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-to reinforce and clarify the responsibilities of States for safe operations in their sovereign
and delegated airspace and for the operation of their own operators outside of that
airspace.
The European Union
Since the summer of 2014, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has issued Safety
Information Bulletins (SIB’S) related to conflict areas. In these Bulletins, EASA refers to
reports that states (France, the United Kingdom, the United States) issue to their
operators. Since the crash involving flight MH17 on 17 July 2014, EASA has published
SIBs related to Syria, Afghanistan, Mali, North Sinai, South Sudan, Pakistan, Libya, Iraq
and Yemen.
The European Commission is working on establishing a structure with the aim of
increasing the sharing of information relevant to flying over conflict areas. The frst step
involves the exchange of information between Member States and setting up a shared
methodology for risk analyses. Under the chairmanship of the Directorate-General for
Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME) a working group has been set up that will map
out the risks conflict areas pose to civil air traffc. The information that emerges from this
working group will be processed by the Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport
(DG MOVE) and EASA, with the aim of informing the aviation sector about possible risks
posed by conflict areas. The risk analysis performed by DG HOME will be done on a
confdential basis, in which classifed information will be exchanged. Only the outcome of
the risk analysis, and not the underlying information, will be made available to EASA. If a
high risk is established, EASA will issue a recommendation to avoid an airspace, or not to
fly below a certain Flight Level. The draft recommendation will frst be submitted to the
parties involved for their consultation. For the time being, it is not the intention to issue
legally binding information.31 In this respect, the European Commission strives for a joint
methodology for risk analyses.
The Netherlands
The Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment sends the EASA advance
information and other relevant information about the Safety Information Bulletins to
Dutch operators to support their risk analysis for safe flight operations. The Ministries of
Infrastructure and the Environment, Security and Justice and Foreign Affairs (situation in
July 2015) are consulting with Dutch operators (KLM, Corendon, ArkeFly) and the Dutch
Airline Pilots Association on the international developments at ICAO and EASA and
about the Dutch system of information exchange and risk analyses.32

31 Source: EASA.
32 Ministry of Security and Justice, state of affairs letter MH17, 30 June 2015

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• Annex 2 ‘Rules of the Air’: This Annex includes SARPs related to the use of airspace
and aerodromes including flight altitudes and access rules such as the conditions for
possessing a flight plan and authorisation from air traffc control.
• Annex 6 ‘Operation of Aircraft’: This Annex includes SARPs related to flight operations,
including the requirements imposed on the crew, the equipment necessary for a
flight, maintenance, the provision of information to passengers and safety on board
an aircraft.
• Annex 11 ‘Air Traffc Services’: Annex 11 describes the responsibility of the Member
State to organise the airspace and regulate the associated air traffc services. This
Annex also describes the SARPs related to air traffc services with a particular focus
on the need for coordination between civil and military authorities charged with air
traffc services.
• Annex 15 ‘Aeronautical Information Services’: The objective of this Annex is to ensure
the flow of information necessary for safe and effcient flight operations. The Annex
describes various resources that Member States can employ for this provision of
information, such as the ‘Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP)’ and the NOTAM.
The latter specifcally aims to inform parties concerned about modifed conditions or
the availability of aviation facilities, services, procedures or dangers.
• Annex 17 ‘Security’: Annex 17 stipulates that the primary objective of each Member
State must be to protect passengers, crew, ground staff and civilians from acts of
unlawful interference such as the destruction of an aircraft. To this end, requirements
are imposed related to the establishment of the national organisation necessary for
this purpose.
• Annex 19 ‘Safety Management’: Annex 19 contains the principles for a safety
management system. It includes requirements imposed on the Member State,
aviation service providers and operators.
Member States adhere to the standards by incorporating them in their national legislation,
unless they fle a difference compared to an ICAO standard.40
ICAO has seven regional offces that promote the implementation of the ICAO SARPs.
Ukraine and the Netherlands both fall under the area of responsibility of the ‘European
and North Atlantic (EUR/NAT) offce’, which is based in Paris. Malaysia falls under the
area of responsibility of the ‘Asia and Pacifc (APAC) offce’, based in Bangkok.
The most powerful resources that ICAO possesses to promote the implementation of
SARPs are the ‘Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP)’ and the ‘Universal
Security Audit Programme (USAP)’. Member States are periodically audited as part of
these programmes. To promote aviation safety, USOAP focuses on, for example, the
introduction and implementation of aviation regulation, training and licensing of aviation
staff, incident investigations, airworthiness, flight operations and air traffc services. USAP
focuses on the introduction of critical elements of aviation security using nine basic
principles, including State sovereignty, transparency, objectivity, quality and reliability.

