31

L984 BULIG FASAD W531 KOVIL PW
M136 MEBAM DON M995 OLGIN PENAK
L140 KOVIL FASAD.
FM FL260 UP TO FL320

Table 4: UkSATSE NOTAMs issued after the crash.

A1507/14 NOTAM
Q) UKDV/QRTCA/IV/BO /W /320/660/4822N03807E095
A) UKDV
B) 1407171500 C) 1408172359EST
E) TEMPO RESTRICTED AREA INSTALLED WITHIN FIR DNIPROPETROVSK
BOUNDED BY COORDINATES :
495355N 0380155E 485213N 0372209E 480122N 0370253E
471352N 0365856E 465018N 0374325E 465900N 0382000E
470642N 0381324E THEN ALONG STATE BOUNDARY UNTIL POINT 495355N
0380155E.
RESTRICTION NOT APPLIED FOR FLIGHTS OF STATE ACFT OF UKRAINE.
F) FL320 G) UNL
A1517/14 NOTAM
Q) UKXX/QRTCA/IV/BO /W /000/660/4801N03731E117
A) UKDV UKFV
B) 1407180005 C) 1408172359
E) TEMPO RESTRICTED AREA BOUNDED BY COORDINATES:
495428N 0380202E 490600N 0365000E
481520N 0360510E 475542N 0355136E
460809N 0370518E 464700N 0373000E
465900N 0382000E 470642N 0381324E
THEN ALONG STATE BOUNDARY UNTIL POINT 495428N 0380202E CLOSED.
F) SFC G) UNL

NOTAMs - Russian Federation

Table 5: Russian Federation NOTAMs restricting airspace in force at the time of the crash.

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DEP FM ROSTOV-NA-DONU AD TO DNIPROPETROVSK FIR CARRIED OUT ALONG
ATS RTE A102 KONSTANTINOVSK NDB (KA) - NALEM ON FL340 AND ABOVE.
ARR TO ROSTOV-NA-DONU AD FM DNIPROPETROVSK FIR CARRIED OUT ALONG
ATS RTE A712 TAMAK - SAMBEK NDB (SB) THEN DCT KONSTANTINOVSK NDB (KA)
ON FL330 AND ABOVE.

Malaysia Airlines briefng note - loss of GPS signals
The following company briefng note was issued by Malaysia Airlines to its crews on
flights crossing Ukrainian airspace:

Figure 3: Company briefng note regarding loss of GPS signal. (Source: Malaysia Airlines)

35

The flight’s NOTOC, issued at Schiphol, is reproduced here.

Figure 5: NOTOC for flight MH17. (Source: Malaysia Airlines)

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APPENDIX F
WEATHER CHART AND WEATHER SATELLITE IMAGE

Figure 7: Synoptic weather for Europe, 17 July 2014. (Source: Meteostar via Aviapartner)

Figure 8: Weather satellite image, eastern part of Ukraine, 17 July 2014, 13.15 (15.15 CET). (Source: KNMI)

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13.00:52

13.01:20

13.07:46

13.08:00

13.19:21

41

13.23:04

13.24:03

43

45

47

49

On 24 July at 08.00 (10.00 CET) the international investigation team conducted a
thorough examination of the Flight Data Recorder. The Flight Data Recorder was slightly
damaged but the memory module was intact. Furthermore, no evidence or indications of
manipulation of the recorder were found.
Following the examination, the data was successfully downloaded and the Flight Data
Recorder contained valid data of the flight. Downloaded data from the flight was
decoded using multiple software tools from different manufacturers. The data is
consistent with other recorded information regarding the flight of Malaysia Airlines flight
MH17. Furthermore the unique ICAO 24-bit aircraft address issued by the State of
Registry (Malaysia) matched the recorded ICAO 24-bit aircraft address code on the Flight
Data Recorder. The State of Registry registered the aeroplane as 9M-MRD.
Initial work started to verify shortlist parameters from about 1,300 parameters recorded
on the Flight Data Recorder and identify possible areas and/or systems of interest to the
investigation team. The creation of a shortlist is a means to ensure an effective
investigation and to obtain an insight into possible causes.
On 25 July at 08.30 (10.30 CET) the international investigation team wrapped up the
work. A small team continued to work to verify a shortlist of parameters. On 26 July the
‘short list’ of parameter verifcation was completed.
Cockpit Voice Recorder

This model Cockpit Voice Recorder is a solid-state Cockpit Voice Recorder that records
30 minutes of 4-channel digital cockpit audio. The recording consists of three individual
crew positions microphones, and a 4th channel, the cockpit area microphone (CAM), that
records additional audio information.
Upon arrival at the AAIB UK, it was evident that the Cockpit Voice Recorder had sustained
damage. The Underwater Locator Beacon, or ‘pinger’, was attached to the unit. The
Cockpit Voice Recorder casing was bent over the protective memory module. The
Cockpit Voice Recorder was disassembled to gain access to the protective memory
module. Once this was achieved the memory module was opened to retrieve the memory
board. The protective moulded plastic covering (Room Temperature Vulcanizing or RTV
plastic) was removed to verify the memory board was not damaged. The data stored on
the memory board was downloaded normally

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• One of the four channels of audio was found to contain poor/unusable audio. The
cockpit area microphone was not working as expected, and
• The Cockpit Voice Recorder did not contain additional flight operation information
which was not already included in the air traffc control transcript.
Flight Data Recorder

