the investigation.
The Dutch Safety Board noted an amount of relevant, classifed, information regarding
the crash to flight MH17 that was in the possession of the Dutch intelligence services
AIVD and MIVD. This is information from the AIVD and MIVD themselves and from the
intelligence services of other countries. This classifed information includes the results of

12

Second Progress Meeting, 6 and 7 May 2015
State                                 Number of persons attending
Malaysia                                  2
Russian Federation                   6
United Kingdom                        2
Ukraine                                   1
United States of America          2
Third Progress Meeting, 11 and 12 August 2015
State                               Number of persons attending
Malaysia                                  4
Russian Federation                   6
United Kingdom                        2
Ukraine                                  10
United States of America           2
Observer                         Number of persons attending
ICAO                                        1

14

The guidance committee for the ‘survival aspects’ part of part A of the investigation was
as follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
E.R. Muller (chairman) Vice-chairman of the Dutch Safety Board
-------------
P.L. Meurs Associate Member of the Dutch Safety Board; chair of the Council for Public
Health and Health Care
------------
J.J. van Lieshout Head of acute admissions department of internal medicine and Laboratory for
Clinical Cardiovascular Physiology, Academic Medical Centre Amsterdam;
professor of Cardiovascular Physiology, University of Nottingham, United
Kingdom
-------------
B.P.R. Gersons Professor emeritus of psychiatry at the Academic Medical Centre (AMC) and
the University of Amsterdam; senior scientifc adviser to the Arq Psychotrauma
Expert Group
-------------
P.A. Boelen Professor of Clinical and Health Psychology at the University of Utrecht
-------------
I.B. Schipper Trauma surgeon, head of trauma surgery sub-department at the Leiden
University Medical Centre
-------------
H.J. ten Duis Professor emeritus of trauma surgery at the University Medical Centre
Groningen and the University of Groningen
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
During the investigation, this guidance committee met three times.

16

The following individuals were added to the project team under the supervision and
responsibility of the Dutch Safety Board:
-----------------------------------------------------         
H.G. van Galen Ground Engineer Boeing 777
--------------------
D. den Hartog Trauma surgeon Erasmus Medical Centre and head of South-West
Netherlands trauma centre
--------------------
G. van Ingen Pathologist
--------------------
T. Meeuwsen Flight physiologist, Senior aviation accident investigator, Deputy
commander Centre for Man and Aviation (CML), Royal Netherlands
Air Force
--------------------
J.A. Melkert Senior lecturer aeronautical engineering, Aerospace Engineering
Faculty, Delft University of Technology
--------------------
J.C. de Mol Air traffc control expert
--------------------
B. Mulder Aircraft Ground Engineer B1 Boeing 777
-------------------
J.G.W. van Ruitenbeek Aircraft structures Expert
-------------------
F. Schaefers Cabin safety expert SGI Aviation
-------------------
E.F. Thomassen Aircraft Mechanic/sheet metal worker Boeing 777
-------------------
A.J. van Utrecht Technical Investigator
-------------------
H.G.J.M. Vermetten Psychiatrist, Head of Military Mental Health Research Centre and Arq
Psychotrauma Expert group, professor of psychiatry at Leiden
University Medical Centre (LUMC) and Leiden University
------------------
J. van der Vlist Machinist/contributor reconstruction
------------------
A.P. Young Investigator
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subsidiary investigations were performed by the following institutions at the instruction
of the Dutch Safety Board:
• Academisch ziekenhuis Maastricht (azM);
• Element Materials Technology;
• National Aerospace Laboratory (NLR);
• Netherlands Forensic Institute (NFI);
• Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientifc Research (TNO);
• Delft University of Technology, Faculty of Aerospace Engineering - Structural Integrity
& Composites, Fatigue, Damage Tolerance & Durability.
During the investigation of the Dutch Safety Board assistance was provided by the Dutch
Ministry of Defence, in particular:
• Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence, the Hague;
• Inter Present Combined Joint Interagency Task Force;
• Commander and personnel of Gilze-Rijen Air Force Base;

18

APPENDIX B
REFERENCE INFORMATION (PART A)

