State /
Organisation

Ministry of
Infrastructure and
the Environment
of The
Netherlands

Page

15

Section /
Paragraph

1

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

In the context of this report, the term safety is meant as an
overarching term that encompasses intentional threats to civil
aviation (security) as well as safety in the sense of the word that
does not entail intentionality (safety). The report only mentions
‘security’ when referring to the specifc activity focused on
managing intentional threats (see also, for example, Chapter 6,
page 87). This leads to confusion.

Argumentation /
substantiation

Dutch Safety Board
response

The defnitions of safety and security used are included in
Section 12, Abbreviations and Defnitions

State /
Organisation

Ministry of
Infrastructure and the
Environment of The Netherlands

Page

23

Section /
Paragraph

2/3

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

If, based on its AOC, an airline is authorised to fly and thus land
in a certain area, a National State can only impose a flight
prohibition on its airlines if this action is explicitly included in its
national legislation. The Netherlands cannot do so. This needs
to be clear from the diagram (or at least include a reference to
the third paragraph on page 25). Check wording

Argumentation /
substantiation

Dutch Safety Board
response

The diagram is not specifcally relevant to the Netherlands, but
to a limited number of other countries. It is a simplifed diagram,
which is explained in more detail in the text.

State /
Organisation

Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of
The Netherlands

Page

37

Section /
Paragraph

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

Add nuance to the entire section using other statements:
Ukraine’s briefng on 14/7 and the press statement on 15/7.
Refer also to the CTIVD investigation and other references,
which disproved even before 17/7 that a weapon at cruising
altitude could have been involved in the Antonov incident.

Argumentation /
substantiation

See the accompanying letter. Too much value is attached considering
the complex of facts known before and after 17/7 about the cause of
the Antonov’s crash

Dutch Safety Board
response

The Dutch Safety Board was not able to verify the exact
altitudes of the aircraft that were downed prior to 17 July.
Altitudes that were announced by the Ukrainian authorities are
cited in the text. The weapon systems cited by the RNBO can hit
aeroplanes at higher altitudes. The Dutch Safety Board deems
this report to be relevant to the risk assessment by Ukraine. In
the investigation referred to, the possibility that the aeroplane
was shot down with an air-to-air missile was not addressed.

State /
Organisation

Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of
The Netherland

Page

39

Section /
Paragraph

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

Western military sources doubted this notion (see also
Chapter 6)

Argumentation /
substantiation

Elaborate or delete

Dutch Safety Board
response

This concerns a reference to an elaboration in Chapter 6.

State /
Organisation

Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of
The Netherlands

Page

43

Section /
Paragraph

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

Delete ‘The weapon systems that were explicitly mentioned in a
press statement could pose a risk to civil air traffc at cruising
altitude.

Argumentation /
substantiation

This sub-conclusion goes too far. There were several statements by
the Ukrainian authorities. The systems mentioned in the statement by
the RNBO (p. 38) were, according to that statement, fred by the RF.
The AIVD/MIVD investigation demonstrated (before 17/7) that this
was unlikely.

Dutch Safety Board
response

If an armed conflict is being fought in an area and expands to
the airspace, and there are uncertainties pertaining to the
weapons present, a potential threat to civil aviation should be
taken into account. In the investigation referred to, the
possibility that the aeroplane was shot down with an air-to-air
missile was not addressed.

State /
Organisation

Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of
The Netherlands

Page

59

Section /
Paragraph

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

Delete ‘The weapon systems that were explicitly mentioned in a
press Statement could pose a risk to civil air traffc at cruising
altitude.’

Argumentation /
substantiation

This conclusion goes too far: there is no linear connection between
risks to military aircraft and risks to civil aircraft if weapons that can
reach cruising altitude are not available during the conflict. As
revealed by the investigations cited in the report, such as those of the
AIVD/MIVD, there were no indications of any danger to civil aviation
prior to 17/7.

Dutch Safety Board
response

If an armed conflict is being fought in an area and expands to
the airspace, and there are uncertainties pertaining to the
weapons present, a potential threat to civil aviation should be
taken into account. In the investigation referred to, the
possibility that the aeroplane was shot down with an air-to-air
missile was not addressed.

State /
Organisation

Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of
The Netherlands

Page

62

Section /
Paragraph

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

Add: ‘non-binding recommendation’

Argumentation /
substantiation

Repeat what has already been stated, that this document is nonbinding

Dutch Safety Board
response

Elsewhere the report states that ICAO Docs are non-binding,
which does not need to be repeated here.
This sub-conclusion relates to the fact that Ukraine did not act
according to the spirit of this recommendation. Although the
recommendation is not binding, it isn’t non-committal either.

State /
Organisation

Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of
The Netherland

Page

62

Section /
Paragraph

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

Delete: ‘The weapon systems…closed’.

Argumentation /
substantiation

See previous comments. In light of the information available prior to
17/7, too much value is attached to the suspicions that the RNBO
expressed in its statement

Dutch Safety Board
response

The Dutch Safety Board was not able to verify the exact
altitudes of the aircraft that were downed prior to 17 July.
Altitudes that were announced by the Ukrainian authorities are
included in the fgure and cited in the text. The weapon systems
cited by the RNBO can hit aeroplanes at higher altitudes. The
Dutch Safety Board deems this report to be relevant to the risk
assessment by Ukraine in itself.

State /
Organisation

Ministry of
Infrastructure and
the Environment
of The
Netherlands

Page

69

Section /
Paragraph

5/4

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

The difference between safety and security is not explicit
enough.
Safety of the flight in the flight phase (= safety). A security
department assesses the situation on the ground (= security),
but the airline is also ultimately responsible for in-flight security
measures (on board the aeroplane) to be taken as well as for
those taken. Sentence 16 is also incorrect: ‘security’ is translated
as ‘beveiliging’. Page 70 then goes on to discuss the ‘safety
situation’ (line 1)

Argumentation /
substantiation

Dutch Safety Board
response

This section describes the organisation at Malaysia Airlines. In
Section 12, Abbreviations and Defnitions, the concepts are
explained.

State /
Organisation

Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of
The Netherlands

Page

69

Section /
Paragraph

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

‘The Security Department is responsible for security. Analysts
that produce threat analyses mainly examine the situation on the
ground and not in the airspace.’ ‘The Security Department is not
responsible for studying aeronautical information such as
NOTAMs and threats to airspace.

Argumentation /
substantiation

This shortcoming at airlines appears to have been given little weight
in the fnal assessment.

Dutch Safety Board
response

The shortcoming that arises from Annex 17 of the Chicago
Convention is cited elsewhere in the report (Chapter 9)

State /
Organisation

Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of
The Netherlands

Page

87

Section /
Paragraph

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

This section also mentions the airlines ‘based’ in a particular
state

Argumentation /
substantiation

In the context of the Netherlands, airlines are only ‘based’ in the
country if they possess a Dutch Air Operation Certifcate, are under
the legal control of the Dutch government and are Dutch/European
property. Malaysia Airlines does have a representation in the
Netherlands, but in this sense was not based in the Netherlands.