40 Convention on International Civil Aviation, Articles 37 and 38

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• Maastricht Upper Area Control Centre: This body provides air traffc management
services in the upper airspace for the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and the
northern part of Germany.
The EU has concluded a number of treaties with non-EU Member States or is in the
process of doing so. Their objective is to establish a common liberalised aviation market
with neighbouring countries. Harmonising regulations is an important element in this
process. Since 2007, the European Commission has been involved in negotiations related
to such a bilateral treaty with Ukraine. In Ukraine, aviation regulation is therefore not
formally harmonised with that of EU Member States.
Ukraine joined the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC), which has 44 member
countries, in 1951. The ECAC’s mission is the promotion of the continued development of
a safe, effcient and sustainable European air transport system. Moreover, in 2007, a
bilateral agreement was established between EASA and the State Aviation Administration
of the Ministry of Transport of Ukraine (as a non-EU member of ECAC) on the collection
and exchange of information related to the safety of aircraft using Community and
Ukrainian aerodromes.
3. National States
ICAO Member States must integrate the SARPs in their national legislation, unless this
has already been achieved in another way such as in European regulations. This means
that the SARPs become binding for aviation parties operating in the relevant country and
its corresponding airspace. Member States can introduce stricter or supplementary rules
as long as they do not conflict with mandatory ICAO or regional rules.
Countries possess one or more aviation authorities that are responsible for, or play a role
in, aviation safety. Although the governing structure may differ considerably between
countries, a number of key tasks are present in each country to a greater or lesser extent.
Airspace management
As mentioned, the sovereignty of Member States is ICAO’s starting point. Member States
therefore bear responsibility for managing the airspace above their territories.44 Member
States have the possibility and responsibility to restrict or totally prohibit access to their
airspace, if necessary.
While ICAO focuses on civil aviation, national authorities must also take account of their
country’s military interests. ICAO regulations devote attention to the use of airspace and
of various facilities and services by both civil and military aviation.45 ICAO stipulates that
authorities on air traffc services must work closely with military authorities.46 This
coordination aims to limit the consequences of potentially dangerous activities as much
as possible.47 The ‘Manual Concerning Safety Measures Relating to Military Activities

44 This includes the airspace above bordering areas above land and water that fall under the state’s management.
45 ICAO Assembly Resolution A27-10, Appendix P.
46 ICAO Annex 11, Para 2.17.
47 ICAO Annex 11, Para 2.18.