Reference material
The following reference material was used in the investigation:
• Memorandum of understanding between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine concerning
the investigations regarding the accident of the downing of civilian aircraft, Malaysia
Airlines Flight MH17 on July 17, 2014;
• Agreement between the National Bureau of Air Accident and Incidents Investigation
with Civil Aircraft (NBAAI) of Ukraine and the Dutch Safety Board of the Netherlands
on delegation of investigation in respect of aircraft accident involving Boeing 777-
200, registration: 9M-MRD Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17;
• International regulations;
• Malaysia Airlines documentation.
International regulations
The international regulations relevant to this investigation include:
• The ‘Standards and Recommended Practices’ in the Appendices to the Chicago
convention of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO);
• Certifcation requirements of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA);
• Certifcation requirements of the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA);
• Department of Civil Aviation Malaysia regulations.
International Civil Aviation Organization
Six Appendices are of particular importance for the investigation. These are Appendices
2, 6, 8, 10, 11 and 13.
ICAO Annex 2 - Rules of the Air
The Standards in this document, together with the Standards and Recommended
Practices of Annex 11, govern the application of the Procedures for Air Navigation
Services - Air Traffc Management (PANS-ATM) and the Regional Supplementary
Procedures - Rules of the Air and Air Traffc Services, contained in Doc 7030. In the latter
document subsidiary procedures of regional application are found

20

Other documents
In addition to Annex 11, ICAO Doc 4444 - Procedures for Air Navigation Services - Air
Traffc Management (PANS-ATM), provides additional provisions with regard to air traffc
control procedures. PANS-ATM is a supplement to Annex 11.
Furthermore Doc 8168 - Procedures for Air Navigation Services - Aircraft Operations,
Volume 1 Flight Procedures prescribes among other things operational procedures,
which are recommended for the guidance of flight operational personnel and flight crew
members.
Lastly, ICAO Doc 9554 - Manual Concerning Safety Measures Relating to Military Activities
Potentially Hazardous to Civil Aircraft Operations, provides guidance material which is
meant to assist States in providing for the safe and orderly flow of international air traffc
in the event that military activities, which constitute potential hazards to civil aircraft, are
planned and conducted.
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
The aeroplane type Boeing 777 was certifed on the basis of the certifcation requirements
of FAA airworthiness standards for transport category airplanes: FAR Part 25.
The specifcation Technical Standard Order, TSO-C64, for oxygen masks.
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)
The aeroplane’s engines were certifed on the basis of EASA airworthiness standards for
engines; EASA CS-E.
Department of Civil Aviation Malaysia
Malaysian Civil Aviation Regulations 1996

22

APPENDIX C
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL FLIGHT PLAN

Flight plan
A flight plan is a document that the pilot-in-command of an aircraft, or the operator,
submits to the authorities prior to a flight. A flight plan provides the planned route of the
proposed flight. The flight plan’s format is established in ICAO Doc 4444.
In general, the compilers of a flight plan will opt for the most economic route, using the
air routes that are available. The shortest route is represented by a straight line between
the departure and arrival aerodromes, the so-called great circle. The preferred route is
determined using the available air routes (airways) that are located closest to the great
circle. The fnal route is established taking into account the operational limitations related
to the aircraft and the weather. Examples of this would be avoiding areas with a lot of
headwind, or looking for areas with a lot of tailwind.
The aeroplane’s equipment may also present limitations. The systems on board with
emergency oxygen for passengers and crew members may restrict the ability to fly over
high terrain. With a twin-engine aeroplane, there must be a suitable diversion aerodrome
at each point of the route within one, two or three hours flying time on one engine,
depending on the equipment and certifcation. Another limitation when selecting a route
is related to whether the operator in question has permission to fly over a certain area or
country. The applicable NOTAMs are also examined to establish whether they impose
any restrictions on the route.
Airways can be viewed as three-dimensional highways for aircraft. The flight plan includes
the airways to be followed and reporting points or waypoints. The waypoints are
important airway intersections or points where an airway passes the boundary of a flight
information region (FIR).
During the flight, the crew can request permission from air traffc control to deviate from
the flight plan. In addition, air traffc control can issue the crew with instructions to change
course. In doing so, the pilot-in-command remains responsible for the safety of the flight
operations.
Flight levels are used above the transition altitude, which varies from one country to
another. These are used to facilitate the separation between aircraft. Above the transition
altitude, a globally agreed standard altimeter setting applies, which means that all traffc
uses the same altitude indication. Airways employ standard flight levels. Typically,
magnetic tracks between 0 and 179 degrees have odd-numbered flight levels (FL290,

24

Table 1: Explanation of air traffc control flight plan.

