State ofplayinvestigation Primo (Gerrit) Gerrit presents an update of the investigation. The results of the investigation exclude the alternative scenarios. We are waiting for the NLR report, which is expected to be finalized within two weeks.
The forensic part of the investigation is accomplished. Recently the forensic investigators came across a 2015 KFI-report (about the launch site). The report was made for the OVV). Oleg is not familiar with it, he will check if it is or otherwise can be shared in the JIT. Maartje asks him to first contact Manon before it is shared.
Gerrit explains our approach to try to reach out to potential witnesses or people related to POI's that live in countries where we can work. For instance a relative of a POI in the
USA.
Gerrit tells about Russian influence in elections in several countries like Bosnia and Montenegro and parallels with the eastern Ukrainian conflict.
Maartje states that we are considering how deep we should get into these parallels, or subjects like the command structure and for instance the involvement of oligarchs, operating in the background.
It is a concern that the SBU doesn't make enough effort at hearing relevant witnesses and/or persons of interest on the already long time ago shared list.
The posting of information on our VK-page (like for instance the Buk-image we posted there) can effectively bring us new witnesses.
Gerrit further elaborates on the phone call he received from B, as a result of the witness approach via direct messaging. The conversation of B has lead us to Budik, who was being held as a prisoner of war by July 17, 2014. Anne: He is an excellent witness. He saw and heard a lot while being a prisoner of war. It was worthwhile to have an interview with him.
The report of the identification of Delphin is not yet ready. Oleg: we (SBU, not the Ru-speaking officers at the FiO) are monitoring potential witnesses as well as suspects and trying to get them on our side. Actually we are in contact with someone who was on the launch site and we are trying to get that person at our side. This is actually why Igor is not present today. We are aware of the whereabouts of this person via current telephone interceptions.
Oleg tells that still new information, relevant to MH17, is found in old conversations.
Maartje states that it can be a problem if we keep receiving new data. How long can we go on with keeping personnel in the FiO to analyze new intercepted data, how relevant is this, what can we expect from this. A lot of the people working in the field office have been doing this so for three and a half years. That is a long period. We really have to look for an end date. Not that NPN will leave Kiev all together, but we need to work to a lesser amount of people. This is a conversation that we have to have with the SBU.
Gerrit: Our ambition is to gather evidence. Gerrit shows the composition of the investigation team and tells that the help of the SBU is needed. The investigation depends on the help of the SBU to do the interviews in Ukraine.
David endorses that the SBU is needed for witness opportunities. Oleg explains the difficulties and the workload where of the SBU because of some threats.
Maartie stresses that we fully understand the pressure the SBU is under and that we are aware of the importance of the other investigations that they are undertaking, but that we simply cannot move on with our investigation without them.
Oleg states that according to their law an Ukrainian official must be present during witness interviews in Ukraine and that according to the JIT-agreement Ukrainian law must be respected. He further states that he has a solution for the problem with the witness interviews: he himself, like policemen are, is allowed to take interviews. So if witnesses need to be interviewed, instead of the SBU he would be able to conduct the interview. When asked he added that he would not only have to be present, but actually should be doing the interview himself.
Manon responds by saying that this is not the answer, since Oleg is busy enough doing his own job and besides that, conducting the interviews is one thing, but finding the witnesses and bring them in is another thing. Only the SBU is able to locate witnesses
and bring them in.
David is willing to have someone working on the witness approach but a SBU investigator is needed to join.
Gerrit announces that national police chief Akerboom, on behalf of the Dutch police, wants to invite the SBU boss Grytsak to discuss the point that SBU help is needed.
Oleg repeats what Igor has said before, that the best solution is to put Ukrainian officers here in Driebergen so they are out of reach for new work. After a discussion on this point, in which it is being stressed that the SBU is needed in Ukraine, because the work that needs to be done, needs to be done there and cannot be done by NPN and AFP alone,

Wouter tells that in Belgium they even did it with suspects, but those were suspects that were residing in countries that we had no treaties with. To lure a witness is no problem at all.