97

continuation of civil aviation as much as possible, while ensuring the military air operation
benefts from adequate operational freedom.53 In this respect, it involves military flights
taking precedence with regard to the use of the airspace.54
Just like for operators, ICAO anticipates a role for states and air navigation service
providers in assessing safety and taking action if the usual coordination processes are no
longer effective due to a sudden outbreak of violence.55 As part of their role, air navigation
service providers must possess a safety management system and a security programme
that is used to assess the risks involved in executing their tasks.56
Most air navigation service providers, as part of their crucial role in the aviation
infrastructure, are part of or linked to the government, while their degree of independence
varies from one country to another.
The provision of aeronautical information
NOTAMs57 are a commonly used means in aviation to communicate announcements of
temporary or late changes to previously provided information, that are relevant to flight
operations.58 This is necessary, for example, if there is a change in the use of airspace or
flight routes or if a danger exists to air navigation services.59 NOTAMs are published by
national authorities for a number of reasons, such as:
• Military exercises resulting in restrictions to the airspace;
• The establishment or end (including activation and deactivation) of, or changes to the
status of the prohibited, restricted or danger areas. Military activities resulting from a
conflict are not mentioned separately as a reason for issuing a NOTAM, but may
constitute a reason for the establishment of a restricted area. This information is
published in the ‘Integrated Aeronautical Information Package’ of the State concerned.60
In addition to the AIP and the NOTAM, ‘Aeronautical Information Circulars (AIC)’ are
used. These contain any information that is not suitable for inclusion in the AIP or in a
NOTAM, such as announcing future regulation, and recommendations and background
information that involve flight safety, regulations or administrative processes.61
The use of a NOTAM arises from the State’s responsibility to provide aeronautical
information about its airspace and the aerodromes located in its territory.62 It is based on
the directives of the Chicago Convention (Convention on International Civil Aviation,

53 ICAO Circular 330-AN/189, Para 4.2.1.
54 ICAO Circular 330-AN/189, Para 4.2.4 and 4.2.5.
55 ICAO Doc 9554, Para 3.1.1.
56 ICAO Annex 19, Paras 3.1.3 and 4.1 and ICAO Annex 17, Para 3.3.1.
57 The term NOTAM originates from the English term ‘Notice to Airmen’.
58 ICAO Annex 15, Para 5.1.1.
59 ICAO Annex 15, Para 5.1.1.1.
60 ICAO Annex 15, Para 3.1.7. NOTAMs are part of the Integrated Aeronautical information Package. This is a
compilation of all aviation-related permanent publications. It contains the Aeronatical information Publications,
supplements, NOTAMs and PIBs, AICs, checklists and lists of NOTAMs.
61 ICAO Annex 15, Para 7.1.
62 ICAO Annex 15, Para 3.1.1.

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Safety management
Each ICAO Member State must have a State Safety Programme in place that describes
the State’s safety policy, safety objectives, risk management, safety assurance and safety
promotion.70
Monitoring
Each Member State must have systems in place that monitor requirements related to
flight safety and aviation security.71 Inspectors monitor compliance with national and
international flight safety and aviation security requirements.72
Aviation treaties
States have established mutual agreements in aviation treaties to facilitate the
development of international commercial aviation. Such treaties establish that operators
can use each other’s aerodromes.
Ukraine’s national regulations
During the investigation, Ukraine’s authorities referred in various documents to articles in
Ukraine’s aviation legislation. This legislation consists of:
• The Air Code of Ukraine. The beginning of this code stipulates (translated): ‘The Air
Code of Ukraine determines the legal basis for aviation activities. State regulation of
aviation activities and of the use of Ukraine’s airspace is intended to ensure aviation
safety, and meet the State’s interest, national security, and to satisfy requirements of
society and the economy related to air transport and aerial work.’ Article 30:1 of this
code reads: ‘The use of Ukraine’s airspace or a part thereof can be fully or partially
restricted by the competent service for civil aviation and by the bodies of the united
civil-military system of airspace organisation in accordance with the Regulation on the
use of Ukraine’s airspace.’
• Regulation on the Use of Ukraine’s Airspace. This regulation establishes the organisation
and management of the airspace over Ukraine in a large number of articles.
• Rules of Aeronautical Information Service. This Resolution establishes the way in
which aeronautical information is communicated to airspace users. It describes the
compilation, publication and distribution of NOTAMs, among other things.
Malaysia’s national regulations
In Malaysia, the tasks and roles of the Director General of Civil Aviation include monitoring
and implementing aviation regulations with regard to guaranteeing the safe growth of
civil aviation.73 The Civil Aviation Regulation of 1996 was developed to regulate civil
aviation. This regulation stipulates, for example, the conditions with which one must
comply before an aeroplane is permitted to fly, the conditions that must be satisfed
before passengers and cargo may be transported by air and the conditions related to an
aeroplane’s safety. The Director General, or a person authorised by the latter, has the