Dutch Safety Board
response

The context reveals that, with regard to a flight prohibition or
restriction, Malaysia Airlines is not referred to.

State /
Organisation

Ministry of The
Interior and
Kingdom
Relations of The
Netherlands

Page

89

Section /
Paragraph

6.3

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

Addition by the CTIVD is missing: ‘It is then up to the AIVD to
consider whether the provision of information is one of its tasks’.

Argumentation /
substantiation

Dutch Safety Board
response

For the full text, refer to Appendix T.

State /
Organisation

Ministry of The
Interior and
Kingdom
Relations of The
Netherlands

Page

89

Section /
Paragraph

6.3

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

It is important to explicate the interaction between the AIVD’s
different legal tasks here. Namely that the focus of the AIVD’s
A and D tasks arising from the WIV2002 does not involve
conducting research into the safety of an airspace. Since the C
task, which is being referred to here, is an extension of the A
task, it may have little or no relevant information related to the
safety of flight routes.

Argumentation /
substantiation

Dutch Safety Board
response

he footnote refers to the Appendix in which this is explained.

State /
Organisation

Ministry of The
Interior and
Kingdom
Relations of The
Netherland

Page

90

Section /
Paragraph

6.3

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

After the sentence: ‘in accordance with the AIVD’s policy…
intention (motives)’ add: ‘these factors offer an insight into the
severity and the probability of a threat’. This makes it clear that
the AIVD’s efforts are linked to those of the NCTV and that the
system is used of the Monitoring and Security system, of which
conceivable threats are an integral component.1
1. For details, see the circular on monitoring and security accessible to
the public (the new circular entered into force on 1 July 2015).
https://zoek.offcielebekendmakingen.nl/ … -3324.html

Argumentation /
substantiation

Dutch Safety Board
response

This part specifcally refers to the AIVD and the MIVD. For a
more comprehensive description, refer to Appendix T.

State /
Organisation

Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of
The Netherland

Page

94

Section /
Paragraph

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

Add nuance to ‘The Dutch Safety Board… civil aviation’. The
embassy in Kyiv performed its task properly. The information
obtained was assessed in The Hague and used to arrive at the
necessary conclusions.

Argumentation /
substantiation

At several points it is stated ‘that no connection was made between
risks the conflict posed to civil aviation’. Here also applies that the
diplomatic service reported the information that was shared with it.
This information was used to arrive at specifc conclusions in The
Hague, i.e. AIVD/MIVD: there were no indications/actual threat. See
the AIVD/MIVD’s wording on p. 92-93

Dutch Safety Board
response

This concerns a factual representation of the communications.
Moreover, the embassy reports concern not only a literal
account of what was shared, but also a political and military
interpretation thereof. Paragraph 8.4 explicitly states that
identifying risks to civil aviation is not one of the embassy’s or
the defence attaché’s tasks.

State /
Organisation

Ministry of The
Interior and
Kingdom
Relations of The
Netherlands

Page

106

Section /
Paragraph

7.3

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

Firstly, it requires an integral risk assessment to be performed.
Parties that view the conflict from a military or geopolitical angle
should be more aware of potential secondary effects on civil
aviation. Knowledge of the main flight routes could increase this
awareness. Airlines that want to fly over a conflict area must take
into account the potential risks posed by that conflict

Argumentation /
substantiation

Airlines can conduct independent research in this respect

Dutch Safety Board
response

The Dutch Safety Board agrees, but also sees a role for states in
this, as descibed.

State /
Organisation

USA/FAA

Page

Overall
Comments
regarding:
Operations
Specifcations

Section /
Paragraph

Overall
Comments
regarding:
Operations
Specifcation

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

Argumentation /
substantiation

• Assuming that neither the FAA nor the air navigation service
provider managing the airspace has restricted or prohibited the
use of particular airspace, in choosing routes of flight, US Air
Carriers are required to adhere to their Operations Specifcations
(OpSpecs).
• In general, OpSpecs are not prohibitive; they allow operations
within the requirements of the regulations in Title 14 CFR based on
specifc conditions and limitations. 14 CFR Part 121 Subparts E and
F contain the requirements for Approval of Routes.
• §§119.49(a)(6),(b)(6) and (c)(4) (depending on the kind of operations
conducted) state that the certifcate holder must obtain operations
specifcations that list the areas of operations and, in some cases,
routes. OpSpec B050 lists the authorized areas of en-route
operation for the certifcate holder. How the general areas are
divided can be found in Order 8900.1, Volume 3, Chapter 18,
Section 4 for B050.

Dutch Safety Board
response

State /
Organisation

USA/FAA

Page

40

Section /
Paragraph

3.4

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

Non-concur with oversimplifcation of the graphic that
presents Ukrainian military aircraft shot down by the ProRussian separatists. The graphic should include an altitude
representation to more accurately represent and clarify the
signifcant difference in threat conditions based on aircraft
altitudes. As stated in the report, the separatists were known to
be supplied/equipped with MANPADS and AAA weapons capable
of engaging aircraft at lower altitudes. The separatists also had a
demonstrated intent to target military aircraft conducting combat
and combat support missions at lower altitudes. There was no
indication (as stated in the report) the separatists had any intent to
target civil aviation, and prior to July 17, there was no indication
that they had any operational weapon system capable of targeting
civil aviation at high altitude (e.g. MH17 at 33,000ft).

Argumentation /
substantiation

The graphic as presented gives the false impression that all of the
shoot downs were equal in circumstances. It fails to portray the
signifcant altitude difference between the low altitude shoot downs
of military aircraft conducting active combat operations or combat
support operations (less than 21,000ft) and the higher altitude attack
against a civil air carrier (MH17 at 33,000ft) flying a heavily travelled,
well-defned overflight air route on a pre-coordinated commercial
flight plan.
The Ukrainian-issued NOTAMs in place effectively prohibited civil
aviation in the altitude layers impacted by the lower altitude
separatist weapons systems and the associated military aircraft shoot
downs.

Dutch Safety Board
response

The fgure only includes incidents that were confrmed by the
Ukrainian authorities. The Ukrainian authorities provided an
altitude indication for three of these incidents: An-30, An-26,
Su-25.
The Dutch Safety Board concludes that the airspace restrictions
were inadequate for protecting civil aviation at greater altitudes
against the weapons systems that, according to the Ukrainian
authorities, were used on July 14 and July 16.