David: considers this to be a covert operation. Should be possible with witnesses, as long as no criminal offences are being committed, but again I would like to have some time to contact AFP legal department.
Oleg sees no problem if this is done by The Netherlands. It's like a regular intelligence operation but he also wants to discuss this point back home.
Maartie states that we have to discuss this with Malaysia as well. Gerrit would like to let Malaysia know what the outcome of the discussion with each individual country is. That might make it easier for Malaysia to decide.
Maartje states that it is important that we have consensus on these issues with all JIT- partners, so that we will also show consensus to the world in case an operation like this would happen and become known.
Maartie asks for the opinions on engaging and interviewing suspects in RF, without the authorities being informed and involved?
Oleg thinks that it is a problem according to Ukrainian law, we have to notify him of his position as a suspect and he has the right to be assisted by a lawyer. In Ukraine you cannot waive that right. The lawyer has to be present.
Maartie: and what if it is not the JIT that acts but only the Dutch (from Driebergen)? Oleg If this takes place under responsibility of the Dutch prosecutor and we are just present I don't see a legal problem under Ukrainian law.
Maartje: Do you think that you can justify this and explain it back home?
Lieve tells that in Belgium they have a fairly lenient supreme court, but this wouldn't pass the test because it violates the rights of suspects. Lieve explains that it would not be a problem if they would make the suspect travel to another country. David thinks that it wouldn't be admissible according to Australian law. Covert action happens in Australia. David has to discuss this back home (AFP intern).
Oleg We don't have to do anything with luring of the suspect if it's done by the Netherlands. When it's the JIT it's another question.
Maartje finalizes this discussion saying for this moment enough is said. After consultation back home it will be brought up again.
Internationalization ofa future prosecution (Maartje) Maartje presents ideas and possibilities for the internationalization of a future prosecution. An international press centre is important for internationalization of the communication. It makes clear that it's not only the Dutch prosecutor, but that is spoken on behalf of the JIT. Another plus is that messages can be composed by native
speakers.
Maartie postulates the idea of an advisory board of high officials that can advise on important steps, such as issuing arrests warrants.
Lieve warns to be careful that it's not going to be a political board. That might give the impression of not being independent.
David proposes that the advisory board is just part a larger prosecution team with members of all of the JIT-members, rather than giving it a distinct title.
Oleg posits the problem that on his side high persons are not experienced in investigations. Do these people give practical advise? Do they need to read the file,
know the case?
Maartie amplifies that showing international support is the motive for creating this advisory board. This board should be formed by people with judicial background from JIT-countries and possibly also from other grieving nations.
Lieve thinks you don't need an advisory board if you have good international communication. She suggests that Eurojust can be used to host meetings as Eurojust has done before in this case.
Maartje argues that besides international communications harmony is needed: What if Dutch prosecutors conclude to manslaughter and others say manslaughter is not enough and reject the Dutch point of view openly. But also contra's can be seen: How do you go further if one country doesn't agree?
Maartie introduces the idea of a JIT working force: presence of all JIT countries in the court room. This should be a team of experienced prosecutors, who all know what goes on in a court room. Maartje explains that we are thinking about the idea of having colleagues in the court room to follow the trial and to report to the prosecution team at the end of each day on how things went. Should other questions have been asked, what has been said that is relevant, what should be investigated further? The reports will be collected and assessed by the prosecutor.

JIT-FiO meeting 26 January 2018 (Day 2)
Participants Dutch prosecutor's service: Maartje Nieuwenhuis (chair), Manon Ridderbeks, Anne van Dooren, Marvin Aaron (minutes) Belgian Prosecutor's service: Lieve Pellens Belgian Police: Wouter Waumans Dutch Police: Gerrit Thiry Australian Federal Police: David Nelson, Alex Kazagrandi (interpreter) Ukrainian Prosecutor's service: Oleg Peresada
1. Radar Data Analysis Patrick Warnier (NPN) provides an update of the analysis of the radar data received from the RF. The analysis consists of 2 separate analyses of the Utes-t Rostov radar, because of the fact that the RF provided us with two data sets.