70 ICAO Annex 19, Para 3.1.
71 ICAO Annex 19, Para 3.2 and ICAO Annex 17, Paras 3.4.5 and 3.4.6.
72 ICAO Annex 6, Part I, Paras 4.2.1.1 and 4.2.1.7.
73 Civil Aviation Act 1969, Section 2B(a) and (c).

101

The International Air Transport Association (IATA) is the global trade association of
operators.84 IATA has approximately 250 members, including Malaysia Airlines, which are
responsible for 84% of all air traffc. IATA’s objective is to support, represent and lead the
aviation industry in developing a safe, reliable, proftable and sustainable aviation industry.
One of the pillars of IATA’s service involves performing audits. The IATA Operational
Safety Audit (IOSA) is an essential component of the audit programme offered and is
designed to assess an operator’s operational management systems. The IOSA audits are
mandatory for all IATA members. IATA considers security management to be an integral
component of an operator’s operational processes. Security management has been part
of the IOSA audits since 1 March 2007.
Code sharing
Code sharing (sharing a flight under different codes85) is common in civil aviation. Two or
more operators offer seats under their own code and flight number on a scheduled flight
operated by one of the operators involved. Therefore, an operator can sell a flight ticket
under its own name for a flight that, in practice, is operated by another operator. As
established, for example, in Regulation (EU) no. 2111/2005, Article 11, the operator with
which the ticket is booked (the ‘contracting carrier’) is obligated to inform passengers
about the actual operator (‘operating carrier’) of the flight concerned. In accordance with
international practices, like those endorsed by ICAO, the operator operating the flight is
the party responsible for flight operations and for the passengers.86 Liability for any
damage may however be borne by the operator that sells the ticket.87
The establishment of code sharing
If a European operator wants to conclude a code share agreement with an operator from
outside the EU, a bilateral aviation agreement (‘air services agreement’) between the
operators’ states generally forms its basis. In an air services agreement, two states agree
to allow each others’ designated operators the right to operate air services on specifc
routes between and in each other’s territories.88 This agreement also establishes that the
designated operators in the two contracting states may enter into a code sharing
agreement for code sharing services between certain destinations.
Operators can then conclude a code share agreement by drawing up a contract for this
purpose. A code share agreement is predominantly a commercial agreement, which
operators conclude to, for example, maintain, protect or expand their market share
through partnerships and to be able to offer routes that they do not fly themselves.89
These are contracts governed by private law, which, for example, may contain provisions
related to safety and security, time tables, prices, in-flight services, liability and insurances
and aerodrome operations.

84 There are also regional trade organisations such as the Association of Asia Pacifc Airlines (AAPA).
85  The two-letter code of the airline concerned, such as MH for Malaysia Airlines and KL for KLM. See also F. Rossi dal
Pozzo, ‘EU legal framework for safeguarding air passenger rights’ (Springer Cham Heidelberg 2014).
86  ICAO Doc 9626, para 4.8 says on this matter: ‘With respect to responsibility regarding user-related issues, the
usual airline industry rules and practices apply, i.e. responsibility rests with the operating carrier.’
87  The Montreal Convention, 1999.
88  The Netherlands and Malaysia concluded an air services agreement on 15 December 1966, see: Treaty Series of
the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 1967, no.14, ‘Agreement between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and Malaysia
on air services’. This was reviewed/updated in confdential MoUs in 1991, 1995 and in 2008.
89  ICAO Circular 269/AT/110, ‘Implications of airline code sharing’ (1997).