The flight plan starts with the aerodrome of departure (EHAM=Amsterdam Airport
Schiphol) and the flight’s departure time (10.00). It then indicates the planned cruise
speed in knots and the altitude as a flight level (N0490 F310). This is followed by the frst
air navigation waypoint (ARNEM) and the airway (UL620) that the flight will take to the
next waypoint (SUVOX). In this way, the flight plan describes the entire route, in which the
airways are always referred to by using one or two letters followed by numbers and the
air navigation waypoints by name. If a flight directly approaches an air navigation
waypoint, the waypoint’s designation is preceded by ‘DCT’ (direct). If the flight must fly
at a different speed and/or altitude, this is also specifed in the flight plan. Lastly, the
aerodrome of arrival is mentioned in the flight plan (WMKK = Kuala Lumpur), the duration
of the flight (11 hours and 37 minutes), and the diversion aerodromes (WMSA = Sultan
Abdul Aziz Shah/ Subang and WMKP= Penang).

26

De-coding NOTAM data
The following material is provided so as to allow the reader to better understand the
material in this report.

The NOTAMs address airspace that is closed or restricted to air traffc. Two sorts of
restriction were applied:
1. Temporary Reserved Area3
Defned volume of airspace normally under the jurisdiction of one aviation authority
and temporarily reserved, by common agreement, for the specifc use by another
aviation authority and through which other traffc may be allowed to transit, under air
traffc control clearance.
2. Temporary Restricted Area
Airspace of defned dimensions above the land areas or territorial waters of a state,
within which the flight of aircraft is restricted in accordance with specifc conditions.
All times in this Appendix are in UTC only.

3 EUROCONTROL, Airspace Management Handbook for Application of the Concept of the Flexible Use of Airspace,
Ed. 3.0, 2010.

28

A1352/14 NOTAM
Q) UKXX/QRTCA/IV/BO /W /000/050/5015N03349E140
A) UKBV UKDV
B) 1406290000 C) 1407282359
E) TEMPO RESTRICTED AREA BOUNDED BY COORDINATES: 511600N 0303500E
THEN ALONG STATE BOUNDARY UNTIL POINT 501900N 0364942E 490600N
0365000E 492300N 0352700E 512400N 0322000E 511600N 0303500E CLOSED.
THE PROHIBITION IS NOT APPLIED FOR FLIGHTS OF STATE ACFT OF UKRAINE.
FLIGHTS OF CIVIL ACFT IN AREA IS AUTHORIZED UNDER CONDITIONS:
- FPL SENDING IN UKRAEROCENTRE THE DAY BEFORE UNTIL 1200(UTC)
- NOT LATER THAN ONE HOUR BEFORE DEPARTURE RECEIVING PERMISSION OF AIR
FORCES OF UKRAINE THROUGH UKRAEROCENTRE ON FLIGHT
- INFORMING AIR DEFENS UNIT OF AIR FORCES OF UKRAINE AND AIR TRAFFIC
SERVICE ABOUT FLIGHT.
F) SFC G) 1500M AMSL
A1353/14 NOTAM
Q) UKXX/QRTCA/IV/BO /W /000/050/4731N03254E196
A) UKDV UKOV UKFV
B) 1406290000 C) 1407282359
E) TEMPO RESTRICTED AREA BOUNDED BY COORDINATES: 464700N 0373000E
455800N 0345000E 455242N 0323043E 460755N 0312733E 462300N 0312400E
462300N 0310700E 451200N 0294500E
THEN ALONG STATE BOUNDARY UNTIL POINT 481400N 0281700E 484900N
0292300E 481600N 0302700E 472500N 0304500E 472500N 0324400E 465800N
0325100E 470200N 0342700E 472442N 0351749E 473846N 0353706E 475542N
0355136E 472200N 0363900E 465400N 0370500E 464700N 0373000E CLOSED.
THE PROHIBITION IS NOT APPLIED FOR FLIGHTS OF STATE ACFT OF UKRAINE.
FLIGHTS OF CIVIL ACFT IN AREA IS AUTHORIZED UNDER CONDITIONS:
- FPL SENDING IN UKRAEROCENTRE THE DAY BEFORE UNTIL 1200(UTC)
- NOT LATER THAN ONE HOUR BEFORE DEPARTURE RECEIVING PERMISSION OF AIR
FORCES OF UKRAINE THROUGH UKRAEROCENTRE ON FLIGHT
- INFORMING AIR DEFENS UNIT OF AIR FORCES OF UKRAINE AND AIR TRAFFIC
SERVICE ABOUT FLIGHT.
F) SFC G) 1500M AMSL
A1383/14 NOTAM
Q) UKDV/QRAXX/IV/NBO/W /000/260/4833N03731E111
A) UKDV
B) 1407010000 C) 1407282359
E) TEMPORARY RESERVED AREA BOUNDED BY COORDINATES: 501900N 0364942E
490600N 0365000E 481520N 0360510E 475542N 0355136E 472200N 0363900E
465400N 0370500E 0464700N 0373000E 465900N 0382000E 470642N 0381324E