Each data set has been analyzed by a separate expert. The first data set contained primary and secondary radar data accompanied by a software tool for visualization. The expert's conclusion is that 1) there was no evidence of data manipulation, 2) that there were no other objects in the vicinity of MH17, and 3) that supersonic missiles like the BUK would likely have not been detected by the radar due to its processing and display filters. Furthermore, an irremovable setting in the accompanying software would have made it impossible to see a missile in the radar data even if it had been detected. This circumstance led the team to request the RF to send the radar data in ASTERIX-format (an exchange format that is commonly used to interpret radar data). The RF responded by sending the requested radar data, but it seemed they had problems converting the data to the ASTERIX-format. However, the expert was able to extract and analyze the ASTERIX-data. His conclusions are that: 1) there is no evidence of data manipulation, but the data can easily be manipulated without him being able to notice it, 2) the file contains data in ASTERIX and other data, 3) there are no other radar detections in the vicinity of MH17. Reasons for the absence of radar detections could be that possible flying objects were too small for detection, the detection of a flying object was filtered out by radar settings or the detection was manually removed from the data.
Alex (AFP) asks if other planes were detected. Patrick confirms that all known planes have been detected by the radar. Anne (OM) asks if one of the reports mentions the areas that are not covered by the radar. Manon (OM) responds that the first report covers this aspect. Maartje (OM) asks Patrick whether there are any remaining unsolved questions. Patrick responds that this is not the case, besides the three radar plots after impact of MH17. According to Patrick, someone should explain that these plots could either be parts of the aircraft or the missile, to avoid questions or complot theories in a later stage.
The participants discuss what should be the next step. Normally these findings would not be released to the public, but it in this case the matter has generated a lot of attention (of the next of kin and politicians). Gerrit (NPN) suggests that we can use the radar findings in our advantage by using the media. Another question is whether the findings should be (partly) visualized. In any case, the findings will first be presented to the next of kin and then possibly in a letter to the Dutch Parliament.
2. Direct Messaging Manon refers to the last meeting in May '17 in which this subject got a lot of attention. The original plan was changed due to the fact that the SBU had safety-concerns about sending messages through VK/OK and sending messages to persons we know are in the RF. This resulted in a reduction of the amount of messages (66 messages to 55 persons) ns) that the team had planned on sending initially. Alot of effort has been put into this, and the outcome has been positive: 10% of the approached persons responded. Another effect is that the team now has the know-how to undertake such a project. This makes it worthwhile considering doing this again, but more often and in a smarter way. And this leads us to the question whether messaging through VK/OK should be included in the future and whether we should send messages to persons we know are in the RF. The decision cannot be taken without lhor (SBU), but it seems appropriate to consider the options beforehand.
Oleg (PGO) explains that the danger lies in the fact that VK/OK was created by the RF intelligence agencies. The risks could be that we will end up with dead witnesses or witnesses who have been instructed to provide a testimony that leads us down the wrong path. Oleg agrees that a possible solution is sending messages to a group of persons instead of individuals. If that doesn't yield good results, we can always consider sending personal messages. Approaching high-profile persons (because they appear, for example, in the media regularly) is probably less risky than approaching low-profile persons who can disappear silently.
The participants agree that new rounds of direct messaging (including approaching persons through VK/OK and/or persons we know are in the RF) is worth considering. The first step should be the use of relevant fora like f.e. the 53rd brigade or retired military. We will have to sort out what for a we can use. Wouter and Lieve (Belgium) mention that they may be able to provide staff to assist. NPN will get into contact with Wouter/Lieve to work out the details when the time comes.