State /
Organisation

USA/FAA

Page

45

Section /
Paragraph

3.5

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

Add to the words ‘Except for the FAA NOTAMs issued in the
spring of 2014,’ to the beginning of the following sentence,
‘Despite the Western political and military focus on the conflict,
its escalation and its air component, none of the politicians or
authorities quoted publicly made a connection between the
military developments in Eastern Ukraine and risks to civil air
traffc

Argumentation /
substantiation

As written, the sentence inaccurately suggests that the FAA had
made no public statements regarding hazards to civil aviation
resulting from the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. The FAA issues flight
advisories and flight prohibitions for U.S. civil aviation operating in
airspace that the U.S. does not manage via NOTAM. Flight prohibition
NOTAMs are followed up by flight prohibition SFARs, as appropriate.
For the FAA, these documents are public statements and, in addition
to publishing the information in the NOTAM system and, for SFARs, in
the Federal Register, the FAA publishes information about its flight
prohibitions and restrictions for U.S. civil aviation on the internet at
http://www.faa.gov/air_traffc/publicati … rictions/.

Dutch Safety Board
response

his paragraph concerns the interpretations of the conflict by
politicians and diplomats, not FAA publications.

State /
Organisation

USA/FAA

Page

47

Section /
Paragraph

3.7

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

This paragraph reflects inaccurate assumptions, as least so far as
the U.S. is concerned, about the role of the diplomatic corps in
addressing weapons-related hazards to civil aviation. In the U.S.,
it is the FAA’s role, as the civil aviation authority, to make
determinations about whether it is safe for U.S. operators and
airmen to continue operating in particular airspace managed by
another State, in coordination with other elements of the U.S.
government, as appropriate

Argumentation /
substantiation

Protection of civil aircraft from aviation safety hazards related to
conflicts and other weapons-related situations has been and should
remain a technical matter for civil aviation authorities and air
navigation service providers to address, supported by those elements
of their respective governments who provide them with information
about risks to civil aviation, as opposed to a foreign affairs matter. We
would recommend that the Dutch Safety Board consider carefully the
potential negative impact on international aviation safety of making a
technical aviation safety matter the focus of international political
discussions between States

Dutch Safety Board
response

he fact that civil aviation authorities do perform risk
assessments of potential dangers posed to civil aviation by
conflicts does not rule out diplomatic services‘ being able to
pick up signals of such dangers and passing them on to relevant
parties.

State /
Organisation

USA/FAA

Page

47

Section /
Paragraph

3.8
5.6
5.6

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

Non-concur with the similar implication in the following
sentences or statements, (pages 47, 80, 81)
‘During the period from 1 March through 17 July 2014, foreign
authorities and international organisations such as ICAO did not
issue any specifc safety warnings related to using the airspace
above Eastern Ukraine. In diplomatic circles, no connection was
made between the armed conflict and risks to civil aviation
either.’
‘The FAA did not issue a ban or any other warnings related to
flying in the area above Eastern Ukraine.’
‘Insofar as the Dutch Safety Board was able to ascertain, between
the end of April and 17 July 2014 no States issued any formal
warnings about the safety of the airspace in Ukraine, let alone
about the airspace above Eastern Ukraine. It was precisely during
this period that the conflict spread to the air.’
These statements imply the FAA took no action to safeguard
civil aviation in eastern Ukraine during the time period prior to
the MH17 incident.

Argumentation /
substantiation

This is an inaccurate implication with regards to the FAA and the
United States.
The FAA actively monitored the conflict in eastern Ukraine for any
indication of change in the potential threat to U.S. civil aviation in
order to determine whether any action by the FAA was necessary. The
FAA along with other U.S. Government agencies monitored and
analysed the conflict for any indications that new separatist or Russian
anti- aircraft weapons were introduced or if there was an indication of
possible hostile intent toward civil aviation. The FAA also monitored
Ukrainian-issued NOTAMs to ensure that the steps being taken by
Ukraine, as the State responsible for providing air navigation services,
were suffcient to address the risks to U.S. civil aviation.
The FAA did issue NOTAMs in the spring of 2014 that advised of
hazards to U.S. civil aviation in all of the Ukrainian FIRs. However, the
FAA determined that there was no need to take additional action
between the time that it issued the second of the two April 2014
NOTAMs and the crash of MH17, since there were no indications of a
signifcant change in threat levels to U.S. civil aviation during that time
in airspace not already addressed by existing Ukrainian NOTAMs (e.g.
geographic-based altitude restrictions). Based on the information
available to the FAA at the time, the Ukrainian NOTAMs provided
suffcient protection for U.S. civil aviation for the assessed threat level

Dutch Safety Board
response

The wording has been specifed to the period during which the
conflict expanded to the airspace. In this period, not a single
state, for as far as the Dutch Safety Board was able to ascertain,
explicitly warned its operators and pilots that the airspace above
the conflict zone was increasingly unsafe, nor did they issue a
flight prohibition. This was also the case when, according to the
Ukrainian authorities, the shooting-down of an Antonov An-26 on
14 July 2014 and that of a Sukhoi Su-25 on 16 July 2014 occurred
while these aeroplanes were flying at altitudes beyond the
effective range of MANPADS.The weapon systems mentioned by
the Ukrainian authorities in relation to the shooting down of
these aircraft can pose a risk to civil aeroplanes, because they
are capable of reaching their cruising altitude.

State /
Organisation

USA/FAA

Page

109

Section /
Paragraph

8

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

Non-concur with the statement, ‘None of the aviation
parties involved adequately identifed the risks that the
armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine posed to civil air traffc
flying overhead. No integral risk assessment was performed

Argumentation /
substantiation

Dutch Safety Board
response

See above.

State /
Organisation

Russian
Federation

Page

35

Section /
Paragraph

3.1

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

This chapter describes information that the Dutch Safety Board
found in public and closed sources, related to the situation in
Eastern Ukraine during the period between 1 March and 17 July
2014. Were there events and developments prior to the crash of
flight MH17 that States or airline could have interpreted as
signals of a possible decrease in the safety of the airspace
above the area and thus of an increasing risk to aircraft flying
over it?

Argumentation /
substantiation

General comment to section 3 of the report:
The report uses multiple references to the sources of information mainly
limited by the statements of the US, NATO and Ukraine offcials, which
were not proved by any documents. The report does not mention the
materials from the briefng held by the Russian Ministry of Defense
(the link is given below) which presented the objective facts,
characterizing the threats to safety of civil aviation flights observed
before the crash on July 17, 2015.
http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/newsline/
f6c3bbd89ac2532d44257d1d00203ccf
It is necessary to complement the report with the data provided by
the Russian Ministry of Defense regarding MH17 crash.

Dutch Safety Board
response

The briefng referred to in the comment was held on 21 July
2014, four days after the crash. The section concerns signals
prior to the crash.