103

by performing an initial audit in accordance with an approved lease audit programme,
such as IOSA. Once the code share agreement has been concluded, the Dutch operator
must continue to ensure and verify that the non-Community operator complies with the
equivalent safety standard for the duration of the code share agreement. Operators with
safety shortcomings, as per the criteria of Regulation (EC) no. 2111/2005, are not eligible
for code sharing.96

96 This is in accordance with Regulation (EU) no. 965/2012, in force since 28 October 2014, see AIC-B 03/2014, Human
Environment and Transport Inspectorate (ILT). Before this, the practice was established in AIC-B 05/10, Transport
and Water Management Inspectorate (IVW) ‘Leasing, code sharing and interchange manual (‘Handleiding leasing,
codesharing en interchange’), 2 December 2010. The AIC-B was based on Regulation (EU) no. 1008/2008 (that
replaced Regulation (EU) no. 2407/92 as of 1 November 2008) and Appendix III to Regulation (EU) no. 3922/91
(EU-OPS). These Regulations did not contain any specifc provisions related to safety standards for code sharing,
but in accordance with a notifcation by the European Commission from 2000 (COM/2000/365 fnal. No. 61) the
provisions for ‘wet lease’ (related to equivalent safety requirements) also applied to code sharing. This notifcation
provided the then IVW with general approval for a Dutch airline’s selection procedures related to code share
partners, based on an approved lease audit programme (such as IOSA).

105

OPERATOR-DOMICILE
AEGEAN AIRLINES Greece
AEROFLOT - RUSSIAN AIRLINES Russian Federation
AEROLOGIC Germany
AIR ARABIA United Arab Emirates
AIR ASTANA Kazakhstan
AIR BALTIC Latvia
AIR EUROPA Spain
AIR FRANCE France
AIR INDIA India
ATLAS AIR United States
AUSTRIAN AIRLINES Austria
AZERBAIJAN HAVA YOLLARI Azerbaijan
BANGLADESH BIMAN Bangladesh
BELAVIA Belarus
BUSINESS JET TRAVEL AIRLINE LTD Austria
CARGOLUX AIRLINES Luxembourg
CLASSIC JET Latvia
CZECH AIRLINES Czech Republic
DELTA AIR LINES United States
DEUTSCHE LUFTHANSA Germany
DNIEPROAVIA Ukraine
ELITAVIA Slovenia
EMIRATES United Arab Emirates
ETIHAD AIRWAYS United Arab Emirates
EVA AIRWAYS CORPORATION Taiwan
EXECUJET EUROPE Switzerland
FEDERAL EXPRESS United States
FLYDUBAI United Arab Emirates
GERMAN AIR FORCE Germany
GLOBAL JET LUXEMBOURG Luxembourg

OPERATOR DOMICILE
YANAIR         Ukraine
On 17 July 2014, the following flights were operated in UKDV by or on behalf of these
operators. In total, 160 flights were conducted on this day until the airspace was closed
at 15.00 (17.00 CET) see below:

Operator - Type -  Country of departure - Country of destination
AEROFLOT A320 RUSSIAN FEDERATION RUSSIAN FEDERATION
AEROFLOT A320 RUSSIAN FEDERATION RUSSIAN FEDERATION
AEROFLOT A320 RUSSIAN FEDERATION RUSSIAN FEDERATION
AEROFLOT B77W RUSSIAN FEDERATION ISRAEL
AEROFLOT A321 RUSSIAN FEDERATION CYPRUS
AEROFLOT A320 RUSSIAN FEDERATION RUSSIAN FEDERATION
AEROFLOT A321 CYPRUS RUSSIAN FEDERATION
AEROFLOT A320 RUSSIAN FEDERATION CYPRUS
AEROFLOT A321 RUSSIAN FEDERATION RUSSIAN FEDERATION
AEROFLOT A321 RUSSIAN FEDERATION RUSSIAN FEDERATION
AEROFLOT A333 ISRAEL RUSSIAN FEDERATION
AEROFLOT B77W ISRAEL RUSSIAN FEDERATION
AEROLOGIC B77L GERMANY THAILAND
AIR ASTANA A321 KAZAKHSTAN NETHERLANDS
AIR ASTANA A321 NETHERLANDS KAZAKHSTAN
AIR BALTIC CORPORATION B735 AZERBAIJAN LATVIA
AIR BALTIC CORPORATION B733 GEORGIA LATVIA
AIR EUROPA B738 RUSSIAN FEDERATION SPAIN
AIR INDIA B788 INDIA UNITED KINGDOM
AIR INDIA B788 INDIA UNITED KINGDOM
AIR INDIA B788 INDIA UNITED KINGDOM
AIR INDIA B788 INDIA GERMANY
AIR INDIA B788 INDIA FRANCE
AIR INDIA B77W INDIA UNITED KINGDOM

109

Operator - Type -  Country of departure - Country of destination
DEUTSCHE LUFTHANSA B748 CHINA GERMANY
DNIEPROAVIA E145 UKRAINE ARMENIA
DNIEPROAVIA E145 ARMENIA UKRAINE
DNIEPROAVIA E145 UKRAINE ARMENIA
DNIEPROAVIA E145 ARMENIA UKRAINE
ELITAVIA D.O.O. GLEX RUSSIAN FEDERATION CYPRUS
EMIRATES A388 CANADA UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
EMIRATES B77W SWEDEN UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
EMIRATES A345 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES UKRAINE
ETIHAD AIRWAYS B77L UNITED STATES UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
ETIHAD AIRWAYS A319 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES BELARUS
ETIHAD AIRWAYS B77W UNITED ARAB EMIRATES CANADA
ETIHAD AIRWAYS B77W UNITED ARAB EMIRATES UNITED STATES
ETIHAD AIRWAYS A319 BELARUS UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
EVA AIRWAYS B77W CHINA FRANCE
EVA AIRWAYS B77W THAILAND UNITED KINGDOM
EVA AIRWAYS B77W THAILAND NETHERLANDS
EVA AIRWAYS B744 INDIA GERMANY
EVA AIRWAYS B77W FRANCE CHINA
HANG KHONG VIET NAM B772 VIETNAM GERMANY
HANG KHONG VIET NAM B772 VIETNAM FRANCE
HANG KHONG VIET NAM B772 GERMANY VIET NAM
HANG KHONG VIET NAM B772 FRANCE VIET NAM
JET AIRWAYS A333 INDIA BELGIUM
JET AIRWAYS B77W INDIA UNITED KINGDOM
JET AIRWAYS A333 BELGIUM INDIA
JET AIRWAYS B77W BELGIUM INDIA
JET AIRWAYS B77W INDIA UNITED KINGDOM
JET AIRWAYS B77W INDIA UNITED KINGDOM
JET AIRWAYS B77W UNITED KINGDOM INDIA