This solid-state Flight Data Recorder model accepts serial bit stream data in an ARINC
573/717 format at a rate of 128 12-bit words per second. The Flight Data Recorder uses
solid-state flash memory technology as the recording medium. The recording is stored in
a crash survivable memory unit. A minimum of the last 25 hours of operational data is
retained on the recording medium. This output is a continuous sequence of four-second
data frames. Each frame consists of four sub-frames of 128 separate 12-bit words, with
the frst word containing a unique 12-bit synchronisation word identifying it as sub-frame
1, 2, 3 or 4. The data stream is ‘in sync’ when successive synchronisation words appear at
the proper 128-word intervals. If the data stream is interrupted, synchronisation words
will not appear at the proper interval or sequence, and the time reference will be lost
until the sub-frame pattern can be re-established.
Upon arrival at the AAIB, it was evident that the Flight Data Recorder had sustained little
damage. The Underwater Locator Beacon was not attached to the unit and was missing,
the bracket that holds the locator beacon to the Flight Data Recorder was however
attached to the unit.
The protective memory module was accessible and opened by specialists. The memory
board protective moulded plastic covering (RTV plastic) was removed and electrical
continuity tests were performed to verify the memory board was not damaged. Next the
memory board was downloaded from the unit normally using a ‘surrogate download unit’.
From 24 July to 26 July, the Flight Data Recorder data was analyzed using decoding
documentation provided to the Dutch Safety Board by the manufacturer under the
provisions of ICAO Annex 13. Using a ‘short list’ of parameters the goal was to verify the
Flight Data Recorder data and to determine if possible warnings of aeroplane systems
were present at the end of the flight.
The Flight Data Recorder investigation concluded:
• The Flight Data Recorder data contains the event flight;
• No warnings have been detected in the data of flight MH17, and
• The Flight Data Recorder data ends abruptly and at the same time as the Cockpit
Voice Recorder.

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Figure 12: Flight Data Recorder data (image 3 of 3). (Source: Dutch Safety Board)

As can be seen in Figure 12, the reproduction of some engine parameters stops earlier
than others. This is the result of the sampling rate (once per 64 seconds) for these
parameters and is not related to a problem with the engines.
Emergency Locator Transmitters
Each Emergency Locator Transmitter was uniquely identifable by a hexadecimal code
embedded into the Emergency Locator Transmitter software. The fxed Emergency
Locator Transmitter’s code ended with the fgures /0/1, whereas the portable Emergency
Locator Transmitter ended /1/1. The code was for identifcation purposes and it was
embedded in the data that was transmitted to a satellite when the Emergency Locator
Transmitter was activated.

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Information was acquired on the specifcations and the performance of the two
Emergency Locator Transmitters installed in the aeroplane and to determine the
Emergency Locator Transmitter’s emergency signal time and position according to
available information. In addition, the geographic location of the Emergency Locator
Transmitter was analysed using COSPAS-SARSAT satellite and network data. Follow-up
work was conducted on the COSPAS SARSAT data and a subsequent analysis was
performed. Several questions were posed to COSPAS-SARSAT to discuss the fndings
and verify received data and conclusions.
It is noted that the fxed Emergency Locator Transmitter frst transmitted a signal at
around 13.20:36 (15.20:36 CET). This was relayed to ground station as follows:

Table 8: First time of Emergency Locator Transmitter signal receipt by ground stations.
The time of receipt of the message at the Algerian ground station was recorded as being
at 13.20:04.51 (15.20:04.51 CET), 31 seconds earlier than the other messages. Verifcation
against other messages received by the Algerian system on 17 July 2014 confrmed that
there was an offset of just over 31 seconds in their recording system meaning that the
message was actually recorded at 13.20:36 (15.20:36 CET); consistent with the other
messag

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Notes
Times in Table 9 are in UTC only.
The symbols for flight MH17 are decoded as follows:
• The flight number MH17 is shown as ‘MAS17’;
• Its flight level, FL330, is shown as ‘330’;
• The aeroplane type, Boeing 777-200, is shown as ‘B772H’ with the letter ‘H’ standing
for ‘heavy’; a term referring to the aeroplane’s wake-turbulence category. The number
‘491’ indicates the flight’s groundspeed in knots;
• The word ‘TAMAK’ indicates the air navigation waypoint to which the aeroplane is
currently cleared to.
The replay showed no other contacts in the direct vicinity of MH17.
A ‘coasting’ mode is one for which the radar returns have been (temporarily) interrupted
and position and altitude are being predicted and displayed based on the previously
received radar data and flight plan information. The phenomenon is comparable to the
manner in which a car’s navigation system continues to display vehicle movement when
in a tunnel, without being able to receive a signal.
Russian Federation air traffc control - radar data
The flm provided to the investigation by GKOVD depicted the Rostov air traffc
controller’s radar screen from 13.00 to 13.40 (15.00 to 15.40 CET) showing flight MH17
and other aircraft in the area. The scale of the screen was such that the distance shown
from the symbol for flight MH17 is between about 30 and 60 km to the south, about 90
km plus to the north and east and about 200 km to the west. An image of the flm,
showing a small portion of the radar screen, is reproduced below.

Figure 13: Russian Federation radar Basic image from flm. (Source: GKOVD)