State /
Organisation

Russian
Federation

Page

36

Section /
Paragraph

3.3

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

Following Crimea’s accession to the Russian Federation, the
Russian Federation issued NOTAMs for the Simferopol FIR
(Crimea), in which a Russian air navigation service provider for
Crimea was introduced. At the same time, the Ukrainian air
navigation service provider issued NOTAMs for that area, which
contradicted this message. This was followed by more NOTAMs
from Ukraine as well as from the Russian Federation. The situation
thus created led to the possibility that civil air traffc over the area
would receive conflicting instructions, as the various NOTAMs
made it clear that there were two air navigation service providers
that both claimed responsibility for air traffc management. This
could present a risk to the safety of air traffc due to possible
conflicting instructions.
On 2 April 2014, ICAO published a State Letter (EUR/NAT 14-0243.
TEC (FOL/CUP)) in which Member States were informed of the
potential risks to the safety of civil flights in the Simferopol FIR, as a
result of the conflicting instructions: ‘Due to the unsafe situation
where more than one ATS provider may be controlling flights within
the same airspace from 3 April 2014, 0600 UTC onwards,
consideration should be given to measures to avoid the airspace
and circumnavigate the Simferopol FIR with alternative routings’.
Also on 2 April, and in response to the ICAO State Letter, the
Network Manager at EUROCONTROL urgently recommended that
airlines avoid Crimean airspace (the Simferopol FIR) and select
alternative routes. On 3 April 2014, EASA issued a Safety
Information Bulletin (SIB), in which EASA highlighted ICAO’s
warning.
In the State Letter, ICAO also announced it that would closely
monitor the developments together with all parties to detect any
potential dangers to civil aviation: ‘ICAO continues to actively
coordinate with all involved authorities, international organizations,
airspace users and other States in the region regarding
developments as they unfold, specifcally those which could impact
flight safety.‘
However, during the period between 2 April through 17 July 2014,
the period during which the armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine
broke out and intensifed, ICAO did not refer again to the situation
in Ukraine

Argumentation /
substantiation

Proposed text:
1. Delete this text from the report.
2. Delete all references to the ICAO Letter EUR/NAT 14-0243.TEC
(FOL/CUP) of April 2, 2014 on ‘Safety of civil aircraft operating in
the Simferopol Flight Information Region (FIR)’ as having no
relation to the review of flight safety issues over the armed conflict
zone in Dnepropetrovsk FIR.
Argumentation:
1. The crash of MH17 occurred in Dnepropetrovsk FIR. Simferopol FIR
has no relation to Dnepropetrovsk FIR covering the territory of
Eastern Ukraine both before and after ICAO letter of April 2, 2014.
2. In the flight safety report, Simferopol FIR is associated with the
events in Eastern Ukraine (Dnepropetrovsk FIR) for no reason at all.
This conclusion from the standpoint of international civil aviation
and ICAO standards is not supported and substantiated by any
facts at all.
3. The report completely distorts the idea of ICAO letter of April 2,
2014. The contents of item 3 of ICAO letter of April 2, 2014
unambiguously indicates that ICAO decision was not related to the
threats arising from the armed conflict zone requiring the action in
accordance with the recommendation of ICAO Doc 9554.

Dutch Safety Board
response

The developments in Crimea were relevant to understanding
why it was prohibited to fly over Crimea, which affected
decision-making pertaining to flight routes over the eastern part
of Ukraine

State /
Organisation

Russian
Federation

Page

41, 42

Section /
Paragraph

3.4

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

On 14 July, three days prior to the crash of flight MH17, a
Ukrainian air force transport aeroplane, an Antonov An-26, was
shot down in the Luhansk region, killing two members of the
crew. On the same day, Ukraine’s National Security and Defence
Council (RNBO) published a press release that Stated that the
aircraft was flying at an altitude of 6,500 metres when it was hit
(see the box for the text, literally translated into English). Given
this altitude, according to the Ukrainian authorities the aircraft
must have been hit by a ‘more powerful weapon’ than a
MANPADS. The Ukrainian government assumed there were two
possibilities, either a modern ‘Pantsir’ anti-aircraft system or an
‘X-24 air-to-air missile’ that was allegedly fred from a Russian
aeroplane. Both weapons systems could most probably reach
civil aeroplanes at cruising altitude, but this risk was not
mentioned by the Ukrainian authorities (see also chapter 4).
{…}
According to a press release of 15 July 2014, a committee was to
investigate the causes of the crash and report on the matter.
However, no indications were identifed that established that the
results of this investigation were later published. In December
2014, President Poroshenko did award a posthumous medal to
the pilot of the AN-26, who died in the incident. The
corresponding press release States that the aeroplane was hit by
an air-to-air missile. It is relevant to the investigation into the
crash of flight MH17 that none of the public communications
established a connection with risks to civil air traffc

Argumentation /
substantiation

Proposed text:
Delete this text from the report and replace it with the following:
‘On April 14, 2014 the crash of Ukraine Armed Force Antonov-26
aircraft occurred in the area of Lugansk. Ukrainian authorities did not
investigate the Anotnov-25 crash and the causes of this accident
therefore remained unclear. The statement of Ukrainian offcials on
the circumstances of this crash contained the information which was
both contradictory and unconfrmed in by other sources and therefore
could not be used for risk assessment of civil aircraft flights in the
conflict zone. No relation between Boeing 777-200 (MH17) crash and
Antonov-26 crash was identifed during the investigation. The
hostilities in the territory of Ukraine had already taken place before
Antonov-26 crash, which required the Ukrainian authorities
responsible for provision of air traffc services to assess the hazards
for civil aircraft flights and determine whether it was necessary to
restrict flights in the conflict zone or continue flight operations with
due regard to the certain conditions as stipulated by item 10.3 of
ICAO Doc 9554. After the Antonov-26 crash, Ukrainian authorities did
not evaluate the flights safety risks over the armed conflict zone for
civil aircraft and did not take necessary measures to fully close the
airspace over Eastern Ukraine. This is an additional confrmation to
the fact that irrespective of the statements of Ukrainian offcials the
Antonov-26 was not hit by ‘heavy’ anti-aircraft weapon system or airto-air rocket shot by an unknown aircraft. The provision of a priori
untrustworthy and distorted information by the offcial authorities of
Ukraine with the reference to a non-existing weapon system of the
Russian manufacture i.e. «X-24 air-to-air missile» could have
misinformed ICAO, other States as well as the airlines during the
planning of flights over the armed conflict zone’.
The report reflects what the Ukrainian authorities reported
about the incident. The reports about the altitude and possible
weapons used are relevant to gaining insight into the decisionmaking process related to airspace management.
Argumentation:
1. The Antonov-26 crash of July 14, 2014 in the area of Lugansk is
mentioned throughout the report exclusively as an indirect
confrmation of use of ‘heavy’ anti-aircraft weapon system in the
armed conflict zone creating the threat to safety of civil aviation.
No evidence of any relation between July 14 (Antonov-26) and July
17 (Boeing 777-200) events has been identifed during the
investigation. The offcial documents received in the course of
investigation do not provide any single proof of the Russian
Federation’s involvement in Antonov-26 crash.
2. The report does not consider the issue of deliberately distorting
the information on Antonov-26 crash by Ukrainian authorities which
repeatedly confrmed in other sections of the report including the
data from the Dutch Intelligence (section 6.4.2 of the report). In the
report the Antonov-26 crash is presented as the only circumstance
which should have encouraged the complete prohibition of flights
over Eastern Ukraine beforehand. However, the very fact that
Ukrainian authorities did not take adequate measures should have
aroused mistrust to the information they provided.