111

Operator - Type -  Country of departure - Country of destination
SINGAPORE AIRLINES A388 SINGAPORE UNITED KINGDOM
SINGAPORE AIRLINES B77W SINGAPORE UNITED KINGDOM
SINGAPORE AIRLINES B77W SINGAPORE GERMANY
SINGAPORE AIRLINES B772 NETHERLANDS SINGAPORE
SINGAPORE AIRLINES A388 UNITED KINGDOM SINGAPORE
SINGAPORE AIRLINES B772 DENMARK SINGAPORE
SINGAPORE AIRLINES A388 FRANCE SINGAPORE
SINGAPORE AIRLINES A388 GERMANY SINGAPORE
SINGAPORE AIRLINES A388 UNITED KINGDOM SINGAPORE
SWISS INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES A343 THAILAND SWITZERLAND
THAI AIRWAYS A388 THAILAND GERMANY
THAI AIRWAYS A388 THAILAND FRANCE
THAI AIRWAYS A346 THAILAND SWITZERLAND
THAI AIRWAYS B744 THAILAND UNITED KINGDOM
THAI AIRWAYS B772 THAILAND SPAIN
THAI AIRWAYS B77W THAILAND BELGIUM
THAI AIRWAYS B744 THAILAND ITALY
THAI AIRWAYS A346 UNITED KINGDOM THAILAND
THAI AIRWAYS A346 THAILAND GERMANY
THAI AIRWAYS A346 THAILAND UNITED KINGDOM
THAI AIRWAYS B744 THAILAND GERMANY
THAI AIRWAYS B77W BELGIUM THAILAND
THAI AIRWAYS A388 FRANCE THAILAND
THAI AIRWAYS B744 UNITED KINGDOM THAILAND
THAI AIRWAYS A388 GERMANY THAILAND
TURKMENHOVAYOLLARY B752 UNITED KINGDOM TURKMENISTAN
UKRAINE INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES B735 ARMENIA UKRAINE
UKRAINE INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES B739 GEORGIA UKRAINE
UKRAINE INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES B738 GEORGIA UKRAINE
UKRAINE INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES E190 AZERBAIJAN UKRAINE

113

APPENDIX S

PRECEDENTS: ACCIDENTS INVOLVING CIVIL AVIATION OVER CONFLICT ZONES

Introduction
The shoot-down of a civil aircraft with a surface-to-air missile may be a rare event, but it
is not without precedent. Since the Second World War there have been a number of
similar cases. There are several lists and studies in circulation.98 Comparisons of these
lists have resulted in more than 20 occurrences that possibly involved cases of civil
aeroplanes being shot down, or attempts to do so.
Criteria
Flight MH17 was flying at a cruising altitude of 33,000 feet, beyond the reach of
MANPADS. To select similar precedents, the Dutch Safety Board focused on civil
aeroplanes flying en route (in most cases, above FL250 99), which were accidentally shot
down with anti-aircraft missiles. Not included are attacks on military airplanes and attacks
during approaches or take-offs.
Based on these criteria three similar incidents can be cited.
• 1980: DC-9 Aerolinee Itavia flight 870, crashed in the Tyrrhenian Sea on 27 June 1980.
On 23 January 2013, the highest Italian legal authority ruled that there was clear
evidence that it had been downed by an anti-aircraft missile.
• 1988: A300 Iran air flight 655, downed on 3 July near the Strait of Hormuz, in the
Persian Gulf. It involved a misidentifcation by a U.S. cruiser that then fred an antiaircraft missile.
• 2001: TU 154 Siberia Airlines flight 1812, downed above the Black Sea on 4 October.
Firing exercises were being conducted close to the flight route of flight 1812. One
missile missed its target and subsequently hit flight 1812.
Other incidents
Including civil aeroplanes shot down in cruise flight by military planes, the number
increases to eight incidents. It should be noted that, in these fve additional cases, the
involved military planes intentionally downed the civil aeroplanes. The respective
locations can be considered as conflict areas. The most recent of these fve was Korean
Air Lines flight KAL007 in 1983. The other four occurred in the 1950s and 1970s.

98 The following lists were consulted: a study by HCSS, Aviation Safety Network, Gutenberg list.
99 This altitude was selected to flter out MANPADS.

115
APPENDIX T

REPORT OF THE DUTCH REVIEW COMMITTEE FOR THE INTELLIGENCE
AND SECURITY SERVICES
Dutch Review Committee for the Intelligence and security services (CTIVD101)
Review Report arising from the crash of the flight MH17
The role of the General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands (AIVD) and
the Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) in the decision-making related
to the security of flight routes.

101 The CTIVD is responsible for the content of this appendix, including the terminology used, which may deviate
from the terminology used by the Dutch Safety Board.

117