Dutch Safety Board
response

The report reflects what the Ukrainian authorities reported
about the incident. The reports about the altitude and possible
weapons used are relevant to gaining insight into the decisionmaking process related to airspace management.

State /
Organisation

Russian
Federation

Page

43

Section /
Paragraph

3.5

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

Public interpretations of the conflict by politicians and
diplomats.

Argumentation /
substantiation

Proposed text:
Exclude completely this section from the report as politically biased
and having no direct or indirect relation to the investigation
objectives established by Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention.
Argumentation:
1. In accordance with Standard 3.1, Annex 13 to the Chicago
Convention, the sole objective of the investigation of an accident
or incident shall be the prevention of accidents and incidents. It is
not the purpose of this activity to apportion blame or liability. The
objective of the MH17 crash investigation is not to establish the
reasons and analyze the development of the conflict in Lugansk
and Donetsk regions of Ukraine. The contents of section 3.5 do not
contain any analysis which could substantiate the recommendations
on flight safety. The section 3.5 does not meet the standard 3.1 of
Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention.
2. The section 3.5. reviews the statements of US politicians and NATO
offcials. The idea of all these statements is that the Russian
Federation’s Armed Forces reportedly participate in the conflict in
Eastern Ukraine. However, the report is missing any statements
from the offcials of the Russian Federation that repeatedly pointed
out at the direct safety threats arising from the armed conflict in
Eastern Ukraine

3. The list of reference to the statements of the offcials is done lopsided without regard to the fact that the investigation shall answer
the question as to why the Ukrainian authorities did not close the
airspace over the conflict zone before July 17, 2014?
In this connection for instance it would be worthwhile drawing
attention to the statement of Vladislav Seleznev, a Ukraine spokesman
for the antiterrorist operation (please see the reference link below)
made on July 12, 2014 on putting on highest alert Ukraine’s Air
Defense forces (highest degree of application readiness).
https://www.facebook.com/vladislav.sele … 7802786689
783?pnref=story
Also publicly available is the information broadcast on July 16, 2014
by the Offcial video hub of TV & radio studio of the Ministry of
Defense of Ukraine on the use of BUK-M1 anti-aircraft weapon system
for airspace control over the anti-terrorist operation zone in Eastern
Ukraine: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q3MomxNHnUA
This statement and information from Ukraine Ministry of Defense
coincide with the data of the Russian Ministry of Defense presented
on July 21, 2014 on movement and intensifed activity of BUK-M1 antiaircraft weapon systems of Ukraine Armed Forces in the conflict zone.

Dutch Safety Board
response

The public statements are important for obtaining an idea of the
context in which the decision-making process about the flight
route and airspace management was organised

State /
Organisation

Russian
Federation

Page

45

Section /
Paragraph

3.6

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

Reports in the media related to possible available weaponry
capacity

Argumentation /
substantiation

Proposed text:
Delete completely this section from the report as politically biased
and having no direct or indirect relation to the objectives of the
investigation as established by Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention.
Argumentation:
The respective argumentation is given in the comments to section 3.5
of the report.

Dutch Safety Board
response

This paragraph is necessary to provide an effective overview
and understanding of the circumstances that could have
contributed to an assessment of the risks to civil aviation.

State /
Organisation

Russian
Federation

Page

45

Section /
Paragraph

3.7

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

Non-public sources.

Argumentation /
substantiation

Proposed text:
Delete completely this section from the report as politically biased
and having no direct or indirect relation to the objectives of the
investigation as established by Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention.
Argumentation:
The respective argumentation is given in the comments to section 3.5
of the report.

Dutch Safety Board
response

See above.

State /
Organisation

Russian
Federation

Page

78, 79

Section /
Paragraph

5.6

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

ICAO stated that it did not receive any request for advice from
Ukraine pertaining to the possibility of taking safety measures.
With regard to the possibility of assisting a landing in the event
of an armed conflict, ICAO Doc 9554-AN/932, par. 10.10 says:
ICAO may assist in the development, co-ordination and
implementation of necessary safety measures in the event that
the State(s) responsible for the provision of air traffc services in
an area of armed conflict cannot, for some reason, adequately
discharge the responsibility referred to in 10.2 above. The
specifc nature and scope of such action will depend upon the
particular circumstances involved. In such circumstances, ICAO
will work in close coordination with the responsible State, with
other provider and user States concerned, and with IATA and
IFALPA

Argumentation /
substantiation

Proposed text:
Insert the following after this text:
‘As can be seen from the analysis of situations in other armed conflict
zones shown in section 4.5 of the report, ICAO has never used the
practice of issuing recommendations or restricting civil aircraft flights in
these countries. Consequently, while having the possibility as
described in item 10.10 ICAO Doc 9554, to offer Ukraine its assistance
to develop and implement necessary measures in Eastern Ukraine,
ICAO acted passively and did not take any necessary steps in this area.
Thus, Boeing 777-200 (MH17) crash shall be viewed with regards to the
fact that ICAO lacks leverages encouraging States to accomplish
coordination between the military and civil authorities to comply with
the requirements of the Chicago Convention and ICAO Doc 9554.’
Argumentation:
The outcomes of the investigation indicate that Ukraine’s military and
civil authorities did not comply with the recommendations of ICAO
Doc 9554. This lead to the appearance of risks to flights of civil aircraft
over the armed conflict zone in Eastern Ukraine. In this situation after
July 14, 2014 based on the recommendations of item 10.10 ICAO Doc
9554, ICAO could have taken a more active stance in implementing
ICAO objectives as stated in part ‘h’ of Article 44 of the ICAO
convention i.e. foster the safety of flights and international navigation

Dutch Safety Board
response

This point is already addressed in a different manner in
Section 6

State /
Organisation

Russian
Federation

Page

86, 87

Section /
Paragraph

5.9

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

1. Insofar as the Dutch Safety Board has been able to ascertain,
no airline altered its route for safety reasons related to the
conflict in Eastern Ukraine, not even as a result of the
Antonov An-26 being shot down on 14 July 2014, possibly
with a weapons system that could reach cruising altitude, as
suggested by the Ukrainian authorities. Data supplied by
EUROCONTROL revealed that from 14 through 17 July,
62 airlines from 32 countries used the airspace above Eastern
Ukraine. The airlines did not view developments on the
ground as a threat to their safety when flying overhead

Argumentation /
substantiation

Proposed text:
1. Add a new conclusion before this conclusion (change the
numbering of the conclusions) as follows:
‘1. As DSB could fnd out, Ukraine’s authorities did not issue
respective NOTAMs as stipulated by Annex 15 to the Chicago
Convention and recommendations of ICAO Doc 9554 confrming
the hazard of flying over the armed conflict zone in Eastern
Ukraine’.
2. This conclusion (lines 39 - 42) shall be paraphrased as follows:
3. ‘Ukrainian authorities did not take all necessary measures aimed at
ensuring safety of civil aircraft in the airspace of Dnepropetrovsk
FIR after the Antonov-26 crash on July 14, 2014 and deployment of
BUK anti-aircraft weapon systems by Ukrainian Armed Forces in the
conflict zone. Meanwhile, the regular references to the Antonov-26
crash, including in the preliminary conclusions were based on
unproved statements of the Ukrainian offcials that were in
contradiction with their further actions (inactions) with respect to
exclusion of risks to ensure safe air traffc in Dnepropetrovsk FIR’.
Argumentation:
1. The conclusion is based on the false statement that Antonov-26
was hit by a ‘heavy’ anti-aircraft weapon. No evidence was
presented either at the moment of the crash or afterwards
confrming that the Anotonov-26 was indeed shot down by a longrange air-to-air or ground-to-air rocket.
2. The report does not consider the possibility of deliberate
misinformation or disclosure of partial or unverifed information by
Ukraine’s military authority. The lack of further steps by Ukraine’s
aviation authorities aimed at full closure of the airspace over the
conflict zone underlined the fact that the information on
Antonov-26 crash was not trustworthy
3. As indicated in the report, Ukraine was issuing NOTAMs to ensure
restriction-free flying of Ukraine’s Air Force below FL320 rather
than preventing the threat of shooting down the civil aircraft from
the ground or in the air which also confrms the untrustworthiness
of the statements made on the Antonov-26 crash. All the
information both from offcial and unoffcial sources provided in
the DSB report indicates that the opposition forces at Lugansk and
Donetsk regions of Ukraine did not possess ground-to-air rockets
able to hit high-flying targets.

Dutch Safety Board
response

The Dutch Safety Board was unable to verify the circumstances
surrounding the crash of the Antonov An-26. If the Ukrainian
authorities issued their own reports about it, this is mentioned in
the text. The weapon systems cited by RNBO can hit aeroplanes
at higher altitudes. The Dutch Safety Board deems this report
relevant to the risk assessment by Ukraine.

State /
Organisation

Russian
Federation

Page

87

Section /
Paragraph

5.9

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

3. Airlines and the States in which the airlines are based did not
realise that the armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine constituted a
potential threat to civil aviation. They assumed that the open
airspace (above FL320) was safe. This was despite the fact that
the conflict was increasingly spreading to the air and the
possible presence of weapon systems that could reach civil
aeroplanes at cruising altitude.

Argumentation /
substantiation

Proposed text:
Delete the following words from the last sentence: «and the possible
presence of weapon systems that could reach civil aeroplanes at
cruising altitude».
Argumentation:
The only factor that could indirectly indicate a potential risk for flights
of civil aircraft was the deployment of BUK type anti-aircraft weapon
systems by Ukraine authorities in the conflict zone on the ground of
conducting exercises or protection of their airspace. Nevertheless the
information on the deployment of weapon systems was not
considered by Ukraine authorities as the basis for safety
considerations under Annex 15 and recommendations of ICAO Doc
9554. Ukraine authorities did not either issued a respective NOTAM
based on this information which did not allow the airlines and other
States taking adequate safety measures well beforehand

Dutch Safety Board
response

The conclusion refers to reports by the Ukrainian authorities
about the weapon systems used. The Dutch Safety Board deems
this report relevant to the assessment of the risk analysis by
Ukraine.

State /
Organisation

Russian
Federation

Page

96

Section /
Paragraph

6.4.2

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

In addition to the Separatists, two other parties were involved in
the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, namely the Ukrainian armed
forces and the Russian armed forces

Argumentation /
substantiation

Proposed text:
1. Delete this text.
2. In the text of the report the term ‘separatists’ shall be replaced
with the term ‘rebels’ as recommended by OSCE.
Argumentation:
Any mentioning of Russian Armed Forces shall be excluded as the
Russian Federation is not a party of this conflict.

Dutch Safety Board
response

The terminology has been changed to ‘armed factions fghting
the Ukrainian government’.

State /
Organisation

Russian
Federation

Page

106

Section /
Paragraph

7.3.4

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

The scenario involving civil aeroplanes at cruising altitude being
hit, either intentionally or unintentionally, by anti-aircraft missiles
or air-to-air missiles is improbable, also from the perspective of
risk analysis. Statistically, the probability of such an event taking
place is low. Similar events only occurred a few times in the past
(see Appendix D). In relation to the total number of civil flights,
the number is so small that statistically the probability is
extremely low

Argumentation /
substantiation

Proposed text:
Add the following text after this text:
«All the accidents listed in Appendix linked to shooting of civil aircraft
are associated with the activities of the military units of the offcial
authorities. There are no known cases (including MH17 crash) when
opposition forces had an opportunity to utilize ‘heavy’ weapon
systems again high flying civil aircraft. Besides, the offcial authorities
have a greater potential and motivation to prevent the use of such
types of weaponry, including by the groups controlled by individual
politicians or the so-called business oligarchs who possess signifcant
fnancial resources, exercise large influence and have a wide scope of
personal interests. The probability of using heavy weapon systems by
illegal armed groups in Ukraine who are not part of the offcial armed
forces or the rebels but are rather controlled by the Ukrainian
oligarchic entities should not be disregarded. Consequently, the
probability of uncoordinated actions or inaction of various agencies
and detachments of the offcial authorities represents an even higher
risk for flight safety. Mitigation or exclusion of this risk is done through
the appropriate oversight by ICAO of compliance with the generally
accepted flight safety standards such as Annex 15 and ICAO Doc
9554.’.
Argumentation:
The inclusion of the proposed text to the report is necessary to
highlight the responsibility of State for timely reacting to the existing
and potential threats arising from the military activity

Dutch Safety Board
response

The passage concerns a statistic approach of risks. Elsewhere in
this report it is stressed that risk-enhancing factors should also
be considered in the risk assessment.

State /
Organisation

Russian
Federatio

Page

109

Section /
Paragraph

8.1

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

c. None of the other parties involved - the airlines, the States of
the Operators or third parties such as ICAO - identifed
potential risks that the conflict in Eastern Ukraine posed to
civil air traffc. Airlines assumed that any open airspace was
safe, did not receive any information pertaining to the
underlying reasons for the closures of portions of airspace,
and did not perceive any threat for overflying as a result from
developments on the ground. None of the airlines stopped
flying over Eastern Ukraine as a result of the armed conflict in
the area. The States that did gather information about the
conflict in Eastern Ukraine focused on its potential
geopolitical and military-strategic consequences and not on
its possible impact on civil aviation.

Argumentation /
substantiation

Proposed text:
The following text shall be added after this text:
«The absence or provision of distorted (untrustworthy) information by
Ukraine about possible risks of flying over the armed conflict zone
would eliminate the possibility of their evaluation and mitigation of
the consequences’.
Argumentation:
See the comments to the other parts of the report.

Dutch Safety Board
response

The proposed text is not supported by the fndings in this
investigation.

State /
Organisation

Ukraine

Page

36

Section /
Paragraph

3.3

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

The Dutch Safety Board examined the extent of the availability
of aeronautical information that could have signalled increasing
deterioration of the safety of the airspace security above
Eastern Ukraine (also refer to Figure 2).

Argumentation /
substantiation

Defnition ‘airspace security’ provided by Eurocontrol Manual for
National ATM Security Oversight properly reflects the subject of the
Report

Dutch Safety Board
response

ICAO defnitions allow room for the selected interpretation,
which includes accidents as well as intentional acts.

State /
Organisation

Ukraine

Page

38

Section /
Paragraph

3.3

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

On 16 July 2014, the Russian Federation authorities published
two NOTAMs…
…The aforementioned FL530 that is specifed at the end of the
NOTAM is much higherthan the Ukrainian airspace restriction.

Argumentation /
substantiation

Dutch Safety Board did not defne why and how Russian Federation
decided (decision making process) to close airspace up to FL320 at
ATS routes segments and why the NOTAM published on July 16
entered into force on July 17, which may indicate planned Russian
military actions at the Ukrainian territory.

Dutch Safety Board
response

The considerations cited here are not substantiated with facts.
De Dutch Safety Board did not receive any clarity on the
meaning of the restriction to FL530.

State /
Organisation

Ukraine

Page

38

Section /
Paragraph

3.4

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

During the period between the conflict breaking out in Eastern
Ukraine the eastern part of Ukraine in March 2014 and the day of
the crash of flight MH17 on 17 July, a number of Ukrainian
military aircraft were shot at by the illegal armed groups with the
support from the territory of Russian Federation (mostly from
the ground).

Argumentation /
substantiation

Illegal armed groups were, and until present remain, under effective
control of the Russian Federation, receiving fnancial and other forms
of support from Russia

Dutch Safety Board
response

The account is factual without going into the question of who
was responsible for the shootings.

State /
Organisation

Ukraine

Page

42

Section /
Paragraph

3.4

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

It is relevant to the investigation into the crash of flight MH17
that none of the public communications established a
connection with risks to civil air traffc

Argumentation /
substantiation

Considering the ongoing investigation into the downing of the
military plane which was flying at an altitude of 6,500, it was not
possible to predict with due certainty, within such a short period of
time, the consequences and the risks to civil aviation

Dutch Safety Board
response

Given the statements by Ukrainian authorities on the weapon
systems that were probably used and the altitude of the
aeroplanes

State /
Organisation

Ukraine

Page

47

Section /
Paragraph

3.8

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

The weapon systems that the authorities cited in their public
Statement are most probably capable of reaching cruising
altitude and can therefore pose a risk to civil aviation. However,
this connection was not established - not by the Ukrainian
authorities, but also not by Western diplomats, who had their
doubts about the degree of truthfulness of Ukrainian reports
about the altitude at which the Antonov An-26 had been shot
and the presence of weapon systems with this kind of range in
the conflict area.
The aircraft was hit by a weapon system probably capable of
reaching cruising altitude, which most likely fred from the
Russian Federation. Upon available information, illegal armed
groups did not have such type of weapon.
Ukraine is not able to assess unexpected threats arising from
undeclared military activity of neighbouring State. The shooting
down of civil aircraft by Military Forces of neighbouring State
was not considered as a realistic scenario. (see comments to
section 3.4).
However, the connection between shooting down of Antonov 26
and risks to civil aviation was established neither by the
Ukrainian authorities, nor by Western diplomats.

Argumentation /
substantiation

Considering the available information, it was not possible to estimate
with due certainty, within such a short period of time, whether such
weapon systems can be used against civil aircrafts.
There is nothing in the report and there is no single reference to a
credible source or fact suggesting that ‘Western diplomats […] had …
doubts about the degree of truthfulness of Ukrainian reports.’ Such
meritless and ungrounded statements undermine the credibility of
the report.

Dutch Safety Board
response

Responsibility for the safety of its airspace for civil aviation
means that all hazards to civil aviation in that airspace,
intentional as well as unintentional, must be recognised.

State /
Organisation

Ukraine

Page

54

Section /
Paragraph

4.3

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

Later it was revealed that there would have had to be a formal
reason for closing the airspace. UkSATSE felt that until the
report on the investigation into the exact cause of the crash of
the AN-26 had been published, there was no such formal
reason

Argumentation /
substantiation

This conclusion does not follow from the written response of
UkSATSE.
The only reason for closing the airspace at that moment would be the
availability of offcial request or information about hazards for civil
aircraft in defned volume of airspace.
The aircraft was hit by a weapon system probably capable of reaching
cruising altitude, which most likely fred from the Russian Federation.
Upon available information, illegal armed groups did not have such
type of weapon.
Ukraine is not able to assess unexpected threats arising from
undeclared military activity of neighbouring State. The shooting down
of civil aircraft by Military Forces of neighbouring State was not
considered as a realistic scenario. (see comments to section 3.4, p. 41)

Dutch Safety Board
response

Responsibility for the safety of its airspace for civil aviation
means that all hazards to civil aviation in that airspace,
intentional as well as unintentional, must be recognised.

State /
Organisation

Ukraine

Page

64

Section /
Paragraph

4.6

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

The parties concerned did not use the opportunity to explain
the content of the restrictions issued, as recommended in ICAO
Doc 9554-AN/932. In this (non-binding) document, ICAO
prescribes that, in the case of conflicts, information must be
provided in NOTAMs about the nature of a threat that forms the
rationale for the NOTAM.

Argumentation /
substantiation

The text should be either deleted or modifed.
As it is mentioned in the report, ICAO Doc 9554-AN/932 is a nonbinding document and does not prescribe to the States to provide
information about the nature of the activities in restricted area or
threats.
Nevertheless, all airspace closures were set in accordance with the
forementioned ICAO Doc.
Doc 9554 contains only two examples of NOTAM. No references in
the text of the document that obligue the States to publish reason of
airspace restriction set. Para 10.3 of Doc 9554 ‘…An international
NOTAM containing the necessary information, advice and safety
measures to be taken should then be issued and subsequently
updated in the light of developments’.

Dutch Safety Board
response

The altered text makes it clearer that ICAO Doc 9554 AN/932 is
non-binding. However it isn’t non-committal either.

State /
Organisation

Ukraine

Page

65

Section /
Paragraph

4.6

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

This meant that airspace users were not fully informed

Argumentation /
substantiation

Unwarranted assumption, taking into account Annex 15, Doc 9554
par. 10.3

Dutch Safety Board
response

See above

State /
Organisation

Ukraine

Page

65

Section /
Paragraph

4.6

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

Considerations other than those related to safety may have
played a role in Ukraine’s decision not to close the airspace to
civil aviation completely. If portions of airspace are closed,
airlines may fly over other countries, which means that a country
may miss out on revenues. Indeed, in 2014, UkSATSE’s revenues
did decrease. The fact that closing the airspace could lead to
the impression that the State has lost its grip on part of its
territory may also have played a role. With regard to fnancial
and other possible motivations, the Dutch Safety Board has not
been able to establish whether they played a role in Ukraine’s
decision-making process.

Argumentation /
substantiation

This statement is of a prejudiced nature and is based on unconfrmed
probability of Ukraine’s motivations.
Moreover, such statements are inappropriate and do relate neither to
safety nor security nor airspace management.
It is not a subject of fnal report accordantly to ICAO ANNEX 13.

Dutch Safety Board
response

All possible factors should be investigated. On the basis of this
investigation, the Dutch Safety Board concludes that it was not
evident that these factors played a role.

State /
Organisation

Ukraine

Page

66

Section /
Paragraph

4.7

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

Sub-conclusions
1. The decision-making related to the airspace above Ukraine
was dominated by the military authorities and the interests of
military aviation. Due to a lack of information related to the
substantive decisions made by the military authorities, the
civil aviation authority and air navigation service provider
were not able to perform an independent assessment of the
safety of the airspace for civil air traffc at cruising altitude.
2. Ukraine’s military authorities took into consideration a threat
to military aircraft posed by shelling from the ground or
another aircraft, but did not take into account the possibility
of a civil aeroplane being shot down.
3. The Ukrainian State established a higher minimum flight level
for civil air traffc by means of NOTAMs and left the airspace
open to civil aeroplanes at cruising altitude. The NOTAMs did
not specify any substantive motivation for the altitude
restrictions. Therefore, Ukraine did not act in accordance with
the recommendation in ICAO Doc 9554-AN/932.
4. The weapon systems that the Ukrainian State reported in
relation to the Antonov An-26 being shot down on 14 July
2015, could represent a danger to civil aeroplanes because
these weapons can reach aeroplanes cruising altitude.
However, this connection was not made and the airspace was
not closed as a precaution.
5. It is rare for a State that is faced with an armed conflict to
close its airspace, and NOTAMs containing specifc
information or warnings about the conflict are not generally
issued. In the international system of responsibilities, the
primary responsibility for the safety of airspace is borne
exclusively by the sovereign State concerned. The Dutch
Safety Board concludes that the basic principle of sovereignty
is vulnerable when States face an armed conflict on their
territory and in their airspace.

Argumentation /
substantiation

Ukrainian side disagrees with the sub-conclusions. The subconclusions should be totally revised upon the Ukrainian comments to
text of the document.
There is no basis for this conclusion, as such coordination was in place
at that time and continues to be the case now. Decisions on concrete
steps relating to closing the airspace is taken by the States in
coordination both of military and civil components. Moreover, both
components (military and civil) are involved to the decision making
process as it was mentioned in the answers of the Ukrainian side
This statement is prejudiced and groundless and is based on
unconfrmed probability of Ukraine’s motivations.
The action taken by the Ukrainian authorities is not in conflict with
Doc 9554-AN/932 and other ICAO documents.
There is no basis for this conclusion - considering the available
information, it was not possible to estimate with due certainty, within
such a short period of time, whether such weapon systems can be
used against civil aircrafts.

Dutch Safety Board
response

The text of the conclusions have been modifed slightly in
response to the comments, but their essence remains
unchanged.

State /
Organisation

Ukraine

Page

97

Section /
Paragraph

6.4.2

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

virtually daily. Initially, the emphasis was on the situation in
Crimea, but after its accession to illegal occupation by the
Russian Federation

Argumentation /
substantiation

UN RESOLUTION ARES8І

Dutch Safety Board
response

The Dutch Safety Board does not provide any political
interpretation of the situation.

State /
Organisation

Ukraine

Page

102

Section /
Paragraph

7.2

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

As far as Ukraine was concerned, the military interests took
priority in the management of its airspace

Argumentation /
substantiation

We do not agree with such conclusion in view of the above mentioned
argument

Dutch Safety Board
response

The fndings in this investigation point out that decisions related
tot the airspace were primarily taken from the perspective of the
military’s interest, in which a potential risk to civil aviation was
not the subject of explicit consideration.

State /
Organisation

Ukraine

Page

145

Section /
Paragraph

Appendix E

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

…was annexed… was illegally occupied.

Argumentation /
substantiation

Based upon the generally recognized interpretation of the actions of
the Russian Federation in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea

Dutch Safety Board
response

See above

State /
Organisation

Ukraine

Page

145

Section /
Paragraph

Appendix E

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

…pro-Russian separatists (referred to hereafter as the
Separatists)… Russia-backed militants (referred to hereafter as
the militants)

Argumentation /
substantiation

This term is inapplicable for the illegal armed groups acting in certain
areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine.

Dutch Safety Board
response

See above.

State /
Organisation

Ukraine

Page

145

Section /
Paragraph

Appendix E

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

The MIVD’s information indicates that the Separatists illegal
armed groups were procuring an increasing number of weapons
in the months prior to the crash through uncontrolled sections
of the Ukrainian border. Since they were also attacked targeted
from the air by the Ukrainian armed forces, mainly after the
Ukrainian government had reactivated its so-called antiterrorism operation in the course of May 2014, the illegal armed
groups tried to acquire anti-aircraft systems to attack Ukrainian
military aircraft with the aim of defending themselves.

Argumentation /
substantiation

Inapplicable as the counter-terrorist operation was offcially launched
by the Government of Ukraine and this is its offcial name, not
‘so-called’
From the text it appears that illegal armed groups were the victims of
attacks of Ukraine’s military, which did not reflect the real situation.

Dutch Safety Board
response

See above.

State /
Organisation

Ukraine

Page

145

Section /
Paragraph

Appendix E

Text to be corrected
(frst... last word)

‘so-called’

Argumentation /
substantiation

Inapplicable as the counter-terrorist operation was offcially launched
by the Government of Ukraine and this is its offcial name, not
‘so-called’.

Dutch Safety Board
response

See above.